

TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY



3 1761 02849114 0



LIBRARY  
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

CLASS OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC

SENIOR DIVISION.

Tenth


PLACE OF HONOUR

James Hardie

SESSION 1869/70

W. White, Prof.











A COMMENTARY  
ON  
KANT'S  
CRITICK OF THE PURE REASON,  
&c. &c.



A C O M M E N T A R Y  
ON  
K A N T'S  
CRITICK OF THE PURE REASON:

TRANSLATED FROM  
THE HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY,  
BY  
PROFESSOR KUNO FISCHER, OF JENA,  
WITH  
*An Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and Appendices,*  
BY  
JOHN PENTLAND MAHAFFY, A.M.,  
FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

LONDON:  
LONGMANS, GREEN, & CO.

1866.

193-2

FIS

## PREFACE.

---

THERE can be no doubt that Kant's merits are being daily better appreciated in this country. The English public has gradually been trained to understand his nomenclature, and even some of his arguments, through the works of Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel; and the knowledge of the German language is now so much extended in this country, that many are enabled to dispense with loose commentators and inaccurate translations. Even in Germany, the Schelling and Hegel fever has passed away; and most of our distinguished neighbours are again disposed to consider the great critic as *νήφων παρ' εἰκῇ λέγοντας τοὺς ὕστερον* (if I may adapt Aristotle's remark on Anaxagoras.)

Still the difficulties and obstacles which meet the student when first approaching Kant are most formidable. Clumsy as are the works of most German professors, the great Critick of Kant is even among them remarkable for cumbrousness and prolixity; and the style is not more difficult than the subject. His system is, indeed, an organic whole, where each part exists for the sake of

the whole, and in connexion with it ; but the complications, the ramifications, the subdivisions, are so great as totally to obscure at first the comprehension of the whole plan. But there are many English readers who have not even the privilege of being obstructed by the real difficulties of the original alone. They have to contend with grave mistranslations, and still worse with perversions and misrepresentations, put forward under the title of commentaries and explanations of the Critick. I speak of these difficulties from personal experience ; and having myself first obtained a clear idea of Kant's system from the work which I now (with the author's sanction) submit to the English public, it is to be hoped that others will reap from it like benefit.

I call the reader's attention first of all to the fact, that Professor Kuno Fischer writes a clear, easy style, in short sentences. This extraordinary merit in a German philosopher deserves special notice, and has given him great reputation as a teacher and lecturer in his own country. Professor Fischer's thinking is also, in most instances, clear and precise, and his general conception of the bearing and relation of all the details in Kant's cumbrous treatise deserves the highest praise. But, like most very clear writers, he is, perhaps, apt to facilitate for himself his subject too much, and he has slurred over or misconceived some important difficulties in Kant's system. A very careful study of the Critick compels me, with much reluctance, to differ with him on these points ;

and my objections have been recorded in the Introduction, and in various foot-notes appended to the translation of his text.

I trust the author will acquit me of all motives, save the love of truth, in opposing his arguments ; but the very ability and value of his work have made me the more anxious to correct what does not appear to be corroborated by Kant. This sincere apology for the polemical tone of my own part of the volume will also apply to the able English philosophers whom I have criticized. Any one who understands the subject must know that Truth, in philosophy at all events, must be polemical—it must be attained by polemical discussion, and maintained by it.

This feature in Metaphysic, which is commonly urged as an objection, is in reality a singular recommendation to it as a valuable aid in mental improvement. It has been shown by Mr. Mill, and more recently by Mr. Grote, that the great deficiency of modern, as contrasted with Greek and mediæval education, is the absence of discussion. Formal debate, discussion *per se*, apart from the conclusions attained, was the great engine recognized by the Socratic teachers and the schools. Now, on the contrary, Mr. Grote has observed that *conclusions* only are taught and remembered ; but the process by which they were attained, the antecedent doubts, difficulties, and failures, are all passed over in silence, or forgotten.

I think he might fairly have excepted Metaphysic,

where every conclusion is being constantly attacked, where almost nothing is considered settled, and where every author has to submit to the *elenchus* of an acute opponent.

Even supposing, then (what I do not admit), that we could attain no body of truth by Metaphysic, its importance as a discipline of the mind must be now greater than ever.

With regard to the plan of this book, it were better for those who are not familiar with Kant's system to read the Introduction last, as it presupposes an acquaintance both with his system and his nomenclature. This Introduction was added, because foot-notes of great length would have encumbered the text; it does not profess to be more than a collection of hints towards the fuller comprehension of Kant, thrown together loosely, and sacrificing manner for matter. But I found it very difficult to compress what seemed useful within reasonable limits.

The material points of difference between my Introduction and Dr. Fischer's interpretation of Kant, made it necessary to add the Appendices, which are literal translations of the more important passages in the First Edition of the Critick, omitted or rewritten by the author subsequently. The reader who compares these Appendices with Dr. Fischer's work will see how marvelously different in point of style, and how clear and concise, the exposition is, as compared with the original treatise.

To translate Kant literally into nice English being impossible, the reader will not blame me for the obscurity and difficulty of these Appendices. As any paraphrase would be colored with the special views of the commentator, the very words of Kant will be, at least, more trustworthy.

I have been obliged throughout to refer to Mr. Meiklejohn's translation of the Critick of the Pure Reason (in Bohn's Library); but, in quoting from him, have taken the liberty of altering his version, when it did not convey the author's meaning. All the variations, therefore, from his rendering are intentional. A portion of his work (pp. 333-8), will be found by the reader in a corrected form in Appendix D., as the last article of the Introduction would otherwise have been unintelligible.

Some new words (or forms of words) are used for clearness' sake, and will explain themselves. When a term is used ambiguously, such as *reason* or *idea*, I have endeavoured to mark the difference by printing the word when used in the special Kantian sense with a *capital* letter. It was impossible to carry out this completely, but the reader's attention will at least be constantly called to the ambiguity. The words to *cognize* and to <sup>know</sup>~~think~~ are used synonymously.

My most sincere thanks are due to Mr. Monck, of Trinity College, not only for revising and correcting the whole work, but for giving me hints and suggestions

so numerous, that it would be tedious to acknowledge them individually throughout the volume.

I am under similar obligations to Doctor Tooleken, both for the valuable advice he has given me, and also for the interest he has taken in the progress of the work.

38, TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,

*Feb.* 26, 1866.

---

CORRIGENDA.

Page 5, note, *for infer, read imply.*

— 124, note, *for communium, read communio.*

— 191, foot, *for Kantian, read Cartesian.*

— 190, line 14, *for any, read my*; and line 15, *for these, read this.*

— 227, note, line 2, *for theses, read thesis*; and line 17, transpose thesis and antithesis.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

## INTRODUCTION.

	Page.
I. Subjective and Objective Necessity, . . . . .	iii
II. The Association School Theory of Space, and Mathematical Judgments, . . . . .	xvi
1. Of Space, . . . . .	xvi
2. Of the Necessity of Mathematical Judgments, . . . . .	xxiii
III. Kant's Table of the Categories, and his Critics, . . . . .	xxx
1. General Objections of Mr. Mansel and Fichte, . . . . .	xxx
2. The Category of Reciprocal Action, . . . . .	xxxv
3. The Schematism of the Categories, . . . . .	xxxvi
IV. The Variations between the First and Second Editions of the Critick, and the Idealism of Kant, . . . . .	xxxviii
1. Supposed Discovery of Schopenhauer, . . . . .	xxxviii
2. Order of the Exposition, . . . . .	xlvi
3. The Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, . . . . .	xlvi
4. Origin of the Error respecting Kant's Meaning, . . . . .	l
V. The Intuition of Self not Immediate, . . . . .	liii
1. Mr. Mansel's Theory, . . . . .	liii
2. The Permanence of Self, . . . . .	lvi
VI. The Distinction between Reason and Understanding, . . . . .	lviii
VII. The Reason as a Source of Delusion, . . . . .	lxiv
VIII. The Theory of the Intelligible and Empirical Characters, . . . . .	lxxii

## CHAPTER I.

The Problems and Methods of the Critick of the Reason—Historical

Development of the Critical Problems, . . . . . 1

I. The necessary Preliminaries to the Critick—The Distinction drawn  
between the Cognitive Faculties: Sensibility and Understand-

	Page.
ing—The Inaugural Treatise, and the Critick of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	2
Note.—Ambiguities in Kant's Language noticed—Consequent Mistakes, . . . . .	4
II. The Fundamental Question of the Critick—The Fact of Cognition and its Explanation, . . . . .	8
III. The Attributes of Cognition, . . . . .	10
1. Analytical and Synthetical Judgments, . . . . .	10
2. Synthetical Judgments <i>a priori</i> , . . . . .	12
Note.—Parallel Passage from First Edition, . . . . .	12
Note.—On the Views of English Philosophers respecting Universality and Necessity, . . . . .	13
IV. The fact that Synthetical <i>a priori</i> Judgments exist, . . . .	14
Notes.—On the Transition of Synthetical into Analytical Judgments—On Kant's Views as to Arithmetic, as opposed to Mr. Mansel, . . . . .	15
On the Analytical Principles of Geometry—On <i>a priori</i> Mechanics, .	17
V. Pure and Metaphysical Cognition, . . . . .	18
VI. The Methods of the Critick—The Critick of the Pure Reason and the Prolegomena, . . . . .	22
VII. Historical Order of the Critical Problems—Origin of the Transcendental Æsthetic, . . . . .	28
Note.—On the History of the Distinction between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments, . . . . .	28
Note.—Genesis of Kant's Opinions, and Changes in his Views, .	29

## CHAPTER II.

Transcendental Æsthetic—The Doctrine of Space and Time, and the Explanation of Pure Mathematics, . . . . .	34
Note.—On the Receptivity of Intuition, . . . . .	34
I. Space and Time as Conditions of Pure Mathematics, . . . .	35
Note.—On the Analogy between Kant and Copernicus, . . . .	36
II. Space and Time as Primitive Representations, . . . . .	36
III. Time and Space as Infinite Quantities, . . . . .	38
IV. Space and Time as Singular Representations or Intuitions, .	40
Note.—On M. Cousin's Misconception of Kant's argument, .	41
1. Space and Time as a Principle of Difference, . . . . .	42
2. Time and the Laws of Thought, . . . . .	44
V. Space and Time as Pure Intuitions, . . . . .	47
Note.—Various meanings of the Word <i>Without</i> , . . . . .	48

VI. Intuition and Sensation—Phenomena, External and Internal, . . . . .	Page. 51
VII. Space and Time as Conditions of all Phenomena, . . . . .	55
Transcendental Ideality. Empirical Reality.	
Note.—Professor Webb's Interpretation of Kant's View of Space and Time, . . . . .	55
Note.—On some Difficulties at the conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic—References to other parts of the Critick, . . . .	57

### CHAPTER III.

Transcendental Analytic—The Analytic of Concepts—The Doctrine of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding as Conditions of Empirical Cognition, . . . . .	60
I. The Fundamental Question of the Analytic, . . . . .	60
II. The Possibility of Empirical Judgments (Perceptive and Empirical Judgments), . . . . .	63
1. The Pure Concepts or Categories, . . . . .	65
2. The Problems investigated in the Analytic, . . . . .	66
Note.—On the meaning of the word <i>Deduction</i> in Kant's Critick, . . . . .	67
III. The Discovery of the Categories, . . . . .	68
1. The Forms of Judgment, . . . . .	68
Note.—Kant's use of the word <i>Function</i> , and Elucidation of his Argument, . . . . .	69
2. The Forms of Thought, or Categories, . . . . .	71
Note.—On the obtaining of the Categories from the Forms of Judgment, . . . . .	72
IV. Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, . . . .	75
Note.—On the Supposed Categories of "unum, verum, et bonum," . . . .	75
Note.—Parallel passage from the First Edition, . . . . .	76
1. The Representation as an Object—Synopsis and Synthesis, . . . .	78
2. The Unity of the Representation—The Synthesis of Apprehension, of the Imagination, and of Pure Consciousness, . . . . .	81
3. The Necessary Unity of Apperception—Pure Consciousness and the Productive Imagination, . . . . .	85
V. Summary of the Deduction—The Pure Understanding and the Categories, . . . . .	87
VI. Categories and Innate Ideas—Critical Idealism, . . . . .	88
Note.—Quotation from Kant against the Assumption of Innate Ideas, . . . . .	89

## CHAPTER IV.

	Page.
Transcendental Analytic—The Analytic of Principles—The Doctrine of the Schematism of the Pure Understanding and of its Principles,	91
I. The Application of the Categories—The Transcendental Faculty of Judgment, . . . . .	91
1. The Possibility of the Application—Image—Schema, . . . . .	92
2. Time as the Schema of the Categories, . . . . .	94
<i>Note.</i> —On the Confusion of Schema and Image, . . . . .	95
3. The Schematism of the Pure Understanding, . . . . .	95
<i>Note.</i> —Further Explanation of the Schemata, . . . . .	96
II. The First Principle of all the Principles of the Pure Understanding—The Possibility of Experience, . . . . .	97
III. The Axiom of Intuition, . . . . .	99
IV. The Anticipation of Perception, . . . . .	100
1. Sensation as an Intensive Quantity, . . . . .	100
2. Intensive Quantities in Natural Philosophy, . . . . .	102
3. The Continuity of Quantities, . . . . .	103
V. The Analogies of Experience—The Principle of the Analogies, . . . . .	105
<i>Note.</i> —Importance of Time in the Analogies, . . . . .	107
1. The Permanence of Substance, . . . . .	108
<i>Note.</i> —Comparison of Kant and Hamilton, . . . . .	111
2. Succession in Time according to the Law of Causality, Kant and Hume, . . . . .	112
<i>Note.</i> —On the Empirical Criterion of Substance, . . . . .	119
3. Coexistence according to the Law of Reciprocity, . . . . .	120
<i>Note.</i> —Kant's Definition of Influence and Reciprocity, . . . . .	123
VI. The Postulates of Empirical Thinking; Possibility, Reality, Necessity, . . . . .	124
VII. Summary of the Principles, . . . . .	128
VIII. Summary of the Analytic—Idealism and Realism, . . . . .	129
IX. The Idealism of the Critick—Kant and Berkeley, . . . . .	130

## CHAPTER V.

Transition to the Transcendental Dialectic—The Limitative Concepts of the Pure Understanding—Distinction between Phenomena and Things in themselves—The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection—Kant and Leibniz, . . . . .	133
I. The Negative Problem of the Critick—Impossibility of a Knowledge of the Supersensuous, . . . . .	134

	Page.
II. The Representation of Non-sensuous Things—Noumena and Phenomena, . . . . .	135
III. Distinction between things <i>per se</i> , and Appearances (Phenomena), . . . . .	137
1. The Thing <i>per se</i> as a Representation (Leibniz), . . . . .	138
2. The Thing <i>per se</i> not a Representation or Object of the Understanding (Kant), . . . . .	138
IV. The Transcendental Object. The Pure Concepts and their Transcendental Meaning, . . . . .	140
V. The Signification of the Thing <i>per se</i> for the Understanding, . . . . .	141
1. The positive Signification, . . . . .	142
2. The Negative Signification—Limitative Concepts, . . . . .	142
3. The Immanent and Transcendent Value of the Pure Concepts, Transcendent and Transcendental, . . . . .	143
VI. Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection—Kant's Criticism of Leibniz' Philosophy, . . . . .	144
1. The Principle of Indiscernibility, . . . . .	146
2. The Opposition of Realities, . . . . .	147
3. The Origin of the Monadology, . . . . .	147
4. Origin of the Leibnizian Doctrine of Space and Time, . . . . .	148
VII. Leibniz and Locke, . . . . .	149

## CHAPTER VI.

Transcendental Dialectic—The Doctrine of the Concepts of the Reason or Ideas—Transcendental Illusion, and the Dialectical Syllogisms of the Reason, . . . . .	151
I. Problem of the Dialectic—Explanation and Refutation of Ontology, . . . . .	151
II. The Thing <i>per se</i> as the Limit of Experience, . . . . .	153
1. The Continuity of Experience—Regression, . . . . .	153
2. The Syllogism obtained by Regression (Prosyllogism), . . . . .	155
III. The Thing <i>per se</i> as the Unconditioned, or Idea, . . . . .	156
1. Rule and Principle, . . . . .	156
2. Concept and Idea, . . . . .	158
3. The Transcendental Idea, . . . . .	159
IV. The Idea in Relation to Experience—Extension and Unity, . . . . .	160
V. The Idea as an Apparent Object—Transcendental Illusion, . . . . .	161
<i>Note.</i> —On Kant's Doctrine of Natural Delusion, . . . . .	163
VI. The Principle of all the Metaphysic of the Supersensuous, . . . . .	165

	Page.
<i>Note.</i> —The Synthetical Unity at the Basis of the Ideas, . . .	165
1. The true Syllogism, . . . . .	166
2. The false Syllogism, or Sophistry of the Pure Reason— The Dialectical Syllogism, . . . . .	167
3. Solution of the Fallacy, . . . . .	168
VII. The Transcendental Ideas—The World, the Soul, and God, .	169
1. The Ideas and the Syllogisms of the Reason, . . .	169
2. The Dialectical Syllogisms of the Reason—Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology, . . . .	170

## CHAPTER VII.

Psychological Ideas—Rational Psychology—The Paralogisms of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	172
I. Transcendental Idealism as opposed to Rational Psychology—First and Second Editions of the Critick, . . . . .	172
<i>Note.</i> —On Kant's <i>X</i> as the basis of Phenomena, . . .	174
II. Psychology as a Science of Internal Experience—The Psycholo- gical Idea, . . . . .	175
III. The Apparent Object of Rational Psychology, . . . . .	177
IV. The Paralogism of Substantiality, . . . . .	179
V. The Paralogism of Simplicity, . . . . .	181
1. Simplicity no Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul, .	182
2. Simplicity no Proof of the Permanence (Immortality) of the Soul, . . . . .	183
VI. The Paralogism of Personality, . . . . .	184
VII. The Paralogism of Ideality—Des Cartes, . . . . .	186
1. Empirical Idealism, . . . . .	187
2. Empirical Idealism, and Transcendental Realism, . .	188
3. Transcendental Idealism—Empirical Realism—Critical Dualism, . . . . .	189
<i>Note.</i> —On the Receptivity of Intuition, . . . .	189
4. Critical and Dogmatical Dualism : Kant and Des Cartes —The Psychological Problem, . . . . .	192
5. The Correct View of the Psychological Problem—Its Insolubility, . . . . .	193
VIII. General Refutation of Rational Psychology—Dogmatical and Sceptical Idealism, . . . . .	195
1. The Critical Refutation, . . . . .	195
2. Refutation of Materialism, . . . . .	197

IX. Summary—Rational Psychology as a Discipline, . . . . .	Page. 198
<i>Note.</i> —On Kant's View of the <i>cogito, ergo sum</i> ; and the <i>a priori</i>	
Determination of Self by the Moral Law, . . . . .	199

## CHAPTER VIII.

The Cosmological Ideas—Rational Cosmology—The Antinomies of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	202
The Cosmological Problems :—	
I. The Idea of the World, . . . . .	202
II. The Four Ideas of the World, . . . . .	203
<i>Note.</i> —Difficulties answered by Kant, . . . . .	204
III. Impossibility of Concepts—Law of Contradiction—Antinomy, . . . . .	205
IV. The Contradictory Propositions of Rational Cosmology, . . . . .	207
V. The Antinomy of the Quantity of the World, . . . . .	209
1. Proof of the Thesis, . . . . .	209
<i>Note.</i> —On the Real Notion of an Infinite, . . . . .	210
2. Proof of the Antithesis, . . . . .	211
<i>Note.</i> —On the Leibnizian Evasion of it, . . . . .	211
VI. The Antinomy of the Matter of the World, . . . . .	212
1. Proof of the Thesis—Transcendental Atomistic—The Dia- lectical Basis of Monadology, . . . . .	213
2. Proof of the Antithesis, . . . . .	213
VII. The Antinomy of the Order of the World, . . . . .	214
1. Proof of the Thesis—Transcendental Freedom, . . . . .	215
<i>Note.</i> —On Kant's Remarks upon the Thesis, . . . . .	216
2. Proof of the Antithesis—Transcendental Physiocracy, . . . . .	216
VIII. The Antinomy of Existence of the World, . . . . .	217
1. Proof of the Thesis, . . . . .	218
2. Proof of the Antithesis, . . . . .	218
IX. The Reason as a Party engaged in the Conflict of the Antino- mies—The Interest of the Reason, . . . . .	220
1. The Thesis and Antithesis, . . . . .	221
2. The Dogmatism and Empiricism of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	223

## CHAPTER IX.

The Solution of the Antinomies as Cosmological Problems—Freedom and Natural Necessity, . . . . .	225
I. The Antinomies as Judgments of the Understanding—The Scep- tical Solution, . . . . .	225
<i>Note.</i> —Scepticism and the Sceptical Method, . . . . .	225
Mr. Monck's View of the Fourth Antithesis, . . . . .	227

	Page.
II. The Antinomies as Conclusions—The Critical Solution, . . .	228
1. The Paralogisms of Rational Cosmology, . . . . .	228
2. The Solution of the Paralogism, . . . . .	230
3. The Antinomies as an Indirect Proof of Transcendental Idealism, . . . . .	230
III. The Antinomies as Logical Contradictories, . . . . .	231
1. The Illusion of the Contradiction—Dialectical Opposition, . . . . .	232
2. Solution of the Contradictions in the Antinomies, . . . . .	233
<i>Note.</i> —On Mr. Mill's View of the Law of Excluded Middle, . . . . .	233
IV. Summary Solution of the Cosmological Problem—Regulative Principles, . . . . .	235
V. Mathematical and Dynamical Antinomies—Particular Solution, . . . . .	236
<i>Note.</i> —Particular Solutions of the First and Second Antinomies, . . . . .	237
VI. Freedom as a Cosmological Problem. <i>Note.</i> , . . . . .	239
1. Freedom and Nature, . . . . .	239
2. Freedom as a Transcendental Principle, . . . . .	241
3. Empirical and Intelligible Cause (Character), . . . . .	243
4. The Intelligible Character as a Cosmological Principle, . . . . .	243
5. The Union of the Intelligible and Empirical Characters as the Cosmological Problem, . . . . .	244
6. The Intelligible Character as Rational Causality (Will), . . . . .	246
7. The Intelligible Character of the Human Reason as an Object for the Critick, . . . . .	247
<i>Note.</i> —On the Receptivity of Intuition, . . . . .	248
VII. The Necessary Being as Extramundane, . . . . .	249
<i>Note.</i> , . . . . .	250

## CHAPTER X.

The Theological Idea—Rational Theology—The Ideal of the Pure Reason—The Demonstrations of the Existence of the Deity, . . . . .	252
I. The Theological Idea as the Ideal of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	252
<i>Note.</i> —On the <i>Prototypon Transcendentale</i> , . . . . .	254
II. The Theological Idea as Rational Theology—Transcendental and Empirical Methods of Proof, . . . . .	255
1. The Ontological Proof, . . . . .	257
<i>Note.</i> —On the Demonstrations of Anselm and Des Cartes, . . . . .	258
2. The Cosmological Proof, . . . . .	260
<i>Note.</i> —Additional Fallacy mentioned, . . . . .	261
III. Critick of all Theology, . . . . .	265

	Page.
1. Deism and Theism, . . . . .	265
2. Theoretical and Practical Theology, . . . . .	266
3. Theoretical used as the Critick of Dogmatical Theology, .	267
IV. The Critical Importance of the Doctrine of Ideas—The Ideas	
as Maxims of Knowledge, . . . . .	268
1. The Principle of Homogeneity, . . . . .	270
2. The Principle of Specification, . . . . .	271
3. The Principle of Continuity (Affinity), . . . . .	271
V. The Theological Principle as a Regulative Principle in Science,	273
VI. The Summary of the Whole Critick, . . . . .	274

## CHAPTER XI.

The Transcendental Methodology—Transition to the System of Pure Reason—The Discipline, Canon, Architectonic, and History of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	276
I. The Problem of the Methodology, . . . . .	276
II. The Discipline of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	278
1. The Dogmatical Method, . . . . .	278
<i>Note.</i> —Kant's Account of Algebra, . . . . .	279
2. The Polemical Method, . . . . .	281
3. The Sceptical Method, . . . . .	285
4. The Sceptical and the Critical Methods, . . . . .	286
5. The Hypotheses of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	287
6. The Demonstrations of Pure Reason, . . . . .	289
III. The Canon of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	290
1. Theoretical and Practical Reason, . . . . .	290
2. Pragmatical and Moral Reason, . . . . .	291
3. Moral Laws and the Moral World, . . . . .	293
4. The Moral Government of the World—God and Immortality, . . . . .	294
5. Opinion, Knowledge, and Faith, . . . . .	295
6. Doctrinal and Practical Faith, . . . . .	297
7. Pragmatical and Moral Faith, . . . . .	297
IV. The Architectonic of the Pure Reason, . . . . .	300
1. Philosophical Cognition, . . . . .	300
2. Pure Philosophy and Metaphysic—The Aristotelian and Kantian Metaphysic—Metaphysic and the Critick, .	301
3. The Metaphysic of Nature and Morals, . . . . .	303
V. The History of the Pure Reason—The Critical as distinguished from the Dogmatical and the Sceptical Points of View, . .	303

## APPENDICES,

CONTAINING TRANSLATIONS FROM THE FIRST EDITION OF THE  
CRITICK, AND A RE-TRANSLATION OF PART OF THE DISCUSSION  
ON THE INTELLIGIBLE CHARACTER.

	Page.
APPENDIX A.—Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,	309
SECT. II.—Of the <i>a priori</i> Grounds of the Possibility of Experience,	309
Prefatory Remark, . . . . .	311
1. Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition, . . .	311
2. Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination, .	312
3. Of the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept, . . .	313
4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Cate- gories as <i>a priori</i> Cognitions, . . . . .	317
SECT. III.—Of the Relation of the Understanding to Objects in Ge- neral, and of the Possibility of Cognizing them <i>a priori</i> , . .	320
Note, . . . . .	321
Note, . . . . .	323
Summary Statement of the Legitimacy and Possibility of this Deduc- tion, and no other, of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,	323
APPENDIX B.—Containing passages omitted or re-written (in the Se- cond Edition), in the Chapter on Noumena and Phenomena (Analytic, Book II., Chap. III.), . . . . .	330
APPENDIX C.—The First Paralogism of Substantiality, . . . . .	335
Critick of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology, . . . . .	335
The Second Paralogism of Simplicity, . . . . .	337
Critick of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology, .	337
Third Paralogism of Personality, . . . . .	343
Critick of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology, .	343
The Fourth Paralogism of Ideality (of External Relations), . .	346
Critick of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology, .	346
Considerations concerning the Whole of Pure Psychology, as an Ap- pendix to these Paralogisms, . . . . .	355
APPENDIX D.—Possibility of Causality through Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity, . . . . .	369
Further Elucidation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity, . . . . .	371

# INTRODUCTION,

CONTAINING

A VINDICATION OF KANT'S PRINCIPLES AGAINST  
THE OBJECTIONS OF SUCCEEDING  
PHILOSOPHERS.



# INTRODUCTION.

---

## I. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE NECESSITY.

THERE is no more important metaphysical discussion now pending than that concerning necessity, as a test of *a priori* notions and judgments. On the one side we have Leibniz and all those who have followed him in this country, who, with some minor varieties, hold that these must arise from the *primitive* laws of the subject beholding the object, and that hence this necessity is a law of the object, or *objective necessity*.\* On the other side we have the school of Hartley, now represented by Mr. Bain and Mr. Mill, who hold that necessary judgments are only the result of connexions in themselves not necessary, inseparably united by the law of association; hence, not ultimate facts of our nature, or of the objects, but possessing only a *subjective necessity*. The former school make the assertions of substance, causality, &c., to be *a priori* judgments, and hence laws of the object, or of nature; the latter hold them to be merely empirical in origin, and various applications, or cases, of the Law of Association. Under the former we might also mention a modified school, which, while admitting that association

\* They differ as to whether the object contributes elements, or, if so, what elements. Reid and Hamilton hold that the object determines the subject; Kant, exactly the reverse. They both agree, however, in recognizing the dignity and truth of necessary judgments. Perhaps Leibniz himself can hardly be said to have acknowledged any objective necessity.

can give rise to a so-called necessity, does not regard such subjective necessity as a real but as a spurious one, reserving the term [objective] necessity for those principles which result from the constitution of the mind as such, and in its relations to objects as such, apart from all contingent and accidental elements. This I believe to be the position of Kant, who certainly differs from many of the first school, as well in his catalogue of objectively necessary judgments, as in the criterion by which he distinguishes them. Still, the whole system of Kant depends upon the establishing the general principle held by the former side. Upon the fact of Space and Time being *a priori* intuitions he builds the inferences that Space and Time are *a priori* and primitive, and hence imposed upon all objects by the mind, and similarly with the Categories. Now, the opposed school usually admit Time indeed as primitive and inexplicable, but profess to be able to deduce Space and Externality from it (combined with certain muscular sensations). If they can do so, Kant's system, as regards space at all events, must fall to the ground; and, seeing that he insists so constantly on the completeness and harmony of his system, it might be asserted that his whole theory would be rendered doubtful.

We must, then, settle two questions—(1.) Has there been any analysis performed which really removes space from the rank of an original element in consciousness, and makes it subsequent to time? (2.) What proof has Kant given that the necessity (which he makes the test and evidence of a primitive notion or judgment), may not be derived merely from (*a*) inseparable association, or may not result from (*β*) some pre-established harmony by which the subject is compelled to believe it objective,

without its being really so? To take the second question first—"There are only two ways," says Kant (p. 101) "in which a necessary harmony of experience with the concepts of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these concepts possible, or the concepts make experience possible. The former of these statements will not hold good with respect to the Categories (or the pure sensuous intuitions); for they are *a priori* concepts, and independent of experience [and this because they are *necessary* and universal]; consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative," &c. In this passage he assumes necessity to be a proof that the concept or judgment is *a priori*, and this he had already laid down very dogmatically (Introd. II.), pointing, as all his followers have since done, to the fact that empirical universality is only comparative, and that experience does not possess or produce the character of necessity at all. Now, all the psychological school (as Mr. Mill pleases to term them) immediately cry out that this can only be true if necessity cannot be shown to be a consequence from higher laws; and they add that Kant and all his followers have ignored inseparable association; they further profess to exhibit cases of necessary beliefs so generated, and even found in course of time to be false. We must, then, first examine whether Kant did ignore inseparable association; and, next, whether they have proved cases of necessary beliefs from this principle, which were afterwards shown to be false.

Now, in the Second Edition of the Critick there is no official passage on this point; but in the deduction of the Categories, as it stands in the First Edition, the passages in Appendix A, pp. 319 and 324, touch upon this ques-

tion. He there shows that association of representations presupposes that they are associable, if the association is to be at all necessary ; and that their being associable implies an *affinity* among them, which is the objective basis of all association ; so that necessary association is a consequence of the synthetical unity of apperception, and harmonizes perfectly with his principles, being even necessarily implied by them. This point is the very basis of the Deduction of the Categories in the Critick.\*

Thus, Kant literally retorts upon his antagonists the very charge they brought against him (Appendix, p. 319). Laying aside the question of necessity, let us ask : supposing we assume association as a principle, and assert the following rule, obtained from it, that no event can occur isolated, without some event preceding it, on what does this rule depend ? By what was it suggested to us ? Must there not be some affinity among phenomena, in order that we should ever begin to use such a rule ? In short, must there not be some ground or reason in objects, not only to make us take up this rule of association rather than that, but even to suggest to us any necessity or reason for associating at all ? What account can you give of this ? You postulate association as an ultimate law, whereas I deduce it as a consequence from my first principle, that all phenomena, being representations, are *my* representations, and therefore subject at least to one uniform set of conditions, viz., those under which alone they can become to me objects of experience. This establishes a transcendental affinity among them, from which your empi-

\* Cf. §§ 14, 15, p. 86, *sq.*

rical association follows. It is you, then, that have postulated a principle—I have not. Nor is my principle an hypothesis arbitrarily assumed. It is a fact that nothing can be an object, except it come into consciousness. It is, accordingly, quite certain that phenomena must conform to whatever mental laws and conditions are necessary for producing knowledge. The Categories can have no other use. Hence, the association postulated as an ultimate principle by the school of Hartley really results from, and is dependent upon, the synthetical unity of apperception.

The only possible answer to this is, to assert that the *Ego* is itself a result of association—a theory which could not possibly be verified by experience, and which substitutes an inconceivable for the above perfectly conceivable and reasonable hypothesis. The very law of Redintegration, laid down by psychologists of both schools as the ultimate law of association, appears to me to be an immediate inference from, or perhaps even an inadequate statement of, the synthetical unity of apperception. Whenever, we are told, several objects have been present to our mind simultaneously, so as to make up one total thought, any one of these coming before us at a subsequent time is apt to suggest the others. But all the objects present to us simultaneously have not this property. There are great numbers of objects constantly present to us, which do not at all suggest one-another afterwards. Why not? Because they have not formed a part of our total thought. Is it not more intelligible to answer, because the mind did not originally conjoin or connect them? The unity of apperception did not apply to them, for they could not be brought

under any one of the Categories (which are its phases) ; hence, there being no *affinity* among them, no association was possible. The law of Redintegration, then, is based upon the synthetical unity of apperception. Nor can we let Mr. Mill's school bring against us the law of Parsimony, until we have granted that their single principle accounts for all the phenomena under discussion (which we shall presently see it does not). For the present, it is enough to have shown that their law is not only recognized by Kant, but brought under his own principles.

Mr. Mill (Logic, vol. i., p. 268), thinks he can overthrow the claims of primitive necessary judgments, by defining them as those the contradictory of which is inconceivable, and by then showing that inconceivability is no test of impossibility—in fact, that many inconceivable things have turned out to be true. But he has himself fallen into an ambiguity, very well explained in his own book further on (p. 303), where he shows that inconceivable may mean either *unbelievable* or *unimaginable*, and that the inference from one of these to the other is not valid. The antipodes used to be unbelievable. That two right lines should enclose a space is unimaginable. That the former turned out true, is no argument at all that the latter rests merely upon association ; and yet Mr. Mill thinks that, because some inconceivables (of the first kind) are proved true, others (of the second kind) do not rest upon any higher ground than an additional quantity of the same evidence. Yet there seems to be a definite distinction between them, not of degree ; but of kind.

We may safely defy Mr. Mill to point out a case where an unimaginable (inconceivable) was proved true, or even possible. And the reason is plain. The latter de-

pend upon the form of the thinking or intuiting faculty ; the former, merely upon empirical association. So it was that a mathematical friend told me he perfectly well remembered, when a boy, being taught, without understanding it, the axiom, "Two lines cannot enclose a space." When the fourth proposition of Euclid was shown him, he remembers the universality and necessity of the axiom at once flashing upon him.

We must now revert to the passage first quoted from Kant, and proceed to discuss a far more difficult question. "It is quite possible," he goes on to say (p. 102), that some one may propose a sort of preformation-system of pure reason—a middle way between the two—to wit, that the Categories are neither *self-conceived*, and first *a priori* principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which are so ordered by our Creator, that their exercise harmonizes perfectly with the laws of nature which regulate experience."

Now, to this hypothesis he first very properly opposes the law of Parcimony, which he has stated more accurately in his treatise "De Mundi Sensibilis," &c. (cf. below p. 89, note) "*prius autem, quia viam sternit philosophiæ pigrorum, ulteriorem quamlibet indagationem per citationem primæ causæ irritam declarantis, non ita temere admittendum est.*" But besides, he adds, the Categories would lose the character of *necessity*, which belongs to their nature as such. If their necessity, which is objective, were only subjective, they would be false and delusive. "Nor would there be wanting people who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect of them-

selves, though they must feel it. Least of all could we dispute with any one about that which merely depends upon the manner in which his subject is organized."

The argument is complete against the preformation-school without going into the depths of the question. In the first place, the law of Parcimony is against them; and, secondly, though they are the last to deny the objective, but distinctly postulate two series, a mental and a real one, corresponding to each other, but the one governed by subjective, the other by objective necessity—by separating these two, they cut the ground from under their own feet; and, being only able to prove subjective necessity, open the door to complete scepticism.

The distinction between subjective and objective necessity is a most obscure point. Kant seems to think our arguing the point at all evidently implies an objective necessity; or that other minds are bound in the same way as ours—otherwise, we could only say: "I am so constituted, that I cannot but think this."

Now, there is no doubt that a thing may be really necessary—may be really a necessary condition of something we know, and we may still not feel it to be so. This shows a clear difference between the feeling of necessity (or of the reverse being inconceivable) and real or objective necessity. Suppose I put forward extreme Calvinistic views, and some one says, surely such views necessarily imply that God is an immoral being; I answer, I cannot see that. But, after a while, when I listen fairly to his arguments, I discover that, though I felt no (subjective) necessity in the point, it does exist. But I answer, man's free will necessarily destroys God's omnipotence; and my antagonist answers, you only

imagine that ; it is not really so ; and in course of argument, I may be convinced that where I felt a (subjective) necessity, there was really none at all. Now, carrying up the distinction shown in this empirical example higher, it appears that Kant, when he asserts the Categories to be objectively necessary, does not mean that we are subjectively convinced about them. This appears from various passages in the Critick ; *e. g.*, in p. 3, he makes contingency, not conceivability, the opposite of necessity. Again, he tells us that some of his *a priori* Principles possess only discursive certainty, hence cannot have been felt to be necessary prior to the demonstration. Furthermore, he tells us that two of the Analogies, though necessary *a priori*, and constitutive of experience, were never yet thought of (p. 161). Similar is his demonstration of the existence of external things, which he nevertheless fully allows might fairly be doubted prior to proof given (p. 166). Add to this his contempt for any appeal to common sense, and the small figure which inconceivability or any appeal to ordinary belief makes in his work.

He rather means that when, in the analysis of all phenomena, we arrive at elements which we cannot eliminate, these elements are necessary, and objectively necessary, inasmuch as without them the objects would be (not inconceivable) but impossible (this, of course, on principles of his peculiar idealism). The *a priori* intuitions of the Categories are valid in experience, because they *make* experience, because objects are only brought into existence through them. Now, the very assertion of a *subjective* feeling of necessity—"I am compelled by nature to conceive objects so"—states that the mind is looked upon as different from the objects ; we are compelled to

think them so, implies they are, may be, or certainly *can* be different in themselves; *i. e.*, it is not impossible that the object itself may not correspond to my necessary concept, which in such case cannot form an essential part of the object itself. Here the opposition to Kant's views becomes manifest.

I may add, that in this case there is an additional difficulty or ambiguity, in that the objectively necessary element happens to be in the subject. Because the objective conditions of experience (in the sense explained) happen to be in the understanding (or, in another sense, subjective), most philosophers are apt to overlook and confuse the distinction. But these Categories are by no means convictions, or subjective feelings, or even objects of consciousness *per se*; and though arising in the subject, legislate for the object, and are objectively necessary. As in any other analysis we decompose as far as possible, so as to arrive at the essential elements; so Kant decomposes the facts of consciousness, and, finding some original elements which we cannot eliminate, declares them necessary, and hence, *a priori* or logically prior to our forming any object. If this be so, the following objection naturally suggests itself: is not this thorough idealism? If the object be only constructed in and through the mind, why draw the distinction of subjective and objective? And, again, must not all subjective necessity merge into objective, and *vice versâ*?

In answer to this difficulty, we observe that Kant's holding the distinction at all shows him not to have been an absolute idealist; for it implies a distinction at least between subjective-subject and subjective-object; it implies that the object, even though partially con-

structed by the mind, and necessarily presupposing its laws, is something different from the pure creation of the *Ego*. It implies that, in receiving impressions from the non-*Ego*, in arranging them, and constructing objects with them, there are activities of the *Ego* at work, and necessarily implied in the construction, as distinguished from the accidental associations, which, even if *all* men happen to combine with the object, can be perceived as not necessarily belonging to it as an object, and therefore not as objective conditions. But how can we ever find a criterion to distinguish these two? Surely, if all men combine a condition with an object, it must appear objectively necessary? I think not, *except the result implies it as part of the construction*. And this, I suppose, is the criterion we must have of objective necessity in synthetical judgments, which, the reader must remember, are those upon which the whole discussion in Kant turns. There are certain objects of consciousness which manifest to us, not only themselves, but, *ipso facto*, their construction, as the only possible one which could have ever produced them—*e. g.*, a triangle shows, by the very intuition of it, that we must not only originally have constructed it with three right lines, and in space, but that through this process alone can we now cognize it; and any one asserting that these were only necessarily associated with it, we should consider not worth a reply.\*

Though there may be difficulties and mistakes in the application of this criterion, I believe its principle is sound. It answers the strongest possible case the asso-

\* In confining objective necessity originally to intuition, I rather agree with Locke than Kant.

ciation-psychology can urge, the supposition (and I believe it is probably imaginary), that all men, without exception, should attach some condition to an object by a subjective illusion, or *idolum tribus*. Even in such a case, if the construction of the object did not necessarily imply it as a necessary part or element in the result (which would be impossible, as a fact, without it), we might pronounce such condition to be not objectively necessary. The real case of different individuals appearing to require different conditions to construct the same fact, will be easily answered by this criterion, provided we always take care that they mean the same thing when they use the same name, which is generally not the case.

It is, however, none but an extreme sceptic who could contemplate universal *idola tribus* of such a character as to defy the power of the reason to detect them, and so to involve it in incurable and hopeless error. Mr. Mill himself (*mirabile dictu*) is agreed with Kant as to the criterion of universality being a test of judgments, which may be primordial, and which at all events cannot be accounted for by association; nor can we even entertain any question upon the point.\* But he will only concede this dignity to logical or analytical judgments, and, like Hume, believes that all others are to be explained from these logical necessary judgments, combined with inseparable association. The question, then, is reduced to one of fact. Kant also starts from the principle that there are such things as objectively necessary judgments, adding that strict universality is an independent and safe test of them. He also saw that

\* Exam. of Hamilton, p. 67.

the duty of philosophy was to reduce the number of judgments supposed to be objectively necessary by the mass of mankind.\*

If *all* men are found to agree about a judgment, there is a presumption that it depends upon the relation of the subject *quà* reason to object, assuming, as he does, that, if there exist object, it must affect the subject (*quà* reason) in a uniform and fixed manner. (This is empirically suggested by our whole experience, and may be fairly assumed upon principles of Parcimony until disproved, which is impossible). But this is not enough: we must examine whether it be not explicable upon subjective grounds; for, if so, even though it may continue to illude us by its apparent objectivity, we shall no longer be led astray. Here he meets Mr. Mill. The great question at issue, and the common battle-ground on which it must be decided, is the field of mathematical judgments. And postulating, as both parties do, that there *are* objectively necessary or primordial judgments, and seeing that the general verdict of mankind has placed mathematical truths upon this side, Kant's school are in possession of the disputed property, and must be dislodged by the attack of the association school. If the assaults of the latter be warded off, the school of Kant are victorious. It seems, then, required by the state of the dispute, and in no way beside the point at issue, to attempt a refutation of the last, and probably the most acute, attack on our possessions, that of Mr. Mill. But, as mathematical truths postulate space as their necessary condition, it will first be necessary to

\* Critick, pp. 496-8.

show that space is itself an *a priori* necessary intuition ; and this will bring us back to the question first proposed.

## II. THE ASSOCIATION-SCHOOL THEORIES OF SPACE, AND MATHEMATICAL JUDGMENTS.

1. *Of Space*.—Has there been any analysis proposed which reduces space to time and muscular sensations without *petitio principii*? We may here content ourselves with considering the very circumstantial discussion in Mr. Mill's Examination of Sir W. Hamilton, in which it will not be hard to show how constantly and palpably he has begged the notion he was trying to deduce. After giving a very able analysis of the notions we have of substances as to permanence, he adds (p. 202): "It may, perhaps, be said, that the preceding theory gives indeed some account of the idea of permanent existence, which forms part of our conception of matter, but gives no explanation of our believing these permanent objects to be external, or out of ourselves. I apprehend, on the contrary, that the very idea of anything out of ourselves is derived solely from the knowledge experience gives us of the Permanent Possibilities. Our sensations we *carry with us* wherever we go, and they never exist *where we are not*; but *when we change our place*, we do not carry away with us the Permanent Possibilities of sensation—they remain until we *return*," &c. "And, more than all, they are, and will be after we have ceased to feel them, Permanent Possibilities *to other beings than ourselves*."\* Now, motion being here assumed

\* The reader will find similar expressions in the sequel.

to explain the externality of substance, and motion (as distinct from mere succession) being only comprehensible as change in space or place, space is postulated (as indeed also more palpably in the words "*where* we are not"), to account for the notion of itself. But, if we must have space and motion before we can get externality of substance, surely any further deduction is useless, there being nothing for us to conceive in space except substances—there being no other use or application of this intuition. However that may be, the externality of substance is deduced from that of space as one of its conditions, which is surely (on Mr. Mill's principles) a case of *petitio principii*. I suppose he will hardly hold that we can know that we move, and think of the place where we are not, without having externality already consciously within our minds.

Closely connected with the question under discussion is Mr. Mill's analysis of the quality of extension in bodies, which he, and Brown, and Mr. Bain agree in deducing from certain series of our feelings in time; longitudinal extension in space being nothing more than longitudinal extension in time, or a series of feelings under certain circumstances. The duration of a series of muscular sensations gives us the idea of extension; for, according to Mr. Mill, this duration gives us the notion of longitudinal extension; and the simultaneous possibility of several of these series gives us the idea of the three dimensions in space. (How these series are to be discriminated as at all different, without space; or, granting this, why the dimensions are three, and only three—to these questions I have been unable to gather an answer from Mr. Mill.)

The briefest way of criticizing the long passage (pp. 222, *sqq.*) which follows will be to enumerate its fallacies in general heads. (α) A knowledge of our organism as extended must not be begged, when we are going to explain extension; hence, such expressions as the "range of a limb," or "sweep of a limb," must either be carefully confined to the mere succession of feelings in moving it, or they beg the question; and indeed, as suggesting extension in the very statement, they should be avoided when we are describing the phenomena from which extension is to be derived. (β) Any mention or postulating of *direction* cannot be for a moment allowed; for what possible meaning can direction have except as in space? In particular, lineal (by which I suppose Mr. Bain principally means rectilinear) direction would be only given with great difficulty by the moving of limbs, and we should be brought back to the old Greek notion of circular motion being the most natural. This difficulty, as well as a host of others, are urged with great acuteness by Mr. Abbott, "Sight and Touch," chap. v. More especially, he states, from E. H. Weber, that touch cannot give us the idea of a right line at all, and consequently not the slightest idea of direction. (γ.) No such notion as velocity or rapidity can be admitted, far less such a notion as the comparison of quicker and slower motions. In fact, the idea of motion requires as its logical antecedent both space and time, and is not identical with pure succession. Suppose we had nothing but the series of our thoughts to analyze, we could never get beyond the idea of a series, nor could we ever by any chance get the notion of acceleration or retardation in it. For what is quicker or slower? Nothing but more

*space* traversed in less *time*, and *vice versa*. Motion cannot be apprehended without something fixed, which is only given us by relations of space, as Kant has well shown. The *motion* of our thoughts, then, is, in the first place, only an analogical expression; and, secondly, could never have been felt without something in space whereby not only to measure the increased or diminished velocity of our thinking, but even to learn that there is any velocity at all in the matter. The evidence of dreaming seems to corroborate this view. Why is it, that, the intuitions of velocity afforded us by space being removed, the current of thoughts is found by itself completely incompetent to suggest or estimate speed at all? (δ) What we necessarily use to *measure* extension must not for that reason have originally *suggested* it. And yet all that the association school ever attempt to prove is only this: *that all the measures of extension can be traced to series of muscular feelings in time.*\* The knowledge of extension is one thing, and primitive; the measure of extension is another, and empirical; and we should not accept Mr. Bain's confusion of them together (perhaps identification of them), without some further proof than his bare statement.

Upon all these assumptions, however, the theory of Mr. Bain is based, and the intelligent reader will find them scattered over the very surface of the argument. I would call particular attention to the passage in p. 225: "We must learn to feel that a slow motion for a long time is the same as a quicker motion with less duration, which we can easily do by seeing that they both produce

\* Their definition of extension is also accommodated to their theory.

the same effect in exhausting the full range of the limb." Surely it is clear that without space we could never get the idea of motion, which involves space as much as time—in fact, a series in time only *changes*, it does not *move*; and even granting we had the idea, we could never discriminate whether that motion was quicker or slower, except the notion of something permanent in space, and motion in space, were given. The same *petitio principii* is made by Mr. Mill himself (p. 230).

As to the case recorded by Platner, it suggests two very important questions: ( $\alpha$ ) What notion of simultaneity could we have apart from space as implied in sight; ( $\beta$ ) What notion of extension can we have without sight? The record of all such cases is found to fail in accuracy, when strictly interrogated; and even this unusually well reported one is, I think, vague as to how far the patient knew what simultaneity of different feelings meant. One point is plain: that an increased number of the same sort of sensations only made him feel the sensation more strongly, not that it consisted of several independent sensations occurring simultaneously. This Mr. Mill himself allows.\* But now comes another question: did he discriminate sensations differing in kind when simultaneous, and did he refer them to distinct causes acting simultaneously? Mr. Mill assumes that no being who has a plurality of senses can be without the notion of simultaneity (p. 233). Here is Platner's statement: "In his own body, he absolutely did not discriminate head and foot at all by their distance, but merely by the difference of the feelings (and his perception of

\* "Exam. of Hamilton," p. 245. In defending Brown, he seems to postulate the exact opposite of this statement (p. 228).

such differences was incredibly fine) which he experienced from the one and the other, *and moreover through time.*"

Now, it is clear from the whole passage,\* and especially from the words last quoted, so far as they convey any meaning, that the experiments made were to subject the patient *successively* to certain sensations. If these varied the least in kind, he detected a difference, and so he distinguished head and foot. But the important experiment of subjecting him to distinct sensations *simultaneously*, to see whether he could discriminate them, seems to have been overlooked by Platner. Still I do not deny that he could have discriminated them, but owing to his *education* among people with sight. The question remains: can we postulate a sense of such simultaneity *originally*, before any space or extension is given? I am disposed to agree with Brown, that, although we can afterwards analyze them, all simultaneous feelings form originally *one mental state*, which of course excludes simultaneity until the analysis obtained by the aid of space and extension give us the elements separately. Hence, until at least one body was given as extended, we should not obtain the notion. As to the second question, Mr. Mill actually asserts the patient to have had a notion of extension, without knowing that the parts of space were simultaneous. It appears to me a contradiction in terms to say that a man has any notion of space (*i. e.* that of which the parts are simultaneous), and does not know that its parts are simultaneous: though the denotation of the blind man's *space* may be almost the very same as ours, there is no reason to think the connotation

\* Cf. Mill on Hamilton, p. 232.

is so in any way. After such an assertion, and with such a description of space, it is easy for him to show that the case favors his own view. If, however, we take space and extension to mean what Kant has shown them to mean, the very same case will be just as conclusive against Mr. Mill, and indeed Mr. Abbott cites it in this way.\*

Before proceeding to the second part of our discussion (the *a priori* character of relations in space), it may be well to sum up our results. The foregoing discussion has, I think, proved that what is called objective necessity and space have not yet been explained without begging the question at issue by the association school; and that, until this necessity and the notions which possess it can be so explained, we must accept it as an ultimate fact, and the intuitions, concepts, and judgments possessing it as given *a priori* in the thinking subject.

As to the criterion of universality, the word itself is used in two very different senses.† Kant means by the universality (objective) of a truth, that we must predicate it as true of all things without exception, or at all times, as we say every event must have a cause. M. Cousin takes it (subjectively) to mean that all men believe it (which sense Kant discusses, Critick, p. 497). Mr. Stirling indeed (Secret of Hegel, vol. i., p. 229), cites a passage from a later work of Kant, where he uses it in the latter sense. The statement of the crite-

\* "Sight and Touch," p. 73.

† Cf. M'Cosh, "Intuitions of the Mind," p. 52, note: Hodgson, "Space and Time," p. 9 (chap. I., §. 3). The latter holds that universality and necessity are respectively the objective and subjective phases of the same fact.

tion in the Critick of the Pure Reason (p. 3), is explicitly in the former.

2. *Of the Necessity of Mathematical Judgments.*—In his last work on Hamilton's Philosophy (as already stated), Mr. Mill concedes that logical necessity may be primordial, but will not allow this dignity to any synthetical judgments, which he thinks can all be reduced to a contradiction, along with (in some cases) an inseparable association.\* *E. g.* two intersecting right lines are associated with divergence without limit; but divergence without limit is contradictory to the idea of meeting again, which is involved in the idea of enclosing a space; therefore, the association between two intersecting right lines and divergence without limit renders us incapable of realizing the contradictory idea of two right lines enclosing a space. Similarly,  $2 + 2$  are associated with 4, and 4 excludes the idea of 5, as contradictory to it, &c. He even proceeds to show that in certain imaginable cases the reverse of these propositions might have been just as necessary. These cases we shall discuss presently. He also considers (p. 266) Mr. Mansel's argument, that we have just as universal evidence for physical truths, which are still inferior in necessity; and replies by showing the causes which prevent the association from being inseparable in this case. Agreeing as I do with Mr. Mansel, I desire to take up the other side of his argument; and, instead of asserting the empirical evidence for physical truths to be *as high* as that for mathematical, I shall endeavour to show that the evidence for mathematical may be *as low* as that for physical truths; and this will give us the opportunity of proving that the very facts which Mr. Mill adduces as

\* pp. 67, *sqq.*

weakening the association in physical laws may also take place in the case of mathematical truths.

The first fact is thus stated (p. 266)—“Uniformities of sequence, in which the phenomena succeed one another only at a certain interval, do not give rise to inseparable associations.” Not one word of proof is offered for this statement; and it will be quite enough to establish the possibility of the reverse by appealing to a directly opposite statement in another of Mr. Mill’s favorite theories. He takes great pains to instruct us that extension is not given by sight, but by touch, or by muscular sensations; and that, when we say that two separate points in vision are apart in space, this merely means that we should have to go through a certain series of sensations to get from one to the other; but that the two sensations (of sight and touch) are so inseparably associated, that we confuse them together inseparably. Now, the great majority of the objects of sight are at such a distance, that (if we even measure the distance at all) it would require some time to perform the measurement by muscular sensations; accordingly, either an inseparable association must be possible between phenomena not immediately successive in time (*viz.* the visual sensations, and the subsequent measurement), or Mr. Mill’s Derivation of Extension is false. Even if but a few (instead of the great majority) of the objects of our vision are beyond the immediate range of our limbs, these will be (according to Mr. Mill, p. 267) sufficient to check and prevent the inseparable association. This difficulty has been fully urged by Mr. Abbott in the third chapter of his acute and (negatively at least) conclusive work on “Sight and Touch.”

Even Mr. Mill's own theory of mathematics seems opposed to the truth just explained. From his *Logic*, (vol. i., p. 290), we may gather, that he believes us to be convinced that  $2 + 2 = 4$ , because 00 00 can be shown to make up 0000. Now (according to Mr. Mill himself), these two cannot be inseparably associated, except they be in all cases immediately consequent upon one another. Who will venture to assert this to be the case? Whenever a stone is thrown into the water, it sinks forthwith; it appears to me that there is far more evidence from experience for an inseparable association here, than in the arithmetical case just cited.

Discounting this argument, we must (he thinks) have had instances of the truth from the dawn of consciousness, with no counter-associations at all (p. 267). "Had but experience afforded an illusion, the counter-association formed might have been sufficient to render [the reverse] supposition possible." The case of parallel lines appearing to meet at once starts up before us. That we cannot conceive them so doing, "needs no other explanation than the laws of association afford," is Mr. Mill's answer.\* At first sight it appears as if he had flatly contradicted his previous sentence. If we had an illusion, it might help us to conceive the reverse of mathematical truths. But we have an illusion; therefore—we still cannot conceive them! On looking closer, however, into the matter, we find "a barrister" quoted to the effect, that, if we were unable to *investigate* the phenomena of such lines as those of a railroad appearing to meet, we should be able to imagine two parallel lines meeting. Let us first dispose of the

\* Mill's "Exam. of Hamilton," p. 70 (note).

imagined case.\* A spectator, in a world of round objects, who has never yet seen a straight line, is fixed near railway lines, which he sees converging at a distance in both directions; he infers that two straight lines enclose a space. What does the barrister mean by straight lines? Lines uniform in direction? Then the fixed spectator cannot make any assertion about such lines; for the lines which he sees *converge* at both sides. The illustration actually comes to this: the barrister asks the fixed man what he sees about the railway lines? They appear to enclose a space, is the answer. Though you see them do so (*i. e.* see that they are not straight), rejoins the barrister, I tell you they *are* straight; therefore, you may believe that two right lines enclose a space!!! There is throughout no definition given of straight lines; indeed, any definition would show the absurdity of the example. The arithmetical case added by the "barrister" is still more unfortunate. He suggests that, supposing we were in a world where a fifth unit were always created and added whenever we performed the addition of  $2 + 2$ , we should in such a world be convinced that  $2 + 2 = 5$ . It is surprising that the barrister should not have seen that he is confusing two distinct things—the *act of adding* 2 to 2 making 5,

\* It is worthy of remark, that in a note to the 6th Edition of his *Logic* (vol i., p. 262), Mr. Mill holds that straight lines are not given, but suggested by experience. If he concedes that we possess the idea at all, his argument will coincide with the doctrine of the opposed school, that the real straight line is suggested by experience, but given in a *priori* intuition. But he proceeds to explain the *inseparable association* of parallel right lines not meeting to be "a proof by approximation," according to the method of concomitant variations! Does not any mediate proof contradict the conditions of inseparable association laid down in the passages quoted above?

and *these units themselves* constituting 5. Let us suppose that the four units to be added were visible points in space, colored red, blue, green, and yellow, respectively. In the hypothetical world imagined, the fifth unit created along with the act of adding must be either one of these colors, or not so. If the latter, surely it would be obvious that it was not one of the previous units, or in any way identical with them; if the former, we should now observe two units of one color, which we did not possess in our original data, where they all differed. Our inference, then, must be, that the act of adding created a fifth unit; not that the four units, or the two pairs of them, made five. Supposing the four units added to have fixed places in space (as is the case with many of the things we add), the absurdity can be equally well shown.

But, waiving all this difficulty, need Mr. Mill have gone beyond our present world for examples of this kind? Every child who looks down along a long street sees two parallel right lines converging, and we very rarely proceed to verify or question the result. Every one who puts a straight rule into water may observe that a crooked line is the shortest way between two points (its extremities); and, going on to examples in arithmetic, it may be observed that there is hardly a moment of our waking lives at which we may not find an apparent violation of its truths. Among many examples, one may suffice. If we fix our vision on any point, intermediate objects (or objects beyond it) appear double. Here is a constant example of  $1 = 2$ . If all such examples (which could be indefinitely multiplied) cannot afford us sufficient illusions to make the reverse of

mathematical truths conceivable, what Mr. Mill can mean by his statement is truly inconceivable.

Mr. Mansel's opinion, then, appears to be correct, that, when experience is found to conflict with mathematical laws, they are assumed to be in the right, and experience in the wrong. And nature undoubtedly affords us plenty of examples which appear to be inconsistent with mathematics. Most assuredly no child has verified for himself that the very long parallel lines which he has met, and sees to be equidistant, as far as he can easily judge, and which he sees do not change their direction suddenly—that these parallel lines do not meet. And, even if we can get but one or two instances where two right lines are not forthwith associated with no space enclosed, our case is proved. Mathematical truths, then, *if supposed to relate to empirical intuitions*, are subject to apparent or real exceptions, just as much as those of physics; and there seems no ground for asserting, that association could possibly generate in the one a necessity which could not be similarly generated in the other.

I may add, that Mr. Mill needlessly encumbers his theory by assuming different explanations to account for the necessity of  $2 + 2 = 4$ , and of 4 being not = 5. This latter he calls a contradiction (p. 68) which is as good as primordial. The former is not so; but depends upon an inseparable association with a contradiction. On this I may remark, that any one who could grant to Mr. Mill the possibility of a world where  $2 + 2 = 5$ , must also be compelled to grant him, if he choose, the possibility of a world where  $4 = 5$ . He appears to me inconsistent in placing this truth on a higher ground

than the other. In fact, any one who was not “debauched with philosophy” (as Bishop Berkeley said) would believe these two propositions were not only one exactly as absurd as the other, but that they were even *identical*.

It is well to add that, in basing arithmetic on synthetical axioms, Kant seems not to have considered these axioms to extend to any numbers beyond the range of ordinary intuition. If, as Sir William Hamilton thinks, we can intuit six objects simultaneously, then the original axioms will be limited to the addition and subtraction of units within this number. But within the sum, whatever it may be, which can be intuited at once, the adding and subtracting of numbers is a process directly intuitive; and we should be careful how we speak of the “act of adding” or the “result” produced, as if there were any mediate inference, or manipulation of the units, during which they did not each and all remain actually before us. Mr. Mill and his barrister appear to have been misled by this looseness of expression, as has already been pointed out. Within these limits, the necessity of the (so-called) result appears to be just as primordial as the truths allowed by Mr. Mill to rest upon the principle of contradiction. But when we come to higher numbers, the association school seem to think our principle is at fault, for that we add and subtract large numbers with equal certainty is obvious; and surely we can never have any evidence on the subject from direct intuition?

Mr. Mansel, who bases arithmetic on Time, says that we must have been conscious of even these large numbers at some time or other, in some succession of

thoughts, and that this is sufficient. Sufficient it certainly would be, but its truth is very doubtful. Kant appears more correct in deducing arithmetic from Space ; and on this view we may hold that our knowledge of all the higher numbers, and the processes we perform with them, are mere "*cogitationes cæcæ sive symboliæ*."\*

### III. KANT'S TABLE OF CATEGORIES, AND HIS CRITICS.

1. It is curious that the very ground upon which Kant attacks the Categories of Aristotle has been urged as the particular objection to Kant's own list. "It was a design," he says (p. 65), "worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions. Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they occurred to him." Now, let us hear Schwegler (Ed. Seelye, p. 285-6): "The method of Fichte, just like that of Hegel afterwards, is a combination of the analytical and synthetical methods, by which Fichte earned the credit of having first deduced the Categories of philosophy from one single point, and of having brought them into connexion, instead of taking them merely empirically, and co-ordinating them, as had been done, even by Kant." The same view is taken by Mr. Mansel ("Metaphysics," p. 193, note), "The Kantian Categories are not deduced from an analysis of the act of thought, but generalized from the forms of the

\* In an important remark on the "Anticipations of perception," Kant discusses the *a priori* synthetical propositions of arithmetic, and says they should be called numerical formulæ, rather than axioms, being, as he thinks, *singular*, and not universal, propositions, seeing that a triangle can be constructed in a number of different ways, but the  $7 + 5 = 12$  only in one.

proposition, which latter are assumed without examination, as they are given in the ordinary logic. A psychological deduction, or preliminary criticism, of the forms themselves, might have considerably reduced the numbers." And so both Fichte and Mr. Mansel have given further analyses, which the curious reader may find in the treatise just quoted of Mr. Mansel's, and in Fichte's, "*Wissenschaftslehre*," (Works, vol. i., p. 166-*sqq.*) These analyses are in substance identical, and consist in reducing quality to quantity, and discarding relation and modality, on the principle that substance and cause are implied in them, and that these notions exclude them from the first rank. I suspect that, upon a careful perusal of Mr. Mansel's discussion, the reader will be glad to fall back upon Kant's plainer, though more empirical, classification, and will agree with him in not taking any interest in the subtleties in which modern philosophers have indulged on the subject.\* There is, however, one charge from which Kant must be cleared, and that is, that he did not go upon a fixed principle in his Table. The Introduction to the subject is difficult, and seems to have been carelessly read by most of his critics. If I understand it right, the following is his argument. "Transcendental philosophy," he says (Critick, p. 56), "has the advantage, and moreover the responsibility, of searching for its concepts upon a prin-

\* The great diversity of philosophers as to the reduction of Kant's Categories is remarkable, and is an argument against such reduction. M. Cousin reduces them to substance and cause; Dr. Fischer and Schopenhauer, to cause only; Sir W. Hamilton to Condition, which appears to be the Category of cause without the schema. When doctors in philosophy differ so widely, it may be well to inquire whether any remedy at all is required.

ciple, because they originate pure and unmixed from the understanding, as an absolute unity, and must hence be connected according to one concept or idea. Such a connexion gives a rule," &c.

What is the principle according to which we must proceed? He shows that the understanding has no power of intuition, and hence can only regulate and bring into classes and unities the intuitions given by our sensibility. This spontaneous faculty he calls the function of the understanding. And what is the only use we can make of these unities or conceptions? To judge by means of them. And how do we judge by means of them? We repeat the process by which they have been already formed, and bring an additional representation under them. The understanding has no other duty at all; hence, it may be simply called our judging faculty. This is the *a priori* argument and principle upon which he bases his Table of the Categories; so that, in this sense, his list is neither purely empirical, nor picked up at random.\*

The number of the classes of judgments he did take for granted, from the existing treatises on logic (which, I suppose, discovered them empirically); but this merely because he knew them to have undergone the most searching investigation, and because he saw distinctly that psychologically they depended upon different acts of the mind. That it was possible to reduce them in number, was a point which came distinctly before him, and which he combats in his observations on the Table of Judgments, and the remarks in the seventh section of the

\* Cf. below, p. 69, note, where the explanation is given more fully.

Analytic (p. 67). It is not fair, then, to charge Kant with having evaded or overlooked a farther psychological deduction; but we must rather place his opinion (and his psychological acumen) over against those of his critics, and supposed improvers of his system. Let me, then, commend to the reader a careful perusal of the remarks just referred to, and also of the Introduction to the discussion of the Categories.

It is obvious that two sorts of reduction are possible: we may either reduce the number of the Categories under each head, or we may reduce the various heads or classes to a lesser number. The first description of reduction has been (as was observed already) noticed and rejected by Kant. The second has been attempted by Mr. Mansel (I omit Hegel). Now, that there exists an analogy between the classes of Categories would only be naturally suggested and probable from the unity of the Pure Reason, upon which Kant insists frequently, and this would also suggest the same number of judgments under each head. But the question remains—Is this similarity *Identity*, or merely *Analogy*? Kant could only regard them as identical, if the quantity and quality of judgments could be proved identical. Take, for example, the supposed identical Categories of unity and affirmation. Because affirmation asserts unity between two representations, can we jump at the conclusion that affirmation is identical with unity? Certainly not; an asserted unity between representations has nothing to do with the Category of unity, derived from singular judgments. Of what does a judgment consist? Of a subject, a predicate, and a copula. What can we say about the subject? It may be either one, or many, or a totality (the many regarded as an unity).

What about the predicate? We may assert it to be identical with this one, or many, or whole, or the reverse, &c. Now, how can this act of mind be at all asserted to be the same as the former? If the predicate of a judgment were singular, and we affirmed it of any sort of subject, we should be much nearer the Category of unity.

So, again, in a negative judgment we regard one attribute as not coexisting with another; but here, if we take a singular judgment, viz., Socrates is not foolish, we do not *necessarily* imply other subjects which have this attribute, and hence, we do not obtain plurality. But, supposing a class were here implied, it would surely be just as much implied in the corresponding affirmative judgment, which would, accordingly, suggest plurality as much as unity. Possibly Mr. Mansel was misled by his own statement, that in a judgment two concepts are considered "in relation to a *common object* of intuition." Perhaps the correct expression would be, "in relation to *common objects*," &c, viz., how far the objects which rank under one of these concepts rank also under the other. If so, the cogitating the coexistence or non-coexistence of attributes in a plurality of subjects is obviously distinct from unity or plurality of subjects. They are, indeed, unifying and dividing processes, but so are all the functions of thought, as Kant has said. It would be tedious in this place to urge all the similar objections which could be made in detail to Mr. Mansel's reduction. But, in general, except we can reduce the psychological acts expressed in the various classes of judgments to the same act, we have only demonstrated analogy, and not identity. The attempts, then, of Fichte and Mr. Mansel,

corroborate Kant's view of the symmetry and harmony between the various acts of the understanding as one complete whole; for the analogies are strong enough even to suggest to these acute minds complete identity.\*

§ 2. *The Category of Reciprocal Action* has certainly more difficulties about it than most of the rest; but these arise chiefly from identifying or confusing it with causation, as Schopenhauer does. Suppose, he says, the reciprocal action to mean reciprocal causation, and to be between the parts of a phenomenon—a balanced pair of scales for example—where no *change* is manifested, how can we apply the Category of cause at all without change? Take away one of the weights, and causality alone comes into play to account for the change in one of the scales sinking forthwith. Suppose, again, the reciprocal action to be a case where the effect is said to reproduce the cause. Is not this merely a loose expression to denote a series of causes and effects, of which the alternate members are *similar*, not identical? The effect does not reproduce the *same* cause, but one exactly like it. Hence, it is only simple causality. If it were objected that action and reaction are equal, and that this proves the fact of reciprocal causation, it may be answered that this is the case in all physical causation, so that still the two concepts cannot be distinguished. If real reciprocal causation were true, would not perpetual motion be demonstrable *a priori*? These difficulties will be noticed and some remarks made on the real nature of the Category, in the note to p. 123.

\* Although in this place Kant refuses to define the Categories (his reasons will be found in Appendix B., p. 331), he has elsewhere supplied this want. See Critick, pp. 99, 110, 163, 174.

§ 3. *The Schematism of the Categories* presents still greater difficulties, and Schopenhauer's account of its origin at first sight appears to have some probability. Kant's plan (he tells us) of proceeding, was to find for every empirical\* function of the understanding its transcendental or *a priori* parallel. Now, he observed, that when we use a very abstract empirical concept symbolically (as Leibniz would say), we often glance back towards the empirical intuitions from which we have obtained the concept, and we call up in imagination a sort of imperfect image momentarily, just to secure to us that our thinking is possible in intuition—a psychological fact which any one will discover for himself easily by reflection. This fugitive phantasm, intermediate between abstract concepts, and clear intuitions, Kant called a schema, and then discovered that between the pure *a priori* intuitive faculty of sensibility and the pure faculty of thought there are similar schemata of the pure Categories. But what is the use of this schematism in empirical thinking? Merely to secure that the *content* of the concept be correct. The matter has been abstracted from empirical intuition: we refer to it occasionally, to make sure that our thinking is about *reality*. But the pure *a priori* concepts come from within, and are not derived from intuition; hence, such concepts cannot be referred to any intuition to guarantee their reality. It was, then, upon the misapplication of this psychological fact above mentioned, that Kant based his elaborate schematism of the pure understanding.

Although Schopenhauer's criticism is unsound, it has

\* He should have said *logical*, when he refers to Kant.

been here stated, as the refutation of it will bring the real doctrine of Kant into a clearer light. Schopenhauer has well described the "abstract idea" of Locke as a fugitive phantasm, which gives reality to our symbolical concepts. What is the exact office of this schema? To insure to us that our (empirical) concepts are applicable in experience; to show us that they are not merely logically possible, but objectively real. Now, in empirical concepts this requirement is satisfied, if the content of the concept answers to the schema, as the law of contradiction secures its possibility, or logical correctness. But all our objects of experience stand not only under representative concepts (genus, species, &c.), but also under assertative concepts (substance, cause, &c.). These are the Categories, which were already proved to be part of the (transcendental) content of representations.\* Hence, such concepts must be shown to be applicable to objects of experience just as much as generic concepts are. These latter established their claim by means of the schema just mentioned—how can the Categories do so? Let us look back to the deduction of the Categories. All phenomena were found to agree in one point at all events—they must be *my* phenomena. But this highest and most general synthetical unity of consciousness acts upon phenomena by imposing upon them various phases of this unity, various lesser unities, all dependent upon the highest synthetical unity. These lesser unities were the Categories. These were imposed by the mind upon phenomena, which thus became objects. But how? In this way: the sensations which are the component elements of the object, being received into the mind successively are reproduced,

\* Cf. below, p. 72, note; and also on the schema as an *act*, Critick, pp. 110, 435.

but not simply; the imagination moulds them, and so produces, not only the received phenomena, but also the form of a concept along with them; so that, owing to this addition (which is the transcendental content of the representation), that faculty is properly called *productive*. But what is the form added to the received elements by the imagination or understanding in this its action?

Surely, no additional sensation, surely no heterogenous intellectual something, to be called a Category. The imagination can only have arranged or regulated the relations to *time* of all the sensations. This is the point upon which the imagination fixes; for all our thoughts whatsoever must be in time. The Categories must be thought under this condition. The Categories then are imitated (so to speak) or exemplified in time determinations, which are imposed by the productive imagination upon phenomena. *E. g.*, the pure Category of substance is that which can only be subject—and not predicate. An image of such a concept is impossible; but the nearest sensuous representation of it we can get is something which is absolutely permanent in time. This, then, is the schema under which the imagination brings certain phenomena, which are accordingly declared to be substance. Such is, in brief, the general notion of the schematism, which follows necessarily from the productive imagination, and which forms one of the most remarkable claims of Kant for originality and acuteness.

#### IV. THE VARIATIONS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND EDITIONS OF THE CRITICK, AND THE IDEALISM OF KANT.

§ 1. A most important discussion has been opened in Germany by the supposed discovery of Schopenhauer, who

asserted that these two Editions differed most materially, not only in exposition, but in doctrine. It was said that Kant had become afraid of the idealistic conclusions drawn from his principles, and had suppressed the passages which resolve the whole object into our own sensations, and their form (imposed by the mind also). More particularly, there was one paragraph inserted into the "Deduction," which distinctly states that the matter of our intuitions is given by a source apart from, and independent of, the understanding (§ 17, p. 89); and a refutation of idealism was introduced into the Principles of the pure understanding, which attempted to prove the objective existence of things (of things *per se*) in space, as the condition of our internal experience. Above all, in the First Edition the distinction between soul and body was explained to be a difference, not of substance (of which we know nothing), but of representation; and from this point of view the community or relation of both was discussed. All this was supposed to be contradicted or extenuated in the following Editions, for the purpose, Dr. Fischer thinks, of gaining adherents. The whole question is of great importance; for, in the first place, it must determine the degree of Kant's own conviction as to the truth of his doctrine; secondly, the real import of his system.

Let us, then, first of all, consult the author himself, and see what he says in his second and more elaborate Preface:—"As regards this Second Edition, I have, as might be expected, not wished to let the opportunity escape of remedying, as far as possible, the difficulties and the ob-

scurity from which may have arisen many misapprehensions, which have occurred to many acute men (perhaps without my fault), in their estimate of this work. In the positions themselves, and the grounds of proof, as well as in the form and completeness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter; a fact which is to be ascribed partly to the long consideration to which I subjected my work previous to laying it before the public, partly to the nature of the subject itself, viz. the constitution of a purely speculative reason, which contains a veritable system of members, where everything is organic—that is, where the whole is for the sake of each individual part, and each individual for the sake of the whole; so that any defect, however trifling—whether it be a positive error, or a mere deficiency—is certain to betray itself in use.\* . . . But in the exposition much remains to be done, and in this respect I have attempted to improve the Second Edition, with the intention of clearing away, partly, the misapprehension of the *Æsthetic*, especially of the concept of Time;† partly the *obscurity in the Deduction* of the Catagories;‡ partly to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstrations of the Principles of the pure understanding;§ partly, in fine, to remove mis-

\* Cf. p. xxxix. of the Critick.

† Kant added Section I. § 6, on Time, and the General Remarks, II.-IV. (p. 409). In his Introduction, Sections I. and II. were greatly expanded, and V. and VI. added.

‡ From Section II. § 11, of the Transcendental Logic to the end of the Deduction was completely rewritten.

§ Under each of the Definitions of the Principles, the first paragraph, headed “proof,” was added; as well as an Appendix, entitled, “General Remark on the System of Principles.”

apprehension as to the paralogisms charged against rational psychology\*. . . . But the necessary consequence of this improvement, except we made the work altogether too long, is a slight loss to the reader, since a good deal (that did not indeed belong substantially to the completeness of the whole) had to be omitted, or put into a shorter form,† which, nevertheless, many readers might not wish to lose. This was done to make room for my present, and, I venture now to hope, intelligible exposition, which at bottom, as regards the propositions, and even in their method of proof, *changes absolutely nothing*; but still varies here and there in the method of the exposition in such a manner as could not be managed by interpolation. This slight loss, *which, by the way, can be supplied, 'if any one chooses, by a comparison with the First Edition*, is, I hope, more than counterbalanced by the greater clearness" [of the present Edition].‡

In the face of this declaration, which explicitly asserts that absolutely nothing has been altered in the system, and which invites the reader to compare the two Editions, we are told that the Second Edition is a mutilated, distorted, and depraved work, caused by the weakness of old age, and the fear of public opinion in Kant!! The weakness of old age is indeed a likely excuse for the man who, after this time, wrote and published the Criticks of the Judgment and Practical Reason, and the treatise

\* From the words, "but we shall, for brevity's sake" (p. 241), the whole discussion was rewritten.

† The third chapter of the *Analytic* (on Phenomena and Noumena), and the *Refutation of Rational Psychology*, were considerably shortened.

‡ Cf. p. xli. of the Critick.

on Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason! the fear of men was strong indeed on him who was at the time preparing this last treatise, and who did not alter a word in his refutation of all speculative theology!

As this question is now, so far as I know, brought before the English reader for the first time, and as Dr. Fischer sides strongly with Schopenhauer, it would not have been fair to open the discussion without giving the reader the means of judging for himself, by comparing the two Editions; he will find, accordingly, translated in the Appendices, all the passages of any importance which appear in the First Edition only. The results of my own comparison are only here indicated as briefly as possible; and, first of all, the general conclusion which was arrived at is this: that we may safely defy the advocates of the First Edition to find any doctrine there stated to which we are unable to find a corresponding assertion in the Second; or to point out a supposed alteration in the Second Edition which we cannot prove to be supported by quotations from the original work.\* The assertion of the honest author is most decidedly true; in the propositions themselves, and even in their proof, *absolutely nothing* has been changed. But we must enter into details.

Let us interrogate Dr. Fischer's commentary as to what are the chief points at issue. The sum and substance of all the alterations, according to him, is this, that the First Edition preached a pure idealism, in which the whole

\* In Appendix C. are added short foot-notes both showing the special points of agreement ignored by the critics, and explaining the supposed points of difference; and these will save us in this place from quotations, as well as from the discussion of them.

object was analyzed into our intuitions and sensations, objectified by our concepts, and so there remains nothing at all without us:\* that, on the contrary, the Second Edition allows and admits a something—a hidden *X* Dr. Fischer calls it—which produces, or is the hidden cause of, our sensations. This difference (he states) we first meet in comparing the Deduction of the Categories in both Editions; and I suppose the two passages which are capital in the controversy are § 3, in Appendix A., and p. 89, in the English translation of the Second Edition. But surely there is here no contradiction, though we can see what suggested its existence. The whole discussion in the First Edition goes to prove that the concept of an *object* is a thing constructed by the mind; and that, hence, to refer our phenomena, because they have a necessary unity, to the action upon us of an object of the same quality, without us, as their cause, is wrong. For, says Kant (and Dr. Fischer), analyze any object, and what is it?

Suppose, now, a red geranium. We perceive certain colors, scarlet and green, and a certain form, and we believe it is a single thing or substance. Very well. The form is the intuition of space, imposed on all sensations by the mind; and the unity of the parts into one whole, and the regarding it as one object, comes from our bringing it under the Category of substance, which is also wholly supplied by the mind, and hence requires no foreign cause to account for it. And the red and green colors are subjective affections of our sensibility. It is

\* See below, p. 172.

the mind, then, and the mind only, which makes *objects*; for the objects mean not only mere representations, but an order and unity among them, and the unity necessary. Now, nature in Kant's book means this regular order in phenomena—this classifying of all our sensations under certain heads, and bringing them together under various unities. Hence, the pure Understanding makes *objects*, and so makes *nature*. This is the language of the First Edition. "But there is one thing in the above demonstration [says Kant, in the Second Edition], of which I could not make abstraction, and that is, that the manifold, to be intuited, must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it; but how, remains here undetermined." For if (he argues) this were not the case, our understanding would have a power of intuition, and the Categories would be superfluous. Now, I think, in this important passage he has completed his account of the matter, which he had left unfinished in his First Edition; and, observe, he does not say: I desire to add this point to my original demonstration, but, it is a point of which I could not, and did not, make abstraction. It is true, indeed, that the sensations are subjective—that we meet them within us—but still there are certain elements in them which compel us to believe that they are produced, not by ourselves, but by some foreign cause. Of course, it is quite possible that the foreign cause *may* be some occult law of the *Ego*, beyond consciousness, producing these sensations; but there is not the slightest ground to affirm, or even to suspect this. If we mean by the mind, the whole range of possible consciousness, such an occult action would more properly be classed as not-mind. Hence, most philosophers

.

dogmatize and assert a non-*Ego* as the cause of such sensations. Kant, seeing there was no evidence whatsoever on either side, quietly says that the question remains here undetermined. His solution of the problem of the *Ego* and non-*Ego* is a problematical pluralism, which may not impossibly be a real monism, but upon which we can never hope for the smallest additional evidence. However this may be, the red of the leaf of the geranium, and the green of the stalk, these colors cannot be applied at random. Grass is always green, and the clear sky blue. Why is this never reversed? The cause is not in the [conscious] mind, for it can neither impose it, nor even anticipate it. It may, perhaps, anticipate that all objects must have some color, but *what* color must be learned by experience, and this consciousness is regular. To ignore this fact, and to say that all sensations are purely our representations, is to omit an important element in the object. But it is equally false to say that objects are derived from such an external source, for an object does not mean a mere sensation, but a combination of sensations in an intuition, under a concept.

Thus Kant was neither an absolute idealist, nor a realist; he was a critic. His system being empirical (so far as carrying on an investigation founded upon, and not adverse to, facts of consciousness is empirical), he never meant absolutely to deny any world beyond the subject, but only to determine what belonged to the subject, and what to the object. Nor did he deny that the subject, by some occult, and to us inconceivable action, might produce what is called the object; but this question he leaves undetermined. What we mean

by the *Ego*, or subject, is what can be conceived as belonging to our personal self, not some occult and totally unknown action, which might just as well be God or an external world. So far as to the difference of *doctrine* between the two Editions of the "Deduction," upon the question of idealism.

§ 2. But as to the order of the *exposition*, there are important varieties of detail, and the most remarkable point is this, that Kant thought he had removed the *obscurity* of the deduction in the Second Edition, whereas any one who has ever taken the trouble to compare this part of the two Editions, seems invariably and justly struck with the great superiority in clearness of the earlier form. We must first discount the later portion of § 20 and the whole of § 21 (pp. 93-97) in the Second Edition, as being directed to "clearing away difficulties about the concept of Time," and explaining how we know ourselves only as phenomena; and also leave out of account the paragraph just discussed. This being done, there remain two slight differences: (a) apprehension and reproduction are made both *a priori* and *a posteriori* functions of the mind, in the First Edition, whereas in the Second they are chiefly insisted on as *a posteriori*, the *a priori* faculty of apprehension, of the First Edition, being apparently merged in the synthetical unity of apperception: and by so doing, I think he removed a possible objection; for in the First Edition he called both apprehension and reproduction on the one hand, and productive imagination and apperception, on the other, transcendental *actions* of the mind, so confusing under one title mere conditions of the possibility of objects (the former), with faculties which positively produced them (the latter).

This can be seen from his own exposition given in Appendix A. He there justifies the claim of the former two faculties, by showing that without them objects would be impossible ; but of the two latter he shows that they are indispensable active functions in forming objects. ( $\beta$ ) In the First Edition he systematically enumerates the *a priori* conditions of objects : apprehension, reproduction, and necessary recognition and unity ; whereas in the Second, though in two places he hastily mentions the analysis (pp. 63, 80), he starts at once into the synthetic unity of apperception, and dilates upon it at greater length. Now, there is no doubt that this is the hardest point of his deduction, and was probably least understood, and I may here observe, that Kant honestly confesses in the conclusion of his Second Preface that he feels he has no power of explaining himself clearly ; and true to his word, he always thinks he is explaining a matter by talking about it and going round it, and enforcing it by mere variation of language ; and yet, in most cases, his first statement is far the best. The peculiarity should be carefully noted by the reader, otherwise he will often expect to find a new truth after a former one has been clearly stated, and will puzzle himself to see the drift of Kant, when he is merely insisting upon and repeating what has already been said in less difficult and cumbrous language. This I believe to be the whole cause of the differences and of the greater obscurity of the Second Edition on the Deduction of the Categories. This peculiarity of obscuring a matter by over-explanation is a very ordinary phenomenon, and will not appear strange to those, for instance, who are in the habit of hearing arguments in Chancery—or upon speculative Theology. Nor should

we forget that Kant's clumsiness of thinking is conveyed to us in a style exceeding even the ordinary clumsiness of the writings of German professors, to which Dr. Fischer's work is so pleasant an exception.

§ 3. As regards the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, the point urged by Dr. Fischer (below, p. 188-90), on the importance of recognizing mind and matter as only different *representations*, is, I conceive, stated as plainly as even he could desire in the "Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism" (p. 252), and yet this is the doctrine which Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer think he meant to obscure in the remodelled work. Here is the passage: "But if we consider that these two sorts of objects [soul and body] are thus [by the intuition of them] not distinguished internally, but only so far as each *appears* without the other, so that the basis of the phenomena of matter, *quà* thing *per se*, might not be at all so heterogeneous [from the basis of the phenomenon of mind], then the difficulty vanishes" [*i. e.* of the community of soul and body].

At the point where he commenced his alterations (p. 141), Kant tacks them on to his previous remarks by the observation: "We shall, for brevity's sake, allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connexion." He then cuts down the discussion to nearly one-third of its original length. But is it possible, the reader may ask, that he omitted no doctrine by so doing? Especially the title of the fourth paralogism, and the special refutation of Des Cartes (based on transcendental idealism) seems almost altogether lost? To this we answer: that though the present discussion was abridged, all the substance of it was given either here or in the other im-

portant additions made in the Second Edition. In particular, the refutation of problematical (and empirical) idealism has been transferred to an earlier place (pp. 166, *sqq.*), so as to render it superfluous here. This passage we shall discuss presently. He left untouched the fullest and clearest exposition of transcendental idealism in his book, the sixth section of the antinomy of the Pure Reason. He further (p. 244) refers us himself to the general remark which concludes the discussion on the Principles (added in the Second Edition), and to the section on noumena (altered in the Second Edition).

In one point only does the later form, *perhaps*, differ from the earlier. At first he had been content with merely asserting the equal reality of internal and external phenomena, showing them to be both empirically real, and both transcendently ideal.\* But it seems that difficulties were still found in admitting this. People were so accustomed to regard the knowledge of our internal states as immediate, and opposed to that of the external, that Kant felt obliged to insist more strongly on the point, and to assert that not only are they perfectly equal and on a par as to validity, but what is more, that the external are the necessary condition, without which we could not possess the internal. Perhaps passages might be found asserting this even in the First Edition. It was exactly the opposite of the received theory. The plain sense of this Refutation of idealism has been wondrously misunderstood by the commentators. They actually believe that Kant was endeavouring to establish empirically external *things per se!!* Forgetting

\* Cf. throughout Appendix C., where I have added notes, pointing out the exact amount of variation between the two Editions.

Kant's technical use of the word *object* (and also of thing), ignoring the important sixth section of the antinomy, they never dreamt of the only consistent and reasonable sense which the passage could possibly bear, and fathered upon the great philosopher the most extravagantly inconsistent blunder which their ingenuity could have devised. Accordingly, the whole passage below (p. 131) seems incorrect, and misinterprets Kant, not to speak of the false and anti-Kantian use of the terms, *res* and *ideæ*.

§ 4. It remains to show how the error arose of ascribing to Kant so extraordinary an aberration of intellect ; and in doing this we shall also be able to explain the argument, which in the Second Edition has given such offence. It has generally been supposed that Kant, in this difficult passage, wished to demonstrate the existence of transcendental objects (*per se*) in space, as the necessary condition of our internal experience. Most assuredly, if this were the scope of the passage, nothing could be more absurd and inconsistent, as is well shown by Dr. Fischer below (p. 131).<sup>\*</sup> Space being strictly our representation, the existence of a thing *per se* in space is contradictory to both the spirit and the letter of the Kantian philosophy. But the intention of his argument was quite

\* As a proof that Dr. Fischer must have read this argument carelessly, we may note the fact, that he distinctly asserts it to be directed against Berkeley, while Kant just as positively asserts it not to be so, but against Des Cartes (p. 167). Kant first dismisses Berkeley with one sentence (p. 166), in which he pointedly repudiates the absurdity of noumena in space, as already refuted by his *Æsthetic*. This is in itself a conclusive proof that his Refutation of idealism has been misunderstood. This note should have been placed on p. 132, to which the reader may refer. Sir William Hamilton has been guilty of the same error as to the general scope of Kant's argument.

different. Leaving the question of the relation of things *per se* to phenomena just as before, he writes this passage to oppose the theory that our external intuitions, and external *objects* (in the strict Kantian sense of the word object) are less real than our internal intuitions in time. This theory was and is still very prevalent: the association school, at present led by Messrs. Mill and Bain, seem to hold it. Now Kant wanted to make it clear that external perception is not mere imagination, that it is as real as any part of our experience;\* that, in fact, the internal experience from which some have attempted to deduce our external intuitions, would be impossible but for these very intuitions. If the reader will peruse the passage in Kant (p. 167, *sqq.*) from this point of view, and remember what he means by an *object*, and how carefully he has defined it, he will see that asserting the reality of objects in space is not the absurdity of introducing things *per se* into our intuition. The use of the word *things* need not make him stumble; for in p. 182 he will see the same term used unmistakeably in the critical sense for objects;† and the discussion, supposing it to be directed against the view above stated, would naturally lead him to use the word *things*, as implying most distinctly the reality of our external intuitions. Indeed, this form of expression is not peculiar to the Second Edition, but is found in the original work.‡ “The sole aim of our remarks,” he continues, “has, however, been to prove that internal experience in general is only possi-

\* This point is argued again and again in his First Edition; cf. Appendix C., pp. 349, *sqq.*

† And in p. 352 of the Critick, on which see the note below, p. 254.

‡ Cf. Appendix C., p. 350.

ble through *external experience* in general." It is not necessary to remind the reader that throughout the whole Critick *experience* is uniformly and distinctly used for cognition of phenomena, and of phenomena only. This sentence then seems, by itself, decisive that Kant cannot have had any intention of establishing the absurdity of noumena in space; and, comparing this discussion with the First Edition, he calls it very properly an addition *only in the method of proof*.\*

I confess there are expressions in the note to his Second Preface which might suggest and foster the wrong view; but even then the argument that the intellectual representation of the *Ego* cannot form the permanent correlate to sensuous changes, because heterogeneous, could not but have suggested to Kant the absurdity of making a noumenon, which is far more heterogeneous, the corresponding correlate of phenomena.† We might just as well imagine that the first analogy (of permanance and substance) went to prove the existence of noumenal substances. The result, then, of the whole discussion is this: space is as real as time (First Edition), and internal experience even presupposes it (Second Edition).

Let us here sum up in a few words Kant's theory, and show how it differs from idealism. (a) Space being as real as time (*quà* intuitions), existence is suggested to us in both with equal reality. (β) We are as much compelled to assume a permanent something in space, as we are to assume the *Ego* in time, or even more so. (γ) In both cases a transcendental object must be supposed, but is wholly unknown, and may be the same in

\* Preface, p. xl.

† For the real relation of phenomena to noumena, cf. the Critick, pp. 308-9.

both cases, or not. We have no evidence at all on the subject. ( $\delta$ ) Hence, it would be absurd, if it were supposed the same, to call it either spiritual or material; and noumenal monism could not lead us to infer noumenal Idealism or Realism. ( $\epsilon$ ) It being impossible to know anything about the noumenon (and as we cannot even apply the law of Parcimony, which is only a regulative principle in discussing phenomena), the critical philosophy results in problematical pluralism.

The principle of this passage will be found very well enunciated by Dr. Fischer, below, p. 178, as taken from the First Edition (Appendix C., p. 355). He shows how Kant had already there perceived that the permanent which helps to determine our internal changes must be *external*; and also that external experience has just as much authority, and dignity, and evidence, as internal. But, being still opposed, and perhaps vexed by continued assertions of idealism, he determined to show that internal experience was not only not superior, but even necessarily dependent upon external for its very possibility. The fact that this latter argument *replaces* the discussion of the First Edition just referred to, is, I conceive, an additional proof of the correctness of this view.

#### V. THE INTUITION OF SELF NOT IMMEDIATE.

§ 1. The most remarkable feature in Mr. Mansel's philosophy is undoubtedly the point which he (and indeed, on the question of liberty, M. Cousin also) has drawn to light from Des Cartes. The questions of substance, cause, and of liberty, Mr. Mansel settles upon much simpler, and at first sight more satisfactory grounds, than Sir W. Hamilton, or any of his other predecessors,

by assuming (for I contend he cannot prove it), that self is presented immediately, as substance, as cause (determining its own modifications), and hence as free. This theory comes under the scope of the present work, because Kant's opinion was exactly the reverse, and three important passages were added in his Second Edition (pp. 41, 93-7, and 241), to illustrate and explain his opinion. There was, probably, no position in his whole system which caused such astonishment and opposition, as the statement that we know ourselves (in consciousness) only as phenomena. Hence, in altering his work, he brought this question into special prominence. The proposition objected to is a direct corollary from his general principles. For knowledge Kant holds to be a complex fact, consisting of the elements of sensation, pure intuition, and the necessary unity produced by the Categories. Nothing can be known except through the faculty of knowing; and hence all objects of knowledge are necessarily subject to the above-named conditions, the latter two of which are imposed by the mind. (That the mind should be affected by its own activity is a simple enough statement. Here is an empirical illustration. A man cannot exert himself violently to catch or hold an object, without heating himself; this heat which he feels is then a case of his being affected by his own activity. And Kant himself, in his note (p. 96), gives a psychological example—an act of attention, where the activity of the understanding affects the mind so much as to determine it.) Hence, the mind cannot become an object to itself, without being subject to time (p. 41), and the synthetical unity of the understanding, which must subject it to one of the Categories

(p. 94). Again, as an object of cognition presupposes necessarily the fusion of all these elements, the elements individually cannot be objects of the same cognition (p. 241, *sq.*).

This last point is exactly the reverse of Des Cartes' principle, who held that *because* self was a necessary element in all consciousness, therefore it must also be *known* by consciousness.\* Kantians, therefore, will not be disposed to take up with satisfaction the doctrine of Mr. Mansel, that self is immediately presented. What does he mean by telling us that substance is given us in this way? What does he mean by substance? Not the incompressible, of course, and yet this is allowed by himself to be a very important element in our notion of substance—nor the extended either. What then? the *permanent*, and the permanent only; for to speak of the *substratum* of mental phenomena is too vague a term to require serious consideration, and in any case must rather *follow*, than *antecede*, the establishing of self as a substance. But, if he desires to establish self merely as a permanent within us, surely, as it is on Kant's view the necessary condition of every act of consciousness, it must be in any case a permanent condition, and we have no need to postulate an immediate presentation. Again, what knowledge can we gain by the immediate presentation, which as soon as we attempt to conceive it falls under the limitations of all thought (according to Mr. Mansel himself), the object of which cannot be defined, being simple, which gives us, in fact, a *je ne sais quoi*, without any information, light, or benefit, except to use it (and a

\* That is, if thought be the essence (substance) of mind, which is the usual interpretation of Des Cartes' theory.

very convenient weapon it is) against representationists, sceptics, and heretics ?

The question, I suppose, must ultimately be brought to the test of each man's consciousness, and it is probable that most men will be rather disposed to agree with Kant. Are you conscious of being presented with yourself as a substance ? or are you only conscious that in every act of thought you must presuppose a permanent self, and always refer it to self, while still that self you cannot grasp, and it remains a hidden basis upon which you erect the structure of your thoughts ? Which of these opinions will most men adopt ? After all, Kant's view is the simpler, and the more consistent with the ordinary language.

§ 2. There is a point, too, connected with this, where Mr. Mansel has taken an important doctrine from Kant, but does not apply it similarly. He holds\* that change in time implies successive modifications in a permanent subject. This is the view brought out in Kant's first Analogy of experience. Now comes the question, what is the permanent, which corresponds to, and renders possible, the succession of my internal states ? Mr. Mansel at once answers, the presented substance, *self*. Kant, in his Second Edition,† takes care to observe, that the representation *Ego*, being purely intellectual, and having none of the predicates of intuition (of internal sense), cannot serve as the permanent correlate of the successive states in the internal sense ; in fact, the permanent must be given in sense, in intuition, to be a correlate to our changing states in time. Hence, Kant holds that it is the permanent in space which forms the

\* Metaphysics, p. 364.

† Preface, p. xl, and p. 169.

correlate to our internal changes ; and so he demonstrates the reality, and vindicates the dignity, of our external representations. Surely, if we appeal fairly to consciousness, most men will again agree with Kant. Suppose we ask any man what he means by his thoughts or imaginations ever changing and fleeting, he will say they are so, not as opposed to his permanent self, but as opposed to the permanent objects of the external world, and all the hallucinations' of the imagination are distinctly so contrasted. It appears, then, that Mr. Mansel has here misapplied Kant's principle.

He holds a farther opinion (suggested by Kant's theory of the intelligible character), that the self, which is the permanent corresponding to our internal changes, is altogether independent of time-conditions,\* so that the permanence of the *Ego* is not existence in all time, but some sort of inconceivable *nunc stans*. Surely no appeal to consciousness can support such a doctrine. And Mr. Mansel himself† makes personal existence itself to ~~consist~~ ~~exist~~ in consciousness, by which I suppose he must mean consciousness in time—a doctrine not only opposed to the opinion just stated, but also to the very important fact of latent modifications.

As to the question of the notion of cause being presented in the relation of ourselves to our volitions, possibly Mr. Mansel is right, and his doctrine may be a valuable contribution to mental philosophy. It is possible that we may be presented to ourselves as *cause*, though not as substance. For in this case it is merely the relation of ourselves to our determinations which is presented,‡ and

\* Proleg. Log., p. 140.

† Metaph., p. 355, *sq.*

‡ Cf. below, Appendix D, p. 374.

we need not inquire further into the nature or constitution of the cause. Perhaps, to use Kant's terms, we are indeed conscious of the *causality* of the subject, but are not so of the *cause* or subject itself.\* So far as I have been able to interrogate my consciousness, this appears to be the fact ; perhaps my readers, if they consider the matter carefully, will agree with me. But I am slow to speak dogmatically upon the subject, as there are several difficulties, which we cannot here discuss adequately, and which are therefore omitted for the present. The questions of cause and of liberty I hope to be able to treat in connexion with Kant's ethical system.

Sir Wm. Hamilton's theory, that self (together with Time) is the form merely of the internal sense, is also opposed to Kant's view. For, if it were a pure form of sense, it must also be itself an intuition, like Space and Time ; and Metaphysic, being based upon an intuition, might become a veritable science. The *Ego* in Kant is no intuition, but an intellectual representation, and lies at the basis of both the forms of intuition and the Categories.†

#### VI. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.

"Can we,"‡ says Kant, "isolate Reason ; and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it alone, and through which it can be applied to objects ; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, the duty of which it is to give a certain form to given cognitions—a form which is called logical, and through

\* Cf. below, p. 238, and Appendix D, p. 372.

† Critick, p. 98, note, and *seq.*

which the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated to one another, and lower rules to higher, in so far as this can be done by comparison? This is the question which we have at present to answer." And his answer to the question has been made the subject of attack and criticism by almost all succeeding philosophers. Schopenhauer, Sir William Hamilton, and Mr. Mansel, are perfectly unanimous. And yet Kant deliberately adopted this much-abused distinction, and held a real difference between the two faculties. We must ask, then: Why did he make them distinct? and how far? Has he seen the difficulties suggested by his critics? And, lastly, Have there been circumstances to mislead them, which being explained, we shall find that either Kant saw what they did not, or that they really saw what he did, and that they only differ from him in words? Or has his love of symmetry led him into a false system?

The first thing to be observed is, that in classing both Reason and Understanding under Transcendental Logic, as opposed to *Æsthetic*, Kant does not seem to make the two faculties as distinct from one another as they are from the sensibility, and this agrees with his statement (p. 256), "that the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but only frees the *conceptions of the understanding* from the unavoidable limitation of possible experience."\* At the same time, he uniformly tells us that the Reason has to do with the unconditioned, which is totally beyond the province of the understanding. Let us endeavour to follow Kant's method of establishing and deducing the Ideas of the Reason as the product of a special faculty. "We may expect," he says (p. 212), "according to the analogy of the understanding-con-

\* Cf. also below, p. 4 (note).

cepts, that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental." This has been his clue throughout. How did it work in the case of the understanding? All the acts of the understanding were judgments, and all such judgments, are cases of the understanding producing logical forms by means of analytical unity. The principle is stated in a short passage,\* without any proof proper being added. Hence, judgments, as acts of analysis, imply a previous synthesis, on which they depend. The various forms of judgments, then, suggested the various *a priori* syntheses, which produced the varieties in objects of intuition afterwards analyzed. These various *a priori* syntheses (or rather possibilities of synthesis), were found to be applicable to phenomena of intuition, and hence objectively valid; consequently, the objective value of Categories in experience was demonstrated. But Kant will not call them *principles*, because they depend on *a priori* intuition or possible experience, and are not based merely upon conceptions. Synthetical propositions based on conceptions alone are real principles. And what is the use of principles in this sense? As objects of intuition are reduced to unity (in judgments) under concepts, so these concepts must be reduced to higher unity under principles. This is the true meaning of the syllogistic process, or *logical* procedure of the Reason. The major term is the highest, under which the middle, and thereby the minor, is subsumed. But this analytical logical process, must presuppose a synthetical, transcendental basis, without which the logical process could never have originated: it is this, "Given the conditioned, all its con-

\* Critick, p. 63, to which I refer the reader, as well as to my note, below, p. 72.

ditions, *including the unconditioned*, are given." The synthetical element is here obvious.\* The conditioned relates analytically to a condition, but not to the unconditioned.\* This, then, is the highest synthetical principle of the Reason. Just as the synthetical unity of apperception was the highest principle of the understanding, under which the Categories stood as phases or developments, so the three Ideas stand exactly in the same way under this highest principle of Reason. As the forms of the judgments indicated the Categories, so the forms of syllogisms indicate the Ideas; and these Ideas must be perfectly unknown to, and unattainable by, the understanding, the condition and synthesis of which is always conditioned (p. 218). Be it remembered that the only necessity for this transcendental principle of the Reason is to produce unity in our conceptions (not in things), hence it must have complete validity subjectively, logically, and regulatively; and, as the Ideas are necessary to produce unity and completeness in our knowledge, they are transcendental. But, if we attempt to make them objectively necessary, and impose them upon things (in experience) as their law, our syllogism becomes transcendent.†

The Reason, then, as regards experience, can be only used analytically, whereas the understanding is used synthetically. The Reason is synthetical only as regards our cognition (regarded subjectively), not as regards objects. Any attempt to apply it to objects synthetically must result in illusion and error.

\* Critick, p. 172.

† Cf. Critick (p. 218). This is the general result, which the reader may obtain for himself by comparing the following passages, Critick, pp. 212-3, 230, 257, 386-9.

If all this be true, was Kant right in calling Reason a special faculty, or should he have included it under the understanding? The question as to whether two faculties be identical or not, can only be settled by examining their aim, or their processes, or their value in attaining truth. In all these respects understanding and Reason differ. In their aims, the latter aims at the unconditioned unknown to the former. Hence, the latter systematizes, the former only interprets our experience. Their difference in processes is, I confess, merely one of degree, but it affects them as to their value in attaining truth: the latter has no objective value—the former has. As to their objects, the latter is occupied merely about our concepts; the former, about our experience. These marked contrasts seem to me to justify, though not to necessitate, the subdivision of the Transcendental Logic under two separate faculties.

Kant's case is strengthened if we regard the end he had in view. The great question he desired to solve was this: how are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? Here the distinction between Reason and understanding becomes vital, and more important even than that between sensibility and understanding; and surely almost any classification would be admitted, if specially adapted to the objects we have in view.

The vague objection, that both judgment and reasoning are acts of Comparison, and therefore should be treated as identical, has no weight. The wide and misleading use of such very misty words as Comparison, Limitation, Relation, &c., should either be avoided, or at least not set up as the basis for a classification. The farther objection, that both processes are go-

verned by the laws of Identity and Contradiction, appears to ignore the fact that in synthetical judgments these laws are only negative conditions, and by no means suffice for determining the validity of the judgment—a fact which Mr. Mansel seems to have forgotten.

One more remark is perhaps necessary ; it has already been observed that Kant himself states the Reason gives birth to no new conceptions, but only frees those of the understanding from conditions. If so, it may, lastly, be objected, why call Reason a special faculty ? To this it might, at first sight, be replied, that Kant himself establishes that some Categories only can be raised to the unconditioned, viz., those where a regressive series is possible (Critick, p. 257). But I have no doubt of the truth of what Mr. Monck has suggested to me, that this passage, which is worded generally, only applies to the cosmological Ideas, and that the Psychological and Theological Ideas appear to correspond to the other Categories. Still we may defend Kant, by pointing out that the faculty which imposes conditions can hardly be identical with that which advises us to break down and overstep all conditions ; and we may recall attention to the important difference as to *aim* between the faculties, or rather to the fact that there is a conscious aim in the operations of Reason, which can hardly be said to be the case in the mere judging faculty. This point seems to have suggested to Kant his much abused distinction.

I hope these scattered hints upon the subject will show the reader that Kant both saw the difficulty urged by his critics, and that he has at least given a reasonable solution of it.

## VII. THE REASON A SOURCE OF DELUSION.

With the question just discussed is connected the last and gravest charge brought against the great Critic—that, having made the Reason a special faculty, he made it a source of delusion, and of delusions unavoidable and insoluble. “He explicitly declares,” says Sir W. Hamilton,\* “Reason (or Intelligence)† to be, essentially and of its own nature, delusive, and thus supersedes the distinction between Intelligence *within* its legitimate sphere of operation, impeccable, and Intelligence *beyond* that sphere, affording (by abuse) the occasions of error.” I cannot refrain from forthwith quoting (as an antidote to this gross misrepresentation) the words of Kant: “The Ideas of Pure Reason cannot be, in their own nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the Reason itself; and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation can itself contain mirages and delusions. It is to be expected, therefore, that these Ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob of sophists raise against Reason the cry of inconsistency and contradiction, and affect to depise the government of that faculty, because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its beneficial influence alone that they owe the position and intelligence which enable them to criticize and blame its procedure.”‡ Was

\* Disc., p. 633.

† Observe the total misapprehension of Kant's special use of the word Reason. Cf. also the passages quoted below, p. 163, note.

‡ Critick, p. 401.

there ever a more flagrant falsification of a philosopher's opinions! "He makes," says Sir William, in another place,\* "the Reason a *complexus* of antilogies." "The paralogism," says Kant, "has its foundation in the nature of the human Reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, *though not insoluble*, mental illusion."† But all the critics, in short, are unanimous that Kant has shown the Reason to be the arena of contradictions, which, not being solved by him, nor being even soluble, give rise to complete scepticism. Most of them never hint that Kant has given any solution of these antinomies at all; if they do, they confine themselves to the *sceptical* exposition. Nowhere do we find the least mention, far less appreciation, of the *critical* (*i. e.* Kantian) solution. What is this solution? It is in brief this: in all four antinomies the theses and antitheses are not contradictions, but contraries. Hence, we cannot argue from the falsity of one to the truth of the other. All the arguments, therefore, offered, are invalid; but in the case of the latter two a modification in their *statement* makes them subcontraries, in which case we cannot argue from the truth of one to the falsity of the other.

A short analysis of this whole discussion, beginning with section 4 (p. 298), may not be unacceptable to the student of Kant, and will answer the question clearly.

This section, then, is headed: "*Of the Transcendental Problems of the pure Reason, in so far as they must absolutely admit of a possible solution;*" and shows that, while all questions raised by the pure Reason must be answerable by the pure Reason, the cosmological questions in particular can be even answered as regards the nature

\* Lects., II., p. 543.

† Critick, p. 237.

of their object; for it must be given empirically. The pretence that these questions are insoluble is distinctly asserted to be only a blunder of the dogmatists, which really means that a dogmatical answer to them is impossible (pp. 302-3). We, accordingly, proceed to section 5—the *Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems*. Dr. Fischer calls this a *solution*, which it is not, but is merely a necessary way of exhibiting the difficulties of the question, and their nature. This sceptical method had already been described by Kant (p. 265); and he repeats it here, “in order to give us an irresistible summons to institute a critical investigation” (p. 304). Its result shows that the empirical synthesis requisite for the cosmological Ideas is in all cases too great or too small for the concepts of the understanding. “We are thus led,” he concludes, “to the *well-founded suspicion*, that the error arises from subjective causes.”

The clue to the real critical solution is to be found in the doctrine of Transcendental idealism, which he here states with great explicitness, and in the very terms so much praised by Dr. Fischer in the First Edition.\* The empirical reality and independence of internal and external phenomena are here asserted, and the position of the transcendental object is exactly the same as it will be found in Appendix C., and below, in Dr. Fischer's work, p. 172, *sq.* This brings us to the 7th section: “*The Critical Decision of the Cosmological Conflict of the Reason with itself.*” And this decision is two-fold. First, by the aid of the distinction drawn by transcendental idealism between the pure Category and the Ca-

\* I have before called the reader's attention to the important fact, that Kant left this discussion exactly as it stood in the First Edition.

tegory as applied empirically to phenomena, he shows that the *argument* on both sides is a fallacy, or *sophisma figuræ dictionis*. "But the dispute between the parties has not been settled in this respect, that they have not yet been convinced that either one or both of them were wrong in the thing itself which they asserted (*viz.* in their conclusion), although they might not have known how to support it by proper arguments" (pp. 312-3). Accordingly, the second part of the critical solution applies to the assertions of both parties merely as true or false propositions, and here our course is again two-fold; we prove either that the conclusions in the form asserted are in themselves (not only not proved), but have no sense, being based upon a transcendental illusion; or else we show that, by remodelling, or completing the statement of the grounds of claim (p. 329), it is possible to reconcile both parties, by showing that their arguments indeed were idle, but that the propositions they asserted, when rightly understood, may possibly be both true. In fact, in this latter case the opposed propositions may be subcontraries; whereas in the former, being contraries, they may be (logically), and indeed are (critically), both false. And observe that this former solution applies to all four antinomies, as Kant has expressly stated (p. 315), and is shown by the sceptical exposition (p. 305), being the only possible critical solution, so long as we merely regard the extent of the series only (p. 328). He proceeds, in sections 8 and 9, §§ 1 and 2, to develop this solution. What is the real nature and proper use of the Idea of the totality of the synthesis of phenomena? It is a merely regulative principle for the extension of our experience, and differs according as the

*regressus* is in *infinitum* or *indefinitum* (pp. 318–321). In section 9 this principle is applied to the solution of the first and second cosmical problems. But when Kant arrives at the third problem, he deserts this argument, and bring into consideration (not the extent), but the *nature* of the series. The conception which lies at the basis of these Ideas may contain “either a synthesis of the homogeneous or of the *heterogeneous*, which [latter] can at least be conceded in the dynamical relation of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary and contingent.” This last answer, then, applies to the third and fourth antinomies only, on which some further remarks will be made below.

But, nevertheless, say the critics, he holds the Reason to be naturally the source of delusion. Certainly; but so does every philosopher, from Bacon down, and indeed in every age and time. For what is philosophy, but either the exposition of truths misunderstood, or the reclaiming of truths distorted, by ordinary men?\*. Not only is this the opinion of philosophers in general—it has been enunciated in very strong terms by Kant’s assailants,† and Mr. Mansel tells us, “there are some principles of our nature perpetually leading us astray.”‡ This Kant held also, but held along with it what all his critics held, that when Reason leads us into error, Reason must also be able to lead us out again. The fourth section of his Discussion on the antinomies is headed thus: “Of the transcendental problems of the pure Reason, in so far as they must absolutely admit of a possible solution.” He

\* On this point, see the remarks of Mr. Mill in his last work (on Hamilton), p. 249.

† *E. g.* Sir Wm. Hamilton, *Discuss.*, p. 833. ‡ *Proleg. Log.*, p. 153.

gives (p. 358) a rational explanation of one of these illusions as a phenomenon of the human mind. "The very essence of reason," he says, "consists in its ability to give an account of all our conceptions, &c., upon objective—or, when they happen to be illusory or fallacious, upon subjective—grounds." He opens his Appendix to the *Dialectic* with a statement of the irresistible illusions of the Reason; but forthwith adds, "Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and employment of these powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim." "And thus too," he says, "the antinomial conflict of Reason with itself is completely settled, inasmuch as we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposed assertions of the Reason, but have shown the meaning of the Ideas, in which Reason is at harmony with itself, and the false comprehension of which gave rise to these assertions."\*

In the face of all this evidence, which could be greatly multiplied, it is wonderful to see the pertinacity with which succeeding philosophers charge Kant with inconsistency and scepticism, and with dividing the Reason against itself.†

Never was charge more groundless. Natural illusion he did hold; and one of his great merits was (like Plato in the *Parmenides*) to see that not only the senses, but the Rea-

\* Critick, p. 321. It is not necessary to quote further, but I refer the reader to pp. 433 and 451-2.

† I doubt if any of them observed the ambiguity of his use of the word; it means, in Kant, either the general faculty which distinguishes us from brutes, or the special faculty aiming at the unconditioned.

son, was the source of these ; not, however, owing to their own nature, but owing to mistakes of the faculty of judgment when applied to them. We cannot here repeat the origin, genesis, and progress of these delusions ; some of the remarks in the last section afford hints upon the subject, and the following work will clearly explain it. And surely, if there be one fallacy which has from all ages been fully recognised and denounced by philosophers, it is that of setting up subjective laws of the use of the Reason for objective laws of the objects of the Reason. Still, most philosophers dwelt upon the misapplication of such laws as were not essential, or necessary to the exercise of the Reason, but were either produced by accidental circumstances, or by systems of philosophy. For example Sir William Hamilton, finding it a rule of philosophizing that we must not postulate unnecessary causes, actually imposes this new law upon nature that she must act by the simplest means !\* It was Kant's merit to detect and expose a far deeper tendency to illusion, the most universal and necessary which can possibly exist. For what is more necessary to the very existence of the Reason than *unity* ? Is it not the very essence of its action to reduce, to classify, and arrange—in fact, to detect and declare unity in phenomena ? If any end or limit were seen to this process, the whole working of the Reason would come to a dead stop. Hence, the unconditioned must be our aim—the unconditioned absolutely ; and whether we go back in categorical reasoning, seeking subjects for predicates ; or in hypothetical, seeking antecedents for consequents ; or in disjunctive, to obtain a com-

\* Lectures, II., p. 409.

plete whole ; in any case, let there be no limit attainable among finite things ! How natural, how necessary, to imagine this a law of things ; and, yet, how clearly it is only a law of mind, imposed on us for our good, and to promote our knowledge ! The application in theology of this necessary and valuable tendency has given rise to the great influence of the doctrine of Final Causes, which has been pushed so far, that Kant, with great wisdom, warns us against the evil, and shows the usefulness and necessity of the opposed tendency. This latter, when dogmatical, tends to atheism ; but when merely critical, is an important check upon religious philosophers. Upon this whole subject, Kant's discussion "of the ultimate end of the natural Dialectic of the human Reason,"\* is well worthy of perusal. The advocates of either principle, are too apt to consider their own side the only correct or useful one. An example of these opposed tendencies may be seen in the learned and temperate Harveian Oration for 1865, of Dr. Acland, where he combats Comte's assertion that no final cause is discoverable in the structure of the eye. Dr. Acland certainly makes good his case against the very offensive dogmatism in negation of Comte, but by his whole argument, shows the usefulness of such attacks in forcing the advocate of unity of design in nature, to reconsider old proofs, discover new ones, and avoid all assumptions or conjectures.

\* Critick, p. 410, *sq.*

### VIII. THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTERS.

There seems no part of the whole Critick so obscure and difficult as this discussion upon the critical solution of the third antinomy. The most acute thinkers in our University have expressed themselves as either puzzled or dissatisfied with it, and indeed the translation of this part of the book is much the most defective part of Mr. Meiklejohn's performance. Among many other inaccuracies, he does not distinguish between the cause and its causality, nor between the cosmological and psychological problems of freedom—two errors which are vital in this question.

The English reader should therefore beware upon these two points.\* And first let him observe that Kant uses the word *cause* with open ambiguity for the necessary conditions of the effect, both noumenal and phenomenal, *e. g.* (p. 336), "But is it also necessary, that, if the effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which (cause) is also a phenomenon, must be merely empirical?" Here in distinguishing the causality of a thing from itself as a cause, he speaks of the cause as a phenomenon, while its causality is intelligible. This statement is absurd, if

\* After careful consideration, I found it necessary to retranslate part of the discussion, as I could not appeal to Mr. Meiklejohn's translation for corroboration of the views put forward in this article. In Appendix D., the reader will find a more accurate version than the corresponding passage (pp. 333-8), in the translation to which I usually refer. As this Appendix was an afterthought, the reader will not find it referred to in the text below (pp. 239-49). He will do well to compare it with Dr. Fischer's commentary, and with the foot notes.

we do not remember that by the *cause* he here means the total subject of the causality, both intelligible and phenomenal. The second point has been noticed by Dr. Fischer, whose general account of Kant's theory (as stated below, pp. 239-49) is verbally indeed very clear; but, when subjected to careful reflection, will show great difficulties and obscurities. In particular, I contend that his forcing pure idealism upon Kant has necessarily spoiled his apprehension of the force and nature of this argument.

What, then, is the question under discussion? We find ourselves between two assertions, apparently strictly contradictory, as to the origination of phenomena. On the one hand we have the law of causality, absolutely universal, which asserts that every possible phenomenon, and therefore every possible cause, must have had an antecedent in time, and that therefore it is impossible for any series to originate in the world; on the other, the counter-assertion that such an origination of a series is possible, and that we have actual experience of it in the action of the reason, of which we are conscious. There is also attached to this side of the question the additional one of practical freedom, and of morality, as dependent upon it. But Kant was of opinion that a pure appeal to consciousness was invalid, as it can give us, not direct evidence, but inference, and besides might be fairly answered by the opponent as delusive, except it be shown that freedom in the cosmological sense was *not contradictory* to causality. And by freedom in the cosmological sense, he means the originating of a series of phenomena not from nothing, but from grounds not to be found in

# VIII. THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTERS.

There seems no part of the whole Critick so obscure and difficult as this discussion upon the critical solution of the third antinomy. The most acute thinkers in our University have expressed themselves as either puzzled or dissatisfied with it, and indeed the translation of this part of the book is much the most defective part of Mr. Meiklejohn's performance. Among many other inaccuracies, he does not distinguish between the cause and its causality, nor between the cosmological and psychological problems of freedom—two errors which are vital in this question.

The English reader should therefore beware upon these two points.\* And first let him observe that Kant uses the word *cause* with open ambiguity for the necessary conditions of the effect, both noumenal and phenomenal, *e. g.* (p. 336), "But is it also necessary, that, if the effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which (cause) is also a phenomenon, must be merely empirical?" Here in distinguishing the causality of a thing from itself as a cause, he speaks of the cause as a phenomenon, while its causality is intelligible. This statement is absurd, if

\* After careful consideration, I found 'it necessary to retranslate part of the discussion, as I could not appeal to Mr. Meiklejohn's translation for corroboration of the views put forward in this article. In Appendix D., the reader will find a more accurate version than the corresponding passage (pp. 333-8), in the translation to which I usually refer. As this Appendix was an afterthought, the reader will not find it referred to in the text below (pp. 239-49). He will do well to compare it with Dr. Fischer's commentary, and with the foot notes.

we do not remember that by the *cause* he here means the total subject of the causality, both intelligible and phenomenal. The second point has been noticed by Dr. Fischer, whose general account of Kant's theory (as stated below, pp. 239-49) is verbally indeed very clear; but, when subjected to careful reflection, will show great difficulties and obscurities. In particular, I contend that his forcing pure idealism upon Kant has necessarily spoiled his apprehension of the force and nature of this argument.

What, then, is the question under discussion? We find ourselves between two assertions, apparently strictly contradictory, as to the origination of phenomena. On the one hand we have the law of causality, absolutely universal, which asserts that every possible phenomenon, and therefore every possible cause, must have had an antecedent in time, and that therefore it is impossible for any series to originate in the world; on the other, the counter-assertion that such an origination of a series is possible, and that we have actual experience of it in the action of the reason, of which we are conscious. There is also attached to this side of the question the additional one of practical freedom, and of morality, as dependent upon it. But Kant was of opinion that a pure appeal to consciousness was invalid, as it can give us, not direct evidence, but inference, and besides might be fairly answered by the opponent as delusive, except it be shown that freedom in the cosmological sense was *not contradictory* to causality. And by freedom in the cosmological sense, he means the originating of a series of phenomena not from nothing, but from grounds not to be found in

the preceding time, hence only *phenomenally* speaking from nothing.

It is not sufficient to oppose the indirect testimony of consciousness by itself to a sound cosmological principle, like that of causality. But, if we can prove that a cosmological principle corresponding to the testimony of our consciousness is not necessarily opposed to causality, then the argument from causality becomes powerless; for we may admit all that it can urge, and still evade its force, by replying that the consciousness we argued from may not impossibly repose on a law simultaneous with, heterogeneous from, but not opposed to, the universal and valid principle of causality.

But how is such a proof possible? Is not the whole of our experience purely and altogether phenomenal? It is and it is not. It is, as to what it reveals; it is not, as to what it suggests. All phenomena are representations, and as such suggest a transcendental object, or noumenon.\* Of this noumenon, as suggested by *external* phenomena, we know nothing whatsoever, not even whether it be or be not the noumenon of our own *Ego*. But, seeing that we attribute to this thing *per se*, whatever it may be, the power of becoming a phenomenon, and so becoming in this way known to us (without contradicting experience), surely it does not contradict experience if we attribute to it another influence upon its phenomenon, viz., that it determines the character of its causality in Space and Time. That every phenomenal object has such a character, is obvious. That certain substances act in certain definite ways, is not only well

\* Appendix D., p. 369.

known, but necessary to our very experience. We know under what circumstances they will so act, we can ascertain the empirical laws of the antecedents which must be brought to bear upon them; we can predict this action with perfect (empirical) certainty; but *why* they act in this way rather than that (and they all do act in some definite way), this is ultimately inexplicable.

Now, even though in the case of all external phenomena such an account of the difficulty were a mere fiction (as Kant tells us, Appendix D., p. 373), surely it is not contradictory to experience, and therefore not impossible, to hold that this empirical character is the *result* of the intelligible character of the thing *per se*, which not only has the power or capacity of becoming a phenomenon, but also of causing or producing this empirical character rather than that?

This hypothesis, which may be pure fiction in the case of external phenomena (owing to the causes above stated), appears to be raised to a higher ground, when we come to consider the other part of our experience, viz., internal experience. And this case will probably tell us more about it; for here we are not only conscious of phenomena through internal sense, but we have also pure apperception;\* and what does pure apperception tell us? "In inanimate or mere brute nature we do not in any way find ourselves led to conceive any faculty conditioned otherwise than sensuously. But man, who knows the whole of the rest of nature merely through senses, cognizes himself also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations

\* Below, p. 374.

which he cannot at all class with the impressions of the senses, and [whilst] he is himself, from one point of view, a phenomenon; but [yet he is] from another (viz., with regard to certain faculties), a purely intelligible object, because its action cannot at all be classed with the receptivity of sensibility. We call these faculties Understanding and Reason; the latter, in particular, is quite peculiarly and specially distinguished from all empirically conditioned forces, as it suggests its objects merely according to Ideas, and determines the understanding accordingly, which then makes empirical use of its (also indeed pure) concepts." Hence, what might be a mere invention in the case of the noumenon, supposed the basis of external phenomena, is raised to a more conceivable position in the case of internal phenomena; for here we are convinced that there is a noumenon acting through intelligible faculties, being conscious of these faculties, and also not being conscious that they are determined from without. And the moral imperatives show that we ascribe causality to this noumenon—not only the power of becoming a phenomenon, but also the further causality of determining the empirical character of the causality of the phenomenon.

This shows why he chose the word *character* in the previous case. The particular way or method in which a man's actions are performed are called his character. The very same empirical conditions will produce opposite results on different men. Whichever way they act, their actions are thoroughly conditioned by the empirical antecedent circumstances. But, their empirical character being different, the character of the result is different; and this empirical character is the consequence

or effect of the intelligible character. It is not hereby asserted that the empirical character must be always the same. Variableness in the empirical character may be one of the consequences of the intelligible character. The intelligible character is quite apart from phenomena and therefore from space and time. Now, this case of the causality of the noumenon at the basis of internal phenomena, though it certainly suggested the thesis of the third antinomy—that there might be such a thing in some cases as cosmological freedom, and though it is the best illustration we can use to explain our meaning—of course, cannot prove freedom as a cosmological principle. But, as the cases are to a certain extent parallel, as far as the parallel goes we cannot declare it impossible that the noumenon may not have the same causality in the case of external phenomena; and as we see that the admission of its causality in this sense not only does not contradict experience, but is even a useful hypothesis for its explanation in certain cases, it violates no law of philosophizing or nature to assert that it is not impossibility a cosmological *principle*. Thus much, then, being established, the function of practical freedom, for which Kant was mainly concerned, cannot be overthrown deductively by the advocates of pure natural causality only. And except overthrown in this way, and declared *a priori* impossible, our internal consciousness of the feeling of *ought* and of moral law must be allowed to have its weight. It is for this reason that Kant throughout the discussion almost confines himself to the Reason as an intelligible cause. The case was not worth discussing, except as involving the denial of its freedom.

But what Kant *has* done here—and it is this which

makes the argument so difficult—is to refute the necessitarians on *cosmological* principles. Throughout the whole section we must hold before us Kant's problematical pluralism, and his cautious reserve as to whether the noumenon at the basis of external phenomena and that at the basis of internal, are identical.\* Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer, having previously distorted Kant on this point, follow out their view logically, and arrive at the theory of the intelligible basis and character of external phenomena being the Reason, which on the one side creates our representations—on the other, our own empirical character. Hence, the world is nothing but “Will and Representation.” I have already observed how this theory ignores the *receptivity* of sensibility, which Kant nowhere asserts can be created by the *Ego*. This, I believe, is the general scope of Kant's discussion on the intelligible character.

A difficulty has been already mentioned—that, if the empirical character is the effect of the intelligible, must not the former be permanent; for how could we conceive the latter changing? To this we answer: you have just as little right to assert *permanence* of it, as you have *change*. And, indeed, it is especially the case of changes in the empirical character which seem to make the hypothesis necessary; and Kant illustrates his meaning by the case of a lie which the man need not have told under all the same circumstances, hence, which he might not tell at another time. These very changes may be the result of the intelligible, the laws of which may necessitate a change at what we consider a fixed moment; but the intelligible character itself is, of course, in no way

\* His *opinion* transpires pretty clearly that they are not the same.

conditioned by time. When Kant says, that under the very same circumstances a man might have acted differently, he does not contradict Mr. Mill's theory so directly as appears at first sight. Mr. Mill says, the circumstances are not the same, or the man would have acted in the same way, using, by a *ὑστερον πρότερον*, the result as a proof of the antecedents. Kant would readily concede this, and say that when he said the circumstances were the same, he only meant the *phenomenal* circumstances; and there was, no doubt, a new element in the case, viz. the (so-called) change in the intelligible conditions. Hence, admitting Mr. Mill's premise, he would deny his theory, that, we might know all a man's motives, and so could foretell with certainty how he will act, even so far as to form a science of such predictions. For Kant would hold that the *intelligible* is subject to none of the conditions of phenomena, and does not exist in time, so that it could not possibly become the object of science; for we could obtain no laws or regularity from it, seeing it can originate a series spontaneously from itself.

I cannot conclude this article without noticing an ambiguity in Kant's language, which (as Mr. Monck observed to me) is the probable cause of the mistake of Schopenhauer on the question just discussed. The word *empirical* is used by Kant in opposition to three distinct terms: *pure*, *transcendental*, and *intelligible*. The pure representation of Kant need not be intelligible;\* the use of Categories may be transcendental; the Ideas alone can properly be called intelligible. Schopenhauer and Dr. Fischer seem to identify these three terms.

\* Space and Time; cf. Critick, p. 49, foot.

With these remarks I close this Introduction. My object was to show that a reasonable construction can be put upon all Kant's philosophy, and that he was not more opposed to common sense than his opponents. I have, in consequence, appeared to side with him more completely than is really the case. Many of the questions discussed are so dark and subtle, that it would be rash to accept even Kant's solutions absolutely ; and upon others he has shown much vacillation. It would be, however, beside the question to have added my own positive assent, or qualifications, of his views. I leave the candid reader to judge for himself.

One remark we may venture, in conclusion, that even the most paradoxical statements of so great a thinker should be received and examined with respect and in earnest.

THE  
CRITICK OF THE PURE REASON.

---

CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF THE CRITICK OF THE  
REASON—HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRITICAL  
PROBLEMS.

IN the course of Kant's earlier investigations (previous to the year 1770), which show a gradually increasing alienation from the spirit of dogmatism, the problem of a new system of philosophy had become prominent, and was at length so far determined that metaphysic must be a science (not of the supersensible, but) of the limits of the human Reason. In this as yet vague and general form we state the problem at the opening of the following investigations. For we shall not merely content ourselves with discussing the systematic course, in which Kant presents us his investigations when complete, we shall also pay particular attention to their *genesis*, as they gradually sprung up and succeeded one another in his own mind. For the Critick of the Pure Reason did not originate all at once; hence we must put the question: What was the history of its origin? What was the natural as well as the chronological order of the problems it discussed? Comparing the human reason and its limits to a country and its coast line, we might say, that this new philosophy wished to determine by complete measurement the area of the human Reason, so as to produce, as it were, a most accurate chart of the human Reason.

✓

I.—THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES TO THE CRITICK—THE DISTINCTION DRAWN BETWEEN THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES : SENSIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING—THE INAUGURAL TREATISE AND THE CRITICK OF THE PURE REASON.

We are seeking the limits of the domain of knowledge which the Reason can attain. Every determination of limits is both inclusive and exclusive : the god Terminus, when he fixes the limits of property, determines both what is mine and what is not mine. Thus the determination of the limits of rational knowledge has a two-fold object ; it must show, what knowledge is possible through Reason, and what is not possible. The possibility of knowledge from the [subjective] side of Reason we call its *cognitive faculties*. We have then to determine, how far the cognitive faculties of the human Reason reach ; and this will also tell us how far they do not reach. These cognitive faculties we are to measure with mathematical accuracy from their origin to their furthest limits.

The first requisite is then to know *what* the cognitive faculties are, or we may start from false assumptions at the very outset. And this is the first point, where the critical philosophy takes up a determinate position, in opposition to the dogmatists. Dogmatic philosophy had investigated our cognition of things, and had taken for granted the faculties for doing so. Now as in all cases the true cognition can only be *one*, it was taken for granted, that there was only *one* faculty of cognition really deserving the name. But human nature is related to things in two ways, perceiving them through the senses and thinking them.

We become conscious of the impressions made by objects through our sensibility ; we comprehend them through our understanding. Of these two faculties for considering objects, *one* only can be the true cognitive-faculty, but which of them? Sensibility or Understanding? This alternative starts up at

once along with dogmatical philosophy, and this is the point, where from the common assumption of the unity of the cognitive faculty, realism and idealism necessarily diverge in opposite directions. Realism makes the cognitive faculty of man sensibility; Idealism makes it understanding.

This shows us how the distinction between sensibility and understanding is determined by dogmatic philosophers. *One* of these faculties only is capable of producing knowledge; what one of them can do really and completely, the other can only accomplish in a lower degree. In other words: within dogmatical philosophy sensibility and understanding can only be distinguished in *degree*, not in *kind*; only quantitatively, not qualitatively. Here realists and idealists agree, except that they make the same assertion from opposite points of view. Realism gives sensibility, Idealism understanding, the higher degree of being the cognitive faculty. The former say our clearest representation is the sensuous impression, the latter say it is the perfectly determined concept. To the sensationalist, the concept or representation, when thought, is nothing but the last faint trace of a lively sensuous impression, it is the fading perception already become indistinct. To the metaphysician, sensuous perception is only a dark, imperfect, confused representation, explicated by the understanding alone, so as to become a correct and accurate expression of its object. The former consider the understanding an indistinct sensibility, the latter consider sensibility a confused and hazy understanding. Both schools then distinguish these two faculties only in degree.\* That this distinction was incorrect from either point of view, Kant had already perceived in his investigations during the period preceding the Critick. In his treatise on the false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures, Kant had designated the logical cognitive faculty an original one, differing in kind from sensitive perception, which indeed distinguishes, but does

\* Cf. Kant's Critick, p. 37.

not cognize distinctions. Here he controverts the sensationists. In his prize essay on the distinctness of metaphysical sciences, he had separated from the metaphysical manner of cognition the mathematical, in that this latter is able to construct its concepts, i. e. to intuit them or represent them sensuously. Here at the very basis of mathematics a sensitive faculty of cognition is indicated, quite different from the metaphysical. In this he controverts the metaphysicians. Hence we already possess the necessary data for refuting completely the dogmatical theory of the faculties of human knowledge.

It is not true that sensibility and understanding are to be distinguished as confused and clear faculties of knowledge. If this were true, all sensuous cognitions must be indistinct, all cognitions of the understanding and metaphysical concepts distinct. The conclusion is overthrown by the plain matter of fact, that there are found so many sensuous cognitions, which are perfect models of clearness, *e. g.*, all geometrical propositions; and again, many obscure metaphysical concepts, which can never be made clear, *e. g.* the moral principles based on feelings. We must conclude, then, that sensibility and understanding are cognitive faculties, differing not in degree, but in kind, and that they form the two original cognitive faculties of the human mind. *This determination of the distinction between sensibility and understanding is the first position taken by the critical philosophy.* Kant himself, in his inaugural treatise, notes the doctrine of the difference in kind between the two cognitive faculties as the propædæutic of the new school of metaphysic.\*

\* These remarks will show the inaccuracy of Professor Webb's note, in his able work on Locke, p. 168, and of M. Cousin, *Leçons sur Kant*, pp. 320, 399. They were probably misled by the fact that the distinction between Understanding and Reason is by no means so clear and well-defined, as I think will appear, for instance, from the important statement which closes the introduction of the Critick, p. 18: "There are two sources of human knowledge (which, *perhaps* [not *probably*, as Mr. Meiklejohn translates], spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and

At the same time, the general problem of a Critick of the Reason becomes more accurately determined; it is subdivided into two particular objects, as human Reason is into two particular faculties of knowledge. The first object is the investigation of the sensibility; the second, that of the understanding. The first question is, How is rational knowledge possible through sensibility? The second question, How is the same knowledge possible through the understanding? And, to give the whole matter a definite title at once, the investigation of conditions of the human knowledge is called "Transcendental Philosophy." It is divided into the Critick of the human sensibility (*αισθησις*) and of the human understanding, or into *transcendental Æsthetic* and *transcendental Logic*; with these terms the Critick of the Pure Reason designates the two principal divisions of its stoicheiology.\* Even

understanding." Not a word is here added about Reason. The distinction between Understanding and Reason is discussed in the Introduction to this work. In any case, to call faculties "laws of development," as Mr. Webb does, seems a very loose expression. Kant, undoubtedly, in the title of his work, and elsewhere, uses *Reason* in a far wider and more general sense than the special technical one he afterwards insists on; but though very *technical* in his language, he was by no means *accurate*. These two qualities are often confused, and supposed to infer one another, and in this way Kant has got a reputation for accuracy which he by no means deserves (cf. Mr. Meiklejohn's Pref. to the Critick, p. xv.). For other instances of inaccuracy cf. below, p. 19, upon his use of the term *metaphysic*, and throughout the *Æsthetic*, where he constantly calls space and time *concepts*. As above remarked, he uses the word *Reason* in both a wider and narrower sense, which Mr. Webb observed (*loc. cit.*), and the word *object* in two senses, cf. below, chap. iii., § 4; not to mention the very false use of it in the opening of the transcendental Logic, p. 45, where he says *objects* are given us by intuition, with which compare Appendix A. Upon his habit of taking old and well known terms, and applying them in new significations, the reader will do well to consult Sir W. Hamilton's "Dissertations on Reid." The passages in point are referred to in the second index, under the word "Kant." I may add, that the word *category* is also used to mean either the pure category, or more often the category and the schema (*see* below, chap. iv., § 1, 3).

\* I adopt this term from Sir W. Hamilton's Logic.

in his inaugural treatise this distinction appears clearly. In every case the object of human knowledge is the connexion or order of things, complete in the conception of the universe or the world.

The object of sensuous knowledge is the *sensuous* world, the world as appearance or phenomenon; the object of intellectual knowledge must be that order in things which exists in the nature of things themselves, independently of all sensuous intuition, and of ourselves, viz., the world, not as it appears, but as it is; not as it is intuited by us, but as it is thought; in a word, the *intelligible* world. And as form consists in order, Kant's treatise on the subject treats of the form and principles (*i. e.* form-giving principles), as well of the sensuous as of the intelligible world: "De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis."

It is to be observed, in order to determine more closely the relation of this treatise to the Critick of the Pure Reason, that the doctrine of the form-giving principles of the sensuous world developes quite clearly and accurately what the Critick of the Pure Reason repeats in the transcendental *Æsthetic*. Compared with his previous investigations, this division of his inaugural treatise (sec. iii.) appears closely allied to his last work preceding the "Critick," which was on space. The very same examples are used to prove that space and its distinctions are altogether intuitible, not logical. Comparing it with the Critick of the Pure Reason, there is a perfect harmony between this part of the Inaugural Treatise and the transcendental *Æsthetic*. The opposite is the case when we compare the doctrine of the form-giving principles of the intelligible world with the transcendental *Logie*. Here the difference is as remarkable as the agreement in the previous case; and this explains to us, why Kant took more than ten years to produce the Critick of the Pure Reason. The order of the world, existing independent of the human Reason, which can therefore never be an object of sensuous intuition,

but of thought—the forms and principles of this intelligible world cannot have their foundation either in human nature, or in the nature of things, but only in the Deity. From God, as Creator, comes the harmony of the world. The Deity then appears here as the only possible principle of metaphysical cognition; and as nothing can be exclusive or independent of Him, He must be the principle of all human cognition; so that in this part of his inaugural treatise, Kant approaches the position of Malebranche, that we see all things in God. “Yet it appears more prudent”—these are the concluding words of the discussion on the intelligible world—“to hug the shore of that knowledge which is possible to us, according to the measure of our understanding, than to sail out into the wide ocean of mysticism, as Malebranche did, whose view here approximates to ours, viz., that we see all things in God.”

We cannot treat the possibility of knowledge either dogmatically, by assuming it without proof, or critically, by investigating it. But after avoiding the first, and before performing the second, two cases are possible, either to deny the possibility of knowledge, or to affirm it through the Deity, that is, as a miracle. Such a denial is *sceptical*, such an affirmation *mystical*. With regard to the possibility of metaphysical cognition, Kant, in his inaugural treatise, is no longer sceptical, as when he discussed the hallucinations of the spiritualist, nor is he yet critical, as in the Critick of the Pure Reason; but, when just preparing to solve the problem critically, he verges on mysticism; and so it is that in his inaugural treatise Kant stands (as it were) with one foot firmly on critical ground, while the other is touching the uncertain territory of mysticism. The problem of mathematical cognition is solved; that of metaphysical cognition still demands solution.

There are then two questions to be answered: What were the views which led Kant to his new doctrine of space and time, or his Transcendental Æsthetic, established in his inaugural treatise? How did he attain to the Transcendental

✓ Logic, which is not established previous to his Critick of the Pure Reason? In the first case we measure his advance from the year 1768 to 1770, in the second case from 1770 to 1781. To solve these two questions, we shall proceed directly to the fundamental question of the whole critical philosophy.

## II.—THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF THE CRITICK—THE FACT OF COGNITION, AND ITS EXPLANATION.

It is impossible to answer a question without having fully understood it, and having comprehended it in all its bearings. In science it is of the last importance to understand clearly where the problem lies; and Kant particularly insists upon the fact, that it was not only in the way he solved, but in the way he comprehended and proposed the problem of cognition, that he differs from all previous philosophers. He claimed the honor of being the first, who thoroughly understood and proposed this problem. The distinction between the two cognitive faculties being established, we have still by no means ascertained how the fact of cognition takes place; this fact is by no means *explained*. If there be such knowledge at all, both the faculties of our reason must contribute, each in its own way; and, therefore, to explain knowledge each of these faculties must be investigated. But the character of a power or faculty can only be ascertained by its effects. Hence, the nature and action of the cognitive faculties can only be discovered by learning in what the fact of cognition and its possibility consists.

✓ The fundamental question, then, of the critical philosophy is, *how is the fact of cognition possible?* What are its conditions? But in this form the question is by no means sufficiently definite to admit of being satisfactorily answered. It contains assumptions, some problematical, some unknown. Before we investigate *how* a fact is possible, we must be quite sure *that it is* possible, that it does exist. In any accurate investigation no one thinks of running the chance of discussing what might

possibly turn out a chimerical case. We must then ask the preliminary question: *is cognition a fact?* We know that it is possible to doubt this, and acute sceptics have from the earliest times, along with the possibility of knowledge, also contested the fact. Nor is the question easy or obvious. If we are to determine whether anything exists, or not, we must know accurately its properties or qualities. If we do not know what the names of the various curves are, how can we answer the question, whether there be really such things as ellipses and parabolas? First of all, then, we must start the question, *what is cognition?*

These three questions contain the analysis of the fundamental problem of the critical philosophy—(a) What is knowledge? (β) Is knowledge a fact? (γ) How is the fact possible? These questions are so arranged, that the succeeding ones cannot even be asked until the preceding one has been solved. The way in which Kant opens his Critick of the Pure Reason may be well compared to the proceedings in a judicial investigation. If a case is to be tried, first the facts must be accurately established. First the case is *established*, then judged and decided upon judicial grounds, or *deduced*.\* Kant desires, to speak judicially, to put knowledge upon its trial. The first thing is to prepare the pleadings; the second, to decide the question. The pleadings are prepared when we show what the facts consist in, and that they are facts. The trial will be decided, if we explain the possibility of knowledge, if we explain what right it has to exist, if we “deduce” it in the judicial sense. The first is the *quæstio facti*; the second, the *quæstio juris*. The *quæstio facti* consists in the first two questions: What is knowledge? Is there knowledge? The *quæstio juris* is the third: How is the fact of knowledge possible?

It is indeed no trifling matter, as might appear to some, to *establish a fact*. In all such cases there are requisite care-

\* For remarks on this term, cf. below, chap. iii., § ~~ii~~ *ii*. p. 67.

ful, precise observation, and accurate, intelligent judgment, which no man can attain without education and a scientific habit of mind. For example, to establish a fact in history, to determine accurately what really happened in a certain case, we require that complete knowledge of the nature and value of historical evidence which only the trained historian possesses. To establish a fact in the material world—a physical fact—we require, not mere random perception, but the educated mind of a physical philosopher, which the vulgar do not possess. An ignorant observer is likely unintentionally to misconceive the observed fact, and misrepresent it. We do not expect the correct view from him, but we may expect him to keep silence. It is incredible how the conceptions of what happens, or has happened, have been distorted and falsified by these ignorant, and consequently wrong views. Most errors are disseminated in this way. We must first know *what* happens, before we can with any safety investigate *why* it happens. Most physical and historical problems arise from the difficulty of establishing facts. It is a dogmatical proceeding to accept a fact upon hearsay, but a critical one to inquire first of all, *who* has established the fact, and form our views accordingly. If it be a case in equity, let a jurist establish the facts; are we to discuss the fact of knowledge, let it be the philosopher, who establishes the case, and this is the case at present under our consideration.

### III. THE ATTRIBUTES OF COGNITION.

1. *Analytical and Synthetical Judgments.*\*—What, then, is cognition? The very first explanation we meet in elementary logic tells us, that every cognition is a conjunction of representations—a conjunction in which one representation is predicated of the other, either affirmatively or negatively. In brief; cognition is *judgment*. But it is obvious that every

\* Cf. the Critick, pp. 7, *sqq.*

judgment is not a cognition. No one considers self-evident judgments to contain scientific knowledge. Under what further limitations, then, does a judgment become a cognitive-judgment? If two representations are conjoined in a judgment, two cases are possible. The two representations are either not diverse, or they are so—the predicate is contained in the comprehension of the subject, or it is not. For instance, in the representation of body, extension is necessarily implied but not weight. Supposing nothing to be given but the representation of body, this *datum* is sufficient for the judgment, bodies have extension—not for the judgment, bodies are heavy. I could not have the representation of body without having that of extension. If I judge: body is extended, I have analyzed my representation into its elements, and determined it by one of them. The judgment is *analytical*. On the contrary, I may very well have the representation of body without that of weight, since the mathematical concept of body does not contain it. To judge: body is heavy; I must have experienced the pressure of the body—the effect which it produces on another body. I cannot have the representation of weight without that of power; and the mere representation of body tells me nothing of power. The judgment is not analytical. It is not the determining of a representation by one of its marks, but two different representations are connected, or synthetically conjoined. The judgment is *synthetical*.

All judgments are either analytical or synthetical. The analytical do not amplify my representation; they only explicate it, in that they determine the same representation more closely, or explain it. The synthetical, on the contrary, amplify my representation, by joining different representations, by adding a predicate to the subject which was not given in the mere representation of the subject. The first are *explicative*, the second *ampliative* judgments. Now, all knowledge which deserves the name can only consist in extending my representations; in my conjoining different representations, different facts, and so

learning to comprehend the relations of things. We declare, then, that *all knowledge consists in synthetical judgments*.\*

2. *Synthetical Judgments a priori*.—Yet this explanation does not fully explain cognition. We shall presently see that it is too general, and requires an additional mark to complete the concept of which we are in search. Every synthetical judgment is not necessarily a cognition in the strictest sense. Given two representations A and B, joined in a judgment A is B. Suppose this conjunction to be a contingent one. Suppose it to exist in this case under accidental conditions, but by no means universally, without exception. Let it be contingent and particular, not necessary and universal. Every cognition, strictly speaking, must be a true judgment. What is truth, if it does not exist in all cases without exception? If the angles of a triangle were not to all eternity equal to two right angles, mathematical truth would be in an awkward predicament. Cognition, then, is *a synthetical judgment, possessing the characters of universality and necessity*. The character

\* Accordingly, Kant says, in his first edition, "So it follows, 1. That our knowledge cannot be at all extended by analytical judgments, but [by them] the concept which I already possess is explicated, and made intelligible to myself; 2. That in synthetical judgments I must have something else ( $x$ ) besides the concept of the subject, upon which the understanding must rest in order to cognize a predicate, which does not lie in the concept, as belonging to it notwithstanding. In the case of empirical judgments there is no difficulty. For this  $x$  is the complete experience of the object, which I think through the concept A that only consists of a part of this cognition. For, although I do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in general, still that concept indicates the complete experience by means of a part of it, to which I can add other facts of the same experience as belonging to the first. I may previously have cognized the concept of body analytically by the attributes of extension, impenetrability, shape, &c., all of which form part of the concept. But I now amplify my cognition, and, referring to experience, from which I had abstracted the concept of body, I find the attribute of weight always conjoined with the rest. Experience, then, is that  $x$  which lies beyond the concept A, and upon which is based the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight B with the concept A."

of universality declares that the matter is so in all cases. The character of necessity declares that the contradictory of the assertion is impossible.\* But human experience can only know *individual* cases. It can never comprehend all the cases; nay, more, it is perfectly impossible to know that the known cases are all the possible ones. Even with the greatest number of cases which a rich and extended experience can furnish, its judgments can only have comparative, not absolute universality. Hence Bacon, who wished to refer all human knowledge to experience, was right to warn empirical science against universal assertions—*axiomata generalissima*. A judgment drawn from experience alone can never have the character of universality and necessity. In other words, universality and necessity can *never* be given by experience. That which is given by experience *only* I receive from without; it is, in the language of philosophy, a datum *a posteriori*, because it follows from perception. That which is *not* given by experience can never follow from experience, and must, if it exist at all, exist independently *before* all experience; it is, so to speak, a datum *a priori*.† Universality, then, and necessity are *a priori*. Now, cognition must be a judgment which forms a necessary and universally valid conjunction of different representations; that is to say, both synthetical and *a priori*.

\* It is remarkable that Kant does not attempt to reduce these two criteria to one. Sir Wm. Hamilton distinctly (Lects., vol. ii., p. 352) reduces universality to necessity. Mr. Mill and his school reverse the process (*see* Mr. Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 264). Kant says (Critick, p. 3), "It may be advisable to use these criteria separately, each being by itself infallible," having just stated that they are "inseparably connected with one another."—cf. Introduction, for further remarks on this question.

† Kant adds, in his first edition—"Now it is a very remarkable fact, that even with our experiences cognitions are mixed up, which must have their origin *a priori*, and perhaps only serve to supply a connexion for our representations of sense. For, even if we remove from our experiences all that belongs to sense, there still remain certain primitive concepts, and judgments generated from them, which must have originated *a priori*, quite independent

Hence, *all true cognition consists in synthetical a priori judgments.* This is the answer to the question—What is cognition?

#### IV. THE FACT THAT SYNTHETICAL A PRIORI JUDGMENTS EXIST.

The second question was—Does there exist cognition? Expressed in our formula, Are there synthetical *a priori* judgments? We answer the question by taking up the existing sciences, and making trial of them, whether their principles are synthetical *a priori* judgments, or not? Excluding Logic, which, as the mere analysis of concepts, does not come into consideration here, the objects of science are either sensuous or non-sensuous. The sensuous objects are either such as we ourselves generate, or make sensuously, by constructing them like figure and number, or they appear to us as things given from without. The science of sensuous objects of the first sort is mathematics, that of the sensuous world is physics, that of the supersensuous is ontology, or metaphysic in the stricter sense. To complete our experiment, these three sciences must give evidence whether their judgments conform to the conditions in question. Their existence only is here questioned, not their legitimacy. We only ask, whether there be synthetical *a priori* judgments—whether these sciences do judge in this way, not whether they do so *legitimately*?

1. *Mathematics.*—There is a geometrical proposition: a right line is the shortest way between two points. We only require to represent this statement intuitively, to see quite clearly that it holds good in all cases, that its contradictory is perfectly impossible, that to all eternity the right line is

of experience, because they are the cause that we can, or at least think we can, assert more of the objects of sense than mere experience would teach us; and that assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, such as mere empirical cognition cannot afford." To this a longer passage (pp. 3 and 4) in the second edition corresponds.

the shortest way ; no one will think of warning us to be cautious about this statement, that we have not yet collected enough experience to make the assertion for all possible cases, that a crooked line might possibly in some cases turn out the shortest. The statement is valid independently of all experience. We know, forthwith, that it will remain true throughout all experience. The statement is a cognition *a priori*. Is it analytical, or synthetical? This is the important question. In the concept of a right line, however accurately we analyze it, the representation of being the shortest way is not contained.\* Straight and short are diverse representations. How do we come to combine these two necessarily? There is only one way possible. We must draw a right line ; we must run through the space between two points in one intuition, in order to make it evident that between two points there is only *one* right line, and that it is shorter than any other junction. We must *construct* the line, make the concept sensuous, or turn it into intuition, that is to say, add intuition to the concept. The judgment is then synthetical, and synthetical *a priori*.†

Given the arithmetical statement  $7 + 5 = 12$ .‡ It is incon-

\* That is to say, originally. Of course, it might be said : a straight line is the shortest way, &c., is now an analytical proposition ; for, as we always think of the two attributes together, we come to include them under the single term *straight*. There are, however, many other examples not open to this objection, which is in reality only a *verbal* difficulty. It is from this cause that a necessary addition to a concept is often thought to be analytically a part of it. See below, p. 16, *note*.

† Let the reader observe that it is the *act* of constructing the line, and not the result, which is of importance, and cf. the Critick, p. 435.

‡ It is to be observed that Kant does not refer arithmetic to the intuition of time (like most of his followers, *e. g.* below, chap. ii. § 1 ; Mansel. Proleg. Log., p. 118, *sq.*, and Schopenhauer, &c.), but to that of space. This is plain from the Critick, p. 10, where he distinctly refers it to points in space, from the fact that in the transcendental exposition of time he makes no mention of arithmetic ; pp. 177 and 180 of the Critick preach the same doctrine. It appears to me that *fractions*, which depend upon the indefinite divisibility of

ceivable that  $7+5$  could ever make any sum but 12; the statement is strictly universal and necessary—it is an *a priori* judgment. Is this judgment analytical, or synthetical? It would be analytical if in the representation  $7+5$ , 12 were contained as an attribute, so that the equation would be self-evident. But it is not so;  $7+5$ , the subject of the proposition, says, *add* the quantities. The predicate 12 says that *they have been added*. The subject is a problem, the predicate its solution. The solution is not immediately contained in the problem. The sum does not exist in the several items as an attribute in a representation. If this were the case, counting would be unnecessary. In order to form the judgment  $7+5=12$ , I must add something to the subject—viz., intuitive addition. The judgment is then synthetical, and synthetical *a priori*. The fact is established, that mathematics are based on synthetical *a priori* judgments.\*

any unit, could not be obtained from the intuition of time at all; nor could the *simultaneous* presence of the numbers of a series be represented, except by using a right line as the schema of time, as Kant suggests (pp. 30, 85). There can be no doubt as to the fact of children learning arithmetic through the intuition of space. In support of this view, I may retranslate the important passage inadequately rendered by Mr. Meiklejohn (p. 180). As it is requisite for an abstract conception to be made sensuous, Kant adds, “Mathematics fulfil this requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses (although produced *a priori*). In the same science the concept of quantity finds support and significance in number; this in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines and points placed before our eyes.” As to the origin of the mistake, *see* below, chap. iv., § 1, 2, *note*.

\* Kant adds, very properly, that there are certain analytical principles also required in mathematical demonstrations; and yet these “are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition.” The difficult passage which immediately follows, as Mr. Monck observed, refers not to these analytical principles, but to the synthetical principles of geometry. Because something is *necessarily joined* to a certain concept, we have no right to call the assertion of this fact an analytical judgment, which takes place only when we assert something of a concept which we really think therein.

2. *Physics*.—What is the case in *Physics*? Physics rests on one proposition, without which it would be impossible. This physical principle states:—Every change in nature has its cause; in other words, it is an event which presupposes another, which it necessarily follows. A physical philosopher cannot dream of making this proposition dependent upon experience. He cannot think of asserting that he has obtained it from experience, or else he should prove it from experience; and as experience never includes *all* cases, he could not then say, every change has its cause. The proposition could not be a fundamental principle. Yet it is such, and he declares with the fullest conviction that no change could possibly take place in nature without a cause. Such a change would take away the possibility of physical science. The proposition is *a priori*. At the same time it asserts, that two different events are necessarily conjoined, that the second follows the first necessarily. The judgment is then synthetical and *a priori*, and this we establish as a fact in Physics.\*

3. *Metaphysic*.—Finally, consider Metaphysic, so far as it aspires to be a cognition of the supersensuous, or the nature of things; so far as it judges from pure reason alone concerning the substance of the soul, the origin of the world, and the being and attributes of God. All these objects cannot be sensuously perceived; they can only be *thought*. It is not the existence of

The ambiguity of expression alluded to by Kant appears to be this—"We must join this to the concept," may mean it is a necessary *part* of the concept, or it is a necessary *addition* or assertion about the concept. The first would be an analytical, the second a synthetical judgment: cf. also p. 5 of the Critick for another cause of this error (*see* note, p. 15).

\* Kant evidently (p. 13 of Critick) thinks that the intuitions of space and time, which give us change, are a sufficient basis for a science of pure physics; Dr. Whewell, then, has not stumbled so badly at the threshold of the Kantian philosophy, as Mr. Mansel thinks (Proleg. Log., Appendix, Note A.). Indeed, his view of an *a priori* science of mechanics agrees with the passage of Kant just quoted. See, however, the limitation stated in the Critick, p. 35.

objects of the senses, but objects of thought, which metaphysic asserts. An object of thought, as such, is a mere representation; an existing object means a great deal more. It is very different to imagine myself something, and really to be what I have imagined myself. If I judge of an object of thought, that it exists, I have extended the representation of the subject in the predicate, I have judged synthetically. Judgments predicating existence are always synthetical; and what would metaphysic be, if its judgments were not existential judgments? Its judgments, then, are synthetical, and, not being drawn from experience, *a priori* also. We establish the fact, that mathematics, physics, and metaphysic contain synthetical *a priori* judgments, not accidentally, but owing to their nature as sciences. There are, then, such judgments; it remains to be settled, whether legitimately or the reverse. So the *quæstio facti* is solved, and the *quæstio juris*, the real critical problem, is still open. How is the fact of cognition possible? or, expressed in one formula: *How are synthetical a priori judgments possible?* Precisely in this position does the problem of cognition stand at the threshold of the critical philosophy. To solve it, Kant wrote the Critick of the Pure Reason.

#### V.—PURE AND METAPHYSICAL COGNITION.

*Meaning of Metaphysic.*—Before proceeding to the immediate question concerning the legitimacy of cognition, we must here append some explanations necessary to the right understanding of the Kantian philosophy. By two attributes the cognitive judgment has been fully determined; it is synthetical and *a priori*. By means of the first attribute it is distinguished from all analytical judgments which the logical understanding makes in comparing and analyzing concepts. By means of the second attribute, it is distinguished from all empirical judgments, which we draw from perception. Let this distinction find its proper expression in both directions. Let

us designate, with Kant, the information which we gain *a priori*, which follows from mere reason independent of all experience, *pure cognition*. This expression asserts that it is not empirical. The fundamental principles of logic, the principles of identity and contradiction, and their consequences, are pure cognitions, because they precede all experience, but are not real cognitions, because they only explicate, without amplifying, our concepts. That part of mathematics, the cognitions of which are all *a priori*, Kant calls *pure mathematics*, as distinguished from applied. The sum of those cognitions, which are possible concerning nature through the pure reason, he calls *pure physics*, as distinguished from empirical. And as throughout his Critick only the possibility of pure cognition is discussed, its special questions, when accurately stated will be : how is pure mathematics, and how is pure physics possible ?

Now, if pure cognition consist at the same time of synthetical judgments, so as to be real as distinguished from logical, Kant calls such a cognition *metaphysical*. Synthetical *a priori* judgments are metaphysical. And as the Critick of the Pure Reason investigates nothing but the possibility of such judgments, its fundamental question may be stated briefly in this form : *Is Metaphysic in general possible, and how ?* We must be on our guard in using this expression, which generally suggests no very determinate representation, especially with Kant, who does not always employ it in the same sense. Let us now come to a clear understanding about this very ambiguous term. In its widest sense, metaphysic is the universal and necessary cognition of things, so far as such cognition is synthetical. In this sense it is distinguished from Logic, which does not judge synthetically, and from sensuous experience, which is neither universal nor necessary. Aristotle also included under his *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, afterwards called metaphysic, the science of the causes and first principles of things, hence real *a priori* cognition. When Kant asks, is

metaphysic in general possible? he means the sum of all the knowledge obtained by the pure Reason, so far as it is real, that is, all except the logical. In this sense mathematics would come under the head of metaphysical cognition. But here we find an obvious distinction, which Kant had already discovered. Both knowledges are *a priori*,—*a priori* in the same sense, but not *real* in the same sense. The objects of mathematics are not real things. For the former are made by us, the latter given to us. In mathematics the synthesis of the judgment consists in the intuited construction, with regard to real things it consists in the conceived relation. In both cases we obtain cognition by synthetical *a priori* judgments, but the synthesis itself differs in the two cases. Hence mathematics and metaphysic are distinguished as different species of knowledge, and co-ordinate; and the great question of the Critick divides itself into these two: *How is pure Mathematics, How is Metaphysic possible?* With this limitation, Metaphysic means the cognition of *real things*, so far as it is *a priori*. Here lies its distinction from all knowledge founded on mere experience. Under real things we may understand either things so far as they appear to us, hence sensuous things, or things so far as they do not appear to us, hence non-sensuous, or not given in our perception—viz. the nature of things, or *things in themselves*. Hence metaphysic is subdivided into a cognition of phenomena, and a cognition of things in themselves. Kant calls these the metaphysic of phenomena, and the metaphysic of the supersensuous, respectively. It is possible that his investigations may lead us to the result of affirming the one, and denying the other. In this case we should not say that Kant has denied metaphysic as such, rather that he has placed it on a firm basis within well-defined limits. What he did deny was metaphysic in its narrowest sense, which, indeed, many consider its widest.

There is another question, not explicitly solved in the Kantian philosophy, concerning the relation or distinction between

metaphysic and the Critick of the Pure Reason. Kant had left metaphysic no other alternative than to become a science of the limits of human reason, *i. e.* critical philosophy. And the problem of his Critick is to investigate and explain the possibility of metaphysic. What is, then, the Critick of the Pure Reason? Is it metaphysic, or only its basis? As if the foundation of metaphysic, if it is to have the name of any definite science, could be called anything but metaphysic, when it must contain the fundamental principles of all metaphysic! But let us waive this question, which forms a subject of dispute within the confines of the Kantian school, as it can only be clearly analyzed and solved when we come to review the whole Kantian philosophy. This is no mere verbal dispute, but from it diverge two fundamentally different conceptions of the Kantian philosophy. At present let us merely consider the Critick of the Pure Reason to be the proceeding which determines the legitimacy of metaphysic as such, and gives the thorough and complete answer to the question: Is metaphysic in general possible, and how so? Consider, if you will, this investigation as propædæutic; or, as Kant expresses himself, as Prolegomena to real metaphysic. Its problem being to declare the possibility of metaphysic in general, let the ulterior system occupy itself in carrying out into detail this metaphysic, as far as possible.

We have now obtained a conception of the problem of the Critick both clear and complete in all its parts. The question: How are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? is identical with the question: How is metaphysic in general possible? But mathematics must not be subordinated as a mere species of metaphysic, but co-ordinate to it as a peculiar species of rational cognition. We must ask, then: *How is pure mathematics, how is metaphysic possible?* And according to the distinction already drawn, the latter question is subdivided into two: *How is the metaphysic of phenomena (pure physics), and how is the metaphysic of the supersensuous, or of things in them-*

*selves, possible?* The Critick of the Pure Reason investigates and establishes the possibility of pure mathematics in the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, and investigates the possibility of metaphysic in the Transcendental *Logic*, and here first the possibility of pure physics is established in the Transcendental *Analytic*, and then the possibility of a metaphysic of the supersensuous (ontology) is refuted in the Transcendental *Dialectic*. These terms will be explained in their places. We here only indicate the order of subjects treated.

#### VI.—THE METHODS OF THE CRITICK—THE CRITICK OF THE PURE REASON AND THE PROLEGOMENA.

*Kant's Inductive Proceeding, and the Method of his Discoveries.*—To solve this problem, three different writings must be jointly considered: the "Inaugural Dissertation" of the year 1770; the "Critick of the Pure Reason," in 1781; and the "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic which can claim to be a Science," in 1783. This last treatise embraces in the shortest and clearest form the whole result of the Critick, while the Inaugural treatise only solves completely the first question, relating to the possibility of mathematics—I say emphatically, the Critick of the Pure Reason in the year 1781, because I take the *first edition* as the text of this treatise, as distinguished from the second and five following, which in several all-important passages depart from the spirit of the genuine Critick. As is well known, Schopenhauer deserves the credit of having remarked this difference, and having called attention to it; he has investigated the whole matter in detail, and so has added a substantial contribution to the right understanding of Kantian philosophy.\*

*What* the critical philosophy investigates is now clear; we must subjoin, *how* the investigation is carried on, by what *method* Kant solves the critical problem. From this point of view

\* Cf. Introduction.

we shall immediately discover the difference between the Critick and the Prolegomena to any future system of metaphysic. The fact of human knowledge (in the sense already given) is to be explained. To explain a fact means in any case to show the conditions from which it follows. The question, then, is concerning the conditions, from which the fact of knowledge necessarily proceeds. These conditions are to be discovered, and the facts derived from them. If we consider merely the manner in which the explanation of human cognition may be scientifically stated or taught, two courses are open. Either we start from the highest conditions of knowledge, as its elements; and show how from these elements the fact of cognition is composed and constructed; this method is synthetical—this derivation of the fact from its conditions is deductive. Or else, conversely, we can start from the fact, and fathom the conditions, under which alone the fact is possible; we resolve the fact, as a product, into its simplest component factors; this method is analytical—this establishing of conditions from the investigation of facts, inductive. This is the difference between the Critick and the Prolegomena. The one is synthetical, the other analytical. In the Preface to the Prolegomena Kant himself has thus distinguished the two works.\*

There is a wide difference between scientific exposition, the way in which we expound to others a truth we have recognized, and scientific discovery, or the way in which we find it out ourselves. For the purpose of scientific exposition the former method presents the advantage of a systematic connected arrangement, but at the same time the disadvantage of proceeding *with a view to system*; so that it easily becomes artificial, where nature gives no assistance, in order to avoid sacrificing symmetry, and to keep up the clear and imposing form of the structure. Kant had a fancy, in systematizing his investigations, to carry out this logical architecture into the most mi-

\* Applications of both these methods may be seen in Kant's treatment of space and time; cf. pp. 25 and 38 of the Critick.

nute details. This fancy found a strong support in his natural love of order, which degenerated even into pedantry. In his Critick Kant has shown a great deal of talent for the art of scientific arrangement, but also a certain weakness, which appears in many forced and artificial symmetries.

To explain a fact from its conditions, we must know these conditions. If we do not determine it capriciously, which would be the worst possible *a priori* construction, devoid of any scientific value, we must have discovered these conditions by means of a scientific investigation. Such a discovery can only be obtained by a careful analysis of the given facts. Before a fact can be deduced from its conditions, the conditions must have been induced out of the fact. Induction is the method of the discovery, and makes out the calculation, while deduction proves it. It is evident that Kant must have discovered the conditions of knowledge before he could think of deriving from them the facts of knowledge. His "Prolegomena," though written after the Critick, is in method prior to it. It describes the way in which Kant reached his discoveries. It shows the whole critical investigation in its natural untrammelled course, and therefore not only shows us, but facilitates our view of, the inner construction of the critical philosophy. From the Critick we learn to know the Kantian structure; from the Prolegomena, the architect himself. No one can comprehend the Critick of the Pure Reason without continually thinking from Kant's inductive point of view. In my opinion, there is no better clue to the understanding of the critical philosophy. The fact of cognition is established. As certain as is the fact must be the conditions under which alone the fact can take place. Continually keeping his eye upon the established fact, without swerving for a moment, Kant seeks the conditions which make the fact possible, not by any means those, beyond which other grounds of explanation might still be conceivable, but those alone which render the fact possible, those the negation of which annihilates the fact of cognition,

the affirmation of which assert the same fact. Formal Logic, indeed, teaches us that we can argue positively from the antecedent to the consequent, but only negatively in the converse case. But there is an exception to this, when the fact is reduced to its *only possible* conditions.\* If we can prove that B occurs *only* on condition of A, and not otherwise, in such a case we can argue negatively from antecedent to consequent, and affirmatively in the reverse case. Or does any one object to our concluding, if A (the only possible condition of B) does not exist, B cannot exist; if B does exist, so does A necessarily; since without A, B is impossible. Nay, rather in this case we can conclude in no other way. Now, B is the fact of cognition, A the sum of its only possible conditions. And such is Kant's investigation, concluding from the fact of cognition the fact of its only possible conditions; showing that, if these conditions were not present, cognition could not take place at all, quite independent of its legitimacy or illegitimacy.

Let no one object to this investigation, that it obviously reasons in a circle, in proving from the fact of knowledge its conditions, in order from the conditions again to demonstrate the fact. Such is not the case. From the fact of knowledge, Kant determines the only possible conditions of the same; what he determines by means of the conditions is not the fact, which is already proved, but its *legitimacy*. No man doubts that there exists a science of the supersensuous—a thing which many existing systems prove; but whether this science exists legitimately, whether the conception of it is correct or not, whether it is sound or unsound, this is the second question to be decided. The fact must be explained, even though it contains nothing but error. Supposing Kant to discover the illegitimacy of such a science as the metaphysic of the supersensuous, he will not simply deny this so-called science, or refute

\* By this expression I mean the only conditions under which the fact becomes possible, or the necessary conditions only.

it; he will make it his business to explain how it ever came into existence, how the error was possible in so notorious a case. Even here there must be certain conditions in the human mind, by which alone the fact of such a delusive science can be explained.

But still it may be asked, How is it possible, in such a case, to come to any conclusion at all about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of existing sciences? As certain as the fact are the necessary conditions of the fact. Now, mathematics, physics, and the metaphysic of the supersensuous, are all matters of fact in the same sense. Therefore, the conditions, from which alone each of these follows, must also exist. How, then, is it possible to assert the legitimacy of the first two, and deny that of the third? For to do this last is to show that the necessary conditions for the science do not exist. Supposing, now, that mathematics, physics, and ontology, were respectively reduced to their necessary conditions, that these conditions lay before us, clearly distinguished from one another, and that it then became perfectly clear that a flat contradiction existed between the conditions of mathematics and physics on the one hand, and those of metaphysic on the other, a contradiction which the constitution of the human reason cannot get rid of—if this were the case, we should at least have gained an alternative judgment as to the legitimacy of these sciences; either one thing or the other, either mathematics and physics, or ontology.

The alternative does not yet make it clear which of the two is legitimate, and which is not. We can hardly settle the question by preferring to give up one rather than two, nor by saying that we feel more confidence in mathematics and physics than in ontology; this would not be scientific criticism. But we can find scientific grounds to decide the alternative. Supposing that the conditions which mathematics and physics require fully explain the fact that both these sciences exist, and also explain how human reason was capable of going astray

in the region of the supersensuous, and so of producing that metaphysic, which lies before us as a fact, while they disclose to us along with the fact the mistake, and the scientific impossibility of the thing; in this case all the given and established facts are explained, but the legitimacy of one of them is disproved. Conversely, supposing that ontology pre-supposes a cognitive faculty, which by its very existence would destroy the conditions of both mathematics and physics, then from this point of view not even the existence of these two sciences could be explained. But this fact must be explained under any circumstances. What is now the state of the case? While from one side the fact of ontology can be explained, from the other not even the fact of mathematics and physics existing can be made conceivable. While in the one case only the legitimacy of ontology is sacrificed, in the other the plain fact of the other well-established sciences is made impossible. There can be no doubt as to the decision of such a question.

We must add another point, which in this dispute among the sciences weighs very heavily against the metaphysic of the supersensuous. Mathematics stands on the other side of our alternative. Among all human cognitions the universality and necessity of the mathematical has been least of all questioned; and though there have indeed here too been sceptics, they have had but little success. This science is the best witness human reason can produce for the possibility of strictly universal and necessary cognitions. Such certainty ontology has never possessed. If, then, mathematics appears as a witness against the cognition of the supersensuous, and indeed with the distinct declaration that both cannot exist together *de jure*, and that while its existence is possible, its legitimacy is not so, we can clearly foresee which will gain the day. If it be once established, that the same human Reason cannot unite within itself mathematical and supersensuous cognition, there can be no doubt which must be surrendered.

Mathematics, therefore, rightly understood, affords to all

further criticism of the reason the very best touchstone, whereby to test other sciences. Either they are consistent with it, and therefore legitimate, or inconsistent, and therefore illegitimate. Hence the starting-point of the critical philosophy is *an accurate knowledge and appreciation of the scientific nature of mathematics.*

## VII.—HISTORICAL ORDER OF THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS—ORIGIN OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.

*Mathematics as the Clue to the Critick.*—We can now determine the development of Kant's philosophy from the year 1768 up to the appearance of his *chef d'œuvre*, and so solve the question already raised. The fundamental question of the whole Critick was comprised in the position, that all real knowledge consists of synthetical *a priori* judgments, and that there are such. This position implies the distinction between *analytical* and *synthetical* judgments, and between *pure* and *empirical* knowledge. In the preface to his Prolegomena, Kant notices this distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments as necessary to the Critick of the human understanding, and notes it in this respect to be *classical*.\* But this view he had at that time already held for twenty years. As early as 1762, Kant declared that all logical judgments were analytical; and the following year, that the conjunction of things as cause and effect was synthetical, that is to say, he declared

\* There can be no doubt of Kant's originality in discovering for himself this celebrated distinction. Kant was not very deeply read in previous philosophy, but indeed we may well excuse him for not seeing what escaped the terrible erudition of Sir W. Hamilton. Mr. Webb has shown very clearly (Intellectualism, pp. 112, *sqq.*) that Locke in substance completely anticipated it. Indeed, Mr. Monck called my attention to a passage at the end of Locke's Chapter on Trifling Propositions, where he discusses the "Infallible Rule," which is more explicit than any quotation in Prof. Webb's book. On the correspondence of this celebrated distinction with Aristotle's predica-  
bles, cf. Mansel's Ed. of Aldrich's Logic, p. 168.

all real cognitive-judgments to be synthetical. A few years later he made all real knowledge to be experience, as he regarded the concept of cause to be empirical, with Hume. At that time Kant divided all human cognitions, so that all pure rational judgments should be analytical, all empirical judgments synthetical. It then appeared to him, that no *a priori* judgment could be synthetical, no synthetical judgment could be *a priori*.\* The possibility of the union of these two attributes in the same judgment was as yet wholly undiscovered. It could not appear, until some cognitive-judgment, the universality and necessity of which was established, could be proved synthetical, or some undoubtedly synthetical judgment could be proved to be *a priori*. How did Kant make this discovery? While his pre-critical spirit possessed him, it never could occur to him that any synthetical judgment could be *a priori*. Waiving metaphysical judgments, which Kant questions, and at length casts aside as mere illusion, all the synthetical judgments given us are *empirical*. How could an empirical judgment be *a priori*? Empirical means, made merely by experience; *a priori* means, made by mere reason alone. It is impossible that the same judgment could have both these origins; or else the pure reason, of which the very definition makes it independent of experience, would be nothing but experience—a complete *contradictio in adjecto*.

It remained to make the discovery, which could not be made from the side of synthetical judgments, from the side of

\* This history of Kant's opinions is most instructive. We see him here holding exactly the theory of Mr. Mill and his school; and yet *after* doing so, he feels dissatisfied, and upon farther research adopts a totally different theory. Kant, then, cannot be said to have "ignored inseparable association," as Mr. Mill thinks Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel have done, nor to have been blinded by early prejudices, or by the school in which he was educated. He must have understood and considered well the theory which he adopted for so many years, nor can he have "taken for granted that it deserved no examination." See Mr. Mill's Exam. of Hamilton, chap. xiv.

pure rational judgments: Are not these, or at least some of them, synthetical? The judgments of pure reason are logical, metaphysical, mathematical. The metaphysical are indeed synthetical, but doubtful, or even impossible. There remain, then, mathematical judgments. Being universal and necessary, they must be *a priori*. Even Hume was obliged to grant this. But he had considered them analytical, and so classed them with logical judgments. Here, then, is the point where the discovery which leads to the critical philosophy must be made. We have excluded the other possible cases; mathematics alone is left. If there be judgments synthetical, and also *a priori*, they must be *mathematical*.

As early as the year 1764, Kant had shown that mathematics might be taught synthetically, because it forms its concepts synthetically, because it makes them intuitible, or produces them by means of intuition. Mathematical judgments are synthetical, because they are of the *intuitive* sort. But if the objects of mathematics, especially geometry, are intuitions, space itself, the foundation of all geometrical forms, must be a primitive intuition. Such Kant declared it to be in his last pre-critical treatise. But at the same time he ascribed to space a "reality proper to itself," which lay at the foundation of all matter.\* So space appeared as an original fact, given to human reason from without. What is given us from without we can only obtain by experience; it is given empirically. Then space must be an empirical intuition; then geometry, and mathematics generally, would be an empirical science, and none of its judgments *a priori*, universal, and necessary.

Mathematical judgments are synthetical, but are *not* empirical, which they must be, were space of such a nature as Kant asserts in his last pre-critical treatise. They can only be

\* He now held Sir W. Hamilton's view. The great importance of this historical sketch is to show that he saw and considered the solutions of his problems, attempted since by other philosophers, and deliberately rejected them.

synthetical if space is an intuition; they can only be *a priori*, necessary, and universal, if space is not the object of an external intuition, but is a mere intuition; in other words, if space is not an empirical, but a *pure intuition*. Only under this condition are mathematical cognitions synthetical *a priori* judgments. The fact that they are so, is established, but not the reason. Even up to the last moment of the pre-critical period, the matter stands so, that the very cause which makes them synthetical is the cause which threatens to reduce them to empirical judgments. To give a reason for their *a priori* nature, that is to say, their purely rational character, space itself must be regarded as a form of the pure Reason. This must be Kant's next step. All the preparations for it are made. This is the advance from 1768 to 1770.

By maintaining that mathematical judgments are *synthetical*, and yet *a priori*, Kant separates himself from Hume, and enters upon the new path of the Critick. Hume had asserted that there are no *a priori* synthetical judgments. Kant proves that there are such, *e.g.* mathematical judgments. Here is a direct contradiction to Hume. Mathematics is the example upon which Kant overthrows scepticism. Synthetical judgments being once granted, and shown to be explicable from the nature of human reason, we must examine whether there may not be others than those of mathematics; whether metaphysic—a cognition of things through pure Reason—is not possible.

Of course it cannot be such metaphysic as existed among the dogmatical philosophers. If space and time be rational intuitions, or, if you like intuiting (sensuous) reason, things as existing independent of us and our intuition, *things in themselves*, can plainly *not* exist in space and time. Our representations, proceeding from intuition, are all in space and time. Wherefore we can have no representation of things in themselves, or their nature. And how shall we cognize what we cannot even represent to ourselves? It is clear, then, that in the sense of a cognition of things in themselves, metaphysic is

absolutely impossible, quite contradictory to the nature and constitution of human reason, and subversive of all mathematics; mathematics are only possible under conditions which make the metaphysic of the supersensuous *for ever* impossible, and *vice versâ*. Things in themselves can never be objects of possible cognition to a reason, the fundamental intuitions of which are space and time.

The only question, then, remaining for the Critick of the Reason is, whether and how a real cognition of *sensuous* things, *i. e.* a metaphysic of phenomena, is possible, such as we see actually in pure natural science (physics)? Sensuous things are the objects of possible experience. In this sense the cognition of them is an empirical judgment. If such cognition be universal and necessary, that is to say, metaphysical, then it consists of an empirical judgment *a priori*. It is, then, the second question of the Critick, how there can be judgments which are at the same time empirical and metaphysical? This question is the most remote from Kant's pre-critical point of view. It had not even appeared on the horizon, when Kant introduced his critical philosophy by his Inaugural Treatise. For here he regards metaphysic as a cognition of things as they are in themselves, a problem which he clearly sees only the divine Reason can solve. The whole transcendental Logic still lies hidden in darkness, barely touched by an occasional ray of criticism, and remains as obscure as the transcendental Æsthetic is clear. So far Kant has not yet made the discovery that a cognition of sensuous things need not be for that reason a sensuous cognition;\* that the objects of a cogni-

\* The reader will find this all-important principle slipped in quietly in Chap. I. of the Paralogisms of the Pure Reason (p. 238) where he is refuting rational psychology. Its importance has not been noticed by any previous commentator on the Critick, so far as I know. It is, perhaps, more distinctly stated in Kant's remarks on the term "Transcendental," Critick, pp. 49-50; but is implied in his reiterated statement that a transcendental principle is only of empirical use.

tion may be empirical, and the cognition itself metaphysical. This discovery he made between 1770 and 1781.

But with the clear comprehension of the fact of mathematics, and its only possible explanation, the critical point of view is established, from which we gain a completely new insight into the nature of human Reason. It was the safe clue, the compass, as it were, formed for the farther voyages of discovery through this unexplored region. What Kant undertook was (to use his own explanation in his Preface to the *Prolegomena*), "a perfectly new science, of which no one had previously ever dreamt, of which the very idea was unknown, and towards which no previous labours could be of any service, except, perhaps, the hint suggested by Hume's doubts, though even he, too, never suspected the possibility of such a formal science, but in order to secure the safety of his ship, hauled it up on the strand (of scepticism), where it may lie and rot; whereas my design is to give it a pilot who acts on fixed scientific principles, drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and, being provided with a complete chart and compass, may guide his ship in safety whithersoever he listeth."

## CHAPTER II.

## TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC—THE DOCTRINE OF SPACE AND TIME, AND THE EXPLANATION OF PURE MATHEMATICS.

A PROPER and well-put question is likely to contain in itself a clear indication of its only possible solution. The fundamental question of the whole critical philosophy was: How are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? It is easy to see under what conditions alone such judgments, if really matters of fact, can take place. To say a judgment is synthetical, means: it connects diverse representations. To say it is a *priori*, means: this conjunction is an universal and necessary one, accordingly such an one as can never take place through sensuous experience, but only through the pure reason. If we are to possess synthetical *a priori* judgments, the reason, as such, must be able to conjoin diverse representations. What we conjoin is the content of our knowledge: the conjunction itself is the *Form*. What we have denominated synthesis *a priori* is the form imposed by the reason, or the *pure Form*, which from representations differing in kind constructs the cognitive-judgment. But how is reason to give such forms, or add them to representations, if it has not such forms within itself—if it does not possess in its original constitution *form-giving faculties*, the necessary and only function of which consists in connecting representations? The whole critical investigation is directed to show and enumerate these form-giving faculties in the human reason.\*

\* Dr. Fischer has expressed himself incautiously here. Kant everywhere insists on the *receptivity* of intuition, as contrasted with the *spontaneity* of thought. Space and time are not products of mental activity, and are only given by the mind to objects, because they are given *to* the mind logically prior to all representations. Hence they form part of the matter of thought.

All our representations, which form the content of a possible cognition, arise in intuition, and are therefore either entirely, or in their origin at least, *intuitable or sensuous representations*. Two cases are possible :—Either these sensuous representations are given us from without, as the various impressions of the outer world, which we call objects of sense ; or they are given us by ourselves—we make them ourselves, in that we generate them out of the original faculty of our Intuition. Sensible representations are, then, either things or constructions. In the first case they are *empirical*, in the second *mathematical*. We may anticipate the whole result of the Critick of the Reason. It is perfectly evident that all possible objects of our knowledge must be either empirical or mathematical, in no case not intuitable ; accordingly, all human knowledge is either experience or mathematics, in no case a knowledge of things in themselves, or a *metaphysic* of the supersensuous.

#### I.—SPACE AND TIME AS CONDITIONS OF PURE MATHEMATICS.

We have now to consider mathematics. *How is pure mathematics possible ?* This question embraces all sciences which belong to the genus of pure mathematics : geometry, arithmetic, mechanics—not in its practical application, but only as a pure cognition. The object of geometry is figure, or magnitude of space, of which the fundamental condition is Space ; the object of arithmetic is number ; that of mechanics is motion. Numbers are formed by counting, and counting is always an adding of unit to unit ; and as this addition is only successive, and must take place in successive times, numeration has as its fundamental condition Time.\* Motion is a change of place, that is, a temporal succession in space, and requires nothing but Space and Time. Space, then, is the only condition of geometry, time of arithmetic, Space and Time together of mechanics.† Conse-

\* See Note on p. 15.

† Still there is a difficulty about this. Kant himself (Critick, p. 95, *note*) says, that it is only motion as an act of the subject which can belong to

quently, space and time are the fundamental conditions of pure mathematics.

What are space and time? What must they be, when we know, that all the cognitions of pure mathematics are synthetical *a priori* judgments? These judgments would not be synthetical if space and time themselves were not syntheses; they would not be intuitive in nature if space and time were not Intuitions; they would not be *a priori*, universal, and necessary, if space and time were not pure Intuitions. This, then, is the point to be established, the problem of the transcendental *Æsthetic*. I could hardly, among philosophical investigations, mention a parallel case which led to so startling, new, and unexpected a discovery by means of so accurate and perfectly irrefragable an investigation. The transcendental *Æsthetic* is Kant's most brilliant performance. As well in result as in procedure, this investigation is a model of scientific accuracy and method.\*

## II.—SPACE AND TIME AS PRIMITIVE REPRESENTATIONS.

That we have the representations of space and time is certain, but how do we come by these representations? According to the usual and proximate view, it might appear that the representations of space and time originate as our collective or generic concepts in general do. From a number of individual things, which we perceive sensuously, we abstract their common attributes, and so form a collective or general concept. Just in the same way space and time may be abstracted from perception, from sensuous impressions. They would then be abstract concepts, deduced from experience. This is the em-

pure science, not as a law of objects; yet mechanics is surely the science of the laws of motion in objects.

\* It is with reference to this, the accounting for the *a priori* or necessary element in intuitions and concepts, that Kant in his second Preface compares himself and his system to Copernicus, and to the *rotation of the earth* as discovered by him, not to the heliocentric hypothesis, as Cousin and Professor

pirical explanation, which the sensational school gave in its day, and which our so-called realists repeat, as if it were the best in the world! But we might ask, nay, must ask: out of *what perception* are space and time drawn—from *what impression* are they abstracted? The only conceivable answer is this: we perceive things as they exist out of us, and beside one another, as being either simultaneous or successive; out of these perceptions we abstract what they have in common, the general concept of being without and beside one another, and call this concept *space*—the general concept of being beside and after one another, and call this concept *time*—and so these two representations are formed apparently like all our other abstract concepts.

We perceive things as they exist beside one another. What does existing *beside one another* mean? Either it means nothing at all, or that they are in different places. We perceive things as simultaneous or successive. Simultaneous can mean nothing but in the same point of time; successive, nothing but in different times. What, then, do we perceive? Things as existing in different places, in the same or different points of time; this is simply to exist in space or time; so that the empirical explanation of space and time says merely this: we perceive things as they are in space and time, and from that we abstract space and time. In other words, from space and time we abstract space and time! This is a perfect example of an explanation as it should *not* be. It explains the thing by itself. It presupposes, instead of explaining, what is to be explained. The explanation, then, or deduction, is as worthless as it is easy.\*

Webb suppose. Indeed Kant's words (Preface, p. xxxix.) make no allusion to the sun at all. The laws of the apparent motion of the fixed stars are fixed, because there are certain fixed motions and revolutions in the spectator's position. Just in the same way, the supposed laws of Being as Being (the fixed stars of metaphysic) depend wholly on the necessary laws of mind. Hence the simile is capable of "perfect exactitude of parallel." See Webb, "Intellectualism of Locke," p. 172, *note*.

\* For a specimen of this explanation, cf. Mill's Exam. of Hamilton, pp. 202-3.

Space and time are already complete when this explanation seeks the attributes from which to form them logically. Space and time are *always present*. There can be no impression, no perception, no representation, not in space or time. Place it where you will, space and time accompany us everywhere—our apprehending reason advances not a single step, and cannot do so, without them. Consequently, that explanation which attempts to deduce them from our sensuous perception is not only futile, but really almost ridiculous. It imagines it has deduced them, and hence that it did not possess them antecedently; whereas it was only shortsightedness which prevented them from being seen. We can never get rid of these representations; whosoever tries to do so is like the man in Chamisso with the pig-tail—"He turns him this way, turns [him that, his pig-tail hangs behind him." It is impossible to deduce space and time from our perceptions, simply because our perceptions are all only possible through space and time; wherefore these two representations are not and cannot be deduced. They are *original* representations, such as our reason does not receive from without, but has through itself—which do not follow, but anticipate experience—are not its product, but its condition—are not *a posteriori*, but *a priori*.

### III. TIME AND SPACE AS INFINITE QUANTITIES.\*

We have, however, not yet settled anything about the *content* of these original representations. Space and Time are quantities which, from their very nature, exceed every definite limit. I cannot represent to myself the maximum of space, such a space as is not contained in a still greater; nor can I represent to myself the minimum of space, a space in which a lesser space is not contained. There does not exist either a maximum or a minimum of space: the one can be always

\* That is *quanta*, or possessing infinite *quantitas*.

increased, the other diminished. The same is true of time. Every moment follows, and is followed by another. There is, then, neither a first moment to which no other is antecedent, nor a last moment, to which none is consequent. Space and Time are, in their very nature, illimitable or infinite quantities.

The question now is : what are our original representations of Space and Time? Is their original content infinite space and infinite time; or is it limited space and limited time, so that both indeed are always represented to us, but gradually widen, and extend their limits to infinity? Which comes first: Space and Time, or spaces and times? If we judge from the example of other concepts, it might appear that these representations also become universal only by gradual enlargement, as our other concepts by continued abstraction become poorer in comprehension, richer in extension. It might hence appear, that we only reach Time in time.

The whole question depends on the relation of space to spaces, and time to times. Every limited space, be it great or small, is *in* space itself, and part of space; every limited time is *in* time itself, a part of time. But if every limited space is a partial representation, the whole representation is unlimited space. The same is true of time. The question, then, is: which is the original representation, the whole, or its parts?

In all cases the partial representation is later than the total one. In all empirical concepts partial representations arise through abstraction, by separating from the given content one of the attributes. So the general concept man is an attribute or part of the empirically given representation of an individual man. Now, the different individuals are each the whole representations, and the general concept only a part, only the sum of those attributes which are common to *all*. On the contrary, in the present case space and time are the whole representations, and their parts are the different spaces and times. Every part of space presupposes the whole of space;

for it is only possible as a limitation of this whole. The same is true of time. Consequently, the content of the original representations are the whole of space and time—viz., the infinite quantities of both.

#### IV. SPACE AND TIME AS SINGULAR REPRESENTATIONS OR INTUITIONS.

Representation is a word of wide acceptance. We do not yet know *what sort* of representations space and time are. There are different sorts and classes of representations in the human reason; to which of them do space and time belong? Two classes must above all be distinguished, which depend on *what* we represent. This may be either an individual object, or an universal one. An individual object is, for example, this man, this stone, this plant, &c.; an universal object is the genus man, stone, plant, &c. The individual can be only sensuously represented or intuited. The genus must be abstracted from the individuals, formed from their common features, in one word, conceived. The representation of the individual is *intuition*, that of the genus *concept*. All our representations must be one of these. Are space and time intuitions, or are they concepts?

Every general concept, compared with an individual, is a partial representation of it, a fraction of its attributes, a numerator less than the denominator. Cæsar is a man, as to genus: so says the numerator. But how many more attributes than those common to the lowest of his genus has *this* man—this singular, incomparable person! How much more does *this* individual imply beyond the mere expression of his genus! That he was *Cæsar* the denominator tells us. How much does the one here exceed the other!

Space and time would be general concepts, if they were partial representations, attributes of spaces and times. But the reverse is the case; they are not partial, but the whole repre-

sentation. Here the numerator is always greater than the denominator. Space contains *all* spaces, time *all* times within itself; they are not partial representations, therefore not general concepts. General concepts always contain a minimum; the poorer they are, the more universal. They become richer by being made more specific, by approaching singular representations or intuitions. The intuition only contains the complete sum of the attributes; and the complete, as it were unbroken, representation is always a singular one—an intuition. Space and time are intuitions; because they are such, they are not collective, but singular concepts. There exists only *one single space*, in which are all spaces; *one single time*, which comprehends all times.

If space and time were general concepts, they must stand to spaces and times in the same relation as the genus does to species and individuals. Spaces should be subordinate to space, as species are to genera; and space should contain them *under* itself, whereas it does contain them *in* itself.\* Were space a general concept, it must be abstracted from various spaces, as the concept man is from various men; and then space must contain all the attributes which are common to all spaces, and

\*This important truth is stated in sec. iv. (p. 24) of the Critick. Mr. Meiklejohn has been evidently puzzled with it. The words *under* and *within* are emphatic, and then read—"Nevertheless, space is so conceived; for all the parts of space, *ad infinitum*, exist simultaneously." M. Cousin (Leçons sur Kant, p. 83) also misses the sense of the passage, and imagines that in this paragraph Kant meant to show that space and time were *infinite*, as opposed to indefinite quantities! In consequence, his *résumé* (p. 319) shows that he had no idea of Kant's real theory. The germ of truth contained in his remarks that sensibility by itself can give us no object, has been noticed by Kant himself (Critick, p. 85, and 98, note), where he justifies his omission of the fact in the transcendental *Æsthetic*. The reader of Kant must be on his guard against many expressions which would imply that *objects* are given us by intuition, which is the contrary to his general theory (though I suspect he wavered in opinion on this point), cf. Critick, p. 118.

*only* these. There should then, evidently, be further attributes by which the various spaces are distinguished, and these distinguishing attributes must be here, as in all other cases, *not* the common ones. Can any one tell us a single conceivable attribute to distinguish one space from another—a single attribute, *not* spatial and spatial *only*? All spaces, however they may differ, only differ in space—all times only in time: the clearest proof that space and time cannot possibly be the general concepts of various spaces and times, and, to speak generally, are not *concepts*.\*

If space and time were concepts, their differences must be comprehensible, and explicable by means of concepts—in a word, definable. But let any man try to define such differences as are merely spatial or temporal. Define the distinction between here and there, above and below, right and left, earlier and later, &c.? How does here differ from there? The wisdom of the wise is of no avail: the hand points it out to us. We make clear the distinction by making it visual; in other words, the distinction cannot be conceived—it must be *intuited*. Endeavour to distinguish the right hand from the left, the object from its reflection. All attributes noted by the understanding, determined by concepts, expressed in words, are here identical; the only existing distinction, the spatial sequence of the parts, that what is right in the object is left in the reflection; that in the right hand the fingers go the opposite way from the left—this single distinction cannot be logically defined; it can only be intuited. It is perfectly impossible to draw the left glove on the right hand. Equally impossible is it to explain this logically. Are there not two

\* It should, however, be remembered that we can, and probably do, form a general notion of space, under which we class particular times and spaces, so that *space* may be an ambiguous term, both the *concept under* which, and the *intuition in* which, we rank different spaces; and so of time. As to forming a concept of an individual, cf. Hamilton, "Discussions," p. 13, note.

magnitudes, perfectly like, equal, and still incongruous—as, for example, two similar and equal spherical triangles in opposed hemispheres? The understanding can only distinguish concepts by determinate attributes. If all the attributes be the same, and the concepts in this respect identical, the understanding *cannot* distinguish them. There are such representations, as we have shown by many instances. If, then, all distinctions were only to be made by the Understanding, how could the “principle of the indiscernible” stand before such representation—we mean the Leibnizian *principium indiscernibilium*, that there cannot possibly be two things not distinguishable? This proposition is a necessary principle of knowledge. It would be false if there were only concepts, representations through the understanding. It is not through concepts that everything is distinguished. What our concepts cannot distinguish is distinguished in space and time; and in space and time everything can be distinguished, not through concepts, but only through intuitions.

1. *Space and Time as a Principle of Difference (Principium Indiscernibilium).*—Without space and time, our representations would be a chaos, in which the greater part could never be distinguished. In space and time every representation appears at some definite point or moment which belongs to it alone; by this here and now it is distinguished from all the rest, so that exchange and confusion are perfectly impossible. Even though two things exist in the same time, they are separated by space; they are simultaneous, but in different places. Though two things be in the same place, they are severed by time; they occupy the same place, not simultaneously, but successively. Space, then, distinguishes what time does not; and time distinguishes what space unites. Without them nothing, and in them everything can be distinguished. And that everything must be distinguishable—that there is nothing indiscernible—this is the first condition and possibility of any

knowledge. Leibniz had seen quite correctly that this proposition is the condition of all knowledge;\* but he had not recognized the conditions of his own proposition. It is through Kant only that this principle receives its real value. Space and time are the principles of all distinction; they discern intuitively what the understanding cannot discern by means of any of its concepts; they are the real *principium indiscernibilium*; and as the absolutely distinguished thing is singular or individual, Schopenhauer was quite right in scholastically expressing space and time to be the real and only "*principium individuationis*."

2. *Time and the Laws of Thought*.—The law of difference is no law of thought, as Logie pretends; simply because the understanding is in many cases incompetent to carry it out—namely, in every case where the differences are merely spatial or temporal. But even the laws of thought—the celebrated laws of contradiction and of sufficient reason—require intuition to be conceivable. They are idle without the intuition of time. Kant had already made this acute and important remark, in his Inaugural treatise. If the law of contradiction merely declares, that the same thing cannot have contradictory predicates, such as A and *not*-A, then, even in the formally logical point of view, this is false. It must say that it cannot have them *simultaneously*. Wherefore, a determination of time is the only condition under which this law of thought is true.† And the law of sufficient reason, according to which every change has a cause—this conjunction of two occurrences can only be comprehended as a necessary sequence in time. Here again it is a determination of time, which explains the law of thought.

\* See Locke, Essay, Book II., chap. xxvii., § 1-3; and IV., chap. I. § 4. He also saw that space and time were the necessary conditions for applying the principle.

† Cf. Critick, p. 116, for remarks upon this.

3. *Time as the Principle of Continuity.*—Leibniz had not perceived the real nature of space and time. He held the concept of time to be an abstraction, obtained from the perception of our inner states and their sequence. There was here a double error. The concept was obtained by the fallacy of reasoning in a circle, and when obtained was too narrow. When various states follow upon one another, we call it a succession or sequence in time. Leibniz, then, derived the concept of time from the sequence of time. But time is not only succession, but simultaneity. It determines not only that this follows that, but also that this is together with that. Of these two time-determinations Leibniz assumed the one, and totally forgot the other. He considered time-sequence as an attribute, contained in the concept of change. If this were the case, time could be nothing else than time-sequence, and succession, the only determination of time.

Since change is the series of different states in the same subject, this series is a time-sequence. Wherefore all change is only possible in time; in other words, time is the condition under which alone change can take place. This is the simple and perfectly intuitive reason why every change must be *continuous*. Leibniz had set up the law of continuous change; it was the most important point in his *Metaphysic*; but the key to his law he missed, along with the correct notion of time. Something changes, means: it goes through a series of various states. If these various states so follow one another that there is no transition from one to the other—that no series of transition-states is passed through, then the change is interrupted every instant; it ceases in the condition A, and begins afresh in the condition B; the change is not continuous. It is only continuous, if it never stops for a single instant; and the cause of its lasting, perfectly uninterrupted, can only be found in time. State A is in a fixed point of time, state B is in another. Between these two points there is still time; that is to say, an infinite series of points of time. For a moment is not a part,

but a limit of time. Consequently, that which is conceived to be changing must pass through an infinite series of moments between the moments A and B. During this time it is no longer A, and not yet B; it cannot have vanished, hence it must be passing through the various states between A and B; it must be continually changing. From this concept of continuous change an important geometrical theorem follows: that if a right line is to be produced continuously, it can never change its direction; that a continuous change of direction is only possible in a *curve*, not in broken lines or angles; consequently, it is impossible to pass round the three sides of a triangle with a continuous motion. Kästner perceived that this impossibility followed from the concept of continuous change; he challenged the Leibnizians to demonstrate the impossibility. Kant did so from the concept of time. The lines  $a b$  and  $b c$  meet in the vertex  $b$ ; from  $a$  to  $b$ ; and from  $b$  to  $c$  are different directions. At the point  $b$  one ceases, and the other begins. If a continuous progress were possible along these lines from  $a$  to  $c$ , then in the point  $b$  the different motions from  $a$  to  $b$  and from  $b$  to  $c$  must take place *simultaneously*, which is impossible. On the contrary, the former motion must cease in the point  $b$  before the latter motion begins. Consequently, the direction is here altered in two moments. And as between any two moments there must still be necessarily time, the moving point during this intermediate time will move neither towards  $b$  nor towards  $c$ ; it will *rest* in the point  $c$ , and interrupt the motion, so that the continuity of the change, and the very change itself is thus stopped. Space and Time are the foundation of the law of diversity. Time explains by the determination of simultaneity the law of *contradiction*, by that of succession, the law of *sufficient reason*; it explains by the nature of its quantity [*being infinitely divisible*] the law of *continuity*.\*

\* Yet the first law can be freed from the condition of Time (Critick, p. 116); the second is not identical with Causality, but is a *logical* principle, and so has

## V. SPACE AND TIME AS PURE INTUITIONS.

It has been proved that space and time are original representations, that these representations are intuitions; in brief, that space and time are original intuitions. But what sort of intuitions are they? Surely such as something external corresponds to, something objective and real, in any case such as have their object given from without, viz., *empirical* intuitions; whether they be existing *per se*, real, substantial, or merely properties and attributes of individual things, or, lastly, the relations of things to one another? Space, especially, is wont to be represented so substantially as to be, as it were, the empty locus of the world—the great receptacle of all things, which exists completely independent of us. It is very easy to see, without much reflection, that of the three possible cases which might arise were space and time realities, *none* is the fact. Were space and time properties which belong to things, or were they, as Leibniz thought, relations which order things externally, in either of these cases they could not be represented without things, and abstraction from things would also be abstraction from space and time, and with the former representation the latter must also vanish; but this is impossible. We can abstract from things, but not from space and time: a sufficient proof that neither of these representations is given with things, otherwise they must vanish along with things. But let us set up space, as the old physical philosophers, mathematicians, and even Kant, in his last pre-critical treatise, did, as something self-subsistent and real, as the object of our external intuition. This view apparently saves the primitiveness of space, satisfies by its objectivity the realistico-dogmatic spirit, but when examined more closely is subject to all possible difficulties, and does not solve

not the empirical element of change; the third law is, I suspect, rather based on space than time, as the only image of the continuity of time is a line drawn in space.

a single one. What is this real space? A being in which all others exist. Without\* it nothing can exist. For were anything outside it, it must evidently be in a different place or space; there must then be different, perfectly separate, spaces, which could not be distinguished in space, or there would be but *one* space, containing both as its parts. But if everything is contained in space, then everything must be extended; and, by logical consequence, not only the cognition, but even the existence and possibility of all non-extended beings must be denied. Again, if space be the object of our intuition, it must be finite space; and then infinite space must either be denied, or explained as a product of the imagination. But what is there beyond the limits of finite space? What is finite space but a part of space? Space, as such, must be infinite. But how can infinite space ever be the object of our necessarily finite intuition? The object of our intuition is given. How can the infinite be given as an object of our intuition? Either, then, space is an intuitible object, and as such finite, and only finite, (consequently not space which is necessarily infinite), or space is infinite, and not the object of our intuition. In fine, how can space be at all *given* to us? It must be given from *without*; it must, then, be outside us, or in another place or space than that in which we are; surely nothing can be more absurd.

\* The various senses of the word *without* are important, especially as regards Kant's supposed Idealism. Let us observe ( $\alpha$ ), space consists of *partes extra partes*, and all objects in space are therefore without each other. In this sense we can only say a thing is without another if both be in space; as, for instance, when we speak of things without our body. ( $\beta$ ) A thing in space may be said to be without a thing not in space, by which we merely mean that they are not identical, and empirically heterogeneous; so we say, on spiritual principles, our bodies are without us. In this sense the reciprocal use is very rare. ( $\gamma$ ) In a looser sense, "without" may be used to imply that a thing is distinct in existence, and transcendently different from us, as when I say that *noumena* are without me, independent of me (in this case because they are *not* in space). Kant argues that neither of the first two meanings imply the third, as space is only a representation, and hence phenomena are modifications of mind only. Cf. Appendix C. Critick of the 4th Paralogism.

But, however space might be the object of our intuition, it would in any case be given *empirically*; we could only make sure of it by experience, and all our spatial representations and cognitions would be empirical. Are they empirical? Are space and time quantities given in experience? Where can you find in experience the merely mathematical point—the line, the surface, the body, merely as mathematical quantities? Where is number, as such, to be found? We generate number by counting; we make number. We generate figure by constructing it; it is nothing but our construction. When we extend the point *a* the shortest way to the point *b*, we get the right line *ab*; if we move the line round its fixed point *a*, till it returns to its original position, we get a circle. What are line and circle but mere spatial quantities? What are these but our constructions? Mathematical quantity can be embodied in a sensuous material. A sphere may be of wood, and this sensuous material is certainly given from without; but it does not belong to quantity as such—it is to mathematical quantity both contingent and indifferent. Mathematical quantities, as such, consist in nothing but space and time—quantities which exist nowhere except in and through our intuition. Wherefore, space and time can be nothing but this very intuition, which is not empirical, but pure.

If space and time were empirical intuitions, mathematics would be an *empirical science*—all its propositions empirical, and none of them universal and necessary (as, for example, that  $2 + 2 = 4$ ). As surely as mathematical cognitions are absolutely universal and necessary, so surely mathematics is no mere science of experience—so surely space and time are not empirical intuitions. They are not given from without, like the objects of sensuous intuition; they are not sensuous, but pure intuitions. They are not representations of anything which could be given us as an object of the senses; but mere representations—nothing but representations—and yet

not capricious or contingent ones, which you may as well have as not have, but necessary and original representations, without which we could not represent, distinguish, or cognize anything. This, then, is the positive and irrefragable result of the whole investigation:—(1.) Space and time are not deduced, but *original* representations. (2.) These original representations are so, not as finite, but as *infinite* quantities. (3.) These original representations of infinite space and time are not concepts, but *intuitions*. (4.) These original representations are not empirical, but *pure*; meaning by this that they are intuitions without a given object—that is, forms of intuition.

If you wish to make these pure forms of the reason objective, and as it were picture them, in this natural effort you are always thrown back upon themselves. Because they are the conditions of all our representations—because they make everything else intuitible—for this reason they cannot be themselves made intuitible by means of any empirical representation. The only image of spatial quantity is number, the addition of which requires an infinite time; the only image of temporal quantity is a right line produced to infinity. So that space forms, as it were, the schema, or—as Kant expresses it, in his Inaugural treatise—the type, by which we image time.\* No concept can explain these intuitions, though these latter may very well bring our concepts within sensibility; and time, as we have explained, was pre-supposed in the explanation of the laws of thought.

But, if space and time are mere intuitions, which are in no case given from without, but only through the pure reason itself, they must apply to everything which can possibly come under such conditions. To make anything, whatever it be, our object, means to distinguish it from ourselves—to place

\* This latter fact Kant repeats several times in the Critick (pp. 30, 176). Time only affords us the *schema* of quantities in space, which is not an image, but a vague and more general representation.

it without, and opposite us. There can be no object without opposition, which evidently presupposes spatial difference. *Objects* are only possible in space; *changes* in time, whether external changes or internal. External changes are changes of space, or *motions*; internal changes are, speaking quite generally, changes of mental states, or *representations*. Objects, then, and changes can only exist under the condition of space and time; wherefore, like these latter, they are mere intuitions, or forms of representation. The reason requires nothing but space and time to be able to represent objects and changes. When we construct a line, this is a mere form of representation—a product of pure intuition. And yet is this form of representation not an object, not a change, consisting as it does clearly in the motion of a point?

But by means of the intuiting reason, by space and time, only the *form* of the object, the form of a change and of its existing states, is given us, not the qualified something which makes the content of the object and of the change. Mathematical quantities indeed, figures and numbers, are also given in their whole manifold content through the rational intuition, for they are nothing but our constructions; but in this case the represented content is nothing but form. What else is the matter from which mathematical magnitudes are formed than *the pure intuition*, or form?

## VI. INTUITION AND SENSATION. PHENOMENA EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL.

Our representations have another content besides the merely mathematical one of quantity—they differ in kind; and this qualitative difference pure intuition can by no means produce: this material of our representations cannot be given by pure reason; it must then necessarily be given us from without, or we must receive it from without. We must guard against taking up the expression “given from without” in a wrong

sense.\* It is opposed to "given by means of ourselves." We mean by it, then, a datum as opposed to a product; that is to say, a datum which we cannot produce or make by means of the pure reason, but find ready. As far as space is concerned, this datum may be either without or within us. The apprehending of the fact so given is in all cases by the receptive faculty, by which we perceive or find what is so given; in other words, by our perceiving sensibility, which can be, and is as a matter of fact, variously affected. In any case, then, the presented material can only be sensuously perceived by us, and in this point of view is strictly nothing but our *sensation*. As none of our sensations can take place anywhere but *within us*, we see that the expression *given from without* means something absurd, if taken literally or spatially. Neither can our sensations be at a different place from ourselves, nor can they be out of space, which is a faculty of our pure reason.† The expression, if misunderstood, leads us right away from the Kantian philosophy, and confuses again the notions we had just explicated and cleared up. Something is given from without, can only mean, in the genuine spirit of the Kantian philosophy, its origin is not the pure reason, it is not given *a priori*, it is not a pure product of the reason; and if we wish to express what is not given in this sense *a priori*, as a datum *a posteriori*, as something given from without, let us use the expression, if we choose, but not understand it as if we were the recipients, and some unknown being without us the donor.

It is clear, then, that all the possible content of the human reason which is not generated by pure reason itself (as, for instance, mathematical forms) can only be given by way of *sensation*. What we neither produce nor feel is completely independent of our reason—independent also of all the forms of the reason, in which it cannot be clothed; it does not exist

\* Cf. above, p. 48, note.

† Cf. above, p. 34, note.

in the rational intuition, hence not in space and time, and we call it *thing per se*; but, space and time being the necessary conditions under which we represent everything, it follows, that any representation of a thing *per se* is impossible.

A connexion between intuition and thing *per se* is impossible; because the concepts of both mutually exclude each other. On the other hand, the connexion between intuition and sensation is necessary; because the former comprehends the latter within it. Sensations must be intuited. To intuit is to represent in space and time. All sensations must be represented in space and time. Sensation gives the *sensuous* content; intuition adds the form of the *representation*; the combination of both forms the *sensuous representation*, or *phenomenon*. A phenomenon is an intuited sensation—a representation whose content or matter is the sensuous facts of sensation, its form the pure intuition. Without form sensations would be a perfect chaos, the comprehension of which could not be called reason. The form of intuition unravels this chaos, by resolving it into a series of various representations; or, in other words, by representing it in space and time. We order our sensations in space; we order them beside one another—that is, we distinguish them as to place, and represent them as differing in place; hence, also, as differing from *ourselves*. In other words, we place them opposite to ourselves, and make them our *external objects*. Sensations are conjoined as simultaneous; that is to say, when taken together, they make up our mental state at the present moment; they are conjoined as successive—that is to say, they form different states of mind, which succeed one another. It is only, then, when sensations are ordered in space and time, or intuited, that they form a representation of objects, of states—that they become phenomena. We now see how the case stands with external objects. The external object, or what we call the *thing without* us, is not by any means the thing *per se*. The thing without us, resolved into its elements, consists of sen-

sation and intuition, partly our datum, and partly our product; it is nothing but our phenomenon—our representation. The thing *per se* is a term by which we designate the very opposite of this, viz., what can never be phenomenon or representation.

The states of our mind we can only represent to ourselves in time, not in space; time alone is the condition under which we can represent and distinguish them. If we call the perception of what takes place within us the *internal sense*, we must distinguish from it the *external sense*, as being perception directed towards what is external. This was the well-known distinction between sensation and reflection drawn by Locke, in his Essay. The distinction, especially the term internal sense, was known long prior to Locke. Kant took it up, and applied to it the distinction between space and time. Time is the condition of all the states of the internal sense; space, of the external. Accordingly, Kant calls space the *form of the external sense*, time the *form of the internal sense*. It were better if he had not made this distinction. It makes the external sense appear something totally distinct from the internal; as if things without us required a peculiar sense—as if they were something special, and separate from our representations. All that we perceive or feel is within us; it is represented as without us, in that we distinguish it spatially; by this means it becomes an external object of perception, and by this means only does our perception become an external one. The external sense is nothing but the perception which represents in space.

Furthermore, *all* changes are in time, even changes in space, the motions which we perceive without us. Time is, then, a form of the external sense also. In fine, all phenomena, even those in space, are our representations, and consequently occurrences within ourselves, which as such are joined and separated in time. The distinction between space and time, then, merely comes to this, that we are unable to represent all

which we feel in space, but must represent all in time ; so that space only makes external phenomena, but time makes *all* phenomena, both external and internal. For this reason, Kant calls time the original form of all our sensibility.

## VII.—SPACE AND TIME AS CONDITIONS OF ALL PHENOMENA.

### *Transcendental Ideality. Empirical Reality.*

Thus the doctrine of space and time is established in every respect, and we may form a final judgment as to their claims with regard to cognition. Of what value are space and time in the cognition of things? That depends upon what we mean by things. If we mean the real being of things, separate from, and independent of human reason, things *per se*—if these alone be called objective and real—it is plain that space and time, as pure forms of the reason, are neither objective nor real, but subjective and ideal. Taken as things, they are perfectly imaginary, for they are nothing that things could be or have ; space and time are neither their substance, nor attributes, nor relations.\* But if we understand by things phenomena, which we

\* So Kant says (p. 31), " Time is, therefore, merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects) and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing," and so through his whole transcendental *Æsthetic*. How, in the face of these reiterated assertions, Professor Webb could write (*Intellectualism*, p. 173), " Whether Kant held that space was nothing but a form of the sensibility may be doubted," seems to me marvellous. And the ground of the assertion is still more so: " it is inconceivable " that so systematic a thinker should have denied the possibility of a knowledge of the objective, and yet dogmatically have affirmed the objective non-existence of what possesses empiric reality. Real inconceivabilities vanish before facts often enough ; and Kant has asserted his opinion so plainly, that, whatever his theory may have been, he could not have asserted their noumenal non-existence more strongly ; but in phenomena he asserted them to be thoroughly objective ; as objective, and indeed more so, than any other part of the object. Mr. Webb, evidently, does not in this passage remember the Kantian use of the term *object*. If he means by objective existence, noumenal existence, then, as

must represent as present within us or without us, it has been proved that space and time are the conditions under which alone things appear to us. We can no longer ask, what value they have for the cognition of things in this sense, or whether they make phenomena cognoscible, *as without them phenomena could not exist at all*. If, now, phenomena, or intuitible objects alone, can become objects of experience, it is plain that without space and time no objects of empirical cognition, hence no empirical cognition, is possible. Compared with things in themselves, space and time are thoroughly subjective and ideal; compared with objects of possible experience—phenomena or intuitible objects—they are thoroughly objective and real. Wherefore, regarded as the conditions of things, or transcendently, space and time have no reality, if the question is about the cognition of the supersensuous (things *per se*); and they have perfect reality with regard to all empirical cognition. The former Kant calls the *transcendental Ideality* of

Kant had shown that the essential difference between noumena and phenomena is that the latter are in space and time (because this is the element specially added by the constitution of our minds), it would be absurd to hold that perhaps noumena might be in space and time also. But, if we apply Mr. Webb's words to the objects and objective of Kant, his remark is false; for Kant asserted the empirical objectivity of space and time. It is, perhaps, hardly fair to criticize a stray remark in this way, but it may draw an explanation from the author in his Second Edition.

Sir William Hamilton in this instance falls into a similar error. Unable to resist the force of Kant's argument, and still unwilling to sacrifice his favourite doctrine of natural Realism, he actually (Lects., vol. ii., p. 114), after admitting the *a priori* nature of space, sees "only one possible answer to the difficulty" so raised against himself. "Does it follow that, because there is an *a priori* space, as a form of thought, we may not also have an empirical knowledge of extension, as an element of existence?" "There seems to me no reason to deny, that, because we have the one, we may not also have the other"! Unfortunately, Sir William Hamilton's "razor" cuts his own throat. The analogy suggested in his marginal jotting, and explained by his Editors, is an unfortunate one, Kant himself having shown (p. 35) that *change* does not stand upon the same footing as space and time.

space and time; the latter, their *empirical Reality*. The absolute reality of either does not come under discussion.

Because Kant makes the first assertion, the transcendental Ideality of space and time, the foundation of his whole philosophy, he calls it "transcendental Idealism." It teaches that space and time are the necessary conditions or rational forms of all representations, and therefore of all phenomena. The force of this assertion lies in two points: (*a*) that space and time are conditions *only* of phenomena, (*β*) that they are their *necessary* conditions. Whoever denies either point, stands distinctly opposed to the Kantian theory. If you assume space and time as conditions or properties of things *per se*, you change into things what are merely representations, and destroy, as in a dream, the difference between thing and representation. If you question the necessity and empirical reality of space and time, you destroy the foundation of all phenomena; and then, along with space and time, all phenomena become mere contingent representations, which may be mere illusion, and then the necessary, real thing has been turned into mere representation. The first fault Kant finds in Des Cartes, the second in Berkeley. The first he blames for "dreamy," the second for "enthusiastic" Idealism. He claims to have answered both by his own point of view, which he designated as "*critical Idealism*."\*

\* In the general remarks on the transcendental *Æsthetic* (Critick, pp. 35-44) there are a good many difficulties which require elucidation. Kant repeats (p. 37) the remark and caution given with regard to space already (p. 27), that we must not confuse the *empirical* distinction between real object and merely subjective appearance with the *transcendental* distinction upon which his doctrine of space and time is based. The passage relative to space (p. 27) was re-written in his Second Edition, the original form was as follows:—"But, with the exception of space, there is no other representation both subjective and referring to something external to us, which could be called objective *a priori*. Wherefore this subjective condition of all external phenomena cannot be compared with any other. The fragrance of a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine, that is, of an object

considered as a phenomenon, but to the peculiar constitution of the sense in the subject, who tastes it. Colors are not attributes of bodies, and belonging to the intuition of them, but only modifications of the sense of sight, affected in a certain way by light. Space, on the contrary, as being a condition of external objects, belongs necessarily to the appearance or intuition of them. Taste and color are not at all necessary conditions under which alone things can become for us objects of sense. They are only accidentally superadded effects of the particular organism connected with the phenomenon. Hence they are not representations *a priori*, but based upon sensation, the pleasant taste even upon feeling (pleasure, or the reverse) as an effect of sensation. Neither can any one have *a priori* the representation of a color, or of any taste; but space only refers to the pure form of the intuition, consequently does not comprehend any sensation (nothing empirical); so that all kinds of determination of space can and ever must be represented *a priori*, if we are to form concepts as well of shapes as of relations. Through the same space only does it become possible for things to be for us external objects." Ideality can only be asserted of things which are *objects* in some sense, according to Kant, at all events subjective-objects. Hence purely subjective phenomena have no ideality at all, as he remarks (p. 27) in his Second Edition. If, then, we attempt to illustrate Kant's doctrine of space and time by saying, for instance, that they are like a coloured pair of spectacles, through which all objects appear as if naturally green or yellow (as, for example, M'Cosh, *Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 19), he tells us the illustration is likely to mislead us; for in this case we look upon the objects as more real than the color, and this might lead us to suppose that the sensation perceived, or that some part of the object of sense, was more real and objective than space and time, which is utterly contrary to his theory; for the whole of what we perceive is phenomenon, and none of it in the least nearer the thing *per se* than the rest; and this he again insists on (p. 38), when he uses the example of the rainbow.

He next (p. 38) proceeds to give an analytical exposition of his views on space and time, the previous discussion having proceeded synthetically. Then comes his proof that our knowledge even of self is only phenomenal, subject to the intuition of time; and he proceeds under sec. III. to defend his theory from the charge of being a doctrine of illusion. When we say that all objects of the senses are only phenomena (not things *per se*), it is a false inference to say they are illusions (p. 42, note). Indeed, it is improper to call objects illusions. Illusion arises when we ascribe to the object *per se* what really belongs only to our senses or subject. Now, we never ascribed space and time to objects *per se*, but only said that they were necessary, and ever present, when the object came into relation with the subject. This is not to assert them to be illusive, but to be phenomena.

He concludes (sec. IV.) by showing that we must ascribe the knowledge of the Deity to intuition, but to intuition freed from the limitations of space and time. The reader should notice the Definition given (p. 43) of primitive intuition.

Throughout the whole of the *Æsthetic* the important foot notes on p. 98 and p. 84 should be kept in view, or else the deduction of the *Categories* will not harmonize with the earlier part of the work. Schopenhauer, indeed, attacks Kant severely for constantly expressing himself as if the intuition and thought separately gave us different sorts of knowledge, which is really contradicted by the whole spirit of the *Critick*—intuitions without thought being only impressions, thoughts without intuition mere vague concepts. The last sentence of the note, p. 84, reads thus: "So that the unity of consciousness occurs in this case as synthetical, and nevertheless at the same time as primitive. This *individuality* of space and time is important in application."

At the conclusion of the seventh section on the antinomy of the pure reason, he gives (p. 316) an indirect or apagogic proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, the ostensive one being contained in the part we have just now discussed. There is also a highly important discussion on the method of mathematics in the *Discipline of the Pure Reason*, sec. I., (pp. 434-49). I advise the reader to peruse this section before proceeding further.

## CHAPTER III.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC: THE ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS.  
THE DOCTRINE OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER-  
STANDING AS CONDITIONS OF EMPIRICAL COGNITION.

## I.—THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF THE ANALYTIC.

THE possibility of pure mathematics has been explained. The impossibility of a knowledge of the supersensuous is already established by anticipation; it remains to examine how such a cognition is possible as an existing fact, but impossible as a legitimate one. This much is certain, that the possible objects of our knowledge can be nothing but things in space and time, that is to say, phenomena, or sensuous things. Let us call the cognition of sensuous things experience, and the question will be: *Is there experience; and how is it possible?* Phenomena are either internal or external; the former are our mental states and their changes; the latter, bodies and their motions. The cognition of the former consists in internal, of the latter in external experience. The science of internal experience is psychology, that of the external experience is physics in the narrower sense. In the wide sense we call the total of all things in space and time—that is, of all possible experience—*nature*; so that, in this sense, empirical science and science of nature are equivalent concepts. We might then express the above question in this way: *Is there a science of nature, and how is it possible?*

In fact, the second part only of this question awaits solution, as the fact of a pure science of nature is already established. The propositions, substance is permanent, and every change supposes a cause, are axioms, the denial of which would destroy every sort of physical science. But the question: *How is a pure science of nature possible?* has yet to be answered. Above all

things, let this question be rightly understood ; or else we shall misconceive the spirit of the following investigation. It has been shown that it is only under certain conditions, which lie in the human reason, that any phenomena at all are possible. We must now investigate, whether there be conditions under which a cognition of these phenomena in experience is possible. If there be no experience, there can be nothing to be experienced ; hence, no object of possible experience. Clearly, the conditions of experience are also the conditions of all objects of possible experience. And if we call the sum of *these* objects nature—if we use the word nature exactly in this sense—then the conditions of experience are also the conditions of nature as an object of possible experience—as an object of possible knowledge. In what other sense could the critical philosophy speak of nature ? Nature *per se* may exist ; we neither know it nor discuss it ; but nature as an object of possible experience, can only exist if experience itself exist. I premise this analysis, to make it perfectly clear that in a certain sense the conditions of nature must be sought for in the reason ; that this sense necessarily belongs to the critical philosophy ; that, therefore, the question : “ *How is nature possible ?* ” is put consistently and deliberately.

But the first and most general question is : *What is experience ?* Clearly, it is the cognition of sensuous things ; and this being also a judgment, we must here pause a moment to investigate the question—What is a judgment, as such ? Every judgment is the connecting of a subject and a predicate ; accordingly, the connexion of two representations which are related, as the universal to the particular, as the individual to the species, as the species to the genus. I represent the subject through the predicate, the particular representation through the general one ; in every case, I represent something through some other representation. Judgments are in every case *mediate representations*, and are in this distinguished from intuitions, which are *immediate representations*. The object

of intuition is always the individual. The object of the judgment is always the concept, through which I represent the individual or its species. I judge: this individual thing (object of intuition) is a metal; metals are bodies; bodies are extended; extension is divisible, &c. The intuition is the singular representation; the judgment, always the representation of a representation. Judgments, then, are only possible through concepts, through a faculty which forms concepts. This faculty is the *understanding*, as distinguished from the sensibility. Concepts always refer to individual things mediately, intuitions, immediately: the former are *discursive*, the latter, *intuitive*. We shall call all cognition through concepts *thought*; then the understanding is the thinking faculty, as distinguished from the sensibility, which is intuitive. The sensibility can produce from itself nothing but intuitions; the understanding, nothing but concepts: here Kant draws the distinction between these two faculties, which consists, not in the different degrees of their representations, but in the difference of their functions. Neither of these faculties can of itself alone produce knowledge; rather, in every cognitive judgment both must co-operate, and the intuitions connect themselves with concepts. Intuitions must be represented through concepts, if we wish to judge and cognize. Concepts must refer to intuitions, if the mediate representation is to be a real one, and the judgment a cognition; or, as Kant expresses it:—Intuitions without concepts are *blind*; concepts without intuitions are *void*.\* We must here add this remark concerning mathematics, that, not indeed in its intuitions as the content of its judgments, but in the *form* of the latter, it must presuppose the understanding, without which it could obtain no judgments at all.† Judging, as such, is a function of the understanding. The investigation of the pure forms of the understanding is *Logic*. General logic teaches the forms of judgments and conclusions, as many

\* Cf. the Critick, p. 46.

† Cf. the Critick, p. 98, note.

as we discover by the analyzing of concepts; it is only concerned with these forms. It does not trouble itself about the conditions under which these judgments become real cognitions. On the contrary, we are investigating the understanding merely from this latter point of view—whether it contains conditions for forming *cognitive judgments*. We assume the forms of judgments and syllogisms ascertained by formal logic. The following investigation, which differs from formal logic, and does not discuss the forms of judgments in general, but the conditions of cognitive judgments, is called *transcendental Logic*. If there be, then, empirical cognition, transcendental logic must point out the conditions in our understanding which make experience possible. If there exist no cognition of the supersensuous, at least not legitimately, this science will explain such impossibility from the conditions of our understanding. The first positive problem it solved in the *transcendental Analytic*, the second negative one in the *transcendental Dialectic*.\*

## II.—THE POSSIBILITY OF EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS (PERCEPTIVE AND EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS).†

The present investigation refers to the former of the above problems. How judgments in general are possible is clear. The question is: How are empirical judgments possible? Every empirical judgment connects two facts, which we perceive sensuously. What is given in this judgment, as matter, is the sensuous perceptions; what is not given, but added as the form, is their connexion, or synthesis. Every empirical judgment is synthetical; and this synthesis, as it is added by us, and hence performed by us, is always *subjective*. But it is very important *what* it is, which is the subjective condition

\* Cf. Critick, pp, 50, *sqq.*

† The substance of the following section is taken from Kant's Prolegomena.

of this connexion. Supposing two phenomena to meet in our minds accidentally; that they connect themselves in this subject, owing to its transient condition, but not by any means in *every* subject: it is clear that their connexion is by no means an universal and necessary one, but merely contingent and particular. I judge, for example, this room is warm—that is to say, it warms me; while some one else in the same room feels the opposite sensation: it makes me feel warm at the present moment; after some time, though at the same temperature, it may not do so. Here is a judgment both empirical and synthetical; but the connexion of the two phenomena differs according to the varieties in the sensation of the perceiving subject. Clearly, such a judgment is no scientific cognition. The connexion depends upon the single perceiving subject, in which the two phenomena may or may not connect themselves. Such a judgment is a *perceptive judgment*, which differs from the empirical judgment, as we shall use the term. For the scientific empirical judgment also does nothing but connect perceived phenomena, and is so far a mere perceptive judgment; but connects them so that their junction is necessary and universal, which was not the case with the mere perceptive judgment. How, then, shall we distinguish the two judgments? The perceptive judgment is only valid for the perceiving subject; it is merely subjective in this sense. The empirical judgment, on the contrary, claims universal and necessary validity; the connexion is not to occur merely in this or that subject—it must be *the same in all*, without exception; the connected phenomena must be judged to be related, not only in this case, but *always*; in a word, the connexion, as opposed to subjective, is to be *objective*. We must attend carefully to the meaning of the word objective. A phenomenon is objective which I distinguish from myself as an external object, by opposing it to myself. A connexion of phenomena is objective, if it be universal and necessary. Object, then, is a different thing in the sense of the transcendental *Æsthetic*,

and in the sense of the transcendental Logic. Space makes an object\* in the sense of the former : what makes an object in the sense of the latter ?

We may, then, determine the empirical judgment as an *objective judgment of perception*. And as the latter is not in itself objective, the question arises : What must be added to a perceptive judgment, to make it an empirical judgment ? And under what sole conditions does a perceptive become an empirical judgment ?

1. *The pure Concepts, or Categories*.—We shall forthwith answer the question by an experiment, namely, try with a perceptive judgment, what must be added to it in order to render it an empirical judgment. Let us use Kant's example. Let the given perceptions be a stone receiving light and heat from the sun. These two phenomena are usually connected in our perception : I judge, when the sun throws light upon the stone, it also warms it. This is clearly a mere perceptive judgment ; there is not a word said about this customary connexion being also a necessary one—that the two phenomena are connected as such ; we may say that in one perception, as far as it extends, they follow one another. The judgment is merely subjective ; the connexion becomes objective when we judge that these phenomena belong to one another as such. The sun warms the stone—that is, the sun is the cause of the heat of the stone. Now, the first phenomenon is no longer the perception, which usually precedes the other, but the condition under which the other necessarily follows.† What has been added to the perceptive judgment ? The concept of *condition*, of *cause*, through which we represent

\* This is (as before observed) an inaccurate expression ; cf. Critick, p. 98, note.

† That is, that all men *now* and *here* would so judge it. And this shows an *a priori* element. The criterion of necessity which shows an *a priori* cognition, asserts that all men must so judge under all possible circumstances. Cf. Hamilton's Reid, p. 754.

to ourselves the first phenomenon, under which we subsume in our example the representation of the sun. We must judge, the sun is the cause of heat, in order to be able to judge, it is the cause of the heat of the stone. The concept of cause, by itself, represents nothing; it is not a concept which I can refer to an intuitible object; it is not a concept which I have abstracted from intuition or perception, like the ordinary general concepts. It is not a representative, but a connective concept; it is not abstracted from any perception; it is not, then, an empirical, but a *pure* or *original concept*. A pure intuition it cannot be, or else it must be construable; but it cannot be thus sensuously represented—it can be only thought. It is, then, a pure concept of the understanding, which we shall denominate, in opposition to all deduced or empirical concepts, a *category*—in opposition to all representative concepts (usually called generic, or general), a *connecting* or *synthetical* concept. So much, then, is now established, that empirical judgments are only possible under the condition of pure concepts, which are themselves only possible through the pure understanding.

2. *The Problems investigated in the Analytic.*—The fundamental question of the transcendental Analytic is now comprehended, and prepared sufficiently for us to take a bird's-eye view of the whole solution, and anticipate the chief points of the investigation. First, the pure concepts must be discovered and established. This being done, there arises a second question, the most difficult of this critical investigation. The pure concepts are as to origin purely subjective; the empirical judgment is objective. How, then, is it possible, that these purely subjective concepts are the conditions of this objective knowledge? How can they have objective existence or value? How can they assert this validity? This claim being proved or deduced, a new difficulty arises. If we may judge phenomena by means of these concepts, we must be able to subsume the phenomena under the pure concepts. Now, the former

are purely sensuous ; the latter, intellectual : the former can only be intuited ; the latter, only thought. This subsumption, then, is impossible, except by some means or other the pure concepts can be made intuitible or sensuous. How, then, can this be accomplished ? When this question also is answered, it is proved that the pure concepts are the conditions of experience ; consequently, of all the objects of any possible experience—that is to say, of all phenomena. • That which lies at the foundation of all phenomena, we call their principle. The principles of cognition are *fundamental principles*. Consequently, their concepts must finally be expounded as *fundamental principles* of all possible experience, or of a pure science of nature. This, then, is the development of the transcendental analytic : it discovers, then deduces,\* the pure concepts of the understanding, then determines for them images, or schemata ; and, finally, gives an exposition from pure concepts of the fundamental principles of a pure science of nature. The doctrine of the Categories is the starting-point ; that of the fundamental Principles, the conclusion. The whole investigation might be comprised in one question : *How can pure concepts become the fundamental principles of experience ?* The answer is : if they admit of an objective, as well as of a subjective application—if they are capable, as

\* This term, to which I believe there is no exact counterpart in our legal language, has been already explained at p. 9, as the answer to the *quæstio juris*, after the *quæstio facti* has been settled. In cases of libel, after the fact has been established, we talk of the *vindication* or *justification* of it, which is the answer to the *quæstio juris* ; so in cases of homicide, we proceed to the *justification* of it, the fact being proved. Either of these terms would convey to the English reader a far more definite sense than the expression “Deduction of the Categories,” which, without commentary, is hardly intelligible. Kant’s expression has, however, become so current, that I have not ventured to change it, but prefer to warn the reader that, wherever he finds it, he is to translate it by vindication or justification of the Categories, as is clearly explained in Dr. Fischer’s text above, as a commentary on the Critick, Analytic of Conceptions, chap. ii., sec. 1 (pp. 71, *sqq.*).

well of connecting, as of representing phenomena. This is the way in which the investigation proceeds from the categories to the fundamental principles. Kant has divided it into the "analytic of concepts," and that of the "fundamental principles."\*

### III. THE DISCOVERY OF THE CATEGORIES.

It is not difficult to discover the Categories, if we once clearly understand how they differ from empirical concepts. They are *judging concepts*; while the latter are representing concepts. Their function is not to represent objects, but to connect representations. Objects are given in intuition; their connexion is not. Representative concepts can be obtained from intuition; not so the connecting or assertative concepts. Now, the form of the judgment consists in the connexion of representations; it is that which remains of the judgment, when we separate the matter of it, viz., the representations given to be connected, or the empirical elements. What remains is the *pure judgment*—that is, the pure form of judgment; or, as all judging = thought, the pure form of thought. Judging concepts, then, are equivalent to pure forms of thought, or judgment. We may also call them the pure forms of the understanding; as judging or thinking is the peculiar function of the understanding.

1. *The Forms of Judgment.*—In this way the Categories may be easily found from the existing judgments, by abstracting from the empirical judgments: what remain are the pure elements or forms of judgments—that is, the Categories. But we may save ourselves the detail of the experiment, as all forms of judgment are long since well known; common logic in its doctrine of judgments offers us the best and safest clue to the discovery of the pure concepts. The Categories must be equal in number to the forms of judgment. If the list of

\* For brevity's sake I shall hereafter omit the word *fundamental*.

these is complete, then in them the list of the Categories also must be complete. And this completeness of the received forms of thought Kant takes for granted as established by Logic.\*

It is clear, that the form of judgment, or the judgment purified of all empirical representations, is nothing but the relation and connexion of the two representations. Of these

\* There is a very difficult passage (Analytic of Conceptions, chap. i., sec. 1), "Of the Logical use of the Understanding in General" (see Critick, p. 56), where Kant proceeds to show that the analysis of judgments will give a complete analysis of the functions of the understanding. But he uses function in a higher and a lower sense in the passage; and this is, I think, the key to part of the obscurity. If I understand it, the following is the scope of his argument:—There are only two ways of cognizing things—through intuitions and through concepts. Intuitions only give us new objects; concepts do not. Hence, the only duty of concepts can be to regulate or systematize our intuitions. All such operations consist in reducing variety to unity, or in comprehending individuals under classes. It is true, that the individual itself might be, and is, constructed by reducing a variety of given representations to unity. Still, as intuitions are individual, we presuppose this unity in thought; and, therefore, thinking consists in comprehending individuals under classes. Supposing now that there were different ways or points of view from which to classify objects, all the individual acts of classification might be reduced under these as heads, as uniformities, or unities, as Kant calls them; and each of these unities produced by reducing many acts of classification to one he calls a *function*. How are we to ascertain all the various functions of the understanding—that is to say, the whole logical use of the understanding? We have already seen that concepts are the only products of the understanding. What use can it make of them? None, except to judge by means of them; for there is no act of the understanding which cannot be reduced to a judgment. And what is a judgment? Nothing but a mode of classing a lower concept, or intuition, under a higher concept, which contains this and many others; in fact, a "function of unity in our representations"—meaning by that expression a *function of the understanding, producing unity in our representations*. If, then, we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgments, by reducing them to classes (as has been done in Logic), we shall attain to the functions of the understanding, which are the functions (in a higher sense) of the functions of unity in our representations. For remarks on this subject, see Introduction.

two representations, one (the subject) must be always contained *under* the other; every judgment represents by its predicate the circumference or magnitude of the subject: this is the *quantity* of the judgment. Of the two representations, one (the predicate) must be always contained *in* the other; every judgment represents by its predicate an attribute of the subject: this is the *quality* of the judgment. Of the two representations, one is necessarily subject, and the other predicate; it is not a matter of indifference which place either takes; there is a necessary reference of subject and predicate, which is represented in every judgment: this is its *relation*. Finally, the connexion or copula of the two representations must be cognised by us in a definite manner, and every judgment must represent this manner: this is its *modality*. The reference of the two representations to one another is determined by quantity (on the side of the subject); quality (on the side of the predicate); relation (reciprocally); the connexion of the two representations is determined by modality. These four are the recognised attributes of pure judgment. Every judgment, as such, has a certain quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

But each of these four determinations comprises various species. A judgment, in its quantity, declares one representation to be contained *under* another. Now, one representation may be contained under another, either wholly or partially. Wholly means to the whole extent of the singular representation, or the genus. Consequently, the extent of the judgment varies according as one representation is thought to be contained under another, as a genus, or part of a genus, or as this individual. Hence, judgments, as to quantity, are divided into universal, particular, and singular. A representation is contained *in* another; this the judgment declares in its quality. Now, a representation, considered as an attribute of another, may be either affirmed or denied, or so excluded from its representation, that all other attributes, excepting this one only, are valid of

the subject of the judgment. Let the representation be A, the attribute B; we may judge A is B, A is not B, A is everything excepting only B; it is *not*-B. So, judgments as to quality are divided into affirmative, negative, and infinite. Of the two representations which form the content of the judgment, one must be subject, the other predicate. The subject is always the representation which lies at the foundation of the other, which conditions it. From this point of view Aristotle had called the subject *ὑποκείμενον*. Substance forms the subject of judgment in this sense; and that which, in a judgment, can only be subject, and never predicate, is substance. If the subject be substance, the predicate is accident (which is added to the subject as its inherent determination. If the subject be cause, the predicate is effect. Finally, if the species of the substance (as to *what sort* of substance the subject is) is to be determined, then the predicate must divide the genus into all its species; it must contain all possible species, one of which belongs to the subject. For example: Suppose I desire to know what sort of representations space and time are, I must know *all* the various kinds of representations; let these be intuitions and concepts: then I judge, space and time are *either* intuitions *or* concepts. The necessary reference of subject to predicate, the judgment declares by its relation. It posits the subject either as substance, or as cause, or as substance requiring closer determination; then the predicate is, in the first case, accident; in the second, effect; in the third, the distinction (division or disjunction) of species. Judgments of relation, then, are categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Lastly, the connexion of the two representations is cognised as a possible, actual, or necessary connexion; and so the threefold value or mode of the copula is determined, and the judgments of modality are divided into problematical, assertorial, and apodeictical.

2. *The Forms of Thought, or Categories.*—These are the possible forms of judgment, and, indeed, all the possible ones.

The Categories are, accordingly, fully determined.\* The form of the singular, particular, and universal judgment gives us the Categories of quantity: *Unity, Plurality, Totality*. The form of affirmation, negation, and limitation gives the Categories of quality: *Reality, Negation, Limitation*. The form of the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgment gives us the Categories of relation: *Substance and Accident* (subsistence and inherence), *Cause and Effect* (causality and dependence), *Reciprocal Action or Community*. Lastly, the form of the problematical, assertorial, and apodeictical judgment give us the Categories of modality: *Possibility* (impossibility), *Existence* (non-existence), *Necessity* (contingence).

\* The obtaining of the Categories (which are, I may observe, in Kant pure concepts of objects of intuition, not merely pure forms of judgment, as Dr. Fischer seems to imply) from the forms of judgments is not so easy in the Critick, and costs us the labor of reading a very difficult paragraph (sec. iii.), "Of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories" (p. 62). The argument appears to be as follows:—General Logic analyses the forms of thought, depending upon receiving its content from beyond its pale. Transcendental Logic, on the contrary, starts with a fixed content—the diversity given in the *a priori* intuitions of space and time. This diversity must be ordered and regulated, or nothing can be done; for the mind cannot analyse except something be first given as complex. But this synthesis is at first an unconscious operation of the mind. Hence, if we want to obtain cognition, in the proper meaning of the term, we must reduce this unconscious action of the imagination to rules—we must bring it under concepts. This pure synthesis (pure because the diversity given is pure) if represented generally—that is, if brought under general types, of which we are conscious—gives us the pure concepts of the understanding. And these concepts must have as their basis an *a priori* synthetical unity, according to which they proceed: just as in counting we proceed according to a concept, that of decads; and this is the unity according to which we accomplish our synthesis. Hence, the pure concepts introduce unity into the *a priori* synthesis of the imagination. Space and time, and the diversity in them, being the content given, this diversity is bound up into unities; and so *objects of intuition* are formed. For the blind synthesis puts together various groups of representations; and these cannot be considered as objects

This is the table of the Categories, which Kant is fond of calling a system. In their arrangement and order, his architectonic fancies are very obvious; we must carefully avoid placing too much faith in the symmetries here exhibited. As these Categories are obtained from the judgments—as the forms of judgment are merely borrowed from the common logic—this dodecalogue of the pure concepts of the understanding wants the real form of a system, which is not supplied by ingenious symmetry. The Kantians have clung servilely to this mere appendage. Kant himself has employed his Categories as a clue for all his subsequent investigations; and we shall often again meet them. As all knowledge consists in judgment, and all judgments are determined by the Categories, Kant uses the latter as the fixed, immoveable point of view, from which he illustrates every object of cognition, every part of his investigations—as well the concept of the Beautiful as that of the Church. They form for every discussion the ever ready and only possible principle of division,

without the necessary unity given by the concepts. The same function which is exercised by the understanding upon the pure synthesis of the diverse parts of intuitions, is also exercised in the case of concepts. For, making them the predicates of judgments, these judgments we already saw were functions producing unity among our representations (cf. last note). It is, then, the same faculty, and the same function of it, which ties up the parts of an object *a priori*, so as to form a necessary unity, and which ties up a number of objects, or lower concepts, into a concept, so as to form a unity. Hence, the forms of judgment, which are the types of the latter, correspond to the Categories, which are the types of the former; and these are the *a priori* element in objects of intuition, and hence form part of the *content*, or matter on which judgments are employed (see Critick, p. 63). On the general subject of the Categories, see Introduction. Let me add here, that Kant inverts the order of the Categories of quantity, the reversal of either, as regards the corresponding judgments, appearing somewhat unnatural. His remarks on infinite propositions are directed towards distinguishing them from *affirmatives*, not from negatives. They are, however, distinct from both, as they imply a foregoing conception of the whole sphere of possible existences.

and may in this respect be well called the Topica of the Kantian philosophy.

3. *The Category of Relation—Causality.*—One point suggests itself: if the Categories are to be the conditions which add the necessary connexion to representations, and express that necessary connexion, as such the Categories of Relation assume a prominent position. From this point, we might venture to simplify the doctrine of the Categories. The rest should either not be allowed to reckon as Categories, or we might endeavour to deduce them from those of relation, as the peculiarly metaphysical concepts. This latter attempt has been made in the school of Fries. But the simplification might be more thoroughly carried out. Among the Categories of Relation, there is *one*, to which the other two may be reduced: the concept of Causality, the category of cause and effect—the simplest expression for any necessary connexion. How can substance be conceived, except as the efficient cause? And supposing reciprocal action—a category which Kant rather extorted from the form of the disjunctive judgment artificially, than by natural deduction—suppose, I say, this category were not distinguishable from pure causality, as being an effect which has as its consequent, not the same, but only a *similar* cause, called by the same name; then the category of *causality*\* would remain the sole substantial concept of the understanding, and principle of knowledge. To this concept Schopenhauer sought to reduce the whole doctrine of the Categories in the transcendental Logic. By Hume also, and in Kant's pre-critical investigations, causality was considered the only form of necessary connexion, and the only cognitive concept. It should be remarked, that the investigation of this concept is the very root of the transcendental Logic; and that Kant, in all his examples of the application

\* If we take causality here to be the pure category, without the schema, this deduction will be the same as that of Sir Wm. Hamilton from the Conditioned. Cf. his Discussions, p. 17.

of the Categories, always reverts to this concept. But we shall not retard the course of our exposition by any further critical comments.\*

#### IV. DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

##### *Problem of the Deduction.*

Empirical judgments only become possible through pure concepts, which have been completely discovered by the clue of the logical judgments, and established in the table of the Categories. There now arises a second question, the solution of which compels us to penetrate the innermost recesses of the human reason: *How are empirical judgments possible through pure concepts?* or, how can concepts, which are purely subjective, make our judgments of perception objective? What right have they to this objective validity? The answer to this question must prove the legitimacy of the claims of the Categories, and will be in the judicial sense a deduction† (justification). If I prove the legitimacy of a concept from

\* It may be well to make a remark upon § 8 (p. 69), which, with the preceding section, were added in the 2nd Ed., and hence are not noticed by Dr. Fischer. Mr. Meiklejohn did not understand the passage, as appears from his note (p. 71), where he comments on his own translation. The reader should alter the passage on p. 69 as follows:—"These pretended transcendental predicates of things are nothing but the logical requisites and criteria of all *cognition of things* in general, and lay at the basis of this cognition the Categories of quantity, viz., *unity, plurality, and totality*; but these Categories, which should properly [that is, if used by the schoolmen consistently] have been considered as material, belonging to the possibility of things *per se*; [these, I say] they used indeed in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites when we consider any cognition, and still they unguardedly changed these criteria of thought into properties of things *per se*." The italics are Kant's own. I may observe, that in many passages Mr. Meiklejohn has inserted italics of his own, and neglected to note Kant's italics, which are of great assistance in getting at the point of his argument; e.g., he is here evidently contrasting the application of the Categories to things, and to the cognition of things, the latter of which he goes on to explain.

† See above, p. 67, note.

experience, such a deduction is empirical. We can have nothing to do with such a deduction here. For the pure concepts are not at all given by experience, but independently of it, by the pure reason. Hence, the present deduction was named by Kant, "the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding," the last two sections of which differ in the Second Edition of the Critick considerably from the First.\* Let us first obtain a clear notion of the question, and the difficulty it involves. How can pure concepts make our perceptive judgments objective? Being, as they are, independent of all experience, they are still to afford us the possibility and foundation of experience. Purely subjective in their origin, these concepts by their function are to form the object of experience. And, indeed, this is to be their only function. We are accustomed to the complete opposition between pure understanding and experience, between subject and object. In the apparent gulf between the two lies the difficulty. If it were really so, then our question would admit of no answer.

Space and Time were also independent of all phenomena, and could never have been abstracted from them; nevertheless they were valid in all phenomena, and had empirical reality:

\* The end of § 10 (p. 77) of the Critick, beginning from the words, "the celebrated Locke," was re-written. The following was the original form: "But there are three original sources (faculties or powers of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and which cannot themselves be deduced from any other faculty of the mind—I mean *sense*, *imagination*, and *apperception*. Thereupon is based ( $\alpha$ ) the *synopsis* of the manifold *a priori* through sense; ( $\beta$ ) the *synthesis* of this manifold through the imagination; finally, ( $\gamma$ ) the *unity* of this synthesis through original apperception. All these faculties have, besides their empirical, also a transcendental use, which merely relates to the form, and is possible *a priori*. Concerning this we have spoken above, as far as regards the senses, in the first part. The two others we shall now endeavour to understand as to their nature." The rest of the Deduction was completely changed, and will be found in its original form, translated, in Appendix A.

and for this simple reason, that Space and Time made all phenomena, because they are the intuiting faculties, without which nothing can be intuited, and of course nothing become a phenomenon. Possibly the problem of the transcendental Logic admits of a similar solution. Possibly the reason why the pure concepts are valid in all experiences is, that they make experience in general; that they are objective, because they alone can form an object of experience. At all events, if experience and the pure concepts are to agree perfectly, either there must exist some miraculous harmony between them, or, supposing the connexion natural, it must be one of two: either experience must be the foundation of the concepts, or *vice versâ*. The former is already proved to be impossible; the problem must, then, be solved by demonstrating the latter.

But we must make plain what an object of experience is. It is nothing but an objective, viz., an objectively valid experience—nothing but an universal and necessary connexion of perceptions, that is to say, such a connexion as is not made contingently by the consciousness of this or that perceiving subject, and which is therefore independent of the empirical consciousness, but not therefore of consciousness in general also. For how could a cognition be independent of consciousness as such? The connexion or synthesis of perceptions (phenomena) is in all cases made *by us*. If it be subjective, it was made by our empirical consciousness, which alters with time. If, on the contrary, it is to be objective, that is, universal and necessary, then it must be conditioned by a non-empirical, and therefore pure and unchangeable consciousness, if there be such. This is the extreme point, towards which the investigation tends, and from which, if once established, the whole problem can be solved. But let us always keep before us the fact, that the object of Experience is not identical with the object of Intuition. The object of intuition is the phenomenon; the object of experience is the necessary connexion, the legitimate conjunction of phenomena. If this necessary con-

nexion be only possible through pure concepts, we may then assert, that the pure concepts make the object of experience, just as the pure intuitions make the sensuous object.\* But we can have no other object than either that in intuition, or that in experience. There can be to us absolutely *no* object independent of subjective conditions; nay, further, not completely dependent upon the same. This plain and irrefragable statement suffices to teach us to lay aside the imaginary antithesis between subject and object. This very antithesis, as well as the object, is merely our representation; but along with it the whole difficulty is removed which impeded our solving the problem.

The *first* edition of the Critick proceeds in a thoroughly critical spirit, resolving the object altogether into our phenomenon or representation, and showing the faculties which form it. For even the raw material of which the object consists, the sensuous data of sensation, being mere modifications of our sensibility, are *nothing without us*, or independent of our perceiving consciousness. The form as well of intuition as of experience, is altogether our product. Kant here expresses it most explicitly, that phenomena or sensuous representations, are not objects beyond our power of representation; that the object of cognition does not exist out of cognition; that all phenomena are objects *within us*, and as such determinations of ourselves.†

1. *The Representation as an Object. Synopsis and Synthesis.*‡—But, if all objects are in this way nothing but our phenomena, and as such nothing beyond our representation, how comes it that we consider them as *objects*? How did we ever obtain the very concept of an object? Is not an object some-

\* See above, p. 34, note; and Mr. Mansel's *Metaphysics*, p. 206, note.

† On this subject cf. Introduction. I protest against this dogmatical solution of a point left by Kant intentionally problematical.

‡ Cf. throughout Appendix A.

thing opposed to me, something which resists me, and by this very fact proves its own independent existence without me? A representation which I can form in this or any other way at pleasure, connect with this or any other, never appears to me to be a real object, but only a mere representation. That which in the object offers me resistance\* (so to speak), is the very thing which forces me not to treat it capriciously, not to represent it in various ways. Such a representation only appears to me as an object which exercises this compulsion upon me. It is not hereby asserted that I feel this constraint from without. Nay, rather, it could not be explained by an external thing; its basis, which cannot be without the pure reason, must rather be sought for in the pure reason. We shall, therefore, determine more accurately what an object is, in order to be able to explain how it is formed. We must do this in order to explain how an object of experience is formed by means of the pure concepts. The problem of the transcendental deduction must expand so as to include this. *What, then, is object in general?* Every object consists of a number of parts, of a multiplicity, given in intuition. It is intuitible in its elements, whether they be given by pure intuition, as in the objects of mathematics; or by empirical intuition, in sensation, as in the case of all other objects. And because all objects are only possible through intuition, each of them is in its elements manifold; for in intuition, whether space or time, only *multiplicity* is given. The proximate, the successive, the simultaneous, all include multiplicity. But even multiplicity does not constitute an object. An object is always a whole, an unity of representations. Consequently, the representations can only become an object, when the manifold of intuition is bound up into a whole, and

\* This term is here properly explained to mean, not mere physical resistance, but all cases where there are fixed sensations (color, &c., as well as hardness) which we cannot represent differently at will.

connected so as to become an unity. But even this combination of multiplicity into unity, into *one whole*, does not constitute an object. If I can combine the parts at will, or arrange them at random, an *object* will never result from such combination. This only is the complete concept of an object: a sensuous multiplicity bound up into unity by a *necessary* connexion. Such a necessary connexion is the universal condition, under which alone the given manifold can be bound up into unity. Such an universal condition we call rule, or law—*rule*, if multiplicity *may* be bound up in some determinate way through it; *law*, if multiplicity *must* be so bound up. We are now in a position to assert: an object is the regular or legitimate connexion of a sensuous multiplicity into unity. A triangle, for example, becomes an object by its geometrical elements being bound up into this figure according to a determined rule. If the manifold is given by pure intuition, by its regular connexion is formed the *mathematical object*. If the manifold is given in sensation, the necessary connexion of it forms the *object of perception*, the sensuous phenomenon. If these phenomena, or objects of perception, are themselves given as a manifold, their necessary and legitimate connexion forms the *object of experience* or *nature* as the legitimate correlation of phenomena. The question above put: How is the object of representation possible through pure concepts? is therefore identical with the question: *How is nature possible through pure concepts?*

But first the primal question: How is an object in general possible? must be solved. We have explained what an object is. These conditions are necessary to constitute an object: ( $\alpha$ ) the multiplicity in intuition; ( $\beta$ ) its union by synthesis; ( $\gamma$ ) the necessity of this synthesis.\* Intuition, by itself, only contains multiplicity; synthesis unites it; necessary synthesis makes the unity objective—it makes it an object,

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 63 and 80; and note to p. 76.

or adds to the intuition an object (by thought). The intuition, by itself, is not synthetical, in the sense of a real union. Sensation gives individual impressions; Space and Time are the principles of thoroughgoing multiplicity and separation. In Space everything is proximate; in Time, successive; and even what is perceived as temporarily simultaneous, is not for that reason united into *one* representation. The unity of representation is given neither through intuition, nor through sensation. We can allow to sensibility, as Kant expresses it, *synopsis*, but not *synthesis*. How, then, does the synthesis or unity of the representation arise?

2. *The Unity of the Representation. The Synthesis of Apprehension, of the Imagination, and of Pure Consciousness.\**—Let the multiplicity which is to be brought together into a representation be *a, b, c, d, &c.* The first condition must be, that each of these representations be grasped, one joined to the other, and so the whole series of representations gone through successively. This grasping of the parts Kant calls *Apprehension*. Without such apprehension, no union of the manifold, and therefore no unity of representation, would be conceivable. Even the unity of time and space must be represented by this means.† The synthesis of apprehension is pure, because without it even the representation of space and time would be impossible. The representation of every mathematical quantity presupposes this apprehension.‡ But this very apprehension presupposes another power, without which it could not be accomplished. Even if I apprehend all the parts of a representation successively, but am unable along with the last to represent the first—along with the posterior the prior—then the synthesis of apprehension is nothing worth. For this synthesis, there is, then, a faculty necessary, which represents over again what was previously intuited,

\* The substance of this paragraph is condensed into one sentence in the Second Edition (foot of p. 80).

† Cf. Critick, p. 98, note.

‡ Critick, p. 94.

brings up again its picture—in short, a *reproductive faculty of imagination*, which, while I am intuiting *c*, presents to me *a* and *b*; otherwise, union into a complete representation is impossible. It is also clear, that the representation of every mathematical quantity presupposes this reproductive imagination. From this it follows, that this reproductive synthesis is in its origin pure, or *a priori*; that it belongs to “the transcendental operations of the mind.” “It is plain,” says Kant, “that when I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from to-day at noon to to-morrow at the same hour, or even wish to represent to myself any definite number, first of all, I must necessarily grasp in thought these manifold representations successively. But if I lost out of mind, and could not reproduce, the transient parts (the first part of the line, the prior portions of the time, or the successively represented unities), whilst I proceed to the succeeding ones, there never could arise a complete representation, nor any of the thoughts just named—nay, not even the first and purest fundamental representations of space and time.” Yet the comprehension of the parts by means of apprehension, and with it the reproduction of representations by means of the imagination, are not able to produce the unity of the representation. I apprehend the individual parts successively; I present to myself the earlier during the presence of the later; so that the *whole* series of representations is before me. But what security have I that the reproduced representations are accurately the same as those I previously had—that the reproduced representations are perfectly identical with those (originally) apprehended? If they be not identical, then, despite of any reproduction, we cannot attain unity of representation. What advantage is it to represent to myself clearly *a* and *b* by means of the reproductive imagination, if I am not sure that these reproduced representations are really *a* and *b*? It is, then, absolutely necessary for the unity of the representation, not merely that I should reproduce the earlier representations, but also that

I should be certain of the identity of both—that I should *recognize* in those now before me the earlier representations. What must be added, therefore, to reproduction, to produce the unity of representation, is *Recognition*. Its synthesis is the identity of representations. Without it no object, not even a mathematical one, is conceivable. Consequently, it is pure, and belongs to the transcendental conditions of knowledge. But how is this recognition possible, which is met with neither in apprehension nor in imagination? What faculty does it presuppose in us? I must be conscious, and perfectly certain of the identity of my representations—that the representation which I have present to me at the moment *c* is the same which I had in the moment *b*. This recognition is only possible through my *Consciousness*. It is not a representation, but the comparison of two representations, and therefore a concept. Kant describes this act, then, of recognition as “the synthesis of recognition in *concept*.” Suppose now that my consciousness continually changes with my states—that it differs at every moment of time—then the identity of two representations in different points of time is clearly impossible; and so would be also the consciousness of this identity, or recognition. This consciousness, which is subject to alterations in time, and changes with our impressions, we may call *empirical* consciousness. It is the consciousness of our mental states as they arise, and is changeable as these are, and conceived, like all that changes, as changing continuously. Through this empirical consciousness, then, recognition in the concept—consequently, the unity of representations, and the object in general—would not be attainable.

The identity of representations differing in time necessarily presupposes the identity of consciousness; that is to say, a consciousness which, in all changes of time and impressions, always remains *unchangeably the same*. If at every moment I become a different person, then two representations which I have at

different moments can never be the same. This unchangeable consciousness, as distinguished from the variable, is called *pure*. This pure consciousness is the condition under which alone the identity of representations differing in time, the knowledge of this identity, the recognition in concept—in fact, an object in general—is possible; it is the last and highest condition for the completeness of the object. Kant calls consciousness *Apperception*, following Leibniz. He distinguishes empirical from pure apperception, the latter of which precedes all experience, as the condition under which alone objects are possible, and is therefore original, or *a priori*. The object of all consciousness is our representations, and so ourselves. The pure consciousness cognizes the identity of representations differing in time, which would be impossible if our proper self were not independent of all the changes of our empirical states, and always the same. The pure consciousness is then, more accurately, pure, original self-consciousness, which Kant calls “*transcendental apperception*” (also synthetical unity of apperception, transcendental unity of self-consciousness, &c.). All representations, however they may differ, are united in *one* point—they are all *my* representations; they all belong to the same individual consciousness. This consciousness makes their synthetical unity. The consciousness of self is at the same time the consciousness of the synthetical unity of all my representations. In this way the pure self-consciousness forms the highest principle of all cognition. That the *Ego* at any moment is equal to the *Ego* [at another]—this is the ground of connexion for all that appears to it—this the principle which distinguishes and compares representations, and unites synthetically the manifold in general. *Ego* = *Ego*, is an analytical principle; *Ego* = the unity of all representations, is a synthetical one, and indeed the highest synthetical principle of all knowledge. Here Kant touches the point from which Fichte afterwards started, in his work, “On the

Principles of the Sciences.”\* The *Ego* as the first and highest principle of knowledge—as the foundation of all objectivity—has been recognised and established by Kant in this passage.

3. *The necessary Unity of Apperception—Transcendental Apperception—The Pure Consciousness, and the Productive Imagination.*—We now understand how an object in general is possible—only by means of a threefold synthesis: the comprehension of its partial representations, the reproduction of the past ones, the recognition of the identical ones. The comprehension is only possible through the perceiving apprehension; the reproduction, through the imagination; the recognition, through the pure self-consciousness. Without this threefold synthesis, we can reach no object, either of intuition, perception, or experience. One point only is still wanting for the complete explanation of the matter. The synthesis, or union of representations, has been explained; but not their *necessary* synthesis, without which the unity of representations cannot become an object. I can apprehend successively the series of representations; I can make the whole series present by means of the imagination; I can by means of the pure consciousness recognise the earlier representations as those now present; accordingly, I conjoin, indeed, the given representations, but at will: so that in this way an irregular mass of representations, but no ordered whole—a kaleidoscope, but no picture—is produced. If the union, then, does not proceed according to a fixed rule—if a definite synthesis is not compulsory, which excludes random connexions—we shall never get an image from perception, much less legitimate experience from phenomena. *What is it, then, which makes the synthesis necessary?*

The image is the object of perception. It presupposes that all its parts are together present, which is only possible by

\* On this point cf. Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, Art. Fichte (p. 282, sqq., ed. Seelye); and above, Introduction.

means of the reproductive imagination. Without imagination, even the object of perception is impossible. Kant well remarks: "That the faculty of imagination is a necessary ingredient, even in perception, has perhaps not as yet struck any psychologist. This arises, partly from confining the faculty to mere reproduction, partly because it was thought that the senses not only gave us impressions, but even combined them, and so brought images of objects before us—a process which, nevertheless, most certainly requires somewhat besides the mere receptivity of impressions—namely, a function of their synthesis."

The reproductive imagination merely connects various representations; that is to say, it *associates* them. This association allows any variety; and it is not possible to conceive how we could by this means attain a regular and necessary image—an objective unity of representations. The imagination must connect representations necessarily; it must be compelled to connect with the representation *a* the representation *b*, not *c*, *d*, &c. It can only be forced to do this by the representations themselves. If they are in themselves related to one another, and thoroughly connected with one another, then the imagination will be unable to generate and connect representations in any other than one determined order. Let this relation among representations be called *Affinity*; then affinity will be the basis of an universal and necessary association. But what is the basis of affinity—what gives representations this general unity? Nothing but the fact of their being connected in *one* consciousness—that is to say, pure consciousness—makes that objective bond of representations, which gives directions to the imagination how to produce the image. Imagination produces the image according to a rule which is given by pure consciousness, and therefore an original rule, and in this point of view not reproductive, but productive; as it proceeds according to rules, it is not only an intuiting or perceiving, but also an intellectual faculty.

Without this *productive imagination* we could never have an objective picture, or phenomenon, or an object of experience. It is in this sense that Kant asserts the imagination to be the intermediate bond between sensibility and understanding.

But how can we assert that the pure consciousness is the basis of the affinity of phenomena? Phenomena are nothing in themselves, but to him to whom they appear they are representations, which presuppose a conscious subject. This consciousness, as distinguished from the phenomenon, which presuppose it, is pure consciousness. The phenomena must satisfy these conditions: they must agree with pure consciousness—in other words, they must be united in *one and the same consciousness*. This would be impossible, were there not unity in phenomena. Without unity and legitimate connexion among phenomena, there could be no pure consciousness; and without this, no phenomena at all. The connexion between phenomena and pure consciousness means the legitimate connexion of phenomena, or their transcendental affinity, which is, as it were, the understanding of the imagination. “For the fixed and permanent *Ego* (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlatum of all our representations, so far as the mere possibility of becoming conscious of them; and all consciousness belongs just as much to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensuous intuition (*quod* representation) belongs to a pure internal intuition, namely, that of Time. It is, then, this apperception which must be added to the imagination, to render its function intellectual.”

#### V. SUMMARY OF THE DEDUCTION. THE PURE UNDERSTANDING AND THE CATEGORIES.

We have shown that no object of experience—hence no experience—is possible, without recognizing representations—without the recognition by concept; and this was possible only through pure consciousness. Pure consciousness alone can compare representations, and know their unity or difference.

All comparison of representations is judgment. All judgments, without exception, unite representations in *one* consciousness. Pure consciousness, then, is the form of judgments; and the forms of judgments were the Categories. The Categories are, then, those forms in which pure consciousness unites the manifold that appears; they are the conditions under which phenomena are connected in the pure consciousness, and so the laws or rules of this connexion. Now, being connected in pure consciousness means being objectively connected. What pure consciousness connects must be necessarily one, and connected in every consciousness; and this is valid independently of the empirical consciousness, which differs with each individual—it is valid for consciousness as such, and hence *objective*. For this reason, the Categories are the conditions under which alone phenomena can be objectively connected; that is, they are the conditions of empirical judgments and objects—they are the laws by which phenomena are connected among themselves. Let us call this combination of phenomena according to law, *nature* (and what else can nature mean?), and the Categories will be the conditions of nature; the pure understanding will be the faculty of rules, according to which all phenomena must be connected—in fact, the lawgiver for nature. To prove this was the problem of the transcendental deduction, which has accordingly been completely solved.\*

## VI. CATEGORIES AND INNATE IDEAS. CRITICAL IDEALISM.

With regard to the doctrine of the Categories, the critical philosophy opposes equally both the dogmatical schools. The Categories are not, as Sensationalists would have it, mere empirical concepts, any more than space and time. They cannot be deduced from experience, as they are the conditions of all experience. An attempt at such a deduction is, as

\* “The understanding does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from, but prescribes them to, nature.” Kant’s *Prolegom.*, Part II., § 36.

Kant well expresses it, a *generatio æquivoca* of these concepts, just like the attempt to deduce the animate from the inanimate. At one time Kant agreed with Hume that causality was an empirical concept. He now has discovered, that to deduce causality from experience would be just like deducing space and time from our perceptions; that in both cases the question is begged by vicious reasoning in a circle. Causality is not the product, but the condition of experience: *it is not experienced, but makes experience*. With regard to the Categories, this is the difference between Kant and Hume—between criticism and scepticism.

The Categories are primitive concepts, as space and time are primitive intuitions. The expression might lead us to imagine that both were implanted or innate to human reason. This was with regard to cognitive concepts the doctrine of the dogmatical Idealists from Des Cartes to Wolf. In his transcendental *Æsthetic*, Kant has already secured the primitive intuition of space and time from such an interpretation. He calls it pursuing the course of a "lazy philosophy" to spare ourselves any fundamental explanation of the matter as idle, and to appeal to innate data. Space and time are the primitive operations of intuiting reason, the Categories are the primitive operations of the pure understanding. If they were innate ideas, they must be merely subjective, and then the agreement between these ideas and things (and so knowledge) would be absolutely incomprehensible; it must be a miraculous preformation or harmony, which explains nothing, and excludes all critical investigation.\* The Categories are by no means innate to the human understanding, but rather only exist through the

\* So in Kant's treatise "De Mundi Sensibilis et Intelligibilis Principiis," he says (sec. III., coroll.), "Tandem quasi sponte cuilibet oboritur quæstio utrum conceptus uterque sit *connatus* an *acquisitus*. Posterius quidem per demonstrata jam videtur refutatum: prius autem, quia viam sternit *pigrorum philosophiæ*, ulteriorem quamlibet indagacionem per citationem causæ primæ irritam declarantis, non ita temere admittendum est."

human understanding, being its necessary *functions* or operations. As mathematical quantities only come into existence by being intuited or constructed, so the pure concepts only exist when they are thought. What is thought by means of them is not the individual thing, which can only be intuited and represented by means of the imagination, but the connexion or combination of phenomena. If we can grasp the objectivity of pure consciousness, or of transcendental apperception, the objectivity of the Categories is at once conceivable. The whole Kantian deduction, to sum up its chief points, comes to this: that all phenomena are perfectly subjective, and nothing is objective but pure consciousness and its connecting functions.

## CHAPTER IV.

## TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC—THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES—THE DOCTRINE OF THE SCHEMATISM OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING AND OF ITS PRINCIPLES.

THE first two problems of the analytic are solved, the pure concepts have been discovered, and their objective validity proved. They are, like space and time, valid as empirical reality. Space and time may be applied to all phenomena, as objects of intuition; the Categories may be applied to all phenomena as objects of experience. Space and time *make the phenomena*, as an object of intuition; hence their validity. The Categories *make experience*; hence they are valid for all its possible objects. All experiences consist in an universal and necessary connexion of phenomena, which connexion of phenomena is always ourselves,—that is to say, our consciousness. It is all-important *which* sort of consciousness makes the connexion—whether it be the empirical or the pure—whether it is I the perceiving subject, or I the thinking subject, who make the connexion. If the synthesis be only an empirical (transient) consciousness, then it is contingent and particular, then its judgment is a mere judgment of perception. If, on the contrary, the synthesis is performed by the pure and universal consciousness, which is *the same* in every man, the former is, as the latter, universal and necessary, and its judgment objectively valid, or an empirical judgment. Now, the Categories are the concepts or rules of this pure understanding; it is therefore clear that they are valid in all experiences, because they are the conditions of all experience.

## I.—THE APPLICATION OF THE CATEGORIES. THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.

The Categories are the rules of empirical science, the object of which is nature; just as there are rules of grammar,

the object of which is language. In both cases the rules are the conditions according to which the objects—things or words—are formed and connected. We may know perfectly the rules of grammar, and yet not be able to speak or write correctly. Knowledge of rules differs from their right application. In order to apply the rule rightly, we must represent the given cases through the rule, or be able to subsume them under it rightly. “This case comes under this rule:” this is a subsumption, or judgment, only possible by means of the judging faculty of the human understanding. Without this faculty no application of the Categories to sensuous objects, and hence no experience, is possible. Consequently, this faculty of judgment belongs to the conditions antecedent to experience. From this point of view, Kant calls it “*the transcendental faculty of judgment.*”

But the transcendental faculty of judgment presupposes a condition, without which it could not judge. It must apply the rules of the pure understanding to phenomena—must subsume them under it, or represent the phenomena through Categories. In this consists the transcendental judgment. Now, phenomena are thoroughly sensuous, and arise from intuition; the Categories are thoroughly intellectual, and spring from the pure understanding; both, then, differ in kind, and could not be more dissimilar. How is it possible to represent a subject through a predicate which has nothing in common with the genus of the subject? How is it possible to think phenomena through Categories? Herein lies the difficulty. If the subsumption of phenomena under pure concepts be *not* possible, it was idle to demonstrate the objectivity of the latter: we have, indeed, the rules which make experience, but are unable to apply them, and they are useless, like the gold of Midas.

1. *The Possibility of the Application—Image—Schema.*—The question is: How can pure concepts be applied to sen-

suous things? Homogeneous representations may be connected. I may judge of a plate that it is circular. But how am I to connect heterogeneous representations? How can we judge of the sun, that it is *a cause* (for example, of heat)? In order to make the transcendental judgment possible, there must be, as it were, a bridge, which leads from understanding to sensibility—from the region of pure concepts to that of sensuous things; and, *vice versa*, a mediating faculty between both, which conducts sensuous objects to the understanding. This intermediate faculty—this bond between sensibility and understanding—has been already discovered in the productive imagination. If, then, the Categories are to be at all applicable to the phenomena, it can only be through the medium of the imaginative faculty. The imagination must be able to accomplish what the pure understanding never can—to present by images the Categories, or to make them sensuous, and so to make them homogeneous with phenomena. An image, in the proper sense, is always the perfect expression of a sensuous phenomenon. In this sense, there are only images of intuited objects, never of concepts. Not even mathematical concepts, which proceed immediately from intuition—still less empirical (general) concepts (which, the more universal they are, the further apart from intuition are they), can be represented in images. How much less, then, the pure Categories, which are pure concepts, and do not at all arise from intuition! The concept of a triangle is a triangle in general, whether it be right-angled or obtuse. The intuited triangle is necessarily either one or the other; and the same is true of the real image of a triangle. Of the concept triangle there is no image; still less is there an image of the concept man, beast, plant, &c. For the real image is always a particular individual, which a concept is not. Still, our imaginative faculty is involuntarily called upon and actively employed in producing *figures* of these concepts, as well of mathematics as of experience, which it cannot represent in images. It sketches out their forms, as

it were, in outline and contour; it gives us a sort of monogram of those concepts, as it cannot give us images of them: it can paint sensuous phenomena, but only sketch concepts in general outlines.\* “This is,” says Kant, “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, the real secret of which we shall hardly ever be able, by observing nature, to guess and bring to light.”† Let the monogram, as distinguished from an image or picture, be called a *schema*. The question is, then: *Whether there exist by means of the imagination schemata of the pure concepts?*

2. *Time as the Schema of the Categories.*—This schema would be the only condition under which pure concepts become sensuous, and apply to phenomena, or make experience. This schema, then, would be a condition of all experiences, and be therefore *a priori*, or transcendental; it must then be a product of the pure imagination. It must correspond to concepts, by applying, as these do, to all phenomena *a priori*; it must correspond to phenomena, by being, as these are, intuitible in its nature. Now, there is one form which comprehends *all* phenomena in itself *a priori*, and is itself intuition; this form is *Time*. Determination, then, by time, is the only possible transcendental schema. What, then, are the special determinations of time, in which the imagination renders the pure concepts sensuous, or schematizes them?

All phenomena are in time. Each has a certain duration in time; that is, it lasts while a certain time elapses. This duration is a temporal series; the representation of the temporal series is produced by the successive addition of equal parts of time, each of which is an unit. This addition of units gives

\* As Professor Webb has remarked, the schema of Kant corresponds to the abstract idea of Locke (Intellectualism, p. 190).

† The reader will observe that the translation differs in sense from that of Mr. Meiklejohn (Critick, p. 109). The meaning is plainly what I have given, but the idiomatic elegance of the original is lost in any English version.

us *number*.\* Every phenomenon, while it lasts, fills time, and produces from this point of view a certain *continuity of time*. Every phenomenon, while it lasts, fills time, and produces, from this point of view, a certain *content of time*. Phenomena do not fill time in the same way, but have determinate relations in time: one remains while the others do not; or they all succeed one another; or, finally, they can be present simultaneously. Let this relation of time be called the *order in time*. Lastly, time includes within it the existence of phenomena in determinate ways: the phenomenon is either at some time or other, or at a definite moment, or at every time. Let this determination in time be called the *comprehension in time*. All possible determinations in time are now exhausted; they are series of time (number), content of time, order in time, comprehension in time. Every phenomenon has a certain quantity in time, fills a certain portion of it, is related to some other in it, and has a certain existence in it.

3. *The Schematism of the Pure Understanding*.—Let us now compare these time-determinations with the pure Categories, and we find number corresponds to quantity, the content of time to quality (that is, the sensations which fill up time), order of time to relation, and comprehension in time to modality. Number, then, is the schema of quantity. The content of time as time filled up, is the schema of reality, as empty

\* I think both Mr. Mansel and Dr. Fischer have been led into the mistake of basing arithmetic on time, by seeing here the statement that number is the pure schema of quantity. But surely all mathematics must be based upon definite intuitions, as is clear from the Critick, p. 109, where he gives an example which should have warned them. Kant, further (p. 110), distinguishes carefully between the schema of sensuous conceptions (figures in space, for example), and the schema of a pure conception of the understanding, *which latter is a thing that cannot be reduced to any image*. Of this description, evidently, is number, the pure schema of quantity as a pure concept of the understanding; it is number, as implying merely the *act* of having added homogeneous units (which are only given in space?) and combining them into a whole, as *generating time*.

time, that of negation. Order in time is a threefold relation : one phenomenon remains, while the others pass away. The former is permanent, the latter change. Permanence in change is the schema of substance and accidents. The succession of phenomena, when according to a rule, is the schema of causality, and the simultaneity of phenomena according to law is the schema of community or reciprocal action. Lastly, existence in an arbitrary moment is the schema of possibility ; existence at a fixed moment is the schema of reality ; existence at every moment (always), that of necessity.

These schemata are what determine phenomena, and at the same time correspond to the Categories ; so that they border both on the region of sensuous things and that of pure concepts. They make phenomena and Categories mutually accessible. The understanding connects phenomena by means of the Categories ; it subsumes phenomena under Categories by means of schemata ; that is to say, it judges through the schemata of the pure imagination. This proceeding Kant calls the "schematism of the understanding." We now have not only rules, but the clue for their application. Phenomena which are regularly simultaneous I shall not connect by cause and effect ; phenomena which pass away in time I shall not represent under the concept of substance ; phenomena which always exist I shall not judge to be merely possible.\*

\* In the first schema we add units of time, without any distinction as to what content, what sensation, they have. But in any one of them we may have a strong sensation, or none at all ; this is, I suppose, what he means by one and the same time differing as full and empty. How, then, do we come to consider reality as a quantum ? By regarding it as the result of a gradual increase of degrees of sensation, generated in successive moments of time, from 0 upwards. Let the reader compare Kant's summary (in p. 112) where he says the schema of quantity is "the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object," the schema of quality "the synthesis [generation] of sensation (perception [this word is omitted in the translation]) with the representation of time, or the occupation of time." The other two schemata do not require elucidation. That of relation refers

## II. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING—THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE.

There is nothing remaining to impede the transcendental judgment. It has been proved that through the Categories, and through them alone, all phenomena may and must be connected; it has been proved that through the Categories all phenomena can be represented by means of the schemata; and thus the knowledge of phenomena, or experience, has been established as possible, as well from the objective as the subjective side. The problem of the Analytic has been now so far solved, that from the pure concepts of the understanding we may draw or form the first principles. After it has been shown that the Categories are valid of all phenomena, we must be able to assert the Categories of all phenomena; and such an assertion of strict and absolute universality is a fundamental or *first Principle*.\* There must be as many original Principles as there are original concepts; of all phenomena, without exception, quantity, quality, relation, and modality must be predicable. Wherefore, the Principles will be distinguished as the concepts are. These Principles are independent of all experience; they are the deliverances of the transcendental judging faculty, exerting its privileges; they are therefore the *Principles of the pure understanding*. But what they declare is only valid of phenomena; they are only the fundamental principles of empirical science; and as the latter means science of nature, they may be called the Principles of the pure science of nature.

to the relations of phenomena among one another as regarded in time; that of modality, their relation to time regarded as a whole. Just as we shall afterwards find the principles of relation and modality differ as relations of phenomena to one another, and to the conscious subject. On the whole question of the schematism, see Introduction. Kant gives the clearest example of what he means by a schema in describing the construction of concepts in mathematics (Critick, p. 435).

\* On the exact meaning of this term, cf. Critick, p. 449.

To the table of the Categories corresponds the “pure physiological table of the universal principles of the pure science of nature.” The possibility of the Principles of pure physics is investigated and explained in the transcendental Analytic.

We shall get a perfectly clear insight into the abstruse discussion on the Principles, if we comprehend it under its simplest aspect. Let us, accordingly, leave aside the topic of the Categories, which in any case is of more use for system than for the Critick. They are, indeed, the obvious index for the order of the first principles; but there is a path which, proceeding strictly according to the clue given by the Critick, leads us most safely to the Principles. They may all be deduced from one source. The whole previous investigation—the discovery of the pure concepts of the understanding, their deduction and schematism—is comprised in one result: *the possibility of experience is demonstrated*; its necessary conditions are shown. It is obvious, that without experience no object of experience (nothing which is to be experienced) is possible. Without experience there are no objects of experience, just as without sensuous perception there can be no sensuous or perceivable things. It is quite clear that all objects of experience stand under the conditions of experience itself; that the conditions of experience are also valid for all its possible objects. This principle is an original principle, and indeed the highest original principle of all real cognition, or of all synthetical judgments, and is therefore itself not logical, but metaphysical; it is the original principle, in which all the others are contained, and from which they simply follow. What are the conditions of possible experience? That there be phenomena, the only objects of experience; that these be necessarily connected. Our first principles, then, must declare that all the objects of possible experience are—(1) phenomena; and (2) as such, standing in a necessary connexion. Now, all phenomena are intuited sensations; they are, then—(a) intuited; (β) objects of sensation; and accordingly determined in the

first case quantitatively, in the second qualitatively. All phenomena stand in a necessary relation—( $\gamma$ ) among one another; ( $\delta$ ) to our consciousness or our knowledge; this gives them, necessarily, relation and modality. Under each of these four points of view, then, which agree with the Categories, an original principle must be valid of all the objects of possible experience.

### III. THE AXIOM OF INTUITION.

The first Principle is this: all the objects of possible experience are intuited; as being objects of intuition, they are in space and time; therefore, as everything in space and time, they are quantities. All spatial quantities are composed of nothing but parts of space; all temporal, of parts of time; that is to say, these quantities are composed of purely homogeneous parts—they can only be represented by our composing them of these parts, or adding these parts successively to one another. It is, therefore, the representation of the parts which makes the representation of the whole (suppose a line, or a portion of space) possible. Such a quantity, formed by the addition of parts, is *ipso facto* extensive. Accordingly, Kant states his first principle: *All intuitions are extensive quantities.\** The intuition of space and time is *a priori*; and so is everything which follows from it immediately. For this reason, Kant calls this first principle an “*Axiom of Intuition.*” Everything intuited is extensive. Everything extended is divisible, and divisible *ad infinitum*. Consequently, nothing indivisible can be intuited, nor any intuition be indivisible. In other words: atoms can never be intuitions, hence, never be phenomena, nor objects of possible experience. Atoms are not objects, but phantoms of metaphysical speculation, which a prudent science of nature can never embrace among its prin-

\* That is to say, have extensive quantity, or are quanta. We are obliged to use *quantity* both for quantum and quantitas.

ciples. On the contrary, the fundamental principle of a pure science of nature from the critical point of view contradicts atoms. They may be possible in themselves; but empirically, or as objects of our knowledge, they are impossible.

#### IV. THE ANTICIPATION OF PERCEPTION.

1. *Sensation as an Intensive Quantity.*—The second Principle will be developed from the assertion that all objects of possible experience, because they are phenomena, must also necessarily be sensations. The intuition produces the form, the sensation produces the content, of a phenomenon. The form of every phenomenon is *a priori*; the content, on the contrary, or what is real in the phenomenon, is given as a sensuous datum from without (that is to say, not produced by the pure reason), and hence *a posteriori*. How is it possible to assert anything *a priori* of such objects of perception? With regard to the content of phenomena—that is, sensations—how can a Principle be at all possible? Only if something could be foretold with perfect certainty of all our sensations, whatever they may be—only if a condition could be anticipated without which what is real in our perception could never be given. Such a principle would not be an axiom of intuition, but, as Kant expresses it, an “*Anticipation of Perception.*”

In no case can it be foretold *what* we must feel, simply because we do not produce, but receive, the content of our sensations.\* But it may be possible to determine *how* we must feel under all circumstances; not indeed the content, but the form, of the sensation may be anticipated. Whatever reality in sensation may be, in any case it is felt in time. Formally, all sensations must occupy time, or make up the content of time. Whatever exists in time is necessarily a

\* Here Dr. Fischer's absolute Idealism seems to break down. This was the very point which Kant hints at in his whole system, and which admits the possibility of a real (non-egoistical) element in our cognition.

quantity. Wherefore, independent of their special nature or qualities, all sensations are in form *quantities*. But the quantity of sensation does not consist, like that of intuition, in the successive addition of homogeneous parts, otherwise a sensation could only be represented or apprehended in a temporal series; on the contrary, it is represented as complete in every moment; nor can any parts be combined to obtain the sensations of red, sweet, heavy, warm, &c. Clearly, each of these parts is the whole sensation. All sensations are quantities, as filling up time; but not quantities the whole representation of which is produced only by the successive apprehension of its parts—in short, they are not *extensive quantities*. On the contrary, the whole sensation is present in each moment. It is either complete, or non-existent. Either I have the sensations of red, heavy, warm, &c., or I have them not; in no case is a temporal series, or gradual apprehension of the parts, necessary to generate these sensations. Let us denominate the presence of determinate sensations *Reality*, and their total absence *Negation*: it is clear, that the reality of sensation cannot possibly be an extensive quantity, because in every moment which it fills, it is present in its completeness. But it need not be equally strong at every moment; it may wax and wane, and at length vanish with the sensation itself. Consequently, every sensation is capable of various states of quantity, but in each of these it is present whole and complete; these states are not its parts, but its grades or *degrees*. Sensation itself is an intensive quantity, or a degree. The original principle, which anticipates all perceptions as such, is this: “*In all phenomena sensation, and the reality which corresponds to it in the object (realitas phenomenon), has an intensive quantity, that is to say, a degree.*” If the sensation is present in a certain amount, this is its reality; if it is present in no amount, this is its negation. Its change in amount, then, or plurality, is an approximation to negation. Reality is the presupposition under which these distinctions—this approximation to nega-

tion, this plurality—is possible. In intuition it was the many distinct parts, the combination of which formed the whole representation. In sensation it is the whole representation which makes possible the plurality of distinctions. Consequently, all intuitive quantities are extensive; all sensation-quantities, intensive. Let us reduce the amount of a sensation to cypher; then the sensation is present in no degree—it is *not* present; nothing is felt; it is a perfectly empty sensation, which is the same as none. A vacuum is no object of sensation. This proposition follows necessarily from the Anticipation of perception. A vacuum cannot be the object of sensation; hence, not of experience either. Empty space and empty time are never objects of possible experience; it is, consequently, impossible to admit these conceptions among the fundamental principles of a science of nature. These Principles, from a critical point of view, must rather deny such concepts. They do not accord with the conditions of possible experience. It is impossible to apply them to objects of experience, or, what means the same thing, use them for explanations in physics.

2. *Intensive Quantities in Natural Philosophy.*—Certain natural philosophers have thought it necessary to assume the possibility of empty space or spaces, in order to explain by this means natural phenomena. We must object that (1) empty spaces can never possibly be the objects of perception; and that, if for no other reason, the assumption of *porousness* is a mere fiction, not founded upon any experience; it is an hypothesis based on nothing; that (2) the hypothesis does not explain the natural\*phenomena in question; that (3) these phenomena may be very well explained without such an hypothesis.

For the fact is: that materials which occupy the same amount of space differ greatly with regard to their quantity, density, weight, incompressibility, &c.; that often, for instance, the same volume accompanies widely different densities. Now, the natural philosophers we allude to translate density by number of parts, and accordingly declare that in

the same volume there are in one case more parts than in the other. Consequently, certain parts of space must be not at all filled, that is, be empty; there must be between the parts of matter empty spaces, or pores; bodies do not fill their volumes in the same way—their extensive quantities differ. Thus, every distinction in physical properties is reduced to a difference in extensive quantity, and explained by it. These natural philosophers, then, make the assumption that all distinctions of matter are only extensive; and accordingly that reality in space, or matter itself, is *absolutely of one description*. It is only under this supposition that they are forced to make that hypothesis of empty spaces which goes beyond any possible experience, and is in the worst sense metaphysical. It is easy to see that mathematical and mechanical natural philosophers are particularly fond of reducing physical distinctions to extensive quantities, that is to say, to mathematical differences; but as they are so anxious to get rid of metaphysic, and pride themselves upon this, they should have seen into what a purely metaphysical fiction they fell by the way.

Meanwhile we can readily explain how portions of matter, which fill the same space extensively, are yet different, if we call to our aid intensive quantities. A room is more or less lighted or heated. No one will assert that in the room where there is less light, or heat, there are certain parts of space filled with no light or warmth at all; that in this room there are fewer portions of light and heat than in the others. Rather in both cases heat and light are spread through the whole room, but in different degrees. By this example it is merely intended to show that distinctions in intensive quantities explain what cannot be explained from mere extensive differences, without the assumption of idle and absurd hypotheses.

3. *The Continuity of Quantities*.—All sensations have a degree. From their reality to their negation an infinity of degrees is possible, which can only be passed through in a time-

series, but must be necessarily passed through. Now, every change, because it takes place in time, must be continuous. Consequently all degrees, because they change in time, are continuous quantities. They would not be so if their change could be interrupted, or have an absolute limit, which could only exist if there were a minimum of degree—such as could not be diminished. This smallest possible degree must be in a moment, which allows no farther change; that is to say, in a simple point of time, which forms no series. Such cannot exist. Every part of time is time; there is no minimum of time, therefore, no smallest possible degree; therefore, no limit of change which could not be *flowing*, like the limit of time itself.

The same is also true of space. Space consists only of spaces, as time does of times. There is no simple part of space, which could be a limit to space. A point is indeed the limit, but not a part, of space; consequently space is divisible *ad infinitum*, because each of its parts is space. Hence it is continuous. Every extensive quantity, then, is continuous. Consequently, these two Principles are comprised in the proposition: *All quantities, as well those of intuition as those of sensation, are continuous.* They both follow from the same principle that all the objects of possible experience must be phenomena, that is, intuited sensations; they are objects of intuition, and therefore extensive quantities; of sensation, and therefore intensive; as being extensive and intensive they are continuous. Both principles relate to the determination of quantity as regards all objects of possible experience. Now, as all determination of quantity is mathematical, these fundamental principles at the same time explain the application of mathematics in its whole precision to experience, and give its proper limit to this application. For this reason Kant comprises the axioms of intuition and anticipations of perception under the common name of *mathematical* principles; the first excludes the possibility of atoms, the second that of empty space and a vacuum in general; both exclude the opposite of continuity.

## V. THE ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ANALOGIES.

There can be no experience except there be an universal and necessary connexion of phenomena. This was the second part of the highest principle on which our Principles depend. The conditions of possible experience are also conditions for all the objects of possible experience, which are not possible except there be this universal and necessary connexion of phenomena.

Now, all phenomena are in time, and are perceived by us in time. Every perception or representation is only possible through the successive apprehension of single sensations; that is to say, every perception forms a *sequence in time*. In our perception all phenomena are successive; and their succession is here merely that of our contingent apprehension. Were phenomena merely this accidental sequence, we could never dream of an universal and necessary connexion. How are we to know that the phenomena, which we only perceive successively, are not successive, but *present simultaneously*—as, for instance, the fact of a house, or an organism, &c.—that the phenomena which we perceive as contingently successive are not contingently, but *necessarily*, successive? We have no criterion to distinguish between succession and simultaneity, because in our perception everything is *successive*; we have no criterion to distinguish between a necessary and a contingent simultaneity—between a necessary and a contingent succession, because in our perception everything *succeeds contingently*. If we have no such criterion, then experience is obviously impossible.

This criterion, then, is absolutely necessary for any possible experience. And how is this criterion itself possible? In mere perception there is no reason for apprehending phenomena as succeeding otherwise than contingently. If the reverse be the case, perception must be overruled by the pheno-

mena themselves; they must themselves have a determined relation in time, or order, which compels perception to apprehend the phenomena in this time-relation, and not otherwise. The condition, then, of this criterion, is the objective relation in time of the phenomena themselves. But the mere relation in time is no objective or necessary relation. This latter cannot be concluded from it, any more than the Categories from intuition. The only possibility, then, remaining to save experience is, that between the temporal and the necessary relations, which are by no means the same, there occurs some sort of analogy or correspondence, by which experience is put upon the right track. But such an analogy has been, in fact, already discovered and explained. The temporal relation is determined by time; the metaphysical, by the pure concepts. Now, the time-determinations were the transcendental schemata of the pure concepts; and order in time was the schema of Relation, which concerns the necessary relations of phenomena. It is, then, this analogy between the time-relations and the fundamental concepts of experience which makes experience itself possible. Kant therefore calls these fundamental principles of relation "Analogies of Experience"—an expression which can only be understood and justified from the doctrine of the schematism. Experience is conditioned by the analogy between time- and concept-relations. This Analogy is no Axiom, or even Anticipation; for it applies to particular cases. It does not determine the empirical judgment, like the two earlier principles, but only guides it—shows it the way and the rule according to which the case is to be treated; the fundamental principles of the analogies are not, then, like the former, constitutive, but regulative.

The common principle, from which the analogies of experience flow, might be thus expressed: Phenomena can only be experienced if their time-relations be determined a priori; or, as Kant has expressed in the First Edition of his Critick: "*All phenomena stand (as to their existence) a priori under rules*"

of the determinations of their mutual relations in time." The expression in the Second Edition is not so accurate, and leaves out the time-relation, which is here essential.\* We can determine directly the three analogies from the doctrine of the schematism. For here the analogy was between permanence and substance, succession and causality, simultaneity and reciprocal action. The fundamental principles, then, will regard the permanence of substance; the succession in time according to the law of causality, coexistence according to the law of reciprocal causation or community. Here we already see how little the analogy is a constitutive principle.† Were it so, every succession in time must be causality—every coexistence must be conceived as reciprocal action; here, however, the distinction between contingent and necessary succession or coexistence comes in. All causality presupposes succession; but every succession by no means includes causality. The same is the case with coexistence and reciprocal action. The following is the simplest way of expounding the Principles which Kant calls analogies. If experience be possible, we must have a criterion to distinguish phenomena which coexist

\* This remark is most important, and must be carefully borne in mind. The original representations of space and time are mere *schemata* (Critick, pp. 118, and 267, note), and are void until phenomena are presented to the mind, which occupy definite spaces and times. Absolute time, he tells us over and over again, cannot be perceived, being merely the mode in which we are affected by our own activity. Nevertheless the unity of experience, resting upon that of apperception, compels us to regard all spaces and times as parts of the one absolute space and time. Let the reader also remember the Kantian meaning of the word *object*, that is, phenomenal object, or empirical object, explained above, pp. 53, 65, and in the next chapter, sec. III. (also in the Critick, p. 147). The relation of such objects to absolute time can only be fixed by bringing them under a rule of the understanding, as all empirical apprehension is in itself successive, and not successive even in any definite or necessary order.

† That is, constitutive of *phenomena*; for the analogies are certainly constitutive of *experience*. (Critick, p. 407.)

from those which do not, but are successive; secondly, there must be a criterion, by which we can distinguish contingent from necessary succession; thirdly, there must be a criterion to distinguish contingent from necessary coexistence. As this criterion is not contained in our perception as such, it must be contained in the phenomena themselves. This is necessary for the possibility of experience; therefore we assert it as a fundamental principle.

Succession  
coexistence

1. *The Permanence of Substance.*—The first question is: under what condition alone can we distinguish simultaneous from successive appearances—such as are in the same time from such as are in different or successive times? In our perception, which apprehends part after part, all phenomena are in different times—the stones of a cliff as much as the eddies of a running river. Under one condition only can perception be compelled to grasp different appearances as simultaneous—if there be a phenomenon which is *always* present. If the same phenomenon exists in different moments—that is, for a length of time—we say it is *lasting*. If it exists every moment, we say it is *permanent*. If we can distinguish between coexistence and succession in time, there must be something *permanent* in phenomena themselves. As compared with this, all remaining phenomena are present simultaneously. Distinguished from it, all phenomena are not permanent; they come and go—while it remains; they are in different times, or successive—whilst the former remains fixed at all times. Consequently, the permanent in the phenomena is the objective criterion for distinguishing the relations in time—coexistence and succession. The presence of the permanent, then, in phenomena, is a necessary condition of all possible experience.

Change

If everything were permanent, there would be no change. If nothing were, the same result would ensue; for to say phenomena change, is merely to assert that they are combined only for a certain time with the permanent appearance; they

do not last, but pass on successively. The permanent is, then, the condition of change, and not *vice versâ*.

Now, the permanent phenomenon and the changing are always present together—the former as the abiding, the latter as the transient; they are, then, necessarily connected with one another: the former is what lies at the basis—the substratum; the latter, its transient determinations—the various ways or modes in which it exists. In a word, the permanent is substance; the changing phenomena are its accidents.

see  
Comm.  
174

It is easy to assert, substance is permanent: this proposition is as old as philosophy, and, if duly considered, is a mere tautology. The permanent in things we call substance, and *vice versâ*. But how do we know that there is anything permanent at all in things? Grant the permanent in things, and anybody can represent substance under the notion. There is no difficulty in this—nor any profit—as long as the presence of the permanent itself is merely presupposed. Here lies the difficulty, which no philosopher before Kant ever saw, much less removed. If the existence of the permanent be not established, the concept of substance is not applicable; it is perfectly void and problematical in its use. And upon closer investigation, we find that the concept of substance has been ever on the lips both of philosophers and the vulgar; but its precise signification it first received from Kant in this place. Did any one before Kant know that there must be in phenomena something permanent? It had, indeed, been asserted, but not *known*. Whence could we know it? From experience? This will never prove an existence which is *perpetual*. From mere understanding? This can never from mere concepts or by logical conclusions prove actual *presence, or real existence*. And how has Kant proved that in phenomena there must be something permanent? Because, if it were not so, every objective determination of time, and with it all experience, would be impossible. Consequently, he does not prove permanent existence by experience, which would not be in any

case possible; but, on the contrary, he shows that without such existence experience in general could not take place; that a permanent phenomenon precedes all experience as its condition. The proof is not empirical, but transcendental; and in this prominent instance we can most clearly see what the nature of the transcendental proof is, which we explained generally at the commencement of this book. Nothing is here proved by experience—nothing without any reference to experience; but everything, *so far as it is a condition of experience*—a condition without which experience could not exist. Remove this condition, and you have removed the possibility of any experience, and with it of any objects of experience. This is the transcendental proof in its negative shape, proving the impossibility of the reverse. This is precisely the *critical* proof, which before Kant no one either knew or employed. Applied to substance, it is this: remove permanent existence in phenomena, and you have removed the possibility of all experience; or, if we express it positively: there must be in phenomena something permanent, otherwise neither experience nor its objects would be possible, nor could we know anything through experience. The point of the proof is, not that substance is permanent, but that the permanent appears, or that substance is a necessary phenomenon—that it exists.\*

The permanent phenomenon exists *at every moment*; otherwise it would not be permanent. Neither can there have been, nor will there be, a moment when it does not exist. In other words: substance neither originates nor passes away. And as all changeable appearances are only its determinations or modes, substance is always the same, as to its proper existence; nothing arises or vanishes; consequently, the sum of its reality, its quantity, cannot be increased or diminished; for every increase would be an addition of new parts, that is, an origination; every diminution an annihilation of existing parts, or their passing away.

\* Cf. Critick, p. 141.

The principle, then, of the permanence of substance is this: "In all change of appearances substance is permanent, and its sum in nature is neither increased nor diminished." This proposition is now critically established, which Kant asserted in his Degree Essay, and repeated in that upon negative quantities. It is now so proved, that to deny it means to destroy the possibility of all experience, of physical science. It follows then, that the proposition is an axiom in physical science.

Substance has no origin, nor can it perish. Otherwise, as it is the basis of all phenomena, it must have originated from something not phenomenon, which must be nothing if regarded as an object of possible experience. Its origination would be a creation from nothing—its vanishing a return to nothing, an annihilation. Annihilation is as little conceivable as creation, among objects of possible experience. From nothing nothing can originate, neither can anything ever pass into nothing; these two statements: "gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti," belong immediately to one another, and follow with equal necessity from the permanence of substance.\* Critically, that is, rightly, understood, these propositions are only valid of phenomena; to assert them, is to exclude from the original principles of physical science the creation and annihilation theory. Whether this theory might have any validity in some other region than that of physical philosophy or experience, is not here discussed.

Now, if the substance of things as regards matter or content

\* This very language is used by Sir William Hamilton in his derivation of Causality from the Category of Existence. He is, however, incautious enough to apply it to our notion of creation, and so alter the connotation of that once very definite term. He would have done far better to confine himself, like Kant, to denying creation altogether in the sphere of nature, than to attempt to explain it as a "new form of existence." There can be no doubt to any fair mind, that, however opposed to Pantheism in his principles, Sir William has decidedly suggested it as a natural and indeed legitimate inference in this passage (Lects. II., p. 406). Cf. Mansel, Proleg. Log., App. C.

remains always the same, then all change in phenomena is nothing but a change or *alteration of their form*; that is, a *metamorphosis*, or difference in the way of existing, of the substance. Every change presupposes something which changes, which lies at the basis of the change as its subject or substratum, and only changes in its form, not in its own nature. This substratum is that which is permanent in alteration; that is, substance. Wherefore all alteration is only possible in substance; it consists in the change of its form, in the transient nature of its determinations, and these transient determinations are its accidents. What changes is not the existence, but the *states* or determinations of existence, (*modes*) of substance. When wood is burnt, it does not vanish, but turns into ashes and smoke; not the matter itself and its sum, but its form only, has been changed.

There must be substance in phenomena; this is asserted by the first analogy of experience. It is not explained by what signs in experience substance or the permanent in phenomena, is known. This only is certain, that all change of phenomena, is nothing but the alteration of permanent existence.\*

The next question will be, under what condition is this alteration itself an object of experience?

2. *Succession in Time according to the Law of Causality. Kant and Hume.*—We have arrived at the point when Kant brings into the forefront of his Critick the truly fundamental problem

\* In this discussion on the first analogy, Kant only proves permanence to be the *necessary condition* of our knowing objects. It is throughout his principle to prove transcendently the existence of a necessary condition of consciousness, without insisting upon its appearing in consciousness; in fact, the first conditions of all consciousness, as such, cannot be objects of it. So that in this analogy he carefully concludes (p. 141) by postponing the question as to whether and how we become empirically aware that some phenomena are substances, and some not. This difficult question he resumes afterwards, in the Critick, p. 151 (see following note); cf. Critick, Introd., p. xli., note.

of his metaphysical investigations, which has been continually occupying him ever since his Essay on negative quantities, and which had for a time separated him from dogmatical metaphysic, and united him with Hume. The concept of *cause* is to be now critically explained and established. This explanation will be simply the solution of the question just stated. Let us forthwith take a critical view of the question: under what conditions alone can we experience change, or represent it as an object of experience? The condition without which change cannot be an object of possible experience will be the condition of change itself.

What is change? If the same phenomenon always appears, or if different phenomena are present at the same moment, there is no change; there must be different phenomena at different moments, or a succession of phenomena. In this time-series every phenomenon lasts a certain time, while it is taking place. Let us call this lapse of time during a phenomenon, an occurrence. Every change is a series of occurrences, or an *event*. But we cannot call any set of occurrences you please a change, because they merely take place in time. If a man is born to-day, and the sun rises to-morrow, the sequence of these two occurrences is still no change; for they are in no way connected—they are not states of one and the same being. Birth is the change in the state of a living individual, who, from being a foetus, becomes a man; the rising of the sun is a change in our earthly existence, which passes from shade to sunlight. Change, then, is the time-series of occurrences which take place in one and the same subject, and are therefore connected by means of an unity, or necessarily. Speaking accurately, they are *different states*, which succeed one another. There can be no change without something which changes, which alters its state. This something at the basis of all change the previous Principle explained to be substance. In brief, every change is a sequence of occurrences, connected in the phenomenon itself; that is, objectively. And now the ques-

tion is : under what conditions alone can the objective sequence of occurrences be experienced ? Or, as all occurrences are phenomena, and all phenomena our perceptions—*Under what conditions alone is the sequence of our perceptions objective ?* This is the question in its critical form.

All our perceptions are in time, and successive in time. This sequence is purely subjective. Here lies the difficulty. As the sequence of our perceptions is only subjective, how can we perceive an objective sequence ? In other words : what makes the subjective sequence objective ? How can it be determined that the phenomena are connected, not only in this, but in the actually fixed sequence of time ?

All phenomena are represented by us successively : the parts of a house, as well the various positions in the movement of a boat gliding down a river. How are we to know that the parts of a house are present together ; that the movements of the vessel follow one another successively ; and that necessarily. If I represent the parts of a house, nothing compels me to represent first some one particular part, then another ; I can begin or end where I please. It is quite different when I observe the downward motions of the boat ; I must necessarily represent the positions up the stream earlier than those further down. The succession of my representations is in the first case without rule ; in the second case it is determined as this particular one, and none other.\*

And what produces the rule for the succession in the second case ? The fact that I cannot put any phenomena I like into the different moments of my perception, just as chance might lead me, but that I can place in the moment A this particular phenomenon only, and in the moment B another such. And what compels me to regulate the succession of my perceptions in this way ? It might be supposed, if we had forgotten the whole transcendental Æsthetic, that the order or relation of

\* Critick, p. 144.

things in time so compels me. Certainly, if things in themselves were in time—if time were an inherent property of things, and if each thing had a definite place in time, as it has any other property, and manifested it to us—then time would be something objective or real without us; and the whole question now before us—how does time become objective?—would be absurd.

It were idle to repeat again the whole transcendental Æsthetic, to show the fallacy in this theory, which pretends to solve the difficulty. Time, as such, is wholly subjective; it is the form of our intuition, or our manner of representing. All our perceptions, which are phenomena, take place in time. So far there is no reason for the phenomena not happening in one moment as well as another. The question is, what connects this particular phenomenon with this particular moment? The moment cannot be regulated by time, which comprehends in it all phenomena; nor by the phenomenon, which may happen at any moment. Yet, if we cannot regulate it, there is no objective time-determination, no objective sequence; consequently, no change as an object of possible experience.

In time itself, that is, pure time, every moment is determined by those which precede it, and which it necessarily follows. But time in itself is no object of perception, but merely the condition or form of such objects; only phenomena are perceived in time, not time itself. If, then, the phenomenon B is to be perceived only at one fixed moment, this is possible solely under the condition that in the preceding moment another phenomenon, A, was perceived, upon which B always follows. Every moment is determined by the immediately preceding, upon which it follows. If the moment of a phenomenon is to be determined, it can only be determined by the phenomenon in the immediately preceding moment. If in the moment *a* any perception you please may occur, it is plain that the phenomenon in the following moment *b* only happens contingently, and might just as well happen at another time.

It is only, then, when necessarily preceded by another phenomenon that the moment of a phenomenon can be a necessary consequence, and cannot vary. One occurrence necessarily precedes another; it cannot exist without the other following; viz., is its *cause*. An occurrence necessarily follows another; it cannot be without the other preceding it; viz., is its effect. The concept, then, of cause and effect, is the sole possibility of determining the moment of a phenomenon--the only condition of an objective time-determination, and of an objective sequence: it is the only *condition* under which a series of different states, each in a definite moment, that is, a *change*, can be represented.

*The concept of causality alone determines the moment of a phenomenon.* The category of cause determines a phenomenon to be such an one as necessarily precedes another, and therefore must be necessarily perceived before it. This concept, then, alone removes from time-sequence the contingency of our subjective apprehension, and makes it objective.

This consideration is of the greatest importance in the Critick. Here it appears as plainly as possible that causality does not proceed from experience, but lies at the basis of all experience as its condition. At this point we see the whole difference between Kant, the critical, and Hume, the sceptical philosopher. Hume had declared causality to be nothing but the customary succession of two perceptions; that the *propter hoc* was merely an oft-repeated *post hoc*. Nothing can be easier to understand than this account of the matter. But, waiving other difficulties, one point has never been investigated by Hume. He has not explained the *post hoc* at all. What, then, is *post hoc*? One perception following another. But *all* our perceptions succeed one another, even those whose objects are in the same time. If, then, this *post hoc* is to be an objective determination of time, it cannot be our perception which produces it. If it is to be an objective sequence, independent of our contingent apprehension, it means a phenomenon later in

time when compared with another. But what does it mean to say : B is later than A, not only in my perception, but in its existence also? It clearly means : B is not simultaneous with A ; it is *only* later ; either it does not happen at all, or *after* A ; it is under the necessary condition of A, or A is its cause. So that, when well examined, *post hoc* is either no determination of time at all, and tells us nothing about the real sequence of phenomena ; or, if it is an objective and exclusive determination, and has any meaning, it only obtains this meaning through the concept of *cause*.\* A phenomenon which, independent of my perception, is later than another—which in this real sense forms a *post hoc*—is necessarily conditioned by that other. To determine the moment of B means to say : B *can only* take place at this moment ; it can only follow upon the phenomenon A, and is its effect, and the cause of C, which it necessarily precedes. It is, then, just the reverse of Hume's opinion : the *propter hoc* in all cases determines the *post hoc*. Two perceptions which succeed one another form no objective time-sequence—no *post hoc*. This Hume had not explained. It is only those which follow necessarily as such, not in our perception only, the determination of which produces causality.

The attempt to deduce the concept of space from the perception of things external to one another was very easy indeed, but perfectly idle. It is just the same with the attempt to deduce the concept of causality from objective sequence in time. Objective succession is that independent of our perception—that which is necessary—that which consists in causality. In the former case it is space which makes the perception, from which space is abstracted. Here it is causality which makes the experience, from which causality is obtained. It is very easy to take out what you have introduced without seeing it. That so little was discovered, although such acute

\* Critick, p. 148.

investigations were being made, shows how superficially the human reason was known before Kant. It was the grossest circle, in which the greatest thinkers, even Hume, argued. This circle lay like an incubus on the precritical philosophy; and it required the giant strength of a Kant to break through it, and get rid of it.

Causality, then, in general, determines the objective sequence of phenomena, in which all that precedes is the cause of all that follows, and all that follows is conditioned by what precedes: this succession, then, of all phenomena forms a causal nexus, the later members of which are the consequences of the earlier. Let us call the sum of all phenomena *world*, then those phenomena which take place at the same time form the existing *state of the world*, and the different states of the world form the *change of the world*. In this change of the world every state and every individual phenomenon belonging to that state has its fixed moment—that is, each of these states is the necessary effect of all the previous world-changes, the necessary cause of all the succeeding ones. Now, as there is always time between two given moments, the change of the world, or its passage from one state to another, can only take place in time; it cannot be sudden, but *continuous*. Let us call the state A the cause of the following one, B, then the transition of the one to the other is the action of the cause; and we must assert that no cause in the world acts suddenly, but continuously.\*

Since causality determines objective succession, it is only valid in the case of succession. The (objectively) earlier phenomenon is the cause of that which follows. In all cases, then, the cause is prior to the effect. It may be that the effect is connected immediately (without perceptible interval) with the cause; but this proves nothing against the priority in time of the latter. Were they both really simultaneous, either might

\* Cf. Critick, p. 154.

be the *prius* to the other. This in the relation of cause and effect is never the case. A leaden bullet makes an impression on a soft cushion—the bullet and the impression are both present together; if the bullet be there, the impression follows; but the bullet does not succeed the impression—the latter is the effect, the bullet is the cause.

Every effect presupposes temporally the efficient cause; but this cause must be the effect of a preceding cause. There must be, then, at the basis of all effects, a cause which is not the effect of another; which therefore was not produced in time, but which forms the permanent substratum of all change. This permanent existence is substance. Substance alone is truly causative—it is the efficient power, the proper subject of the efficient action. Action, or active causality, is the attribute of substance. That which in phenomena can only be represented as cause, not as effect—only as the subject of action, never as the predicate—is substance. Here the second Analogy points back to the first. All changes, radically considered, are productions of the substance from which they proceed.

Hence it is that Kant calls this second analogy, in the first edition of the Critick, the “*fundamental principle of production.*” “Everything which happens presupposes something upon which it follows, according to a rule.” Change is only an object of possible experience when it happens according to the law of causality; and for this reason Kant, in his second edition, calls it “*the fundamental principle of succession according to the law of causality: all changes happen according to the law of connexion of cause and effect.*”

Now, as every phenomenon presupposes another, upon which it necessarily follows, the first cause can never be found within the range of experience, so that substance can never be cognized except by its effects.\*

\* Let the reader compare the important passage corresponding in the Critick (pp. 151-2), and he will see that Kant thinks we empirically prove permanence as an *inference* from action; and he contrasts this with an infe-

3. *Coexistence according to the Law of Reciprocity.*—If there were no substance—that is, nothing permanent in phenomena—it were impossible to determine any relation in time of phenomena, and alterations in things could not be experienced. Things change—that is, they are *not always present*—they come and go. There must, then, be something which is always present, compared with which all else changes. To say, then, the phenomenon is present, means it is connected with the substance, it is coexistent with permanent existence; that it is absent, means it is no longer coexistent with it. To say that phenomena change, means that they are combined with the sub-

rior sort of inference—viz., permanence—from induction of special cases. In no case are we directly conscious of permanence, which would only be the case if we were directly conscious of absolute time. But, as the first cause of a series of changes must be the permanent—a substance—if we trace back causes from effect to cause, we must ultimately reach substance. This, Dr. Fischer says, and very properly adds, that the first cause (in this higher sense) cannot be met with in experience; and hence, substance can only be recognized from its effects—but we must add, from its very remote effects; and this theory would lead to mind and simple matter as the only substances existing, or, more strictly, God, as was the theory of Des Cartes. If this were so, how could Kant be speaking of an *empirical criterion* of substance, and of sufficient proof of substantiality in phenomena? He never insinuates that he is looking to the Deity as the only substance. The first point in this difficult passage to be observed is, that Kant uses the word action (*Handlung*), and not cause. Dr. Fischer's argument depends on these two terms being identical; but Kant carefully defines action as the relation (not of the cause), but of the subject of the causality to the effect. Hence, he distinguishes what Dr. Fischer and Sir Wm. Hamilton do not—the subject or substance from its causality. Now, Kant says, action is a better criterion (empirically) than permanence: but how do we infer or obtain permanence from action, which we must do, if we are to find substance? Now, all change must take place in a permanent; and though the first permanent we infer from an observed change may be permanent only as compared with this change, and itself again a term of a higher change, involving a higher permanent, yet we must ultimately come to a subject (to us) absolutely permanent, which is the substratum of the highest change; and hence, from its action we have been able to infer its permanence. Long before Kant, this criterion of substance was

stance at different moments; that they themselves happen at different times, or are successive. Substance was the condition of determining objectively the difference between coexistence and succession: this the first analogy explained. Causality was the condition of determining objectively the succession (*post hoc*) of phenomena. What is the condition of determining objectively the coexistence of phenomena? This the third analogy must explain.

Phenomena are coexistent means, they exist in the same time. But our perceptions are all successive. How, then, is

acknowledged, not only by philosophers, but by the world at large; but he first showed how change necessarily implied concomitant permanence, and so demonstrated a truth which could not be inferred from mere analyzing of concepts. And this view will show the error of Dr. Fischer, who seems to think that we can only reach substance by a regressive analysis, bringing us back to the original cause. The changes from which we infer permanence must take place in it—it must be given with them; and, though the first permanent we reach may, after all, be part of a larger change, *its* permanent is, of course, also present. Just as our motions on this globe are only possible by regarding the earth as fixed, though this earth again has its motions determined by the sun, which is (in our solar system) the ultimate permanent.

That substance and accident do not stand in the relation of a regressive series, is expressly stated by Kant (Critick, p. 259).

As to *what* effects suggest to us action (as distinguished, I suppose, from mere causality—that is, as suggesting the ultimate permanent), I have been able to collect the following passages:—In pp. 169 and 379, he distinctly suggests impenetrability; but is still more explicit in p. 193 (when discussing Leibniz' system):—"Substance in space," he says, "we are only cognisant of through forces operative in it [the term *force* he explains as equivalent to action], either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from entering into itself (repulsion and impenetrability); we know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter." Cf. also above, p. 79. It is, in fact, by collecting their causality empirically, that we distinguish real objects from creatures of the imagination. The reader will see that Sir Wm. Hamilton might have found both his threefold division of the qualities of bodies, and the importance of *resistance* and its modes, in Kant's system.

it possible to experience in this succession of our perceptions the *coexistence* of phenomena? Here lies the difficulty. If I perceive different things, and can place any of them I please at any moment of my perception, it is clear that these phenomena are not successive, and have no determined succession. But this does not tell us that they are *coexistent*, still less that they are *necessarily* so. Under what conditions is the coexistence of phenomena objective? If it be not our perception, but the phenomena themselves which determine their own moment, the only possibility of determining the moment of a phenomenon is causality. If one presupposes another in time, they must stand in the relation of cause and effect. Now, if phenomena presuppose one another mutually in time, neither of them can be the earlier or later; they are necessarily in the same moment, or *coexistent*. It is, then, mutual causality, the concept of *reciprocal action* or *community*, which determines or objectifies the coexistence of things. This concept regulates the course of our apprehension, which no longer leads contingently from *a* to *b*, or *b* to *a*, but proceeds necessarily from *a* to *b*, and just as necessarily from *b* back to *a*. In this case both phenomena are perceived, each as the *prius* and *posterius* of the other—that is, they both coincide in time. Each is cause, as it necessarily precedes the other. As being cause, the phenomenon is substance; as objects of external perception, these substances are in space. If the perception of them is necessarily to follow mutually, then substances cannot be completely isolated or separated by empty space; they must have a connexion in space, and form a *whole*, of which they are the parts. A whole, consisting of coexistent parts, is a composite phenomenon. A *compositum reale* in the most general sense—and the perception of it, is only possible through the concept of mutual causality.

Consequently, the relation of things, as coexistent, can only be experienced by this concept. *The fundamental principle of community* is, then: “*All substances, so far as they coexist,*

*stand in thoroughgoing community (mutual causation) with one another.”\**

These are the three analogies of experience:—There can be no experience except relations of time are an object of experience; there cannot be an object of experience except it be determined objectively; this determination is given by the concepts of Substance, Causality, and Community. Substance makes permanent existence, and so *alternation*, cognoscible; Causality determines necessary succession, and so makes change cognoscible; Community determines real coexistence, and so makes a composite *whole*—the connexion of phenomena in space—cognoscible. To sum up: it is *causal* relation of phenomena by which their relations in time are determined, and made objective for possible experience. Now, this causal relation is threefold: phenomena are either states (determinations) of a substance, or consequences of a cause, or parts (members) of a whole. In the first case we call their relation inherence; in the second, consequence; in the last, composition.

\* I must again protest against the apparent simplification of this principle by substituting the expression, “relation of cause and effect” for Kant’s *influence* and reciprocal action (*reciprocity*). Kant does not mean to assert that two substances are only coexistent if each be the cause of the other, and also its effect; if he had said this, he would indeed be liable to Schopenhauer’s criticism, that he mistook the reproduction of an effect the same as (exactly like) the cause, for the reproduction of the very (identical) cause itself. We must here also call attention to Kant’s careful definition of influence and reciprocity (Critick, p. 156). “That relation of substances in which the one contains determinations, the ground of which is in the other substance is the relation of *influence*; and when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or *reciprocity*.” In other words—if there be anything in one substance which helps to determine another, or condition it, we say the former has an *influence* upon the latter, in Kant’s sense. Now, there is certainly one respect in which this must be the case universally. All substances which are said to coexist in space (which is one) cannot be so described because we perceive them contained in space, as itself an object of perception, for pure space is not such an object; but rather, because we cannot assign to any object a place in space without its being dynamically related to other

## VI. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THINKING—POSSIBILITY, REALITY, NECESSITY.

All the Principles we have developed are drawn from the conditions of possible experience. Their validity depends upon this, that the denial of them destroys the possibility of any experience. From this point of view, the *possibility* of things in general is decided quite differently from the method of the pre-critical period, and, with the possibility, also the reality and necessity. It is clear that the conditions of possible experience are also the conditions of all objects of possible experience; but what are the conditions in general for a thing being possible, real, or necessary? If these conditions can be determined *a priori*, there must be fundamental principles which regulate the modality of our cognitive judgments—a *Principle of Modality*, which gives the clue according to which we must judge the possibility, reality, and necessity of things, and according

objects in space. "Thus," says Kant (p. 158), "the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces a mediate community between us and them, and so proves the simultaneous existence of the latter; we may also observe that we cannot change place empirically, except matter first make it possible for us to perceive our position, and that [consequently] it is only by reciprocal influence that matter can exhibit its simultaneity, and so the coexistence of even the most remote objects (although only mediately)." In these examples we may see that the only perfectly universal determination of substances which we experience as contained in other substances is their *place*, and we could by no means assert that the substances themselves were related as cause and effect. If the reader will keep these observations in mind, one great difficulty, at all events, will be removed from this passage. That we cannot determine the place of any body without considering it in relation to the surrounding objects, and so (mediately) to all substances in space, is certainly true. Such relation is prior to our determining the object; or, as Kant expresses it, the *commercium* is the condition of the *communium spatii*; and this *commercium* must in all cases be a reciprocal influence either of the related substances upon one another, immediately; or upon some common third substance, and so mediately.

to which our cognitive judgment may be problematical, assertorial, or apodeictic.

Long before his Critick Kant had perceived that propositions asserting existence are synthetical judgments; in other words, that existence is no logical attribute, which we can find by analyzing a concept. This truth completely destroys all ontology; for it removes the possibility of concluding from the concept of a thing its existence. Whatsoever is true of real existence will also be true of possible and necessary existence; for a thing is possible which may be true—necessary, which must be true. Existence in general is, then, no logical attribute; it is never contained in the concept of a thing, and can never be recognized by analysis or by logical means; this was the error of the dogmatical metaphysicians. They thought to discover the possibility of a thing from its concept, and see by the concept alone whether the thing were possible or not. If Possibility were such an attribute, we should be able to abstract this attribute, like any other, from the concept; and the concept should differ when possessing the attribute of existence and when deprived of it. But the fact is not so. Whether a pyramid exist or not, does not in the least alter the concept of it, nor increase or diminish its attributes. Existence does not increase the concept of a thing; in the representation of the thing nothing is altered, but only the way in which this representation is given within us. It may be given us as mere representation, or as an object of our experience; this last determines its existence. Existence and modality, in general, are nothing but the relation of a representation to our cognitive faculty.\*

Existence can be only given us by experience, never by pure understanding, or pure imagination. Kant already knew this, when he laid down the only possible basis for a demonstration of the existence of the Deity. The criterion of exis-

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 165, 366.

tence is never logical, but altogether empirical. But this empirical criterion lies in our cognitive faculty; consequently, existence is nothing but the relation of a representation to our cognition.

The principle of contradiction, the received criterion of possibility, decides nothing about possible existence: it says, what is not contradictory is possible; it is a concept the attributes of which do not destroy one another, like A and not A. This contradiction may not be conceivable, but may be quite possible, as is proved by negative quantities in mathematics, and by movements and changes in nature. And, again, a representation may be such, that its attributes are not contradictory to each other, and yet may be impossible. In the concept of a space enclosed by two right lines there is nothing contradictory: it does not lie in the *concept* of a right line that another can only intersect it in *one* point. The impossibility comes from intuition. So that a thing may be unthinkable, and possible; impossible, and yet thinkable. Conceivability is one thing, possibility another.\* From the *concept* of a thing we do not decide about its existence, but only from experience; and as the conditions of experience are established, the criteria of modality are given.

That is possible which can be experienced, which agrees with the conditions of experience. That is real which is ex-

\* See also Kant's further remarks on the sphere of possibility as compared to that of reality (Critick, pp. 171-2). He specially considers the argument that, as we must add to a possible thing to make it real, the quantity of what is possible must exceed that of the real. "But this adding to the *possible*, I do not recognize; for whatsoever is beyond its bounds is impossible. There can only be added to my *understanding* something over and above the agreement with the formal conditions of experience—viz., the connexion with some perception; but whatever is connected with perception according to empirical laws is real, although not immediately perceived." [The italics are not Kant's, but are added to show the point of the argument.] He very properly adds, that these questions belong to the Reason, not to the understanding.

perienced—which is given as an object of experience—the perceived object, or empirical intuition. That is necessary which must be experienced. Now, every phenomenon must be experienced as the *effect* of another, otherwise it could be in no determined moment, and could not appear at all. The causality of things is, then, necessary. I can only perceive phenomena in succession; I cannot experience this succession except by causality: causality is, then, the only form of necessary experience.

When the mathematician says: draw the right line *ab*, this is no proposition to be proved, but a demand that you should intuite the given concept—a *postulate* of intuition. Just in the same sense do the Principles of modality demand that we should experience the existence of concepts, and judge them from the point of view of experience; they demand as the condition experience, not pure, but experiential or empirical thinking. Consequently, Kant calls them the “Postulates of Empirical Thinking:”—(1) What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (as to intuitions and concepts) is *possible*; (2) what agrees with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is *real*; (3) what has its connexion with reality determined according to the universal conditions of experience is (exists) *necessary*.\*

The law of necessity is identical with that of causality. Here the postulates of empirical thinking coincide with the analogies of experience. The principle of causality says: every phenomenon is the effect of another, upon which it necessarily follows. The principle of necessity says: that is necessary which we experience as an effect. But, as every existence is the effect of another, there is nothing which happens without a cause, or at random—there is *no chance*. If every phenomenon must be experienced as the effect of another, all necessity in the world is conditional or hypothetical;

\* Cf. Critick, p. 173.

there is no unconditional, absolute, or irrational necessity in the sense of experience; but all necessity is explained from natural causes, which are themselves to be explained as the effects of other causes. Hypothetical necessity is thoroughly reasonable; there is no incomprehensible or blind necessity; there is no *predestination* in the nature of things. The law of causality excludes chance; that of reality excludes fate.\*

#### VII.—SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES.

Let us here sum up the doctrine of the Principles in its shortest formulæ. The first two principles have determined things as *quantities*, and are therefore *mathematical*; the last two, the Analogies and Postulates of experience, determine the *existence* of things; the former, according to the relation and faculty which connects phenomena among themselves; the latter, according to their relation to our faculty of knowledge. Both these are *dynamical*. The two mathematical principles in conjunction form the law of *continuity*; the two dynamical, the law of *causality or necessity*. When summed up in a single formula: “*All objects of possible experience are, as to form, continuous quantities; as to existence, necessary effects.*” Each Principle declares its contradictory to be impossible. The negative expression of them is an immediate, obvious consequence. The law of continuity, expressed negatively, is this: *there are no gaps in nature—non datur saltus*: the law of causality and necessity, when negatively expressed, is this: neither is there in nature no necessity, nor blind necessity; *neither chance nor fate—non datur casus, non datur fatum*. From the continuity of extensive quantities follows the *impossibility of atoms*; from the continuity of intensive, the *impossibility of a vacuum—non datur hiatus*.†

\* Cf. Critick, p. 169, *sqq.*

† Cf. Critick, p. 170. The reader should beware of taking these assertions in a dogmatical sense. The expression *non datur* is exactly as far as Kant goes. To assert *impossibility* is, perhaps, hardly warranted by Kant's purely critical discussion.

## VIII.—SUMMARY OF THE ANALYTIC—IDEALISM AND REALISM.

In these Principles is comprised all that the Transcendental judgment can assert of objects of possible experience (phenomena). It could have asserted nothing, had it not been possible to subsume phenomena under concepts, by means of the schemata. Now, the schemata were determinations of time, and time itself the form of our intuition, only valid for intuited existence. It is, then, altogether determinations of time which make the concepts applicable. It is altogether the concepts which make the determination of time objective. Without concepts the time of phenomena can *never* be objectively determined; without time-determination the concepts can make nothing objective. For without intuition, and by themselves, they are empty, and connect nothing.

It is, then, clear that the determination in time, by alone rendering possible the use of the Categories, at the same time limits, or, as Kant says, restricts this use. Accordingly, the concepts can be applied to *all* phenomena, for all are in time. But they can be applied *only* to phenomena, for besides these there is nothing in time. Either concepts connect nothing, or they connect phenomena, and phenomena only. Of these they render the cognition possible, but only of these. Let us call the cognition of phenomena in the widest sense experience, and we may say the function of the pure concepts is *to make experience*, and they have no other function. *They are not produced by experience, but themselves produce experience; yet they cannot produce any other cognition than experience.* In this proposition lies the whole summary of the transcendental analytic, and nowhere is the difference between the critical and the dogmatic philosopher plainer. This very light must have dazzled men, and perplexed them for a moment as to the difference between the critical and dogmatical philosophies. As they did not understand the investigation, they merely attended to the result; and this was twofold.

In one direction there appeared the statement : all human knowledge is only *experience*. Had not the English empirical philosophy ever since Bacon asserted this long before Kant ? Where, then, is the difference between Kant, and Hume, Locke, and Bacon ? His result is clearly the same as their's, but he made the way to this result darker and more difficult. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding reaches the goal much more easily, and is a pleasanter book than the Critick of the Pure Reason !

In the other direction this was the result : all cognition is only possible through pure *concepts*, which are absolutely not obtained from any experience. Had not the dogmatical school since Des Cartes asserted the same thing ? How, then, does Kant differ from Des Cartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz ? And Leibniz, in particular, makes the Critick of the Pure Reason quite unnecessary. Thus the critical philosopher appears to one party as a realist, to the other as an old-fashioned idealist !

But in reality the result of the Critick is not equivocal, nor do these two propositions contradict one another, but rather unite in one harmonious judgment : *All human knowledge is only experience, and this experience is only possible by means of pure concepts*. The first half of this proposition is realistic, the second idealistic. If we desire to unite them both, we may say that the Kantian philosophy gets rid of the contradiction between these two, and forms an Ideal-Realism ; but it is better to avoid giving it the appearance of syncretism, which in truth is not more foreign to any philosophy than the Kantian. It is preferable to say that Kant *refuted* both these tendencies by the result of his Critick, and did so conclusively. Both these schools dogmatically presuppose the cognoscibility of things ; he is the critical philosopher who solves this very problem.

#### IX. THE IDEALISM OF THE CRITICK—KANT AND BERKELEY.

If Kant is to be either a Realist or an Idealist, let us seek the difference between them in the view they take, not of the forms

of knowledge, but of the *object of knowledge*. As to the forms, Kant has determined them to be sensibility and understanding. He might appear to agree in the former with the sensualist; in the latter, with the idealist. But his transcendental *Æsthetic* separates him from both; and we shall find just as many reasons for classing him with the one as with the other. In the question of the form of knowledge we do not find this opposition clearly displayed.

The objects of knowledge are: either things without us, real things (*res*), or merely representations within us (*ideæ*). Let us call the first view Realism, the second Idealism; and let us put to Kant the question: What objects, according to his system, are cognoscible? Which are the only possible objects of our cognition, *res* or *ideæ*? He has already determined all knowledge to be experience, because its only objects are *phenomena*. But the phenomena are felt by our perception, represented by our intuition, connected by our imagination, made objective by our understanding and its concepts. There is in phenomena nothing which is not subjective. They are nothing but our *representations*, and can be nothing else. It is perfectly inconceivable how a thing existing apart from our power of representation—a *thing per se*—could come with all its properties into our faculty of representation, and ever become a representation. But, if there be no representation of a thing, how can there be knowledge of it? It follows from this, that the only possible objects of knowledge can never be anything but our representations. This is the very basis of the Critick of the Pure Reason, and its original form is perfectly in accordance with this spirit. In this sense, it is *thoroughly idealistic*. The whole problem of cognition lies on this safe basis. If the objects of all possible cognition are merely phenomena—that is, representations in us—and altogether subjective, how is a cognition of them possible, which must yet be universal and necessary? How is an objective experience of them possible? This is the question of the Critick. *This* question makes the

investigation both novel and difficult. Berkeley knew that all our objects were only representations; but had no suspicion how from such objects any cognition should ever come; so his doctrine lapsed into the scepticism of Hume. We must not, then, identify Kant with Berkeley, as Garven did, in his well-known criticism. Kant, indeed, agreed with Berkeley in this, that he too allowed no objects of knowledge but *representations*; but he differed from Berkeley in this, that he discovered the *universal* and *necessary* representations, which are not themselves objects, but produce objects—the necessary forms of representation both of the understanding and the sensibility; and in this very discovery consists the Critick of the Pure Reason.

To make the distinction between himself and Berkeley plain, Kant might have laid much more stress on the critical character of his investigations, but should never have weakened their idealism. This was the mistaken line which he took in his Second Edition. He here wrote, as an appendix to the “Postulates of Empirical Thinking,” that “Refutation of Idealism” which was directed immediately against Berkeley. And his whole demonstration comes to this, that it is only the existence of things without us which first renders possible the perception of ourselves. As if, in the true spirit of the Critick, things without us could be anything else than things in space—as if space could be anything else than our representation—as if things without us could be anything but our spatial representations! This is no refutation of Berkeley, but merely a flat denial of Idealism, by which Kant abandoned his own teaching in the most inconceivable manner.\*

\* See this question discussed in the Introduction. Kant probably meant nothing more than this: that the representation of permanent phenomena in space is logically antecedent to the representation of myself as a phenomenon determined in time. Hence, the non-critical Idealists have been guilty of a *ὑστέρων πρότερον*, and to imagine the external world necessarily presupposes our having perceived it.

## CHAPTER V.

## TRANSITION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

THE LIMITATIVE CONCEPTS OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING—  
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHENOMENA AND THINGS IN THEM-  
SELVES—THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTS OF REFLECTION—  
KANT AND LEIBNIZ.

THE positive problem of the Critick has been solved. The fact of mathematics and of physical science (experience) existing has been explained. The conditions have been shown under which cognition, in the sense of the Critick, takes place ; that is, cognition which is synthetical, and at the same time universal and necessary—in one word, which is metaphysical. But the conditions which render this cognition possible, and explain it, also confine it to a limited province. They determine its only objects to be phenomena, which are nothing but our representations. There is an universal and necessary cognition of phenomena, but *only* of phenomena. Let us call all cognition which has the character of strict universality and necessity metaphysical, and the positive result of the Critick is : *there does exist a metaphysic of phenomena*. Let us call all cognition the objects of which are phenomena or sensuous things empirical, and the same result may be so expressed : *there exists experience only*. Immediately connected with this positive result there is a negative one, which now assumes the more conspicuous position in the Critick. If cognition is possible *only* of phenomena, obviously *no* cognition is possible of objects which *do not* appear, and which are excluded from our intuition and representation. The source of phenomena is our sensibility. What is not sensuous cannot appear to us, and *vice versâ*. If the transcendental Æsthetic has shown the

possibility of a cognition of sensuous things, it will now be the duty of the Critick to oppose the possibility of a cognition of non-sensuous things. The solution of this problem belongs to the transcendental Dialectic.

# I. THE NEGATIVE PROBLEM OF THE CRITICK—IMPOSSIBILITY OF A KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUPERSSENSUOUS.

In fact, this refutation is already contained in the result of the analytic as its necessary consequence; and the long and difficult investigation, upon which we now enter, would be quite unnecessary if nothing were to be demonstrated but the impossibility of this cognition. It is already quite plain that the human reason, from the nature of its cognitive faculties, can never lay claim to an object beyond its sensibility. But this very truth, which is neither new nor obscure, is just what forces the Critick to propose to itself a question which it is especially bound to solve. When the fact that knowledge existed was being established, there was found among existing sciences a metaphysic of the supersensuous, which laid claim to synthetical *a priori* judgments. This science, then, exists, although its impossibility is clear. Legitimately, it cannot exist; but the fact that it exists, independent of its legitimacy, is not to be questioned, especially by the Critick, which has itself established that fact. This fact, then, must be explained before its legitimacy is shown. We must distinguish the actual from the legitimate possibility; cases in which they do not coincide are common enough. Mathematics and experience possess both—the metaphysic of the supersensuous, the first only. In such cases the possibility *de facto* must be explained before that *de jure* is proved impossible. It requires no great wisdom to deny the knowledge of the supersensuous. So far the world could have dispensed with Kant, as many others had already denied it in the most express terms. But this science had been denied in such a way, that no one could ever hit on the error through which it

had arisen; and, in fact, the great difficulty is to detect this error. This is the problem which the Critick now undertakes to solve: *How is a cognition of non-sensuous things possible as a mere fact, since legitimately it is impossible?* The legitimate fact presupposes that we *may* accomplish it—the mere fact, that we *could* accomplish it. Where in the human reason is this capability, as regards the ontology which so many systems of philosophy have carried out? If there be no legitimate and real cognitive-faculty for this purpose, it must be the abuse of one of our [real] faculties which produced that science. Which faculty, then, of the human reason has been subject to this abuse? In what does the abuse consist? As it cannot possibly have been part of the end of human reason, some delusion must be the cause, not mere chance. The processes of science cannot be called a delusion, even when in error; if radically wrong, it must have been *originally based* on delusion; but upon what delusion? Here we have a whole series of questions which must be answered, before the transcendental Dialectic performs its proper duty.

## II.—THE REPRESENTATION OF NON-SENSUOUS THINGS—NOU-MENA AND PHENOMENA.

With regard to metaphysic, then, as a cognition of non-sensuous things, the difficulty of explaining its possibility will increase in proportion to the clearness and obviousness of its being in itself impossible. This is the critical position in which Kant finds himself, after completing the investigations of his transcendental analytic. For it has been made out clearly, that there is neither any object nor any faculty in the human reason for the knowledge of the supersensuous. And now comes the question: How could the human reason ever have even strayed into such a science; how was even the shadow and illusion of things possible, which are absolutely beyond the horizon of our reason?

Clearly, there must be in the nature of our reason the possibility of representing non-sensuous things in some sort of way; otherwise, even the *illusion* of a science of them would be impossible. Wherever a cognition is found, it matters not of what objects, or of what validity, it must be preceded by a representation of its possible objects. Now, a representation of non-sensuous things through our intuition is impossible; for our intuition is, both in form and content, sensuous in its very nature. Its content is sensation; its form, space and time. Non-sensuous things cannot, therefore, ever be intuited by the human reason, but only *thought* by it. Their representation, whether it is to be affirmed or denied, is only possible through the pure understanding. Were human reason altogether sensuous, a representation of a non-sensuous object could never come into it; and a science of such things would not only be *de jure*, but *de facto*, impossible. But the pure understanding is a cognitive-faculty quite independent of sensibility; it is a faculty of pure concepts, of which the Critick has itself declared, that they by no means arise from intuition. Every concept demands an object, to which it corresponds, or which it represents. None of the pure concepts represent a sensuous thing. If it is to represent something determinate, or have an object, this can only be a *non-sensuous* thing. And here we find the representation which we were seeking as the first condition of a science of the supersensuous. It is plain, also, what faculty is alone able to form such a representation. Non-sensuous things are not intuitible by the human reason, but only *thinkable*, or intelligible; they are not sensuous objects, but objects of the understanding. Let us divide our representations into such as are phenomena—objects of intuition—and into such as are creatures of the understanding, or intelligible things. After the manner of the ancients, we may call the one *phenomena*, the other *noumena*. If we represent a thing, not as it appears to us through our senses—not as it is pictured in us, but as it is *in itself*—such a representation, if at all possible,

must be produced by the pure understanding. Things in themselves cannot be sensuously represented, but only thought. The distinction of phenomena and noumena is identical with that into appearances and things in themselves.

If, then, a knowledge of the supersensuous be possible, there must be representations which are noumena, or things in themselves. These representations we can only have through the pure understanding, the investigation and dissection of which was the business of the Analytic. Its last duty must, then, be to determine the concept of a thing *per se*, and this only so far the meaning and origin of this concept. It will be left to the Dialectic to show, farther, how from that concept of the understanding, an illegitimate science—ontology, so called—has arisen, and to refute this science by exposing its fundamental mistakes.

### III. DISTINCTION BETWEEN THINGS PER SE AND APPEARANCES (PHENOMENA).\*

What is a noumenon? What does a thing *per se* mean, and how does it differ from a phenomenon? It may be observed that Kant has apprehended and solved this question far more radically in his First Edition than in the succeeding ones. The distinction of things into phenomena and noumena does not date from the critical philosophy; it is very important to know in what sense Kant distinguishes the two.

\* The German language has a proper word (*Erscheinungen*) which it can use instead of the foreign word phenomena. This is not the case with us, *appearances* being a clumsy substitute. I have been obliged, during the previous part of this book, to use phenomena for the German *erscheinungen*, although Kant introduces the term phenomena specially in this place as contrasted to noumena. The sense of the German has not been lost, the two words being identical in meaning. The reader will observe that Kant uses the terms employed by the ancients for a different purpose, in a new and special sense.

1. *The Thing per se as a Representation (Leibniz).*—It might possibly appear that the *same object* were represented in both cases. As phenomenon, the object would be represented through our senses; as noumenon, through our understanding. Sensibility would represent it as it appears (to us); the understanding, as it is *in itself*. The later dogmatic metaphysicians have drawn the distinction between things *per se* and phenomena in this sense. The object of the sensuous representation, and of that which is thought, is one and the same; but the two representations are different in degree: it is represented in the sensibility indistinctly, in the understanding distinctly; the confused and obscure representation is the phenomenon; the distinct and clear one, the noumenon. Hence the dogma: the understanding cognises things as they are in themselves. In this sense, for instance, Leibniz made the distinction. The world, sensuously represented, appears in material things; the world, conceived in thought, appears in the connected whole of its laws; both worlds are the sum of *the same* objects. This was not the meaning of the ancients, when they separated the sensuous world from the intelligible; they did not regard the phenomenon as the thing *per se*, indistinctly represented—as a representation which only required thought to clear it up, and make it true; they regarded it as an imagination—as an illusion—which destroys sound thinking. To them phenomena and things *per se* were not different in degree, but in kind.

2. *The Thing per se not a Representation, or Object of the Understanding (Kant).*—Kant could not possibly agree with Leibniz' distinction. Inasmuch as the critical philosophy shows the sensibility not to differ in degree from the understanding, so the phenomenon cannot be different in degree from the thing *per se*. If both represented the same thing, then the thing *per se* would be nothing but the phenomenon *minus* the sensuous representation. But, in accordance with the critical philosophy, the phenomenon *minus* the sensuous representation is *nothing at all*. The phenomenon is nothing

but sensuous representation. If I abstract from it my concepts, it ceases to be an object, and becomes a mere empirical intuition. If I abstract my intuition, it ceases to be a phenomenon, and becomes a mere impression. If I abstract the impression, its last vestiges are gone, and there remains, not a thing *per se*, but nothing at all. If we take the phenomenon to be something without and beyond our representations, then indeed we might imagine that, after subtracting the representation, something is left, and that is the thing *per se*. The Kantian philosophy has generally been understood in this sense. Nothing can be more incorrect; and yet Kant must bear the blame of having countenanced this false view. In the later Editions of his Critick, he has, as it were, out of consideration for Realism, brought the phenomenon, and consequently the thing *per se*, into this false position; as if the thing *per se* were contained in the phenomenon as its hidden X.\* By this means the matter becomes apparently quite easy, and most people seem contented; but, in reality, the right understanding of it is by this means greatly confused, and even destroyed, and the critical philosophy disturbed from its very foundations. If space and time are our representation, every phenomenon, as being in space and time, is for that very reason nothing but our representation; and the thing *per se*, as being not intuitible nor in space and time, is for this very reason different from the phenomenon, not in degree, but in kind: it is the representation of a *totally different object* from that which the phe-

\* It is remarkable that this expression, which offends Dr. Fischer so much, as implying some reality in the thing *per se*, appears to have been used by Kant with rather the reverse implication. At least, in the Second Edition of the Critick, he has got rid of all the passages in the Deduction of the Categories where this expression is used, and in this Second Edition only applies it to the soul as a thing *per se*. It occurs in three places in the Critick—in a note on the Introduction in the First Edition (see above, p. 12, note), in the Deduction of the Categories (First Edition), and in the refutation of the Paralogisms. See below, chap. VII., § 1.

nomenon contains. These two propositions: the phenomenon is mere representation; the thing *per se* refers to quite a different object from the intuition—these two hang together closely, and support one another. The Critick of the Pure Reason, in its original form, maintains both the spirit and the letter of these two propositions.

In a certain sense, even in Kant, the sensibility and the understanding have the same object. But their common object is *the mere phenomenon*, in the representation of which they exercise very different functions. Sensation supplies the matter of the phenomenon; intuition makes of this matter a phenomenon; the understanding makes of the phenomenon an object. What the senses represent contingently is represented by the understanding *according to a rule*, and by this very means made an objective phenomenon; that is, one which cannot be represented in any other way. If being necessarily represented be identical with *existing*, then we may say, with Kant, that the understanding represents objects *as they exist*, while the sensibility represents them as they appear; but the object in the first case is not the less phenomenal—it is the necessary representation, while perception gives us the contingent one.

#### IV. THE TRANSCENDENTAL OBJECT. THE PURE CONCEPTS AND THEIR TRANSCENDENTAL MEANING.

Things in themselves, then, differ in kind from phenomena; according to Kant, they denote a different object, which can never appear—which, accordingly, the understanding can only indicate, but not determine more closely, or form, as it only forms empirical objects. As opposed to phenomena considered as empirical objects, we may call the thing *per se* "*the transcendental object*." The concepts of the understanding are only applicable to phenomena as objects of possible experience; they have only an empirical use. Were they

applicable to things *per se*, they would have a transcendental use; they do not, indeed, admit of this, but only, as Kant says, of "a transeendental signification." In what does this signification consist? or, in other words: How does the representation of a thing *per se* arise?

Every concept signifies an object, to which it relates. Empirical concepts have their objects in intuition, from which they are abstracted; pure concepts are abstracted from no intuition—they are empirical in their application, but by no means in their origin. If these pure concepts, independent as they are [in origin] of experience, also represent an object [in application] which is independent of all experience—an object which, like themselves, is not at all empirical—then this object will be a thing *per se*—a mere noumenon—of which the quantity is independent of our intuition, its quality of our sensation, its substance and causality without any determination in time, its necessity independent of the mode of our cognition. If, then, our pure concepts represent an object immediately, without the intervention of the schemata, then is this object, like the concepts themselves, independent of all experience—independent of space and time—a thing *per se*.

But our pure concepts in general cannot represent any object, but only connect representations. What they are to connect must be given to them, and that only by intuition; consequently, they can only connect *sensuous* representations, or phenomena; accordingly, things *per se* also they cannot represent, they can only *signify* them. They have an empirical use, and at the same time a transcendental signification.

#### V. THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE THING *PER SE* FOR THE UNDERSTANDING.

What, exactly, does this thing *per se* mean for the understanding? This is the only signification which concerns the Analytic. The immediate representation of an object is never

a concept, but an intuition. Were the thing *per se* to be represented, this could only be done by the understanding, and then the understanding should have the faculty of representing immediately, that is, of intuition; in order, then, to represent the thing *per se*, there must have been an *intuitive understanding*, an *intellectual intuition*. Whether such an understanding be at all possible, we can neither affirm nor deny; for the mere concept of it implies no contradiction. So much only can we say, that this intuitive understanding is not *human*; for the latter is not intuitive, but discursive. We can merely declare, that the human understanding excludes the conditions under which alone the thing *per se* could be a representation.

1. *The Positive Signification*.—One thing we know for certain—the thing *per se* can never be the object of a sensuous intuition. This is its *negative* signification. It can only be the object of a non-sensuous (intellectual) intuition; this is its *positive* signification. It remains undecided whether there can be such a thing as intellectual intuition. It, accordingly, remains undecided whether the thing *per se* can be a representation. It is, then, for our understanding, in its positive sense *problematical*. But, as human intuition is only sensuous, the thing *per se* can never be an object of representation to us. It has, then, besides its problematical meaning, only this negative one, which is, however, of the greatest importance. For we can now decide: all possible objects are either phenomena, or things *per se*. Things *per se* are to us never objects of possible representation; consequently, all objects of our possible representation, and of our possible cognition, are only phenomena; in other words, all our knowledge is (as to objects) only experience.

2. *The Negative Signification—Limitative Concepts*.—The Analytic had shown that experience is possible through pure concepts, and through them only. If any doubt yet remains,

whether by means of pure concepts a cognition might not be rendered possible beyond experience, the thing *per se*, in its negative sense, now signifies to us that pure concepts render no cognition but experience possible. They produce it, and explain its possibility. At the same time they signify, by the thing *per se*, that all knowledge must be confined to experience and its province. In this sense, the thing *per se* forms the "*limitative concept of the understanding*."\* The province of the possible cognition of the understanding having thus been completely surveyed from its source to its limits, the transcendental Analytic may conclude its investigations.†

3. *The Immanent and Transcendent Value of the Pure Concepts—Transcendent and Transcendental.*—Of things in themselves our understanding can know nothing, except that they are generically different from all possible phenomena; that they concern objects totally different from any conceivable to our understanding; so that they are to our understanding quite problematical, and only certain as determining its limits. This limit, and nothing else, is clear about things *per se*, regarded from the understanding's point of view. On this side of the boundary is the wide region of experience, or *nature*; beyond it, a world independent of all experience, and totally distinct from it, of which the existence is completely undetermined, of which we cannot procure any sort of representation by means of the Categories. On this side only of the boundary the Categories are valid in the field of experience; the boundary of possible experience itself they cannot transgress. Since they are valid in all experience, for this reason Kant says that the use of these concepts, and the validity of their principles, is *immanent*. As they can never transgress nor

\* For necessary qualifications of this statement, cf. Critick, pp. 186-7.

† The chapter on Phenomena and Noumena in the Critick was considerably altered in the Second Edition. An account of the differences, and translations of the passages omitted in the Second Edition, will be found in Appendix B.

transcend the limits of experience, Kant says that they have no *transcendent* use, and their principles have no transcendent value. We must not confuse transcendent with transcendental in the Kantian phraseology. That which precedes experience as its necessary condition is transcendental; that which transgresses the bounds of experience is transcendent. The Categories are transcendental, because they do not arise from experience,\* but in the pure understanding; they are in their use immanent, so far as they are valid in all experience; they become transcendent, if they desire to represent or cognize things beyond the limits of experience. All knowledge of things *per se* is then founded, in Kantian language, on a transcendent use of the Categories, on a transcendent validity of their Principles. The pure concepts of the understanding point to an object beyond experience, which they cannot represent, not to say cognize. Their signification is transcendental, but the attempted cognition is transcendent: by means of their transcendental signification, they only signify the limits of possible experience, or limit themselves; by means of their transcendent use, they transgress this limit. This is the clear line of demarcation between their legitimate and illegitimate application; and with this latter commence the investigations of the transcendental Dialectic.

## VI. AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTS OF REFLECTION. KANT'S CRITICISM OF LEIBNIZ' PHILOSOPHY.

The thing *per se*, or noumenon, is not our representation, and cannot be such, simply because it is the *thing per se*, as opposed to our representation. This most instructive proposition comprises in a short formula the summary of the critical philosophy so far, and determines its contrast to the earlier schools, particularly the metaphysic of Leibniz. It was there asserted that the thing *per se* was our representation; that is

\* Empirical is the term opposed to transcendental.

to say, our distinct representation of the thing, as distinguished from the indistinct or sensuous representation. The thing *per se* was the thing as the object of the understanding. In this point, then, dogmatical metaphysic and critical philosophy—Leibniz and Kant—are contradictorily opposed. And Kant finds this the most suitable place to criticize the doctrine of his illustrious predecessor. For its corner-stone is this, that things in themselves—noumena—are representations of the understanding. The natural consequence of this supposition is, that the concepts by which the understanding compares all its representations must be valid for things *per se*--in other words, that these concepts of comparison express the real relations of things. Now, representations can be compared from four points of view: the compared representations are either identical, or different; they either agree, or are opposed; they are related to one another as internal and external, or as determinable or determining (matter and form). The concepts of comparison are these: *identity or difference, agreement and opposition, internal and external, matter and form.*

In accordance with its first principle, the Leibnizian philosophy must regard the comparison of the understanding as the only correct and objective one, and determine according to it the relations of things themselves. This leads to a twofold error; for, in the first place, representations are given to us, not only in the understanding, but in the sensibility; the sensibility is no confused understanding, but itself a faculty of cognition; accordingly, the representations must be compared from two points of view, as well from the sensibility as from the understanding; and, secondly, any comparison which we may make is valid only of phenomena, and not of things *per se*.

It is then, first of all necessary to consider under what point of view representations are compared. This consideration Kant calls *reflection*. And, supposing that the sensibility should compare differently from the understanding, then the compared

representations will appear different from the point of view of understanding, and from that of sensibility; and these concepts of comparison will have a double signification, according to the faculty which compares. This ambiguity Kant calls the *Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection*. He proceeds to make this objection to the Leibnizian philosophy, that it must remain ignorant of this amphiboly; because it drew a false distinction between sensibility and understanding, and so compared phenomena only with the understanding, and determined their relations as if they were not phenomena, but things *per se*. Kant's criticism of Leibniz' philosophy aims at this point: in his method of comparing representations, Leibniz must ignore all sensuous conditions; consequently, his comparison could not be valid of phenomena, but only of concepts, and when referred to objects, only of things *per se*; now, as these are never objects which can be compared, the whole structure of the monadology falls to pieces. Leibniz is refuted as soon as it can be shown that from the point of view of sensibility, and from that of the understanding, we must compare differently. For it is then shown, that the comparison of the understanding is not valid of phenomena, and has, in consequence, no objective value.

1. *The Principle of Indiscernibility*.—The understanding cannot but judge, that concepts which have exactly the same attributes are only one concept. For how can the understanding distinguish them? Only by means of attributes. If they are the same, the concepts must be declared indiscernible. This is the famous Leibnizian *principle of indiscernibility*. Now if, notwithstanding, all things must be distinguished, they must be various in their attributes, and there cannot be, as to attributes, two identical things. This is the *principle of variety*, on which the monadology rests.

The comparison appears quite the converse when regarded from the point of view of sensibility. Two notions may be

perfectly identical in attributes ; in space and time they are always distinct. How are two cubic feet of space distinct in attributes ? Here they are identical ; still, they are not one, but two cubic feet, because they occupy different spaces. If, then, the concepts be identical, they cannot be distinguished as things *per se* ; as phenomena, they are always distinct. The principle of Leibniz, then, is only valid for things *per se* ; that is, it is not valid at all.\*

2. *The Opposition of Realities.*—The understanding cannot but judge, that the positing of a concept is its affirmation, or *Reality* ; the opposite of it is its Negation. It must decide that reality and negation are always related, as A is to *not-A*, and that this relation is the only possible opposition. Let us take A to be every possible reality ; *not-A*, every possible negation. If the only possible opposition be between A and *not-A*, there can be no opposition between realities, and negation is never such, but only its removal, absence, or limit ; so that we must conceive the negation in general only as the limit or absence of reality, not as reality itself. From this follows Leibniz' conception of evil, wickedness, &c. On the side of reality, it also follows, that the understanding (because no opposition is here possible) can render conceivable a sum of all realities, both real and possible ; and so forms the concept of God as "the most real Being."

Quite different do things appear from the point of view of sensibility. Here such an opposition of realities is quite possible. It is shown by negative quantities, opposite directions and forces, &c. The proposition, then, that realities are not opposed, and that negation is no reality, is not valid of phenomena, but only of things *per se* ; that is to say, not valid at all.

3. *The Origin of the Monadology.*—The concept of the in-

\* Critick, p. 192 ; cf. above, p. 44.

ternal, regarded merely by the understanding, must be distinct from any external. That which is internal cannot be external to a foreign being, or it would be itself an external. It must, then, be a self-subsisting being, independent of all external influences, or a substance. This substance cannot constitute an external object; hence, cannot exist in space, and thus excludes all determinations of space, such as quantity, contact, motion, &c. There only remains *representation* and its various states, by which it can be determined. The understanding can only comprehend the internal as a representing substance, or *monad*; nor can monads be allowed to act upon one another externally, as this would destroy the conception of internal reality; but the relation and connexion of the monads must only be conceived as a *pre-established harmony*. On the contrary, regarding things through sensibility, all things different from us in space, and all phenomena in space and time, are only cognoscible from their external relations. The whole monadology, then, is not valid of phenomena, but of things *per se*; that is, not at all.

4. *Origin of the Leibnizian Doctrine of Space and Time.\**—The comparison of matter and form, as conceived by the understanding, is the relation between that which is determinable and that which determines. The concept of matter can in this case be no other than that of determinable material, to be reduced to form and order; the conception of form can only be the determination which the material receives—the distinctions and relations which are realized and carried out in the given material. Consequently, form presupposes matter, as determination does something determinable, or as reality presupposes possibility. With Leibniz, then, there come first the possible worlds, from which the actual one is determined (by selection); and in the real world the first datum, as it were,

\* Cf. Critick, p. 199.

the original material from which the world was formed, must be the monads; the second will be the form produced by their community and order. The reciprocal action of these substances produces their community, the external form of which is *space*; the action of every substance produces the internal changes, or succession of its different states of representation, of which the external form is *time*. Hence, we reach Leibniz' doctrine of space and time, as the forms or external relations, which presuppose the existence of things.

Regarded through sensibility, space and time are not relations of things, but the forms of phenomena, or forms of intuition, without which nothing can appear. Here form precedes matter. Matter merely conceived is without form. That which is the object of intuition and sensation is always in space and time, and therefore always possesses the form of intuition. In other words: matter as phenomenon presupposes space and time; matter as a thing *per se* is presupposed by space and time. Leibniz' doctrine of space and time is not valid of phenomena, but only of things *per se*, and is therefore not valid at all.

## VII. LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE.

The whole philosophy of Leibniz has now been investigated, and shown to be based on the fundamental fallacy of regarding sensibility to be a confused understanding, and its objects as things *per se*, which the understanding by thought cognizes as they exist: in other words, Leibniz considered phenomena to be things *per se*; and compares them only through the understanding, when they should also be compared from the point of view of sensibility. No one can properly comprehend the distinction between phenomena and things *per se*, who does not rightly conceive the distinction between sensibility and understanding. If the distinction between these two faculties be made one of degree, one of them will be the fundamental faculty, of which the other must be an inferior

form, in which case we must reduce sense to understanding, or *vice versâ*. This was attempted by the Intellectualists and Sensualists, respectively. But in either case the objects of sensuous representations are *things themselves*, cognized as they are *per se* by one party through the understanding alone; by the other, through sensuous perception. The distinction between phenomena and things *per se* is missed by both.

Leibniz changed all phenomena into pure objects of the understanding; while his opponent, Locke, wished to analyze the concepts of the understanding into sensuous perceptions as their elements; or, as Kant expressed himself, when determining the radical mistake of both schools, in terse and striking language: "*Leibniz intellectualized phenomena, as Locke had sensualized all the concepts of the understanding.*"\*

\* It was reserved for Professor Webb to show, in his "Intellectualism of Locke," how very mistaken these views of previous critics were as to the real doctrine of the great Essay on the Human Understanding. Any one who will compare the Critick with the remarks of Dugald Stewart and M. Cousin's volume on Kant, will see that the German philosopher has not fared much better.

## CHAPTER VI.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC—THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPTS OF THE REASON, OR IDEAS—TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION, AND THE DIALECTICAL SYLLOGISMS OF THE REASON.

I. PROBLEM OF THE DIALECTIC. EXPLANATION AND REFUTATION OF ONTOLOGY.

THE farthest concept we reached in the Analytic was the concept of limit as well of the pure understanding as of experience, the thing *per se*—the positive signification of which (considering it as an object to be cognized by the understanding), remained quite problematical; its negative signification, from the same point of view, was nothing but the boundary of the horizon of the cognition of the understanding. So far, then, there is not the least error connected with the thing *per se*. The error only arises when it is made an object of knowledge, so that the boundary which the understanding has itself set up is transgressed.

Assuming what has already been denied, that things in themselves could ever be objects of possible cognition, such a cognition must take place independent of all experience through the pure reason, and so be metaphysical; from this point of view, the cognition of things in themselves may be called the *Metaphysic of the supersensuous*. The existence of all non-sensuous things, being never given in experience, can only be perceived by the pure understanding; in other words, the existence of such objects must be given in their concepts, and be concluded from them alone. From this point of view all metaphysic of the supersensuous is *Ontology*. Assuming that things *per se* in general can be objects, we may divide all objects into phenomena and things *per se*. If there be metaphy-

sical cognition of all objects, metaphysic in general is possible. That it is so of phenomena, the Critick has already shown. Were it also possible of the supersensuous, metaphysic in general would be possible. For this reason, Kant proposed the last question of his Critick in the Prolegomena in this form : *How is metaphysic in general possible?* The question is identical with the other : “ How is Ontology possible? (We know quite well now that objects (representations) may not be divided into phenomena and things *per se*, for the latter are *not* objects. We might as well divide men into men and not-men.)

Accordingly, it will now be the duty of the Critick, in one sense, to explain the possibility of Ontology ; in another, to demonstrate its impossibility. The objects of Ontology are things *per se*. Legitimately, things *per se* can *never* be objects or representations. There can, then, be no legitimate knowledge of the same ; and if such knowledge exist in fact, it will not possess the reality, but only the illusive appearance, of true knowledge. But things *per se*, which are never really objects, must be able to produce the *illusion* that they are objects ; or else the metaphysic of the supersensuous would be impossible even as an illusive science, and so impossible in every sense ; so that the plain fact which lies before us in so many systems would be wholly incomprehensible. This, then, is the point solved in the last problem of the Critick. We must show that things *per se* are and must be in a certain sense *apparent\* objects*, then their cognition as an illusive science will be possible ; as a real science, impossible. In experience there are only sensuous objects. In the field of experience, and under its conditions, the supersensuous could not even assume the illusion of an ob-

\* This word has two senses in English—either *quite plain*, and certain ; or *only in appearance*, and not real. In this latter sense I intend to use it. Kant has warned us against the phrase “ illusive object ” before (Critick, p. 42, note), so that the term used above may stand, with the caution I have appended.

jective existence. It cannot, then, be experience which produces that illusion. It must rather have its basis in the reason itself, independent of all experience : that is to say, the illusion upon which all the metaphysic of the supersensuous rests is not empirical, but transcendental. The last duty, then, of the Critic is to explain on principle this *transcendental illusion*, to resolve it from its causes, to detect it in all its special examples, where it forms the basis of a so-called metaphysic. The solution of this problem is called the Dialectic.

## II. THE THING PER SE AS THE LIMIT OF EXPERIENCE.

It is, then, this transcendental illusion which we have as yet only indicated, which gives things *per se* the appearance of being objects, or phenomena (and so cognoscible things), and so deceives the human reason as to turn its faculties towards this apparent object. Before we analyze this illusion any further, we must determine the thing *per se* more accurately. Looking from the understanding, we can discover nothing about the thing *per se*, except the negative sense of *limit*. What the thing *per se* is properly, in its positive sense, is so far a perfect enigma.

But we catch a glimpse of something which brings us closer to this obscure point, and makes it plainer. For, as the limit of the understanding and its horizon, the thing *per se* appears, as it were, the *ultima Thule* of the world of sense and experience—as its extremity, which we can, at all events, approach by way of experience, even should we be unable absolutely to attain to it. It appears as if there must be in experience a way which would lead us to the limits of experience, were we to follow it up accurately. What is the path, then, toward this goal? How, and in what direction, must this path be described?

1. *The Continuity of Experience. Regression.*—The law of all experience is the causal connexion of phenomena; every

phenomenon, as an object of possible experience, is conditioned by another which necessarily precedes it, upon which it necessarily follows. Every phenomenon is conditioned by all the rest, which are earlier in objective sequence: every phenomenon is itself a condition with regard to all those that succeed it in objective sequence. This causal connexion brings all phenomena into a chain of which no link is missing, and so forms the *Continuity of Experience*. It is plain that this continuous causal connexion of phenomena is the only way by which we can run through the domain of experience from one end to the other—if there be indeed such ends. We have, then, discovered the *way* or path of which we were in search. It leads without interruption through the whole series of conditioned phenomena from the first condition downward, and *vice versâ*. By this means then alone we can approach, or, if it be possible, reach the limit of experience.\*

The way extends in two directions—the one descending from condition to conditioned, the other ascending from conditioned to condition. As all causes are prior to their effects, we must ascend from cause to cause, and descend from effect to effect. The latter course, then, may be called *progressive*, the former *regressive*. In which of these are we to look for the limits of experience? We can only find what is already given. It is obvious that with any effect all its causes are given—for they must have preceded it in time; but not all its effects—for they must follow it in time. With the present all the past is given, but not the future. Consequently, the limit of experience cannot be sought for in the future, of which it would be the last moment, but only in the past, of which it is the starting-point, or first member. In other words, the only possible way, which brings us nearer to the limits of experience, is *the continuity of causal connexion in its regressive direction*—the way leading from the conditioned to the condition.

\* Critick, p. 231.

2. *The Syllogism obtained by Regression (Prosyllogism).—*

How does the human reason proceed on this path? Every causal connexion of phenomena is an empirical judgment. The condition comprehends the conditioned under it, and is related to it, as the universal to the particular—as in judgments the predicate to the subject. If, then, we are to ascend from the conditioned to its conditions, this means to ascend from the particular to the universal, or to condition the judgment by its rule. [To explain] Let the judgment be: “All bodies are changeable.” Let the condition of this judgment be: “All bodies are composite.” Then the rule will be: All that is composite is changeable. This rule declares that bodies are changeable, under the condition that they are composite. Judgments, then, are related to these rules as the conclusion to the major premiss; and the condition under which the rule is applicable in a special case is the minor premiss. The rule is the major premiss, its applicability, the minor; its application gives the conclusion. The deducing of judgments from rules, or the conditioning of judgments, is always done in the form of [logical] syllogisms. Logic has denominated judging through rules, or the connecting of two judgments so as to obtain a third from them by necessary consequence, *syllogisms of the Reason*, as contrasted with syllogisms of the understanding, which draw one judgment from another immediately (without intervention of a third judgment). This is not the place to criticize the correctness of these terms. It might be objected, that syllogisms are nothing but judgments, and that therefore the faculty of drawing conclusions cannot be different from that of judging; and so that we do not see why the Reason as a faculty of conclusions should differ from the understanding as a faculty of judgments.\*

Waiving this point, it is plain that the way which leads to

\* On this question, cf. Introduction.

the limits of experience is described by the human reason in the form of syllogisms. This sort of argument may proceed in two ways: either from the most universal propositions through the descending series of intermediate members down to the conditioned judgment; or it may ascend in the reverse way. In the first case it descends from the rule through the minor premises to the conclusions; in the second, it ascends from the conclusions to the rules. The first process is the progressive, or *episylogistic*; the second, the regressive, or *prosylogistic*. It is by the latter that we approach the bounds of experience.

### III. THE THING PER SE AS THE UNCONDITIONED, OR IDEA.

1. *Rule and Principle*.\*—The Rule, which is the foundation of a judgment, is always an universal proposition; compared with the conditioned judgment, it is its *fundamental principle*. We may say, then, that the conclusions of the Reason seek principles for the given judgments. But every rule which we find is itself, again, a conditioned judgment, which requires another rule or principle to explain it. As every object of possible experience is a phenomenon, and therefore *conditioned* in nature, so every possible empirical judgment is itself a conditioned judgment, which, as such, can never be the highest rule. For this must be a judgment, which, while it conditions all others, is itself not conditioned *at all*. It must be a Principle in an absolute, not relative, sense. A principle is relative which is valid in certain relations only, and therefore conditionally. A principle is absolute which is valid in every possible relation. Kant desires the word "*absolute*" to be understood in this sense.† It is clear, then, that an absolute principle is perfectly unconditioned; and it is in this sense only that the expression Principle has its true and complete meaning.

\* Cf. Critick, p. 213.

† Critick, p. 227.

The syllogism of the Reason, then, which ascends from the particular to the universal—from judgments to rules—from the conditioned to conditions—describes a course, the ultimate object of which must necessarily be the *unconditioned*. But every object of experience (phenomenon) is conditioned, as being the consequence of another: the unconditioned can, therefore, never be an object of experience. It is, then, the limit of all experience, and coincides with the thing *per se*. We must therefore assert, with regard to the thing *per se*, that on the one hand the reason *must represent it as the goal which it endeavours to reach*; on the other, that *the unconditioned can never be represented as an object of possible experience*; so that in one sense the concept of the unconditioned is necessary, in another impossible. In other words, it is not a concept of the understanding, but of the *Reason*. And we can here see accurately Kant's meaning in distinguishing between Understanding and Reason. Both are faculties of concepts, but these concepts are different in kind. The concepts of the Understanding only refer to phenomena which are in their very nature conditioned; the concepts of Reason only refer to the unconditioned, which in its very nature can never be a phenomenon. The Understanding is, through its concepts, a faculty of rules, which have always a relative value, conditioned by experience. The Reason is, in its concepts, a faculty of principles which are absolutely valid. The distinction between principle and rule gives us the distinction between Reason and Understanding. No rule of the understanding is valid unconditionally; for it is only valid of phenomena. In this sense the Principles of the pure Understanding are not principles, but only rules. It is not the *form* of the syllogism which makes the distinction between Understanding and Reason. It seeks to attain the highest rule—the Principle, or the Unconditioned. But this could not be the case if it proceeded merely under the guidance of experience; it can only be the case if this goal is appointed to it by Reason itself, indepen-

dent of all experience. The representation of this goal, or object, must precede the search after it. For how else could it ever be sought? Without the concept of the unconditioned, the syllogism of the Reason, which aims at it, must be impossible.

This concept the Understanding cannot form; for whatever concepts it has only connect phenomena, and relate in their very nature to phenomena. The Understanding can only *signify*\* this concept; because all its concepts, when freed from sensuous conditions, express something unconditioned. To form this concept, a faculty is requisite, totally superior to the Understanding. And this faculty is Reason.

2. *Concept and Idea.*†—We have called the unconditioned *a concept of the Reason*. The expression is not an apt one, because it might be thought that the unconditioned belongs to the genus of *concepts*; that, like concepts, it presupposed an object from which it is either abstracted, like generic concepts, or which it makes cognoscible, as the pure concepts of the understanding do the objects of experience. The unconditioned is not such. It wants the characteristic which all concepts have—the relation to a given existence. That which the so-called concept of the unconditioned expresses is not given, but is to be reached or given—it *does* not, but it *ought* to exist; it is not an object which determines experience, but an *aim* or *end* set up by reason, and to which no possible object of experience answers. This end set up by reason Kant calls *Idea*, with special reference to Plato. The Platonic Ideas were the eternal exemplars, or models of things, which cannot be reached or even clearly pictured in any object of experience; they were also the patterns of all moral actions. In this second

\* This term in the German also means “indicate” and “suggest,” both of which senses are, I think, in Kant’s mind, when he uses the term.

† Critick, pp. 220, *sqq.*; and also p. 257, where he explains himself very clearly on this point. Cf. also the Introduction, on Reason and Understanding.

sense of exemplars in morals, Kant uses the Platonic expression. It shows most clearly the difference between ideas and all experience; the thing *per se*—not which exists, but which ought to exist. This distinction is of the greatest importance. It would altogether confuse and destroy natural philosophy, in Kant's sense, were we to explain natural phenomena from final causes. It would equally destroy the whole of morals were we *not* to determine all human actions from final causes; but it would contradict morals just as much were we to determine the moral ends—such as virtue—according to the usual actions of men which we find in experience. Every conflicting experience is an exception to any natural law. No conflicting experience is an exception to the moral law we have set up. It is wrong to say of any natural phenomenon, it ought not to be. It is both right, and we are under an obligation to say it of a human action which contradicts the moral law. It is in this sense that Kant speaks of Ideas, when he says (with reference to Plato's Republic): “Nothing can be more injurious or unworthy of a philosopher than the grossly vulgar appeal to the apparent contradictions in experience, which experience would not be the case, had institutions been arranged from the beginning according to ideas, and had not rude concepts—rude, simply because they *were* drawn from experience—taken their place, and foiled every good intention.”

3. *The Transcendental Idea*.—The thing *per se* was for the understanding merely the limiting concept of experience. Its positive meaning is the *unconditioned*—the absolute principle, not of what is, but of what ought to be—the principle, not of natural, but of moral events; it is no concept, either determined by or determining an object of experience, but an *Idea*.\* In this sense, the Kantian use of the term must be distin-

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 220, *sqq.*; and qualify the remarks which follow above by the Critick, p. 256.

guished from the Platonic, and must not be applied in the wide extension usual in modern philosophy, in which every representation—even that of red color, for instance—is called an idea. The Idea in Kant's sense is no object of intuition, nor does it produce such an object; it is no object of experience, nor does it produce such an object. It is, then, neither intuition nor concept, and its faculty is neither the sensibility nor the understanding. It has this only in common with the forms of the sensibility, and the concepts of the understanding, that it is, like them, *a priori*, or transcendental.

#### IV. THE IDEA IN RELATION TO EXPERIENCE. EXTENSION AND UNITY.

The thing *per se* is a “*transcendental Idea* ;” compared with experience, it is the limit, or goal, which experience should strive to reach, but which experience, as such, may and can never reach. Experience should strive to attain it, and that continually—that is, it should extend itself. Experience can never attain to it—that is, it can never be complete, or come to a point, when it should be concluded. Such being the case, it is clear that the domain and continuity of experience is without limits, like space and time. If there were one unconditioned or ultimate principle of experience, all empirical judgments would have their common foundation in it, so that here all empirical sciences would form but *one* science, and the whole system of human cognition would be complete in an unity.

Experience should strive at this unattainable goal : while extending itself, it should ever keep it in view, and never cease to seek the *unity* of its cognitions, so as to unite all the parts of science into one *whole*. This idea of a complete whole of the unity of reason forms the goal set up by empirical science, at which it must ever aim, but can never reach. And so we may say with regard to experience—the idea is never its object, but

only its aim. This aim demands the constant extension of our empirical cognition, and at the same time its constant union into a connected whole. Extension secures the material completeness of science; unity and the systematic connexion of parts secure its formal completeness.

From this point of view Reason is related to understanding, just as the latter is to sensibility. Understanding connects phenomena into empirical judgments. Reason connects judgments into one scientific whole, or rather it *demands* such a connexion. The understanding introduces its unity into phenomena, and so produces experience; the Reason introduces its unity into judgments, and so makes them one whole, or rather *demands*\* such a completion.

#### V. THE IDEA AS AN APPARENT OBJECT. TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION.

Experience cannot reach its own limit, because it is without limit. Its unattainable limit is the idea of unity at which knowledge aims, by continually extending and harmonizing itself. If knowledge assumes that limit to be attainable and cognoscible—if the *idea* of unity be regarded as an *object*, which it can grasp and comprehend—then experience forthwith ceases to extend itself; it overleaps itself, and becomes transcendent—it ceases to be experience, and becomes a cognition of the supersensuous, or ontology. Here, then, we can distinctly see how this metaphysic arises. It arises from regarding that to be an object which is no object, but an Idea. This delusion would be impossible, if the idea could not assume the appearance of being an object of possible cognition; this delusion would only be accidental, and could not be laid to the charge of the human reason, as such, if the idea did not *necessarily* assume the false appearance of an object in a certain

\* In the German the term is *aufgegeben*, as contrasted with *gegeben*.

sense—an illusion which, without our intention or will, forces itself upon us; and which we follow, till the light of criticism causes this *ignus fatuus* to pale its ineffectual fire. And whence arises this unavoidable transcendental illusion, by which reason itself lends to the thing *per se* the appearance of a (cognoscible) object?

The matter is easily understood from the explanation we have just given. Our experience is in its very nature without limit, like space and time; every one of its objects is a phenomenon, which presupposes another as its cause, and which precedes another as *its* cause. There is no first or last member of the series, any more than a first or last moment of time. And yet there is something quite independent of all experience, which is neither its condition, like space, time, or causality, nor can ever be its object, like phenomena. This something is the thing *per se*, the Idea. There is, then, a limit to experience, which is itself without limit. And here it is that the illusion arises, as if experience and the world of experience were not without limit, but limited in space and time—as if the limit or bounds of experience lay within the domain of experience, and could form part of phenomena; the illusion makes the thing *per se* appear to be the first link in the chain of phenomena, and itself a phenomenon or object. It was *this illusion* which deceived Leibniz, which has deceived and misled metaphysicians at all times, and made them transcend the bounds of experience. They transcended these bounds without perceiving it. They imagined they were still in the safe domain of knowledge, and never saw the great gulf fixed between phenomena and things *per se*. The thing *per se*, which is the limit of experience, appears also to be the object of experience. The limiting concept involuntarily produces the illusion of being a *limiting object*. We cannot represent to ourselves the limit, except as in space and time; the thing *per se*, regarded as a limit, appears as the spatial and temporal limit of the world, as

its first cause, as its necessary being, &c. &c. This illusion, deceitful as it is, is *unavoidable*.\* The Critick of the Reason can explain it, but the human reason cannot get rid of it. We can be taught by the Critick not to follow this illusion, not to take this apparent object for a real one, not to transcend experience. But no Critick will cause the illusion to vanish. Hence Kant calls it an "*unavoidable illusion*." Just in the same way mathematical geography teaches us, that where the sky and the earth appear to touch, this is not really the case—that the sky is there just as far from the earth as at our zenith; but no explanation can remove the illusion of the senses—it can only prevent this illusion from being accepted and treated as a real fact; it corrects our judgment, not our senses. Astronomy teaches us that the moon when it has just risen over the horizon is not larger than when it is high in the heavens, though it then appears to us smaller; optics explain to us, from the nature of perspective, why the rising moon should appear to us larger.† We avoid, then, judging

\* Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel have both objected to Kant's making the human reason the origin of delusions, of natural unavoidable delusions. But the whole history of philosophy is a prolonged and perpetual attempt on the part of deep thinkers to free the intellects of their fellow-men from natural delusions. We may safely defy them both to produce any philosopher who has not acted upon this principle, not excepting themselves! For example, see Mr. Mansel, *Proleg. Logica*, p. 158:—"There are some original principles of our nature of immutable obligation; *and there are others which are perpetually leading us astray*;" and for Sir W. Hamilton, see a postscript to his *Discussions* (p. 833), where he slips in this strange remark from a man who heaped obloquy upon others for stating the same thing in other words:—"The negative necessity of not thinking so is *even naturally* the source of deception."

This passage is not noticed by Mr. Mill, who has some good remarks on this subject, in his "*Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*," pp. 140, *sqq.* The subject is noticed in the Introduction to this volume.

† Cf. Bishop Berkeley's "*New Theory of Vision*," § 67, *sqq.*, where this phenomenon is discussed; and Mr. Abbott's "*Sight and Touch*," p. 137.

the moon's size by this illusion ; but we cannot avoid being subject to the illusion. In such cases the illusion is explained from the nature of our experience, and is an *empirical* illusion. The same is the case with transcendental illusion, except that this latter does not follow from the perception of the senses, but from mere reason by itself.\*

It is quite true that there is a limit to experience—that the concept of the thing *per se*, or the idea, forms this point of limit. But it is quite false and illusory to imagine that this limit can be reached in experience, and that it lies, as it were, in the same plane. The thing *per se* only appears to be in contact with experience, just as the sky appears to touch the earth at the horizon. The untaught understanding, following sensuous evidence, might hope to grasp the sky when it has reached the limit of the horizon. It knows not that at that very limit it would still stand at the centre of a new horizon. So the uncritical understanding imagines to reach the thing *per se* at the limits of experience, while there would then open to view only a new domain of unlimited experience.

Our experience is limited. This means, if rightly understood, there is something in us which can never be experienced—which can never produce experience—and which, for this reason, forms the absolute limit of experience. If this something be represented as an object, it cannot but be represented in space and time—that is, as a phenomenon—which is only the relative, not the absolute, limit of experience. So the thing *per se* is turned into a phenomenon, and phenomena into things *per se*. For, as soon as the thing *per se* is represented in space and time, space and time must assume the position of objective determinations of things in themselves ; and phenomena in space and time must be regarded no longer as mere representations, but as things *per se*, independent of our faculty of representation. And here lies the fundamental

\* Critick, pp. 209-12.

error of all supposed cognition of things *per se*. The metaphysicians allowed themselves to be deceived by the transcendental illusion, which does not deceive the critical philosopher; they think they can grasp the thing *per se*, as children think they can grasp the sky.

## VI. THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL THE METAPHYSIC OF THE SUPERSENSUOUS.

All metaphysic is founded on a syllogistic argument from conditioned existence to the unconditioned. If conditioned existence be given, it concludes that all its conditions must be given.\* *All* the conditions would not be given, if the whole series were not complete, or if the first member were still conditioned. The complete series, as well as the first member (itself subject to no conditions), are unconditioned. The argument, then, which lies at the foundation of all cognition

\* This is the synthetical *a priori* principle lying at the basis of the Ideas of the Reason, just as the synthetical unity of apperception [*Ego* = the unity of all representations (Critick, p. 81, *sqq.*)] lies at the basis of the Categories. The Ideas are the various phases of this principle, which is stated by Kant in its hypothetical form (p. 217). It is there shown to be a *pure a priori* principle, because it is the necessary condition of the ordinary logical use of the reason. It is also shown to be *synthetical*, because it asserts the unconditioned to be given with the conditioned—not merely the condition, which would be an analytical proposition, if we merely judge it of the concept conditioned, but would be the principle of causality, if we judged it of objects of experience (in which case conditioned would mean *phenomenal*). Many critics have confused it with the Category of causality, which merely asserts that every phenomenal object has a condition, and is thereby perfectly satisfied without *necessarily* ascending any higher. Now the special peculiarity of the Reason is, that guided by this synthetical proposition, it *necessarily* seeks for higher and higher conditions; so that, as Kant says (p. 233), “all pure conceptions in general are concerned with the synthetical unity of representations, but concepts of pure reason (Ideas) with the unconditioned synthetical unity of all conditions in general.” See, further, Introduction, on the distinction between Understanding and Reason.

of things *per se*, is this : if the conditioned be given, then the series of all its conditions, and hence the unconditioned, is given. Now, conditioned existence is given ; hence, the unconditioned is so also.

1. *The True Syllogism.*—The argument from conditioned existence to its condition is quite correct, and in every case necessary. Of the condition we must judge, in a purely logical way, that it is either conditioned or unconditioned ; in one case the argument is repeated until the series of conditions is exhausted, in the other case the unconditioned is forthwith given. So that there is no objection to the argument as a logical principle. The concept of the conditioned points to the unconditioned for its completion. But the concept is one thing, its relation to its object another. To speak in Kantian language : the concept in the logical, differs from the concept in the transcendental, sense. Everything depends upon the sort of object to which the concept relates. What is true of concepts is not in consequence true of objects. What is logically true may be transcendently false.

The concept of conditioned existence refers only to phenomena ; the concept of the unconditioned only to things *per se*, or ideas. Our logical understanding does not trouble itself about this radically different reference ; our critical understanding considers it of the last importance. Logically, we may conclude : Given conditioned existence as a phenomenon, the unconditioned is given as an idea, which can never be an object or phenomenon. On this conclusion no metaphysic can be based. Transcendently, we may conclude : Given conditioned existence as phenomenon, its conditions as phenomena are also given ; but, being phenomena, or objects of possible experience, their series is never given as complete ; for there is no completed experience. This conclusion denies the possibility of metaphysic.

2. *The False Syllogism or Sophistry of the Pure Reason—The Dialectical Syllogism.*—How does ontology draw its conclusion? It considers conditioned existence as a mere concept, without distinguishing phenomena and things *per se*. It considers the concept of the conditioned independent of our representation, and refers it, not only to phenomena, but to things in general. And this is the syllogism: If the conditioned (as a thing *per se*) be given, the unconditioned is also given. But the conditioned is given (merely as phenomenon). Therefore, the unconditioned is also given.

The fallacy on which metaphysic rests is here made obvious. The concept of the conditioned is the middle term of the syllogism, and is used in two totally different senses—in the major premiss, the thing in general; in the minor, only the phenomenon; so that no conclusion is possible, as the middle term must be used in both premises in exactly the same sense. This syllogism of metaphysic is, then, no syllogism; for the middle term is not one, but two totally different concepts—it is what the old logicians called a “*quaternio terminorum*.” If we deliberately in our middle term conceal two meanings in *one* word, this is deliberate deception—a fallacy which generally depends upon a miserable pun. Such an intentional fallacy the present is not. The two meanings of the middle term in this case are *phenomenon* and *thing per se*—implying the distinction between *noumenon* and *phenomenon*. To understand this distinction thoroughly, we must know that phenomena are merely our representations; to understand this, we must know that space and time are pure intuitions, or the original forms of our sensibility—in short, we must understand the whole critical philosophy. So long as this insight is not gained, the human reason is naturally inclined to *interchange* phenomena and things *per se*, and so to be unintentionally guilty of that fallacy upon which ontology founds its structure. It is that transcendental illusion which pictures to us the thing *per se* as a phenomenon, or objective existence. The false

sylogisms based upon it are, as Kant expresses it, "*sophistries, not of men, but of the pure reason itself*, from which even the wisest of men cannot free himself, and may perhaps with much pains avoid the error, but never can get rid of the illusion, which continually deludes and mocks him."

The rational syllogism from conditioned existence to the *unconditioned in general* is well founded. That from conditioned existence to the *unconditioned as an existence or object* is only apparently true; this syllogism is a sophistical or dialectical argument. The so-called Dialectic of rhetoricians and sophists deliberately constructs fallacies, in order to persuade and deceive men. But we have here an unintentional Dialectic of the pure reason itself, which builds up this fallacy into a transcendènt science. The discovery of this Dialectic is the last problem of the Critick, the solution of which Kant has accordingly called "the transcendental Dialectic."

3. *Solution of the Fallacy.*—All metaphysic of the supersensuous is based upon the dialectical syllogisms of the Reason, which we have expounded. If conditioned existence is given, we may conclude from it an unconditioned—not as thing or phenomenon, but as Idea. Now, conditioned existence is given us as phenomenon or object of experience; accordingly, the series of all conditions is given us, not in phenomenon, but as idea—in other words, the series of all conditions is not given, but *proposed* to us; it forms a necessary problem of the reason, which experience can only solve so far as it uninterruptedly extends its views, and combines them into a whole of science. A complete solution of this problem is not possible in experience; or, in other words, experience cannot realize the idea—it can neither make it an object, nor have it as an object.

The dialectical syllogism of the Reason and its solution are now understood generically. We must determine this genus in its various species. Whatever determinations of the unconditioned, or whatever number of ideas are possible, the same

number of dialectical syllogisms of the Reason are possible, and the cognition of things *per se* divides itself into just so many kinds, as to its object.

## VII. THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS—THE WORLD, THE SOUL, AND GOD.

If conditioned existence be given, we are allowed to conclude the unconditioned from it, as the goal which we can never reach, but which we must aim at—I mean the unconditioned as idea. Now, conditioned existence is given us in three different ways: as internal phenomenon (existence within us), as external phenomenon (existence without us), and as possible existence, or object in general. We may, then, prove by syllogism the idea of an unconditioned within us, of an unconditioned without us, and of an unconditioned in reference to all possible being. The unconditioned within us is the subjectively unconditioned—the unconditioned subject, which lies at the basis of all phenomena—the *soul*. The unconditioned without us is the objectively unconditioned—the completed object, or the complete sum of all phenomena—even nature as an whole, or as the *world*. Finally, the unconditioned in reference to all possible existence is the absolutely unconditioned—unconditioned being in general—the absolutely complete being as the sum of all possible realities—that is, *God*. We may conclude, then, from conditioned existence the idea of the *soul*, the *world*, and *God*—the psychological, the cosmological, and the theological Ideas.

1. *The Ideas and the Syllogisms of the Reason.*—The connexion or relation of phenomena was determined by the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive judgment. And, indeed, by the categorical judgment the subject of the phenomenon was determined; by the hypothetical, its condition; by the disjunctive, the sum-total of its possible predi-

ates. Logic divides the syllogisms of the Reason into the same three kinds. The first tries to attain the unconditioned subject; the second seeks the completed series of all conditions—that is, the universe; the third searches for an absolutely unconditioned being as the sum-total of all possible realities. In other words, the three kinds of syllogisms are completed by the three Ideas which correspond to them individually.

Kant found it convenient to use general Logic as a clue for his transcendental investigations. He uses the doctrine of judgments as the clue to his Categories; that of syllogisms, as a clue to his Ideas. In the transcendental *Æsthetic*, scholastic Logic was of no avail. But in the transcendental Logic it comes to his assistance, and leads him a great way along beaten paths. The Analytic is led by the doctrine of the forms of judgment to the Categories; the Dialectic, from that of syllogisms to the Ideas.\*

2. *The Dialectical Syllogisms of the Reason. Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology.*—The Syllogisms become fallacious, or dialectical, when they infer the unconditioned, not as Idea, but as an object of possible cognition. Let the categorical syllogism become dialectical, and it will conclude, not the Idea, but the existence of the soul as a cognoscible object. So the hypothetical will conclude the existence of the world as a whole, given and cognoscible; and the disjunctive, that of God as a cognoscible Being. Hence arise, in the first case, a rational Psychology; in the second, a rational Cosmology; in the third, a rational Theology.

The psychological Idea has a firm basis; rational psychology, only an apparent one. The same is true of the cosmological and theological Ideas, in relation to rational cosmology and theology, respectively. This is accurately the point where we leave truth, and lapse into error.

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 225-6.

The problem of the transcendental Dialectic, when separated into its parts, is the refutation of these three pretended sciences. To refute them means to expose the dialectical syllogism upon which each of them is based. When this has been done, it will have been proved that a Metaphysic of the Supersensuous in general is possible as an apparent science, but impossible as a real one.

## CHAPTER VII.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. THE  
PARALOGISMS OF THE PURE REASON.I.—TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS OPPOSED TO RATIONAL PSY-  
CHOLOGY. FIRST AND SECOND EDITIONS OF THE CRITICK.

ALL objects of possible experience are phenomena. All phenomena are nothing but representations within us ; they cannot be things *per se*, any more than things *per se* can be phenomena. This is *the strictly idealistic teaching* of the critical philosophy, which does not admit of the smallest modification without shaking to its foundation and destroying the very same critical philosophy. We can easily see that, if we impair this idealism in the least possible degree, the whole structure of the Critick is overthrown. The idealistic doctrine proclaims : all phenomena are only representations : its contradictory would be : all phenomena are not mere representations in us, but also something beyond our representing faculty. And what must follow from such a statement ? Clearly, all phenomena are in space and time. Now, if phenomena be not mere representations, then space and time could not be mere representations, or pure intuitions ; and the transcendental *Æsthetic*, the basis of the whole system, would be destroyed. The transcendental *Æsthetic* must stand or fall with the fundamental doctrine of idealism, and with it the whole Critick. No one who has rightly understood the Kantian doctrine of Space and Time can doubt that this doctrine is the foundation of idealism in its strictest sense ; that Kant could not hold any other doctrine without contradicting himself. Neither can we be in doubt as to the *truth* of this doctrine.\*

\* I have discussed this question more at large in the Introduction. The

We have repeatedly pointed out the fact, that the Critick of the Pure Reason, in its original form, carries out that doctrine accurately and consistently, but in its succeeding editions weakens this idealistic doctrine, blunts (as it were) its edge, gets rid of its unambiguous and positive expression, which removes any possible doubt. Nay, further, in certain passages it favours remarkably the opposite view, which it introduces in certain places, like a spurious interpolation. The succeeding Edition of the Critick, as compared with the first, differs from it partly in omissions, partly in additions, both referring to the idealistic doctrine—the former to conceal it, the latter to let its contradictory have its say. Such an addition was the “Refutation of idealism,” which Kant in the Second Edition of the Critick adds to the postulates of empirical thinking. Such omissions are to be found in the deduction of the Categories, and in the doctrine of the distinction between phenomena and noumena. But in no part of the First Edition was the language of idealism so plain, unambiguous, and palpable, as it was here in the refutation of rational psychology. These decisive passages were suppressed in the following Editions, and only lately brought to light again by Schopenhauer’s “Critick of the Kantian Philosophy.” There can be no doubt that Kant weakened the strict idealism of his doctrine, not because he doubted it, nor because he wanted courage to maintain so daring a theory, but merely because he wished to make his teaching, to a certain extent, popular and exoteric. Common (or exoteric, or dogmatical) sense, was satisfied to accept the Kantian philosophy, with this little admission, that phenomena were also something beyond our mere faculty of representation—not much, but just something to be set down for our satisfaction

reader will there see that Kant did not favour Idealism so decidedly in the First Edition; nor did he distinctly repudiate any of his positions in the Second Edition, though he found it necessary to lay stress on some points hastily passed over in the original Edition, and condensed other passages, in order to keep his work within its original size.

as a mere unknown  $X$ ,\* which might readily be excused, when we had so happily discovered the limits of the understanding. Kant made this concession, and so gained a numerous school of followers, which would otherwise hardly have been the case. The Critick in the First Edition was the Critick from the standpoint of Kant, the following Editions were from that of the Kantians. It is remarkable enough that the whole Kantian school expressed itself satisfied with the Second Edition of the Critick, and never remarked its difference from the First. But we are not concerned with the Kantians, but with Kant and his genuine doctrine.

In opposing rational psychology, the doctrine of idealism must be expressed with every precision. One of the most important problems of psychology, the solution of which presupposes a metaphysical cognition of the soul, is the connexion between soul and body. It is plain that we take quite a different view of this problem, and so completely change it, if we regard soul and body not as distinct things, but as distinct *representations*. It is of the last importance how we regard the distinction between soul and body. From the point of view of the critical philosophy this distinction must be comprehended quite differently from that of the rational psycho-

\* It was observed above, that Kant expunged this very expression in numerous places in the Second Edition. In the Appendix will be found examples of it, which were altered in the text of the following Editions. If Kant, then, wished to give that which in the phenomenon is apart and separate from the mind more weight in the later Editions than the First, he must have regarded  $X$  as the vaguest and most doubtful expression he could find. In fact, in an equation  $X$  may turn out  $= 0$ ; and perhaps this was the point he thought too strongly suggested by the expression. Though such a conclusion would be no logical objection to his principles, I believe it would have run counter to Kant's own convictions; or, if the Idealists like to say so, to the prejudice or *idolum* engendered in him by long familiarity with dogmatic Realists. This fact is noticed by Schopenhauer, in his Criticism of Kant. Cf. also the Introduction.

logy of the dogmatical period. Here also do we meet in the First Edition of the Critick the most distinct and uncompromising declaration of transcendental idealism.

## II.—PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF INTERNAL EXPERIENCE. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS.

All knowledge of phenomena is experience. The phenomena themselves are distinguished into those which we perceive without us, and within us. They are the objects, respectively, of the external and internal senses. And so experience is divided into external and internal. All empirical science is science of nature, or physiology in the widest sense. We might, then, divide all empirical science into a physiology of the external and of the internal sense. The objects of the former would be phenomena which we perceive without us, though we of course represent them within us; the objects of the latter would be the phenomena which we perceive *only within* us. So the physiology of the external sense would be physics in its strictest sense; that of the internal sense, as distinguished from it, *psychology*.

All psychology, then is founded upon internal experience—upon internal observation: the science is then, as such, thoroughly *empirical*. The objects of its observation are the various states of our own selves; and as we can only perceive internally our own existence, and no foreign one, the propositions of psychology are only objectively valid with this limitation, and can only be widened to a comparative universality by analogical reasoning. As an *empirical science*, psychology seeks the connexion and unity of its phenomena. Internal phenomena cannot be connected by the concept of reciprocal action; for they are not in space, but only in time; they are different states in succession—changes which occur according to the law of causality. As changes, they presuppose a subject which forms their basis, and, to which these various states

belong as predicates. This subject can never be predicate, but only subject, or substance. When, then, psychology proceeds to the ultimate basis of its phenomena, it concludes in the form of a categorical syllogism the Idea of an unconditioned subject or substance, the various states of which are those internal phenomena or changes as the objects of internal perception.

Now, all the changes perceived in me cannot but be *my* changes, *my* various representations. The unity of all internal phenomena is, then, the Ego, or thinking subject. Let us call the thinking substance *soul*, and it is the Idea of the soul in which the categorical syllogism terminates. This is the psychological Idea at which all internal empirical science aims.

In order to portray the psychological Idea in all its phases, the soul must be the unconditioned subject of all internal changes. As the subject at the basis of the change, in which various states inhere, the soul must be a *substance*. As the substance of *internal* changes, the states of which consist in representations and thoughts, the soul is no composite, but a *simple* substance. Being a simple substance, it is in all the changes of its states *one and the same*; it is numerically identical and conscious of its identity in all change; hence, it is a self-conscious being or *person*. Finally because it is its own object, there is nothing *perfectly certain* except its own existence, the existence of all objects without it is less certain or doubtful.

The psychological Ideas are accordingly the existence, simplicity, personality, and self-certainty of the soul; or, to use the Kantian expressions: "its substantiality, simplicity, personality, and ideality."\* With the substance of the soul there is given its incorporeal existence (immateriality), with its simplicity, its immortality (incorruptibility). As soon, then, as the Idea of a soul assumes the illusive appearance of an object,

\* Cf. Appendix C.

as if it were an objective, cognoscible existence, then, as Kant expresses it, the categorical syllogism becomes "dialectical:" then arises a fallacious doctrine of the soul—rational psychology, which demonstrates in so many syllogisms, that the soul in the sense of an objective existence is substantial, simple, personal, and immediate, and only sure of its own existence. It is, then, of the last importance to rational psychology to prove that a thinking substance exists, or that the soul in a sense of existence is a thinking substance. It is of the last importance that it should not be merely thought as such, but that it is present and can be cognized as such. Rational psychology has carried its point, when it has proved that the soul is a *substance*. As substance it must surely *exist*. As being soul or subject of representations, it must surely be a representing or *thinking* substance.

### III.—THE APPARENT OBJECT OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

We have already shown, that neither representations nor connexions of them were possible without pure consciousness, which in all its representations remains unchangeably one and the same; that "I think," which Kant has called transcendental apperception. This *Ego* recognises present representations as being those before present to it, compares and distinguishes representations; it *judges*; it is the comparing, distinguishing subject of representations, and in all judgments the *subject* of the judgment. It can never be the predicate. Hence, we may assert it to be the subject of all possible judgments.

As there can be no connexion of representations or judgment without the *Ego*, it constitutes the form of judgment. The form of judgment is the purely logical element of it without empirical or material content. Consequently, the *Ego*, accurately described, is the subject of all forms of judgment, the *logical subject* of the judgment; the judging subject, and there-

fore also the basis of all judging concepts, or categories. Compared with cognition in general, it is its highest logical or formal condition.\*

Now, every object of possible cognition, or of possible experience, presupposes the conditions of cognition or of experience. Consequently, every object which can be known presupposes the *Ego* as the formal condition of all knowledge, as the logical subject of all judgments. The *Ego* itself, then, can never be the object of a possible cognition, as it is its condition; or it must presuppose itself, which is absurd.† Now, we already see the impossibility of making out of the “I think,” a cognoscible object. Every cognoscible object presupposes intuition, through which alone objects are given. If an object is to be cognized as substance, it must be intuited as a *permanent* phenomenon; without this application the concept of substance is void, and represents nothing. But a permanent phenomenon presupposes that there are various simultaneous phenomena, of which one remains while the others go. Various phenomena can only occur at the same time in space. Consequently, the permanent phenomenon, to be at all intuitible, presupposes space. In mere time, which as such is not permanent, the permanent cannot be intuited. Internal phenomena, which are only in time, can never be intuited as *permanent*, and therefore never cognized as substances.‡

It is thus clear that the *Ego*, or thinking subject, can never

\* Cf. Critick, p. 237, where Kant says: “It is readily perceived that this *cogito* is, as it were, the vehicle of all concepts in general, and consequently of transcendental concepts also; and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental concept, although it can have no peculiar place in the list [*i. e.*, of Categories: Mr. Meiklejohn mistranslates this clause], inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.”

† So Kant says (Critick, p. 240), “Consciousness in itself is not so much a representation, distinguishing a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far as it may be termed cognition,” &c.

‡ This is the principle of his refutation of Idealism in the Second Edition. Cf. Introduction.

be the object of possible knowledge, because it is merely the formal condition of possible knowledge; that it cannot be the object of intuition, because it forms in itself no phenomenon, but only the highest formal condition for phenomena; least of all can it be the permanent object of an intuition, because were it at all so, the thinking being must be intuited, not in time, but in space. All the conditions, then, are wanting for us to judge that the subject of thinking is a thinking substance, or that the soul is a substance. All conditions for the first principle of rational psychology are wanting. Its whole text is contained in the proposition, "*I think*." It translates this "I think" into "I am thinking = I am a thinking being," and so reaches the desired point. From the "I think" is obtained a thinking substance; from the *Ego*, a *substance*; it is hypostatized, as if it were an independent existing thing—a thing *per se*.

#### IV. THE PARALOGISM OF SUBSTANTIALITY.\*

This supposed science has, then, indicated to us the syllogism upon which it is based—from which all the others it uses depend, with the refutation of which they must also fall. It wishes to prove that our thinking *Ego* falls under the concept of substance. We wish, then, to determine the middle term, which connects the *Ego* with the concept of substance. Here is the syllogism: "That of which the representation is the absolute subject of our judgments, and which cannot, consequently, be used as the determination of something else, is substance. I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute* subject of all my possible judgments; and this representation of myself cannot be used as a predicate of anything else. Therefore I, as a thinking being (soul), am *substance*." The middle term in the syllogism is the concept of the absolute subject of our judgments. Clearly, this concept must be used in one and

\* Cf. throughout this chapter, Appendix C.

the same sense in both premises, and not equivocally; or we should have, not a middle term, but a *quaternio terminorum*, from which no conclusion can be drawn. It depends upon what we understand by subject, whether the real or the logical subject. The subject of our judgments may mean two things: the subject in the judgment—that is, the subject which is the *object of the judgment*; and the subject which makes the judgment—the *judging subject*—as a logical condition. It is in the first sense the real, in the second the logical subject. Substance can only be the real subject of the judgment as being the possible object of the judgment, as the permanent object of an intuition. The mere logical subject is never the object of the judgment, or of intuition; it is, then, never the subject in the judgment—never the real subject, and therefore never substance.

The fallacy is now quite plain. The major premiss declares: that which can only be thought as subject of judgments, and never as predicate, is substance, when it is subject. The minor premiss says: the thinking *Ego* can only be thought as the subject of all possible judgments—that is, the logical subject. No conclusion is possible. The major says that *what can only be judged* as subject is substance; the minor, that our *Ego* in every case forms the *judging* subject. The two propositions have only the word in common.\*

When the middle does not connect the extremes really, but only apparently, we have no syllogism, but a *paralogism*. When the fallacy consists in two different concepts being concealed under one term, it is, in the language of ancient Logic, a "*sophisma figuræ dictionis*." This is the case in rational psychology. The illusion is not empirical, nor intentional,

\* In the above syllogism there is not a single concept used twice in the same sense. *Substance* means in the major premiss something quite different from what it does in the conclusion. The word *thought* is used differently in each premiss. So that the *quaternio terminorum* can be shown with regard to all these several terms. Cf. the Critick, p. 244, note.

but transcendental. It appears to us naturally that the thinking *Ego* may also be the object of thought; that the soul can be a cognoscible object, or thinking substance. Kant calls the syllogisms of rational psychology the "Paralogisms of the Pure Reason." There are as many paralogisms as there are psychological Ideas. In reality, the paralogisms of simplicity, personality, and ideality have already been refuted with that of substantiality.\* If the soul in general is no substance, or at least cannot be proved such, it is naturally no simple personal substance, certain of its own existence alone. Nevertheless, the complete refutation of rational psychology requires us to refute in detail all the arguments it uses.

#### V. THE PARALOGISM OF SIMPLICITY.†

With none of its concepts has rational psychology made more display than with that of the *Simplicity* of the soul. Kant calls its proof the Achilles of the syllogisms of rational psychology. Were the soul not simple, it must be composed of several thinking subjects; these must co-operate to produce a thought: just as in nature, for example, a composite motion is made up of the co-operation of various forces. But different representations in different subjects as little produce a single

\* This is the obvious reason why Kant condensed the whole discussion in his Second Edition, considering the detailed refutation of the paralogisms not false, but unnecessary, stating in the sentence where he commences his alterations (p. 241), "We shall, *for brevity's sake*, allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connexion." He also specially refers us to the general remark added in the Second Edition, pp. 174-7, and he transferred part of his argument to the refutation of Idealism; p. 167. M. Cousin appears to be so totally innocent of the First Edition as to state ("Leçons sur Kant," p. 156), that at least three-fourths of his discussion have been *added* in the Second Edition! If he had said two-thirds, the *exact* reverse of his statement would have been true.

† The reader should collate the antithesis to the second antinomy, and the remarks upon it (Critick, pp. 273, *sqq.*)

thought, as a number of single words at random do a line of poetry. The unity of thinking proves the subjective unity or simplicity of the thinking being—that is, of the soul.

1. *Simplicity no Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul.*—Rational psychology lays great stress on proving the simplicity of the soul, because it affords a basis for the peculiar dignity of the soul—the great privilege of its spirituality. For all that is simple is indivisible; all that is corporeal is divisible; therefore, nothing simple can be corporeal, and the soul must be incorporeal, or immaterial. Now, rational psychology has *not* proved, and cannot prove, the simplicity of the soul. But, supposing even it were proved or demonstrable, we should still not be able to deduce any sound conclusion concerning the difference between body and soul. What are bodies? “We have proved irrefragably in the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, *that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, and not things in themselves.*” Bodies we can only intuit externally; the soul, could we intuit it at all, we must intuit only internally. Just so far is the soul different from corporeal existence; it is no bodily representation—it cannot be intuited in space, or ever be a phenomenon in space, or an object of the external sense. In other words, among the objects of external intuition thinking objects are never given us, such as feelings, desires, consciousness, representations, thoughts, &c.; but only matter, impenetrability, motion, &c.

This distinction between soul and body is not an essential difference between them, but only a difference in our way of representing them. But if bodies, and their extension and divisibility, are only phenomena of the external sense, and therefore only our representations, and if the soul be the basis of all representations, I cannot see how the soul is to be distinguished from the being lying at the basis of bodies. “That unknown something which lies at the basis of external phenomena—that something which so affects our senses as to produce

in us the representations space, matter, form, &c., might also at the same time be the subject of thoughts; although in the way that our external sense is affected by it we cannot obtain any intuition of will, desire, &c., but only of space and its determinations. But this something is not extended, impenetrable, or composite; merely because all these predicates only concern sensibility and its intuition. Consequently, even by admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is not at all proved to be distinct from matter, as regards their respective substrata, if we regard matter (as we ought) *merely as a phenomenon*.”\*

2. *Simplicity no Proof of the Permanence (Immortality) of the Soul*.—Neither, then, can the simplicity of the soul be demonstrated, nor, even if demonstrated, would it be a sufficient ground of distinction between soul and body; as the latter, with its divisibility, is nothing but our phenomenon, or representation. In the simplicity of the soul rational psychology thought also to find a proof for its indestructibility and permanence, which are the condition of its immortality. In particular, this pretended science always has, or pretends to have, a prospect of immortality, and this is in no slight degree the cause of its reputation in the world. That which is simple is indivisible, therefore cannot be destroyed by dissection. This, certainly, is not enough to prove that it cannot cease to exist. This is still possible by means of *disappearance*. Mendelssohn perceived this flaw in the arguments for immortality, and sought to mend it, in his “Phædo.” The simple cannot (he said) even disappear; as it possesses no multiplicity,

\* This passage is condensed from Kant’s words. See Appendix C. This vaunted perfection of the First Edition will be found reiterated in just as strong language in the Second. Cf. Critick, p. 252. Kant here asserts as problematical or possible, what Spinoza taught as consequences of his system, as the English reader will see in Schwegler’s History of Philosophy (trans. Seelye), p. 188.

it does not admit of any diminution, or continual decrease. Either it exists, or it does not. A transition from the first state to the second is impossible. Hence, it cannot disappear gradually, but only *suddenly*. Between the moments of its existence and its non-existence there is no time. But between any two moments there is always time; hence, what is simple must disappear gradually, or not at all. This the nature of the simple excludes. Consequently, the simple, as it cannot cease to exist, either by discription (division) or by disappearance, is absolutely permanent.

But Mendelssohn, as we may easily see, has not proved, but assumed, the permanence of the soul as a simple substance. He has presupposed that what is simple excludes from it all multiplicity, and so all distinctions. Now, divisibility, indeed, and with it parts, are excluded from it; it is not composite—it is no *extensive* quantity. But it may very well be an *intensive* quantity. Nay, it must be such, if it be an internal phenomenon. And every intensive quantity, as the principles of the understanding have taught us, must change continuously from reality to negation. As a matter of fact, consciousness is such an intensive quantity; “for there an infinity of degrees of consciousness down to its total disappearance.”\*

## VI. THE PARALOGISM OF PERSONALITY.

Neither can we prove of the soul that it is a substance, nor of this substance that it is simple. Even were this simplicity proved, nothing would follow respecting the essential difference of soul and body, or the immortality of the soul. Still, there appears to be one property of the soul most certainly demonstrable—that is, its *personality*. Personality presupposes a knowledge of self—a consciousness of our different states. This consciousness is not enough to constitute the person. If consciousness itself be as various as its states, it is not personal.

\* Cf. Critick, p. 245, *sqq.*, and notes.

It only becomes personal when, in all its states, however various they may be, it knows itself as the same *single* subject—when it is conscious of its unity, or numerical identity. Both these belong to Personality: the *unity* of the subject in all its states, and the *knowledge* of this unity. Both appear to exist in the human soul. It is the subject which as one and the same lies at the basis of all inner changes; it knows itself as this single subject. Hence, rational psychology forms the following syllogism, which Kant introduces as the “Paralogism of Personality”: That which is conscious of its own numerical identity in various states is consequently a person; the soul has this consciousness; therefore, it is a person.

How can we know that a subject in its various states of change is the same, or identical? Only by seeing that it is *permanent* in the change of its states. But this permanence is only an object of *external* experience. Internal changes are never objects of external experience; so that the permanence or identity of its subject is in nowise cognoscible. We want, then, the first condition for cognizing the soul as a person. We cannot conclude its identity from its permanence. Where, then, do we obtain this identity? Only from the consciousness thereof. From the mere consciousness: I *think*—that is, from the mere *Ego* we are to discover that the soul is a self-conscious or personal substance. Here we hit upon the same point which every where in rational psychology produces the paralogism. The *Ego* is no object, but only *appears* to be one; it is the formal logical condition of all objects. On this illusion rests the whole of rational psychology. “I think” does not mean a substance thinks. That I am conscious in all my various states of my unity, does not mean that a substance is conscious of its unity—that there is a personal substance. From the mere *Ego*, torture it as you will, you can never prove an existential judgment. From the mere unity of our self-consciousness there follows no cognition of any object. That in all my states I am conscious of my subjective unity

is a mere empty analytical judgment, which brings us no farther than the "*I think.*" The states of another man's consciousness cannot become the object of *my* consciousness, nor *vice versâ*. What makes such states *mine*? Only my consciousness. This is their necessary condition. The representation, then, of various states as *mine* is exactly equivalent to *my consciousness*. I refer them to myself, and in them am conscious of the unity of myself. What, then, does the proposition mean, that in all my various states I am conscious of my subjective unity? In all the various states which I am conscious of as being mine, I am conscious of myself. The succession of these states is within me; or I, as the same subject, am in this succession. These are analytical judgments, which do not extend our cognition, nor our knowledge concerning the representation *Ego*.

## VII. THE PARALOGISM OF IDEALITY. DES CARTES.

Rational psychology is defeated on every point. The fallacy of its arguments has been exposed in the case of the existence (substantiality), simplicity, and personality of the soul. It has been everywhere deluded by the apparent existence of the *Ego*, and this illusion has been proved in every case a delusion. At the same time, this so-called science is far from even suspecting the possibility of such a delusion. It rather regards itself as the surest of all sciences. The existence of its object, at least, it considers to be the most certain of any of the objects of possible cognition—nay, of this it is *alone certain*, and compared to it all other things are doubtful. It thinks it can prove by a syllogism that the existence of the soul alone is certain—the existence of everything else doubtful.

Evidently the existence of an object is the more certain in proportion as we have a more immediate knowledge or perception of it. On the contrary, the more mediate the knowledge—the longer the series of intermediate concepts or representations

we require—the more doubtful is its existence. Immediate knowledge has no intermediate steps, which are necessary in every knowledge obtained by inference. The first alone is certain—the second doubtful. Now, the only existence which we absolutely perceive immediately is our own thought; all other existence—things without us—are first cognized as causes of our perceptions; we *infer* their existence: consequently, our thinking being is the only certain existence—all the rest is problematical.

As is well known, the philosophy of Des Cartes opened with this statement: The “*cogito, ergo sum*,” said, my thought is the only existence of which I am certain. The “*de omnibus dubito*” said, all the rest was doubtful. In this declaration consisted what is called the *idealism* of Des Cartes: nothing is more certain than my thinking—all else is uncertain.

Rational psychology takes up its position upon this proposition, to prove the existence of its own object the surest, and the rest of objects as doubtful. The syllogism in detail is this: “That of which the existence can only be inferred as the cause of given perceptions has only a *doubtful existence*. Now, all external phenomena are of this kind. Consequently, the existence of all such objects is doubtful.” Realism considers the existence of external phenomena certain; idealism in the sense noted considers this existence doubtful. This uncertainty Kant for this reason calls the ideality of external phenomena, and for this reason the above syllogism is called “the Paralogism of Ideality.”\*

1. *Empirical Idealism*.—External phenomena are in all cases objects of experience, or empirical. As to their existence, it may be declared certain or doubtful. The first is Realism;

\* This paralogism does not appear in the Second Edition, and is rather completely altered; and I have no doubt because the refutation of Idealism (pp. 167, *sqq.*) had already settled the question as to the relative dignity and priority of our internal and external experience.

the second, idealism. But the expressions of both refer to the existence of *empirical* objects. We may, then, call them *empirical realism* and *empirical idealism*. By the syllogism just adduced, rational psychology takes up its position with the latter. The refutation of empirical idealism is at the same time the refutation of rational psychology.

Now, up to this moment the whole critical philosophy has been nothing but the refutation of empirical idealism by transcendental idealism. Here, then, transcendental idealism, the proper doctrine of the Critick, interferes. This is the passage which we noted at the opening of this section as being of great importance; it is imbued in every line with the true spirit of the critical philosophy, and written with remarkable clearness. But the succeeding Editions of the Critick have erased this passage, leaving but faint and occasional traces. Empirical idealism, and with it rational psychology, does not deny that there are things without us; it only declares our representations of them to be doubtful, because we perceive them not immediately, but by inference. Hence, that there are things without us must here mean: there are things outside our representation—independent of it; that is, *things per se, without us*.\* That which is without us is, for that reason, in space. If there be things *per se* without us, there are *things per se in space*, and space is a determination belonging to things *per se*.

2. *Empirical Idealism and Transcendental Realism*.—As regards the existence of things *per se* in space, or without us, there are also two points of view which give contradictory explanations. Either we affirm, or we deny, that there are things *per se* without us (in space.) Let us call the affirmative

\* In Appendix C, the reader will find the distinction noted above, p. 48, note, alluded to by Kant, and it must be kept in mind throughout the whole discussion. *Transcendentally* and *empirically* without us (as he suggests), would be good expressions to guard us from the ambiguity.

"*transcendental Realism*," the negative "*transcendental idealism*." If there be things without us, which we represent, it is clear that we cannot represent them immediately; the thing is one, the representation another; hence, the representation is always problematical. This is the explanation of empirical idealism, which is not only connected with transcendental realism, but is its natural and necessary consequence. "The transcendental realist [says Kant] is the proper man to turn empirical idealist; and after he has falsely assumed of objects of the senses, that, if they are to be external, they must possess existence in themselves apart from the senses, he then, from this point of view, finds all the representations of our senses insufficient to guarantee the reality of these representations."

3. *Transcendental Idealism = Empirical Realism = Critical Dualism*.—Both these views transcendental idealism opposes. It has proved that space and time are nothing without us, but intuitions of the pure reason\*—original forms of our sensuous representation; so that all objects of space and time—that is, all phenomena—must be regarded as mere representation, and not as things *per se*. Things in space can only be our representations, as space itself is nothing else. If we wish to call substance in space *matter*, then transcendental idealism "*considers this matter, and even its internal possibility,† to be nothing but*

\* This expression is hardly correct. Empirical representations, when properly determined, are *objects* of intuition. Mathematical figures are, in a certain sense (Critick, p. 435) both *acts*, and objects of intuition. Pure space and time are neither acts nor objects, but *forms* of intuition imposed upon the mind by its original constitution. I fear Dr. Fischer has not kept these meanings distinct, and has used the term intuition in all three senses. This may account for his sometimes forgetting the receptivity of the mind in the intuition, not only of the matter, but of the form of objects.

† By which I suppose he means the occult forces or elements which we can possibly discover by experiment or observation. All these, if cognoscible at all, must become objects of possible experience. As a balance to these strong expressions, let the reader compare Appendix C, for qualifying statements. All the quotations in the text will also be found there.

*phenomena, which apart from our sensibility are nothing; it considers matter only to be a kind of representations (intuitions) which are called external, not as if they referred to objects external in themselves, but because they refer perception to space, in which all things are reciprocally external, but space itself is within us."*

But, if the existence of matter and external phenomena in general are nothing but our representations and nothing apart from them, and so not things *per se*, then they are *cognized immediately*, like every other representation, and are just as certain as my own existence. They are representations in me, and only such, and consequently inseparable from my own existence. The perception of this latter is also their perception. "Now, external objects (bodies) are mere phenomena, and nothing at all but a species of any representations, *the objects of which only exist through these representation, and apart from it are nothing*. Therefore, external things exist just as much as I myself do, and both on the immediate evidence of my self-consciousness; with this difference, that the representation of myself as a thinking subject is referred only to the internal sense, but the representations which denote external existences are also referred to the external sense. With regard to the reality of external objects I have just as little need of inference, as with regard to the objects of my internal sense (my thoughts); *for they are both nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is also a sufficient proof of their reality."*

In this way the uncertainty or doubt as to the existence of external phenomena is removed; and so empirical idealism and the rational psychology based upon it are refuted. Its fallacy (paralogism) consists in regarding *things without us* to be *things per se*. We above explained that empirical realism declares the existence of external phenomena to be certain. We now see that the empirical realism is bound just as much to make common cause with transcendental idealism, as its opponent

empirical idealism is to join with transcendental realism, the opponent of the critical doctrine.

From the point of view of the critical philosophy we must declare that the existence of matter and all external phenomena is just as certain as our own existence; for both are representations of which we are immediately conscious. They are representations (not things), distinct in kind. If you call it dualism to assert the existence as well of external as of internal phenomena, then the critical philosophy accepts *this* dualism; we may assert both, though empirical idealism could not.

But by *dualism* is usually meant the theory which separates things *per se* into thinking and extended substances—into souls and bodies, and so regards the body as a thing distinct from the soul, not as a peculiar species of representation, but as a heterogeneous substance. This point of view assumes that phenomena are things *per se*. Assuming this, the opposite of dualism declares: things *per se* are substances, not distinct but similar in nature, and this in either of two ways: things *per se* have only a spiritual (thinking) or only a material (bodily) nature. The former is *Pneumatism*; the latter, *Materialism*.

The distinction between Des Cartes and Kant may here be accurately determined. Both philosophers, in their distinction between soul and body, are idealists as well as dualists. The Cartesian point of view is empirical idealism; the Kantian is transcendental; the dualistic doctrine of Des Cartes is dogmatical—that of Kant, critical. Des Cartes distinguishes body and soul as different substances;\* Kant, as different representations. The Kantian dualism brings with it the consequence of declaring the representation of corporeal existence mediate,

\* It is, nevertheless, curious that the language of Des Cartes on this point (which the reader will find quoted in Stewart's "Elements," vol. i., Appendix A.) might be used with very little change of the Kantian theory. Matter and spirit were, in his opinion, only substances in a *lower sense*, and each *determined* by a principal attribute.

and therefore doubtful; the Kantian dualism declares this very representation to be immediate, and therefore perfectly certain.

When Kant calls himself now a transcendental Idealist, now an empirical Realist, now a Dualist, it is of the greatest importance to distinguish accurately the various meanings [of these terms] and to see how they meet in one point, which is always the same, though approached from different sides. The existence of matter, bodies, or material things, as nothing but objects of our external sense—external phenomena, representations in us: this doctrine is *transcendental idealism*. Accordingly, the existence of these external phenomena is perceived immediately, and therefore quite certain; this doctrine is *empirical Realism*. Consequently, the existence of external phenomena is just as certain as that of internal. In this sense, then, the existence of bodies is just as certain as that of our thinking (souls): this doctrine is *Dualism*.

4. *Critical and Dogmatical Dualism: Kant and Des Cartes. The Psychological Problem.*—The distinction between the Cartesian and the Kantian Dualism is manifest. From the latter point of view the whole problem of psychology is altered; for if, as Des Cartes taught, soul and body are heterogeneous substances, then we must ask: how are they connected? how is their community to be regarded? The fact of this community is proved indisputably by human life. The changes in our souls (representations) are immediately followed by changes in matter (motions), and *vice versa*. The community of body and soul (*commercium animi et corporis*) was the problem which had never ceased to occupy metaphysical psychologists. And immediately connected with it was the question as to the state of the soul before and after this community. Let us call, with Kant, the life of the soul as connected with the body its “*animality*,” then its existence before it will be “*pre-existence*,” after it “*immortality*.” Here there meet, as it were, in one point the

enigmas of psychology, which have exercised not only the acuteness of the metaphysician, but the human mind generally, through all ages.

Assuming the doctrine of dualism, as established in the dogmatical sense, the relation between soul and body can only admit of a threefold explanation. Either we assume a reciprocal natural influence between the two substances, so that they influence one another in turn, representations producing motions, and *vice versâ*, and this community of both is called the theory of *physical influence*; or as the substances mutually exclude each other, and therefore cannot influence each other immediately, we may deny the natural community of body and soul, and substitute a supernatural one. This, again, admits of two cases. God alone can produce this supernatural community. But He can do it in either of two ways: either He connects soul and body every time they appear connected, and so renews their community at every instant whenever a representation requires a motion, and *vice versâ*; or, He connects soul and body once for all, and sets them going in perfect agreement, which is then carried out with the necessity of law. In the first case, the community of soul and body takes place under the continual co-operation of God, or *Divine assistance*; in the second, it is a *pre-established harmony* arranged by Him. These three views have held sway over rational psychology since Des Cartes. Des Cartes himself held the doctrine of physical influence—his school, the Divine assistance; Leibniz and his school, the pre-established harmony. All three make the fundamental presupposition that soul and body are distinct substances, and, as theories, are only possible under this supposition.

5. *The Correct View of the Psychological Problem. Its Insolubility.*—The Kantian philosophy gets altogether rid of this assumption—this Dualism of soul and body, which forms the *πρῶτον ψεύδος* of all rational psychology, the starting point of

all its problems and questions. The whole discussion about the community of soul and body rests upon a false basis. If we translate it into: "how can a thinking, be combined with an extended, substance in the same subject," then the real point is missed, and the whole question utterly confused. This had been, so far, the question in rational psychology.

What are bodies? Nothing but external phenomena, representations, objects in space. What are thoughts? Nothing but internal phenomena, representations of the internal sense. So that the real question should be: how are internal representations necessarily connected with external? Now, all internal representations or thoughts are explained by the thinking subject, and all external representations from space, which is the basis of all external intuition. Hence, we must ask, as soon as the concepts have been critically determined: *How is it possible that in a thinking subject there should at all be external intuition—namely, that of space?* or, if we call the thinking subject understanding, and intuition sensibility: *how are understanding and sensibility connected together?\** This is the real problem, and proper question of the community of soul and body, which the critical philosophy has here discovered. Under this form the problem awaits its solution, but not at the hands of the critical philosophy, which, from its point of view, cannot find the root of sensibility and understanding, and must declare it impossible that the human reason should ever find it. It is content to discover, explain, and reduce the formula into proper form. This very formula explains the insolubility of the problem. "Accordingly, the question is no longer," says Kant, "about the community of the soul with other known and heterogeneous substances without us, but merely concerning the connexion of the representations of the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensibility, and how it is that these are connected together according to

\* This is an unfortunate selection of terms, as time (which is internal sense) belongs to the sensibility also.

constant laws, so as to form our systematic experience." "The notorious question concerning the community of that which thinks and that which is extended, if we discard all fictions, would simply come to this: *how external intuition—namely, that of space* (its occupation, figure, and motion) *can be at all possible in a thinking subject.* But to this question no man can ever find an answer; and *we can never supply this gap in our knowledge*, but only indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object as the cause of this sort of representations, but which we do not know, and of which we can never obtain any notion."\*

### VIII. GENERAL REFUTATION OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

#### DOGMATICAL AND SCEPTICAL IDEALISM.

Rational psychology has been thus completely refuted; its problem has not been solved, but corrected. Were the solution possible, there would be a rational psychology; but we have seen that all its arguments are paralogisms, based upon that transcendental illusion which gives the *Ego* the appearance of an object (thing); and to things without the *Ego* (bodies), the appearance of things *per se*. But, if the *Ego* be no cognoscible object, it is not a substance, simple or personal. Bodies are not things *per se*, but mere external phenomena or representations; nor is their existence doubtful, but just as certain as any other representation, as our own existence. When, then, "*dogmatic Idealism*" denies the existence of things without us, we have here its refutation. If "*sceptical Idealism*" doubts this existence, we have here its refutation, and indeed its only possible refutation.

1. *The Critical Refutation.*—The whole refutation of rational psychology, as made out by Kant, consists, if rightly

\* Cf. Appendix C., and 2nd Ed., p. 252.

understood in this, that all the proofs of the supposed science are refuted, and exposed as only apparent proofs. In general, any doctrine may be refuted or denied in three different ways. Either you may deny the statement, or merely its proof. We may deny the statement either by asserting its opposite, or denying both. The first proceeding is *dogmatical*; the second, *sceptical*; the denial which only refers to the proof of the statement, is *critical*. Suppose the statement to be: the soul is a simple substance. The dogmatical contradiction would be: it is not simple, but composite; it is not a substance, but an accident of matter. The sceptical objector would deny both; he allows every statement to be destroyed by its opposite, and offers no opinion of his own. The critical objector denies that either side can be proved; nay, he demonstrates the indemonstrability of either, and only decides concerning the proofs. Now, when Kant refuted rational psychology in all its details, his objections were neither dogmatical nor sceptical, but merely critical.

His refutation is not dogmatical; that is, it is far from asserting the reverse of the doctrine of the soul held by metaphysicians, or even favoring such a reversal. If rational psychology decides by its paralogisms that the soul is a simple personal substance, and its existence the only certain one, the reverse doctrine would assert that the soul was no substance—not simple, nor personal, and that the existence of matter was alone certain. The first set of opinions might be summed up as “*pneumatism* ;” its contradictory, as “*materialism*.” We see that materialism everywhere presupposes one thing; the cognoscibility of the soul. In this assumption materialism is just as metaphysical as the opposed doctrine.

Kant, then, in denying pneumatism,\* in no way favors materialism. This would be a dogmatical denial. He refutes

\* Rather, in denying its proofs to be conclusive. Dr. Fischer often speaks of the total absence of proof for a thing as its impossibility.

metaphysical psychology in general—the materialistic, as well as its adversary. If rational psychology had been particularly respected, as being the metaphysical basis of the doctrine of immortality, Kant has indeed taken from that doctrine its support; but he has not given it to the reverse doctrine. The Critick does not declare the soul is not immortal, but merely that neither this nor the reverse can be proved. It might be necessary on quite different grounds to *believe* in the immortality of the soul; and though such a belief, and the hopes connected with it, could never seek proofs from *metaphysic*, neither have they to fear any refutation from this science. The belief in immortality loses indeed by the Kantian Critick one of its proofs, but also one of the causes of its apprehensions, and has, therefore, no right to complain of this criticism.

2. *Refutation of Materialism.*—But it might be asked: why has the critical philosophy merely refuted pneumatism, and not also refuted materialism, except it be secretly inclined in that direction? Why, instead of paralogisms, was not the subject treated in antinomies,\* the thesis being spiritualism, the antithesis materialism? Does not this look like sparing the latter? It is not so, simply because materialism has already been totally refuted. It holds things *per se* to be corporeal beings, or matter to be a thing *per se*. What else can materialism be? And this very doctrine has been declared utterly impossible by the transcendental *Æsthetic*. The refutation of rational psychology is founded (in the First Edition of the Critick) on the *transcendental Æsthetic*, which is, indeed, the basis of the whole Critick. The representing of the thinking self as a thing *per se*—this point of view was worth refuting. On the contrary, the representing matter as a thing *per se* required no additional refutation, when the critical doctrine of space and time had once been established. If there

\* Kant has, indeed, done something of this kind in the Critick, p. 246 (note), where he discusses the baseless hypotheses on the subject; but cf. p. 255.

be no space, there is no matter. Without sensibility and intuition there is no space. Where, then, can matter remain, when the reason, or thinking subject, is removed? Let us hear Kant himself, in order to convince ourselves what the critical point of view is in its strict and consistent idealism. Nothing can be plainer or more unequivocal than the following passage, which removes the very possibility of materialism: "Why do we require a psychology founded on pure principles of the reason only? Without doubt, for the special object of securing our thinking self from the danger of materialism. This is done by the rational concept of our thinking self, which we have set forth. For, far from there being any danger that, if matter were taken away, in consequence all thinking, and even the existence of thinking beings, would vanish, it is rather clearly shown, that if I take away the thinking subject, the whole world of matter must vanish, as being nothing but that which appears in the sensibility of our subject, and a species of its representations."\*

#### IX.—SUMMARY—RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE.

No branch, then, of rational psychology remains, except a problem correctly understood indeed, but insoluble, being the point beyond which scientific psychology cannot reach. Every psychology is false which does not agree with this way of putting the problem—every psychology is false which undertakes its solution. All that remains, then, is not a *doctrinal*, but a *limitative concept*, which determines the direction of scientific psychology, so as to prevent its making common cause with materialism, or wandering into spiritualism.† This

\* Cf. Appendix C.

† He answers materialism specially in the Second Edition (p. 248), by the consideration that "apperception is real, and its unity is given in the very fact of its possibility." But the very nature of space is, that nothing real in it can be simple; hence we cannot explain the mode of our self-existence

concept, with reference to the science, is not a constitutive, but a regulative principle, which does not enlarge, but restrict our psychological knowledge, and show it its proper bounds; or, as Kant expresses it, there remains rational psychology, not as *doctrine*, but only as *discipline*.\*

And with the following words, Kant, in his First Edition, concludes his review of the whole of pure psychology: "Nothing but the sobriety of a severe but fair Critick can free us from this dogmatical illusion, which enslaves so many in fancied happiness under theories and systems, and can restrict our speculative claims to the field of possible experience—not, indeed, by shallow and ill-natured ridiculing of so many failures, or by pious lamenting about the limits of our reason, but by determining its limits accurately according to fixed principles. By this means its 'thus far and no farther,' is most securely fixed at those pillars of Hercules which nature herself has set up, in order to allow the voyage of our reason to extend only as far as the receding coasts of experience reach—coasts which we cannot forsake without wandering into a boundless ocean, which, after constant illusions, ultimately compels us to give up as hopeless all our laborious and tedious efforts."†

from the materialistic point of view, as not affording us *simplicity*, just as the spiritualistic fails in giving us *permanence* for the same purpose. On the impossibility of experiencing what is absolutely simple, compare Kant's observations on the second antinomy (p. 272 of the Critick).

\* Cf. Critick, p. 248.

† There is a still more remarkable passage in the Second Edition (p. 249), which I recommend to any reader prejudiced against German metaphysics, as a genuine specimen of the practical English spirit in regarding insoluble questions. When he tells us, "that the refusal of the reason to give us satisfactory answers [on certain points] is a hint for us to abandon fruitless speculation, and direct to a practical use our knowledge of ourselves," he speaks not only in the spirit, but almost in the very words, of Locke.

There are two difficult points at the close of this discussion in the Second Edition, which require elucidation. The first relates to Kant's view of the celebrated "*cogito, ergo sum*." This point he discusses in the note (p. 249),

and in his General Remark, before proceeding to Cosmology (p. 252; see also the remarks on the second antithesis, p. 277), that he evidently takes two quite distinct views of it, distinguished most clearly by himself in p. 240, and also in his General Remark : (a) the problematical *cogito*, or logical condition of the possibility of thinking in general, which *ex hypothesi* excludes every empirical element (p. 237). This subject of thought is presupposed by all the Categories, hence we cannot apply to it the Category of substance, or any other, as it is the bare condition of thinking, cognized in no definite way. Hence, he adds (p. 253), the expression "*subject and ground of thought*" applied to this *Ego* must not be taken to imply substance or causality. (β) Des Cartes argued that *Cogito* = I exist thinking, viz., in time, or I exist as determined in time, my thinking being this very determination. Hence, if *Cogito* means, I exist thinking, and *sum*, I exist in time, Des Cartes was right (not in inferring one from the other, but) in asserting that they implied one another, since they are identical (p. 250, note). But, in the first place, this judgment is empirical (though containing an *a priori* element); and, in the second, it affords us but a single synthetical judgment—"I exist" (synthetical, because existential, but not *a priori*, any more than A is the cause of B, though both these judgments contain an *a priori* element). Now, existence being given quite indeterminately in this proposition—merely as something real in sensation, which awaits determination from the Categories—I cannot say, "I exist as substance, accident," &c., which would be synthetical additions to my merely existential judgment. Hence, not even this judgment can be the basis of any science, much less of Rational Psychology.

"But, supposing," he adds, "that we found in the sequel, that in the case of certain fixed *a priori* laws of the use of the pure reason we must presuppose ourselves as legislating for our existence, and so determining it, would not this give us exactly that of which we are in search—an *a priori* intellectual determination of ourselves, to which we might apply the Category of existence?" This is the second point upon which I desire to make a few observations. He here anticipates an objection which might be based upon his own principles of the Practical Reason, and of the intelligible and empirical character (below, chap. ix., § 6). It is there shown that the Idea of virtue, which can never be found in experience, is the *a priori* law according to which we legislate for our actions, and according to which we determine their merit or demerit. Hence every action may be regarded as not only resulting from what preceded it in time, but also from the intelligible character of the man, which itself indeed can never be cognized, but the effects of which are cognized in the empirical character. Supposing, then, that the objector says to Kant: You say that I cannot know the *Ego* to exist except I can make it an object; and to do this I must have it determined in some

way (more than the mere vague subject of the *Cogito*); and you add that all such determination must be sensuous, and so phenomenal. On your own principles you have supplied me with an *a priori* determination of self through the intelligible character, and so *a priori* and intellectual; on this, then, I may base my rational psychology. To this Kant answers : It is true that I allow an *a priori* determination of self through the moral law, and that the intelligible character does determine us ; but how ? only by producing the *empirical* character. Though the determining comes from within, is intellectual, and *a priori*, the determination is wholly—so far as we can know it—phenomenal, and subject to the laws and restrictions of phenomena.

## CHAPTER VIII.

THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. RATIONAL COSMOLOGY. THE  
ANTINOMIES OF THE PURE REASON.

## THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.

THE whole of ontology is based upon the syllogistic argument from conditioned existence to unconditioned. Conditioned existence comprises in its narrowest sense the phenomena of our own existence—internal, as contrasted with external phenomena; in a wider sense, all phenomena; in the widest, things in general. We see that the expanse of the conditioned, from which the human Reason starts in its metaphysical syllogisms, gradually widens; consequently, the unconditioned will have to be understood each time in a wider sense. The sum of all merely internal phenomena is called our own thinking self, or soul; the argument for the soul as the unconditioned subject of all internal phenomena gave us the psychological Idea: the syllogism proving this unconditioned subject to be a cognoscible object gave us rational psychology, which we have already refuted in all its details.

## I. THE IDEA OF THE WORLD.

The sum of all phenomena we call *world*, or *nature*; that of external phenomena, the external world, or the *World in Space*. The sum of all simultaneous phenomena make up the state of the world; the sequence of these various states, the world's changes. Each of these states is the effect of the preceding, and the cause of those that follow. No state of the world, or no phenomenon, can be given without the whole series of earlier states having preceded it. The series of *all* these earlier phenomena is a complete, and therefore uncondi-

tioned series. This complete series of conditions of a given phenomenon forms a whole, which cannot be complete except it be unconditioned. Let this complete and unconditioned whole be called the *World*.

From a given phenomenon we may, then, infer the complete series of its conditions, or the world as a whole. This would be the syllogism in strict form: Given a phenomenon, the series of its conditions—that is, the world as a whole—is given. Now the phenomenon is given; therefore, so is the world, in the sense explained. The form of this syllogism is hypothetical, and infers the world as a whole, just as the categorical had inferred the soul as the unconditioned subject of internal phenomena.

When correctly understood, the hypothetical syllogism seeks or demands the complete series of the conditions of a given phenomenon; it wishes to complete the regressive series. It sets up this goal, or Idea. This Idea we call the *cosmological*, or *Idea of the World*. This concept of an universe is a “natural Idea of the Reason,” and, as such, right and necessary. We cannot seek this Idea in the descending or progressive, but in the ascending or regressive series of conditions—not by concluding the conditioned from the condition, but *vice versâ*; for only in this latter direction is the series complete; and when proceeding, not *in consequentia*, but *in antecedentia*, can it be finished or integrated.

## II. THE FOUR IDEAS OF THE WORLD.

Now every external phenomenon, as being an object of intuition, is an extensive or composite quantity; as an existence that occupies space, it is matter; as a member in the series of the changes of the world, it is an effect; as comprised in the concatenation of all phenomena, it is as to its existence dependent upon this concatenation. In these four determinations every conditioned existence is given us; they are the determinations of the pure concepts of the understanding, to which every

phenomenon must submit as an object of possible knowledge. We have already remarked that the Categories are the *Topica* of the Kantian philosophy; they formed the "*Topica* of the rational psychology;" now they form that of rational cosmology.

The cosmological Idea expresses nothing but the completed series of conditions to a given phenomenon; as such, it is fourfold. There is given in every phenomenon conditioned quantity, conditioned matter, effect, and dependent existence. The cosmological Idea, then, directs us to seek the complete series of the conditions of a given phenomenon as conditioned quantity, matter, as being an effect, and a dependent existence.

As a quantity, every phenomenon is composite, or extended in space and time. Every determinate space or time is conditioned by the whole of space and time. The complete series, then, of all the conditions of a given quantity are the whole of space, and all preceding time; or the complete composition of all phenomena—that is, of the world—in space and time.\* Let us call the world in space and time the *quantity of the world*, and the cosmological Idea in its first case refers to the complete composition or Idea of the quantity of the world.

All matter, as existing in space, is divisible, or consists of parts. Its parts are the conditions of its existence; the complete series of these conditions are all the parts, which can only be obtained by a complete or *completed division*.

\* Kant anticipates and answers the difficulty of the extension of space being regarded as a regressive series of conditions (Critick, p. 258). Though all its parts are co-ordinated, yet they must be *apprehended* successively, and are hence ( $\alpha$ ) a *series*. As in the *measurement* of space we take units successively, and as these units are evidently limited and conditioned by the succeeding units, we have ( $\beta$ ) a series of *conditions* and conditioned. And as no space can be given or produced by another as a result, but is only *limited* by it, as a condition, this limitation is ( $\gamma$ ) rather a *regressive*, than a progressive series. "There can be no series," he adds, (p. 260), "of substances in community, which are mere aggregates, and have no exponent of a series. For they are not subordinated to each other as conditions of their possibility, which, however, may be said of space," as above explained. [*Exponent* is used in the logical sense, of the relation of conditioned to condition.]

Every effect is conditioned by all its causes. The complete series of its conditions consists in all the causes necessary for its production—in the *completeness of its origin*.

Every dependent existence presupposes another, on which it depends. The complete series of conditions depends on all the existences on which it depends; that is, in the *completeness of dependent existence*.

In all four cases the cosmological Idea relates to the absolute completeness (1) of composition or quantity, (2) of division, (3) of causes or genesis, (4) of the dependence of existence. These are the four cosmological Ideas, which, as such, are the right and proper goals of the human Reason. We may argue: if a conditioned existence (phenomenon) be given, the complete series of all its conditions is also given as *Idea*—that is, the Idea of a whole is given. But we may not argue: Given conditioned existence (phenomenon), the complete series of its conditions is given as *object*—as cognoscible object. This last argument is based on the confusion of thing *per se* and phenomenon—Idea and object; and the reason is deluded by that transcendental illusion of the thing *per se* being a phenomenon, or cognoscible object. Nowhere is the illusion stronger than here, where from phenomena we infer the world of phenomena, or the sensuous world as a whole; so that, apparently, the limits of experience are *not* transgressed. But even here we can already see through the illusion; for even the world of sense as a whole is never given as an object of experience. Now, if the whole of the world be inferred, not as Idea, but as object, and that illusion really misleads the reason, the cosmological Idea is changed into rational cosmology—into a metaphysical and pretended science, the imaginary object of which is the world as a whole.

### III. IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONCEPTS. LAW OF CONTRADICTION. ANTINOMY.

This rational cosmology offers us quite a different spectacle, and a much harder task, than rational psychology. In this

latter case it was, indeed, not easy to see at first sight its impossibility, as the science did not involve itself in contradictions; but it was neither difficult nor tedious for the Critick to prove its impossibility. The reverse is now the case. It is very easy to see at first sight the impossibility of rational cosmology, but very difficult, and indeed a very complicated duty, to explain this impossibility from its fundamental causes. There is a criterion which decides a concept to be impossible forthwith. We say of a concept that it is possible, when it is not self-contradictory—when it does not combine two contradictory attributes. Of such attributes we say, that every concept must necessarily possess one. There are two criteria which determine the impossibility of a concept. Every concept is either *A* or *not-A*; it is necessarily one of them—it cannot possibly be both. If, then, we can prove of any concept that it is neither *A* nor *not-A*, by this its impossibility is demonstrated. This proof we call a *dilemma*. If we can prove of any concept that it is both *A* and *not-A*, in this case also its impossibility is demonstrated. This proof we call an *antinomy*. An antinomy consists of two judgments, which predicate the same thing of a concept, and so are similar in content, but related as affirmative and negative contradictories. The affirmation is the thesis, the contradictory negation the antithesis, of the antinomy. And in order that these two propositions should constitute a real antinomy, they must not only be asserted, but *proved*, and indeed with equal clearness, and upon equally strong grounds. If the proofs are either omitted, or not perfectly equivalent, we have no antinomy in the strict sense. It is the distinctness and clearness of the proofs on both sides which make the contradictory judgments an antinomy. If the grounds of these proofs proceed, not from experience, but from the pure reason itself—if reason itself be placed in the condition of asserting contradictories of the same object, and proving them—we have the extraordinary fact of a “division of the pure Reason against itself,” or anti-

thetic thereof; and the contradictories so proved are the "*Antinomies of the Pure Reason.*"

And into this self-contradiction reason does fall when it judges of the world as a whole. All the doctrines of rational cosmology are antinomies of the pure reason—their affirmation is as true and demonstrable as their negation. All these principles refer to the world as an object of our knowledge. Now an antinomy proves the impossibility of a concept. It is by the antinomies, then, that the impossibility of rational cosmology is demonstrated. As rational psychology was based on paralogisms, by the exposing of which it was refuted; so rational cosmology is completely based on antinomies, the demonstration of which explains the impossibility of the science.

It will, accordingly, be the duty of the transcendental Dialectic to detail the antinomies of the pure reason; in other words, to demonstrate the contradictions in which the judgments of rational cosmology are involved at every step. But it is not enough merely to prove them; we must also *solve* them. Otherwise, not only rational cosmology, but reason itself, from which these contradictions proceed, would remain involved, and not even be capable of comprehending them.\* If we can see that it is a contradiction, its solution must be possible. And so the Critick, as opposed to rational cosmology, has three duties imposed upon it—to discover, to prove, and to solve the contradictions of this pretended science. At each step the difficulty of the problem increases.

#### IV.—THE CONTRADICTORY PROPOSITIONS OF RATIONAL COSMOLOGY.

To discover these contradictions is easy. They are not hidden, but are as plain as the day. The cosmological systems which the history of philosophy lays before us, contradict one

\* This is the perpetual doctrine of the Critick; cf. Introduction.

another in such a way as to leave no doubt that these cosmological contradictions exist. Hence we observed, that to discover the contradictions was easier than to prove them. In the conflict of systems of rational cosmology, the criterion of its impossibility is brought clearly before us. At least a suspicion is at once raised against this science, which was not the case with psychology. The first question is this: in what does the thoroughgoing contradiction of rational cosmology consist?

The common subject of all its judgments is the world as a whole; that is, the complete series of all the conditions of a given phenomenon. Now, this series may be given completely, without our ever being able to cognize it completely. Its complete cognition presupposes, that we have connected the whole series back to the first member, consecutively; and so the series must have a first, and therefore unconditioned member. The complete series of conditions is given as completely cognoscible, therefore it is *limited*. It is given as not completely cognoscible, therefore it is *unlimited*. And this is the thoroughgoing contradiction in all the propositions of rational cosmology, which has divided all its systems into the contradictions which lie before us in history.

Now, individually, the objects of which cosmology judges were the complete composition of all phenomena, or the *quantity of the world*; the complete division of matter, or the *content of the world*; the complete series of causes, or the *order of the world*; the complete dependence of existence, or the *existence of the world*. The completeness of the conditions, according as they are regarded to be completely cognoscible, or the reverse, must be also regarded as limited, or not limited. The judgments of rational cosmology are, then, the following contradictory propositions: (*a*) the world is limited as to magnitude (in space and time). The world is not so (unlimited). (*β*) The complete division of matter is limited; that is, matter, or the world, as to content, consists of *simple* parts. The com-

plete division of matter is not limited; that is, matter, or the world, as to content, does not consist of simple parts; there exists nothing simple. ( $\gamma$ ) The complete series of causes is limited, or there is a *first* cause; not conditioned, not determined to act from without, but only through itself—a causality through freedom. The complete series of causes is not limited, or there is no first cause or causality through freedom, but only physical causality according to law. ( $\delta$ ) The complete dependence of existence is limited, or there is something belonging to the world, itself independent, upon which all else depends; there is an absolutely necessary being. The complete dependence of existence is not limited; there is nothing belonging to the world absolutely independent; there is no absolutely necessary being. These are the propositions. If all can be proved with equal force, they form the antinomies of pure Reason. Being first determined, our next duty is to demonstrate them. The necessity of a judgment is identical with the impossibility of its contradictory. If I use the latter to prove the former, the method of proof is *indirect*, or apagogic. With a *single* exception, Kant has proved each of the contradictory propositions indirectly, and so expounded the antinomies: the necessity and the impossibility of the same proposition are proved in immediate succession.

#### V.—THE ANTINOMY OF THE QUANTITY OF THE WORLD.

The quantity of the world is the world in space and time. The world is limited in time; that is, it has a beginning in time; it is limited in space, that is, as to space it is included in bounds. Accordingly, this is the thesis of the first antinomy: “*The world has a beginning in time, and as to space is enclosed in bounds.*” The antithesis—“*The world has no beginning, and no bounds in space; but both as to space and time is infinite.*”

1. *Proof of the Thesis.*—Suppose the reverse. Suppose the world to have no beginning in time, it follows that in the pre-

sent state, or at the present moment, an infinite series of changes has already elapsed—a past infinity is the same as a completed one. But a completed infinity is not infinite; nor can any such series be complete in any point. It is impossible that an infinite time should have elapsed, therefore past time must necessarily be not infinite, but limited; so that the world must have a beginning in time.

Let the world have no limits in space,—let it be an infinite whole. As a whole it consists of parts, which are simultaneously present. If a quantity is not enclosed within intuitible limits,\* it can only be cognized by our adding together its parts, or by a successive synthesis of the parts. The infinite world-whole can only be thus cognized; and as these parts are infinite in number, their synthesis requires an infinite time; and its completion presupposes an infinite time having elapsed, and being complete. Such a completion is impossible; it is, consequently, impossible to add an infinite number of things together into one whole; or that such an infinite number should make up a whole, or be simultaneously present; it follows necessarily that no whole consists of an infinite number of parts; hence the world as a whole occupies, not infinite, but a limited, space.†

\* This is, of course, a necessary limitation, which does not affect the present argument.

† Kant adds, that he might have proved the thesis also by starting with a false notion of the infinity of a given quantity, that it is a quantity greater than any other: but, however great (*i. e.* consisting of whatever number of parts) we take a quantity to be, we can add to it (in number of parts, as number is infinite). Therefore, &c. But this notion of an infinite quantity assumes a *given* unit, so that the infinity of it must reach beyond all limits. This would not include the case of a finite body consisting of an infinite number of parts—or a finite time, of an infinite number of moments. The real notion of an infinite does not answer the question: how large? but the question: how often must I repeat an unity *of any size I choose to assume*, to obtain it? Hence, in proportion to the unit assumed, infinities may vary greatly in quantity. The question as to the actual greatness in size of the world is not here under discussion.

2. *Proof of the Antithesis.*—Suppose the reverse. Let the world have a beginning in time; then there must have been a time before the world was—a time in which there was nothing, an *empty* time, in which no one point is distinct from another, nor can be distinguished by there being something in the former, and nothing in the latter. In mere empty time nothing can originate, therefore the world cannot. It is impossible that the world could have originated at a fixed moment, or that it had a beginning in time; it therefore necessarily had no such beginning.

Let the world have limits in space, and it must be limited or enclosed by a space which is void; and so void space, in which the world is placed, must be an object of possible intuition, as the world itself is; space then must exist, independent of our intuition, as something for itself, not as the form of phenomena, but, as it were, the substance in which phenomena exist. The transcendental *Æsthetic* has proved the reverse.\* The principles of the pure understanding have proved that pure space is impossible, as well as pure time. But, if pure space be impossible, then the world cannot be enclosed by pure space; and as the world cannot possibly have bounds in space, it is in this respect unlimited.

The assumption of a world limited in time and space implies, as a consequence, the impossible assumption of void space and time. This consequence being impossible, the reverse consequence, is necessary; that is, the unlimited quantity of the world.†

\* Dr. Fischer here evidently forgets Kant's note, p. 324, and so confounds the antithesis with the critical solution.

† Kant notices, in his remarks on the antinomy, that the evasion of it upon Leibniz' principles, as to space and time being only the relations of things, and hence not supposable beyond them, is invalid. For it consists in substituting some *nescio quid* of an intelligible world for the sensuous; and, for a real beginning preceded by a void time, an existence which merely presupposes no other condition in the world; and so they hope to get rid of Space

## VI.—THE ANTINOMY OF THE MATTER OF THE WORLD.

The second contradiction refers to the matter or content of the world. Matter is the existence which fills space—which lies at the basis of all phenomena in space—the permanent existence or substance in which all change of phenomena in space takes place. Permanent existence is only cognoscible in space. Consequently, matter, being such, is the only cognoscible substance.

As existing in space, matter is a *composite substance*. But a substance can only be composed of substances; for all that is not substantial, but accidental, can only be brought together in a substance, but cannot make a substance. Now, the cosmological question is: of what do material things, or the composite substances of the world, consist? Their division or analysis into parts is either limited, or it is not. If limited, the parts must themselves not be composite, but simple or elementary substances; if unlimited, then these parts are themselves composite; and there are no simple substances. This is the contradiction. The thesis declares: “*Every composite in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing at all but what is simple, and what is composed of the simple.*” The antithesis declares: “*No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing at all simple.*”

We must observe, in order to understand the proof correctly, that the question in this antinomy is simply about the existence or non-existence of *simple substances*. Rational psychology and its doctrine of the substantiality and simplicity of the soul having been refuted, the existence of simple substances can only now be discussed as regards external and material phenomena.

and Time. But we are speaking of phenomena exclusively. A similar objection is similarly answered in the remarks appended to the antithesis of the second antinomy.

1. *Proof of the Thesis.—Transcendental Atomistic. The dialectical basis of Monadology.* Suppose the reverse. Matter or composite substances do *not* consist of simple parts: what must follow? Every composite existence either can, or cannot, be analyzed into its parts in thought. Suppose it cannot be so analyzed, then it must consist of parts which cannot at all be represented except in composition, of which each exists only in and with the other. Suppose it can be analyzed in thought, it must then consist of parts, each of which exists independent of the rest as a self-subsisting thing, their composition only forming an external contingent relation or aggregate. Self-subsisting things are substances. Every existence composed of substances, or every composite substance, can be thought as analyzed into its component parts. Now, it is plain that, if all such composition was in thought removed, nothing composite could remain. If, then, composite substances did not consist of simple ones, then, supposing we remove in thought all composition, *nothing at all* would remain. It would follow, then, that a composite substance could not be analyzed or separated in thought—that its parts could not be substances, and so the substance itself not be composite. If, then, composite substances did not consist of simple ones, our very hypothesis—that is, this composite substance itself—would be destroyed. It is, then, necessary for it to consist of simple parts, which form the “*elementary substances*,” or “first elements of all composition.” A simple substance, as an element of matter, is called an *atom*; a simple substance, as an element of things in general, or of the world, is called a *monad*. This proof, then, of simple substances Kant calls “transcendental atomistic,” or “the dialectical basis of monadology.”

2. *Proof of the Antithesis.*—Suppose the reverse. Let composite things in the world consist of simple parts: what would follow? All composition of things or substances is only pos-

sible in space; each part of a composite substance is in space; consequently, the simple parts must also be in space; and there must be simple, *i. e.*, indivisible, parts of space, or space which is not space. But if every space be composite, then simple substances must exist in a composite space, or must have parts in space; and, as their parts can only be substances, *simple* substances must be composed of substances, which is impossible. Hence the contradictory is necessary, *viz.*, that no substance consists of simple parts. We may generalize the proposition: *there exists nothing at all simple*. For, that which is absolutely simple excludes all multiplicity, and so space and time, and all intuition; therefore in intuition, and in the world of sense, which is nothing without intuition, there is nothing simple.

## VII. THE ANTINOMY OF THE ORDER OF THE WORLD.

The third contradiction concerns the order of the world, or the causal connexion of things. Every phenomenon is an effect, which presupposes the complete series of all its causes. This complete series is either limited or unlimited. If limited, there must be a first member of the series, or first cause, which is not the effect of another, but is determined by itself to action—a causality through freedom. If unlimited, there is no such first member, or cause, which is not at the same time the effect of another preceding cause; and there is no free, but only a natural, causality. The thesis declares: “*Causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which all the phenomena of the world, without exception, can be deduced. To explain them, we must necessarily assume, in addition, a causality through freedom.*” The antithesis declares: “*there exists no freedom; but everything in the world happens simply according to laws of nature.*” The thesis denies what the antithesis asserts: that natural causality is the only causality possible.

1. *Proof of the Thesis. Transcendental Freedom.*—Suppose the reverse. Let every event occur after the manner of natural causality; it is conditioned by another, preceding in time. The causal event cannot have always existed; were this the case, its effect would not have been posterior, but *simultaneous*. The effect is necessarily connected with the cause. If the cause has always existed, so has the effect, which is necessarily connected with it; it has not, then, originated, or happened, which contradicts the hypothesis.

An event which happens in time presupposes another as its cause, which must also have happened in time, and so presupposes a third, of which it is the necessary effect. So the natural *nexus* of things leads us back from effect to cause; and this, again, is the effect of a prior cause. There is no first member or cause in this chain of natural causality; but, if the first member be wanting, then the series of causes is not itself complete, and *all* the causes are not given. But how can anything happen in nature unless all its conditions be presupposed? The physical law itself insists that *all* the causes must be combined, to produce the effect. Consequently, the very natural law of causality demands necessarily a first cause.

This first cause is determined to action by no other, but by itself. This complete self-determination—this development of activity from within—by its own proper impulse, may be called “*absolute spontaneity*.” The first cause is distinct from all consequent or mediate ones. These continue the series of events. The first cause commences it; it has the *initiative*, by which it can be distinguished from all other causes and described: it is the power *which originates a series of events altogether from itself*. This power Kant calls freedom; this freedom, which clearly never occurs in the series of phenomena, and so can never be given empirically, he calls *transcendental freedom*, as distinguished from psychological or empirical freedom. There is a first cause, may then be translated: “every-

thing in the world does not occur according to laws of nature, but there is also a causality through freedom.”\*

2. *Proof of the Antithesis: Transcendental Physiocracy.*—Suppose the reverse. Let there be a causality through freedom: what must follow? As being first cause, this causality must originate from itself a series of events. The commencement of its activity is—as every commencement must be—a moment of time. Every moment presupposes another. Therefore, a moment of time must have preceded the commencement of the free and unconditioned causality. In this earlier moment the first cause must have existed, else it must have originated with its activity. Accordingly, in the existence of the cause, these two states must be distinguished in time; the state in which it did *not yet* act, from that in which it began to act. If this commencement is to be altogether without foundation or condition, we have two successive states without

\* The remarks appended to this thesis are very important. In the first place, he distinguishes the transcendental from the psychological conception of freedom. The transcendental idea “merely presents us with the conception of the spontaneity of the action, as the proper ground to which to impute it.” Mr. Meiklejohn has mistranslated several passages, from losing sight of this caution (Cf. also Critick, p. 486.) In the next place, Kant shows that, although a free cause is only absolutely required to account for the origin of the world, yet, as we have found it necessary to assume a faculty originating a series in time, we feel ourselves authorized to admit it now in the case of substances: and we must not think the fact that everything has an antecedent in time any difficulty; for an origin as to causality is a different thing. Such an event must *succeed*, but may not *proceed* from, the antecedents. He gives as an illustration the act of a free agent. This observation I have already referred to above, Introduction. Mr. Mansel has seen its force, and urged it against Hamilton’s Theory of Causality, in his Proleg. Logica, p. 346. The third antinomy, I may add, exactly reverses Hamilton’s theory, who deduces causality from our inability to conceive a commencement. Agreeing as I do with Mr. Mansel, that causality is a positive principle, it seems to me that the negative inability is much more correctly treated as its consequence than its cause.

any causal connexion—a *post hoc* in no way determined by a *propter hoc*: by which the natural law of causality is totally destroyed.

It is, then, clear that causality through freedom and natural causality are reciprocally contradictory. The thesis attempted to combine both. The antithesis comprehends their incompatibility, and asserts natural causality as the only active power in the world. This principle Kant calls "*transcendental physioeracy*," as opposed to the doctrine of "*transcendental freedom*." If natural causality be the only form of law in the world, then the power of freedom must be the overthrow of all legitimacy, and must be regarded as the very principle of lawlessness. In this antinomy, the most abstruse of all philosophical *quæstiones vexatæ*—that of freedom and necessity (law)—is expressed in its strongest terms.

#### VIII. THE ANTINOMY OF EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD.

This is the last contradiction. It concerns the existence of the world in a determined state. Every state of the world is the effect of all the preceding states, and is therefore a conditioned or dependent member in the series of world-changes. Every dependent existence presupposes another, on which it depends, so that the series of conditions must be given as complete. Must this complete series be thought as limited, or as unlimited? If limited, there must be one existence on which all else depends—itself independent, unconditioned, and absolutely necessary; this existence must belong to the world, be it as a part of the world or its cause. If the series be unlimited, there is no independent or necessary being either within or without the world.

The thesis declares: "*to the world there belongs something which, either as part of it or as the cause of it, is an absolutely necessary being.*" The antithesis: "*there does not at all exist any absolutely necessary being, either within the world or without it, as its cause.*"

1. *Proof of the Thesis.*—This is the only *direct* proof which Kant produces among the antinomies. The method of proof is purely cosmological. From changeable existence in the world is inferred necessary existence in the world—not from contingent existence of the world—a necessary being without it. It is in this last manner that the so-called cosmological argument of theology draws its conclusion. Changeable existence is not contingent. The passage from one to the other is, as Kant expresses it, a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. That existence is contingent, the contradictory of which is just as possible, instead of which, then, another existence might have been present at the same time. On the contrary, changeable existence is only so far contingent as it is not always present—so far as another existence takes place at another time: in *its own* moment it is necessary.\*

Every change is conditioned by all the preceding ones. These presuppose for their completion a first member, which is independent, and exists necessarily. From this necessary being all change in the world proceeds; it forms their starting-point. Now, every commencement is a moment of time, and every such moment is conditioned by an earlier one. Hence, as the necessary being itself must exist in time, and belong to the world of sense, it cannot be thought as without the world, or separated from nature.

2. *Proof of the Antithesis.*—Suppose the reverse. If there exist an absolutely necessary being, it must either exist in the world, or out of it. Let it exist in the world, and it is either a part of the world, or the whole series of world-changes. As a part, it can only be the first member, or the unconditioned commencement of the whole series. If, then, a necessary being exist in the world, it is either the *commencement of the world*, or the *whole course of the world without any commencement*.

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 175 (and note), and 287.

The unconditioned commencement would be one without cause, without time preceding it—a commencement, and not a moment of time. As surely as there can be no commencement not in time, so surely can there be no unconditioned commencement; and the necessary being cannot stand in this relation to the world-series.

What is the world-series without commencement? An infinite number of states of the world, all conditioned and dependent. But, if every single member be dependent, the sum of the members—or, in our case, the whole world-series—cannot be the reverse, or necessary. The absolutely necessary being, then, is neither the commencement of the world, nor its whole series; and so does not belong to it, and is not *in* the world.

Let it be *without* the world, and, as being the cause of all world-changes, it must be their commencement, or first moment. As existing without the world, it must be outside time; so it is a moment of time outside time. It follows, that an absolutely necessary being cannot exist either in or out of the world; therefore, cannot exist at all.

As in this last antinomy the proof of the thesis is direct, the ground of proof of the two contradictory propositions is accurately the same.\* It is this: the series of all the conditions of a dependent existence is completely given in the whole of the past time. The thesis concludes, that, because in the past time the series of *all* the conditions is contained completely, the unconditioned or necessary must also be given, else the series would not be complete. The antithesis concludes, that, because the series of all the conditions is given *in time*, no unconditioned can be contained therein, as it cannot exist in time. Thus, by changing our point of view, from the same grounds opposite assertions can be made. Because the moon always turns the same side towards the

\* Cf. Critick, p. 287.

earth, we may, according to the view we take of the moon's motion, assert either that the moon revolves round its axis, or the reverse.

#### IX. THE REASON AS A PARTY ENGAGED IN THE CONFLICT OF THE ANTI-*NOMIES*. THE INTEREST OF THE REASON.

The judgments of rational cosmology are completed in these four antinomies. It has been shown that each of these judgments results in contradictory propositions, not started at random, but resting on rational grounds. It is proved that Reason, as soon as it judges the world as a whole, or given object, falls into contradictions with itself, expressed in these contradictory judgments. They have proved nothing further than this conflict of the reason with itself. Its antinomies are so many *problems*. And now we come to the question: How are these problems to be solved? If any dispute, whatever it be, is to be *justly* decided, such decision, besides legal knowledge and common sense in the judge, above all requires his impartiality. In order, then, to decide this conflict in its cosmological propositions, and solve the problem of the antinomies, the human reason must be the *impartial* judge, which listens to nothing but the law. The critical reason can here allow no other interests any weight. It will, then, be an important preliminary step towards the settlement of the dispute, to examine carefully whether such foreign interests can easily interfere with the judicial question, and secretly bias the judge towards one side or the other. These interests we must separate from the proper grounds of the decision.

Now, these cosmological propositions, besides their proofs, have various other grounds for or against them, which, whether accidentally or not, incline our tempers for or against these assertions. Such an inclination or disinclination not determined by rational grounds we call the "*interest*" which the reason takes in its antinomies. In this state reason is no

longer a judge, but a partizan. And we shall hear it first as the latter, lest it should give its decision in both capacities *at once*.

1. *The Thesis and Antithesis*.—The interest of the reason is divided between these two, and is quite different on both sides. All the theses agree in asserting the existence of an unconditioned; all the antitheses, in denying it. Here there was an uniform affirmation with regard to the same object; there, an uniform negation.

Let us suppose the case of denial: let there be no unconditioned—no beginning of the world—no simple substance—no power of freedom—no absolutely necessary being. Without commencement of the world, there can be no creation; without simple substance, no immortality of the soul; without freedom, no moral action; without absolutely necessary being, no God. Not as if the commencement of the world comprehended in itself the concept of creation, or the simplicity of the soul comprehended immortality, &c.; but because all these latter imply and presuppose the former as conditions, and so include them. If, then, I deny the commencement of the world, the simplicity of substance, the power of freedom, the necessity of existence, I also deny the possibility of creation, of immortality, of morality, of the Divine existence; so that I deny the foundations of morals and religion, which I assert in the reverse case. This *ethico-religious* interest is not of a scientific, but of a moral, nature; it does not concern knowledge, but the direction of the will; it is not theoretical, but *practical*. It is this practical interest which sides with the thesis against the antithesis.

There is added a second interest, of a scientific nature. Our knowledge aims at the connexion of phenomena, at their absolute unity, and indeed in a twofold sense—both the knowledge of the absolute connexion, as well as the complete connexion itself, of knowledge. In the first sense, the unity

or concatenation of things is the object; in the second, the concatenation is the form of our knowledge. The unity as object is the unconditioned as existence. The unity as form is science as a system. Our reason is interested in knowing the unconditioned object, or absolute unity of things, which is the universe; it is also interested in systematically combining its knowledge into a whole of science. The former may be called the *speculative*, the latter the *architectonic*, interest. Both of these have all their hopes centred on the thesis; none on the antithesis.

Lastly, the cognition of the unconditioned is no troublesome investigation, but an argument easily understood; it requires no deep learning, but only the comprehending a few thoughts: while in sciences of observation [and experiment] even a few steps in advance are only attained with great trouble, here in few and easy steps a great journey is safely accomplished, up to the very limits, as it seems, of the world. But, if a science promises or seems to repay the greatest results for the least pains, it fulfils all the conditions which will secure it the most favorable reception among the vulgar, and so obtain an extended popularity, especially when it also satisfies the longings of our hearts. Hence, the interests of the reason, which involuntarily support the thesis, are the *practical*, the *speculative* (architectonic), and the *popular*.

On the contrary, the antitheses systematically deny the existence of the unconditioned,\* and give no support to our practical interests; they deny the complete cognition of the world as to form and content, and from this point totally oppose the speculative (architectonic) interests of reason; they allow no other means of scientific knowledge than the slow and troublesome one of experience, which proceeds from phenomenon to phenomenon; they can expect, then, no popularity or approval except that of the scientific investigator. They

\* Rather, of Absolute; for they do assert the Infinite.

only satisfy the *understanding*, which desires no other knowledge than experience.

If the antitheses only denied the *cognition* of the unconditioned, they would be right, and *critically* opposed to the theses. They would declare: the unconditioned is no object of possible knowledge—no cognoscible object, or phenomenon. But they deny not only the knowledge, but also the *existence*, of the unconditioned, and here themselves transcend the possibility of experience; they deny the unconditioned, not only as phenomenon, but as thing *per se*; so removing the bounds of experience, and becoming themselves dogmatical. They make experience not only the clue for cognition, but a principle of things; they judge that what cannot be an object of experience, cannot *exist* at all.

2. *The Dogmatism and the Empiricism of the Pure Reason.*—The theses, with their uniform affirmation, presuppose the cognoscibility of things *per se*. Their common standpoint is the “*Dogmatism of the Pure Reason.*” The antitheses, with their uniform negation, presuppose, that there can be no other beings, except objects of possible experience. Their common standpoint is the “*Empiricism of the Pure Reason.*” If we wish to represent them under known systems, Kant puts forward the first under *Plato*, the second under *Epicurus*.<sup>\*</sup> This last name is hardly in point. In the whole of ancient philosophy there is no individual who stands exclusively with the theses, or with the antitheses. In the cosmological speculations of the ancients there was a deep-rooted tendency to regard the world-whole as limited, and not to admit in the world

<sup>\*</sup> Cf. Critick, p. 295. “It is, however [Kant adds, in a note], a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever propounded these principles as objective assertions. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims for the speculative use of the understanding, he gives evidence of a more genuine philosophic spirit than any other of the ancient philosophers.” On Kant’s estimate of Epicurus, see below, chap. xi., sec. v.

freedom in the sense of unconditioned causality. From the first point of view, the cosmology of the ancients sides with the thesis of the first antinomy; from the second, it does not side with the theses of the third. The Epicurean philosophy was in physics atomistic, and atomism is in every case nearer to asserting simple substances than to denying them. In general, among the metaphysicians of all ages, none would accurately observe the limits of our contradictory propositions. Spinoza, who asserts with the antitheses the infinity of the world, and the order of purely natural causality, does not with the antitheses deny either the simplicity of substance, or the elementary parts of matter, least of all the existence of an absolutely necessary being.

Let us, then, keep to Kant's general description, without attempting to individualize it by reference to particular systems. All the antitheses tend in the direction of *Empiricism*—their opposites, in that of *Dogmatism*, meaning by this term the opposite tendency to empiricism.

The interests which, in the conflict of the antinomies, the reason has now for one side, and now for another, cannot decide the dispute; they have rather the negative value of being the grounds according to which it is not to be decided. Reason cannot be a partizan where it should be the judge. After we have heard what *interests* determine it in favour of one or other of the parties, the whole dispute may be brought before the *judgment seat* of the reason.

## CHAPTER IX.

## THE SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMIES AS COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. FREEDOM AND NATURAL NECESSITY.

## THE INTELLIGIBLE AND THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER.

LET no one say, that in the present dispute no decisive judgment at all is possible. For it is a dispute which the reason carries on with itself; they are problems which proceed altogether from the reason itself; clearly, then, reason must also be in a condition to settle this dispute—to solve these self-formed problems.\* If the cosmological problems were such that they could ever be solved in the way of knowledge or experience, we might expect the solution, not from the pure reason, but from the time when our science would have reached the point of having the whole world as an object before it, as a distinct representation, of which we can judge what it is, and what it is not. This time human science can *never* reach. The world-whole from the very nature of our knowledge, can never possibly be its object. It is, therefore, impossible to solve the problem of rational cosmology dogmatically. The dogmatic solution would be the distinct cognition of the universe. There remain, then, no other solutions but the *sceptical* and the *critical*.

## I. THE ANTINOMIES AS JUDGMENTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

## THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTION.†

The sceptical solution is very clear. Both parties are allowed to speak, and their declarations, with the reasons

\* It is strange how assertions of this kind, repeated constantly by Kant, have been ignored by his critics, who charge him with making out the Reason a "*complexus* of insoluble antilogies," as "divided against itself," &c. On this point, cf. the Introduction, where the principal passages are collated.

† It should be observed that Kant draws a distinction between *scepticism*

thereof, being compared, it is found that the theses and antitheses reciprocally refute one another, and both parties are declared in the wrong. This sceptical decision must have some justification drawn from reason itself. Why, then, are the judgments of rational cosmology wrong on both sides? How are we to decide in general about the possibility of a judgment? Simply by the judging faculty, the understanding. That which cannot be the object of the understanding can never be the object of judgment. What the understanding is unable to comprehend, cannot be its object. If, then, we can prove that the objects, as well of the theses as of the antitheses, can never be comprehended by the understanding—that these objects are commensurate with no concept of the understanding—then the impossibility or error of the judgments on both sides, is proved. The possible concept of the understanding is the objective criterion, according to which the sceptical judge decides.

In order to comprehend an object, we must have the complete synthesis of its parts. Suppose an object, the complete synthesis of which requires more parts than are given in the object—this object does not suit the concept of the understanding; *it is too small for the concept*. Suppose an object, the given parts of which can never be completely grasped, then this object also suits no concept of the understanding; *it is too large for such a concept*.\*

All the theses suppose a limited world: a commencement of it; a limited division of matter, a limited space for the world, a limited causal connexion, a dependence of existence. The understanding must exceed these limits, and demands before the commencement of the world time, outside it, space; for every cause a preceding cause, for every existence a condition. It cannot be satisfied with a limited world, and demands more parts for its concept of the world than are given in any

and the sceptical method, just as he does between *dogmatism* and the *dogmatical method*. Let the reader compare Critick, Pref., p. xxxviii., and p. 265.

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 304, *sqq.*

limited world. The objects of all the theses are too small for the concept of the understanding.

The antitheses all suppose an unlimited world; or a series which the understanding can never wholly grasp. The object of all the antitheses is too large for the concept of the understanding.\* Consequently, the object on both sides of the anti-

\* This is decidedly wrong, if intended for Kant's view of the fourth antinomy. He distinctly states (p. 305) that here the object of the theses must be put back to an infinitely distant time, which is too large for our synthesis; but, if everything in the world be contingent, this world is too small for the concept, which necessarily postulates conditions for every contingent. Still, this incongruity is remarkable in so systematic a book as the Critick. I cannot but think that there is something wrong in the statement of the fourth antinomy. Mr. Monck first called my attention to this difficulty. In the first place, both thesis and antithesis refute the notion of the necessary being existing outside the world, as its cause; and as they agree here perfectly, this argument may be eliminated from both sides. Secondly, the last clause of the thesis—"whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or part of it"—seems more properly to belong to the antithesis; for it seems no part of the proper thesis to argue, that the whole cosmical series, consisting of nothing but contingent members, is nevertheless as a whole necessary. Kant might, indeed, have fairly appended this to the antithesis, as some philosophers on that side have held such a view; and in this case, the "*secondly*, &c.," of the thesis should have been transferred to the column of the antithesis. Thirdly, in his comments (Critick, p. 305) upon the objects of the thesis being too small, and those of the antithesis being too large, for the concept of the understanding, he (as above remarked) inverts the order, and brings two different principles to bear—on the thesis, the *time* required to complete the series (which is quite beside the question); on the antithesis, the *nature* of the series, as containing nothing but the contingent, and being hence too small; whereas, the view in the text is consistent, and applies only one principle. This view seems strongly confirmed by the passage (Critick, p. 262, note) where he describes the two ways in which the unconditioned may be cogitated. In fact, as Mr. Monck observed, the critical solution of the antinomy proper is contained in Kant's fourth antithesis; for it proves that the unconditioned cannot be predicated of the series, either in its absolute or its infinite meaning. Indeed, Kant seems (Critick, p. 315) distinctly to adopt the antithesis as the critical solution.

Kant finds a direct proof possible in this thesis, because the thesis merely maintains that, the conditioned being given, so is the unconditioned, without

nomies is never conformable to a concept of the understanding, it can never be an object thereof; and these contradictory propositions can be no judgments of the understanding, or be judgments at all; for as soon as judgments come into question, the understanding alone decides about their possibility.

No judgment among the above-mentioned antinomies contains any real cognition. Regarded as such, all the judgments are null and void. This is the *sceptical* solution of the antinomies.

## II.—THE ANTINOMIES AS CONCLUSIONS. THE CRITICAL SOLUTION.

The antinomies are not yet explained. Now comes the question which must be critically answered. If all these judgments, compared with the understanding, are impossible, how was it possible to form them, and prove them by such strict and convincing syllogisms? How can these unfounded and impossible judgments be *conclusions*? The sceptical decision only declares the result impossible, and disregards the process by which that result was attained. Now, the error or impossibility of the cosmological judgments must be discovered in principle. The sceptical point of view only examines the demonstrated propositions. We are now to occupy ourselves with the investigation of the demonstration, and with judging the grounds of the proof. This point of view is the critical one. The sceptic only considers the result of rational cosmology, and declares that it does not tally with the understanding, with which it ought to tally. The Critic investigates the account itself, and finds here the *πρωτον ψευδος* of all rational cosmology.

1. *The Paralogism of Rational Cosmology.*—All the propositions of the antinomies are based upon the following syllo-

determining whether it be the absolute or the infinite; and we only require the minor premiss, "Conditioned existence *is* given," to draw this conclusion from the general principle of the unconditioned.

gism: if conditioned existence be given, then the complete series of its conditions, and so the unconditioned, is given. Now, the conditioned is given, therefore so is the totality of its conditions, or the world. Of this given world-whole, the theses prove the temporal commencement, the spatial limitation, the simplicity as to its elements, unconditioned causality, absolute necessity; the antitheses prove the contradictory opposite. Both sets of judgments, in all the antinomies, make the same presupposition: that the world-whole is given, and, as a given existence, is a cognoscible object. If this assumption be correct, the proofs on both sides are valid. If not so, the proofs on both sides lose all force and validity. This assumption, the *petitio principii* of the whole of rational cosmology, must be examined; the syllogism, of which it is the result, must be investigated.

The major premiss declares: if the conditioned be given, the series of all its conditions must be completely given. It is right to say of the concept of the conditioned, that it presupposes all its conditions. Only in this way can it be thought as conditioned. If then the conditioned is merely a *conceived* object, independent of the conditions of sensibility, the major premiss is correct. It must be so, if the conditioned is given apart from our sensibility. The minor premiss declares: conditioned existence is given us. Obviously, only through intuition, only as a phenomenon; that is, not independent of our sensibility.

It is quite clear that the middle term of these two propositions has two meanings, and meanings which exclude one another. In the major premiss conditioned existence means an object apart from our sensibility, a *thing per se*; but in the minor it means a *phenomenon*, which is our representation, and nothing else. The major says: if the conditioned *per se* be given (not as phenomenal, but as intelligible object), then the world-whole is given. The minor says: the conditioned is given (not *per se*), but as phenomenon. We have, then, a *qua-*

*ternio terminorum*—a *paralogism* in the well-known form of a *sophisma figuræ dictionis*. On this paralogism rests the whole of rational cosmology, with all its propositions.\*

2. *The Solution of the Paralogism*.—If conditioned existence be only given us as phenomenon, or as our representation, something quite different follows from the conclusion on which the antinomies are based. With one phenomenon all phenomena are not simultaneously given; but we proceed from one phenomenon to another, guided by experience, we seek by gradual regress, from condition to condition, the connexion of phenomena, and the conditions are only given us as far as they have been discovered. The connexion of phenomena, or world, only reaches as far as experience. The world is not given us, but we produce it by experience. Were phenomena things *per se*, independent of our representation, the world would be given as an whole; and the contradictory propositions of the antinomies would both be in the right. If phenomena are only our representations, the world is not given, but we make it by connecting representation with representation: then the world can never be given us as an whole, either as limited or as unlimited; and so the contradictory propositions of the antinomies are both in the wrong.

3. *The Antinomies as an Indirect Proof of Transcendental Idealism*.—The doctrine which regards phenomena to be things *per se*, we have called transcendental Realism. The opposed doctrine, which takes phenomena to be representations, was called transcendental idealism. If the first doctrine be correct, both theses and antitheses are true. If the second doctrine be right, the proofs of both are fallacious. It is impossible for contradictory propositions to be both true. Yet this would be so if phenomena were things *per se*, as Realism maintains. This very absurdity proves the necessity of critical idealism.

\* Critick, p. 312.

That phenomena are not things *per se*, but only representations, can be proved in two different ways: directly, and indirectly. The direct proof is found in the *transcendental Æsthetic*; the indirect in the *antinomies of the Pure Reason*. They prove the impossibility of the contradictory opinion, viz., that phenomena are things *per se*. If they were, there would follow what the antinomies have taught—that contradictory propositions can both be proved true.

This critical decision is just as summary as the previous sceptical one; both reject the antinomies in *all* their judgments. The sceptical point of view, measuring the cosmological propositions by the understanding, denies to them the claim of being valid knowledge for the understanding. The critical point of view, by examining their assumption, refuses to allow them their proofs as valid, or rather proves the invalidity of these proofs. The cosmological propositions, then, are neither cognitions, nor are they demonstrated propositions.

### III. THE ANTINOMIES AS LOGICAL CONTRADICTORIES.

They are not cognitions or empirical judgments; they might still be *logical* judgments. Though they may not have been proved, or the proof may be invalid, yet they might still be *true* judgments. But, according to the laws of logic, neither can both be false, nor both be true, but *one* of each pair must be true. This is a logical difficulty, not yet solved. The contradictory judgments of the antinomies may be all worthless as cognitions or conclusions. As logical judgments, neither can both be true, nor both false. According to the antinomies, both appear as true; according to the Critick of the antinomies, both appear to be false, as far as proof is concerned.

The law of contradiction must be true. If a concept does not fall under A, it must fall under not-A; for there is no middle between them. Therefore, logic declares, contradictory propositions cannot both be false. Between them you

cannot find a neither-nor (or *dilemma*)—they cannot both be true; between them there can be no *antinomy*, or as well-as; there is nothing admissible but an either-or, a *Disjunction*. The dilemma and the antinomy prove—as we have shown above—the impossibility of a concept. It is already clear how contradictory propositions can be both true, and both false. It is only necessary to posit an impossible concept, to make an impossible assumption. Suppose a square circle; is it easy to affirm and deny at the same time the contradictory attributes *round* and *not-round* of this absurdity. In the square circle the impossibility of the assumption is perfectly clear, so that in this case the nonsense escapes nobody. But the contradictory attributes may not lie on the surface. In such cases do the illusions of dilemmas and antinomies, of fallacious proofs and logical puzzles, arise, which were long since discovered by the sophistical subtlety of the ancients.\*

1. *The Illusion of the Contradiction. Dialectical Opposition.*—Let us make the matter clear in an example. A concept which is neither A nor not-A is nothing. A thing of which neither motion nor its opposite can be affirmed is impossible. By means of this dilemma (among others), Zeno demonstrated the impossibility of the Deity. Motion is change of place, rest is permanence in place; both are existence in space. All existence in space is either in motion or at rest. If it be neither, it is nothing. Consequently, the existence of God is only impossible, if it be an existence in space. Only under *this assumption* is the dilemma of Zeno valid. It is invalid, because the assumption is *impossible*. It is a *fallacy* (or apparent argument), for the assumption is *concealed*. Applied to the Deity, these predications are no longer contradictory, and do not exclude, but include, the possibility of a third case. In such a case the opposites are not contradictory, but contrary;

\* Critick, pp. 313, *sqq.*

and contraries may both be false, but cannot both be true. With regard to bodies, motion and rest are contradictories; with regard to God, contraries. In the first case, there is no third between them; in the second, there is: there is the case of being in no place or space. Let rest be permanence in place. What is its contradictory? That which is not permanent in any place; either because it is in no place at all, or because it is not permanent in its place, but moves. In the given case, then, the opposites are not contradictory, but contrary, which have the illusive appearance of being contradictory. These judgments, only apparently contradictory, but really contrary, Kant calls "*dialectical opposition*," to distinguish it from analytical opposition, which completely contradicts the given concept.\*

2. *Solution of the Contradictions in the Antinomies.*—If we consider the antinomies under this point of view, the logical enigma is easily solved. Their oppositions are only contradictory under a false condition; in reality they are contrary. They do not exclude, but include, a middle course.

Every given quantity is either limited, or unlimited. Here there is no further alternative. This opposition is valid of the world, if it be a given quantity? But suppose it is *not* such? If so, the above propositions would not be contradictory, but

\* Mr. Mill, in his remarks upon the law of Excluded Middle (Logic, Vol. i., p. 310, Sixth Edition), appears not to have observed this distinction, and brings objections which do not apply to real—*sc.* analytical—opposition. The very objections he urges against the law of Excluded Middle are those brought by Kant against the first pair of antinomies, to prove that they do not really come under the law, which, though elliptically expressed, always refers to contradictories. Sir Wm. Hamilton appears to me to found the principle of causality upon these very same dialectical oppositions; hence, it would be an illusive principle! At all events, he might have avoided giving in illustration of his law the very examples which Kant shows not to be true contradictions.

contrary, or, as Kant calls it, a “dialectical opposition.” The world is finite. The contradictory of this is: the world is a thing not-finite (an infinite judgment), *i. e.*, the world is either not given at all as a quantity, or it is an infinite one. In other words, the contradictory opposite admits of *two* cases, while the antinomy pretends that there is only *one*. And the third case is not only possible, but is actually true, in the present example. The world is not a given quantity, or else quantity in general must be something independent of our intuition, and given apart from it. Space and time, as that in which all quantities must exist, must then be given independent of our intuition—an impossibility which the critical philosophy has proved, and made the contradictory view its foundation stone. It is now clear why this given world-whole—this square-circle—may be judged of contradictorily; why these contradictory judgments both appear true, and yet must both be false; because they are in reality not contradictory.

It is just the same with all the other antinomies. If the parts of the world be a given number or quantity, their quantity must be either finite (simple parts), or infinite (only composite). If the causes of a phenomenon be a given series, it must either have a first number (causality through freedom), or not (natural causality only). If the conditions of an existence be given, the series thereof must be either finite (unconditioned, necessary being), or infinite (mere contingent existence.)

Everywhere we hit upon the same false assumption: if the world-whole is given—if it exist independent of us as thing *per se*—if the thing *per se* is a phenomenon—if the Idea of a whole can be a cognoscible object—allow this, and the antinomies are correct. They all rest on this impossible assumption, produced by transcendental illusion. Disavow the assumption—destroy the illusion which causes it, and both sides are wrong, as was declared both by the critical and by the sceptical decisions. They are logically contrary, and

may both be false. This is the solution of the logical difficulty.

#### IV. SUMMARY SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM. REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES.

The world-whole is not *given* in any case, for it is no object of intuition or phenomenon, but a thing *per se*, an Idea; it is not something existing as a whole *per se*, independent of us; but this whole is our combination, our conjunction. It is *we* who produce the world as an whole, as the connexion of phenomena, as the legitimate order of things. We produce it through experience; and, as we never experience the complete whole, or can never experience the whole *completely*, the world-whole is never given to us, but always *proposed* to us; and our science, by continually extending and systematizing itself, is the continual solution of the problem, which can never wholly be solved.

Our knowledge is never conditioned by the Idea of the world, but is only continued and directed towards a goal constantly to be aimed at, but which we can never reach. In other words, the problem of the universe does not produce knowledge, but compels it to progress; it is not the condition of knowledge, but its clue; that is to say, the rule of its continual progress, both material and formal; or, as Kant expresses it, the cosmological Idea is, with regard to our cognition, *not a constitutive, but a regulative, principle*. The error of all the antinomies was the use of this Idea as a constitutive principle. The solution of all the antinomies is the regulative use of the antinomies in their four given cases.\*

Consequently, all the antinomies must be convicted of false pretences, so far as they wish to be demonstrated propositions, real knowledge, and contradictories. None of them contains any real information; none of them is a real syllogism; none

\* Critick, Antinomy, § viii.

of them is a really contradictory negation of its opposite (analytical opposition). The opposition in all cases was only contradictory under an impossible assumption; when this is removed, it is only contrary. Hence, rational cosmology is impossible. None of these judgments is a cognitive judgment.

#### V. MATHEMATICAL AND DYNAMICAL ANTINOMIES. PARTICULAR SOLUTION.

The world-whole must, then, be regarded as only an Idea, or thing *per se*, not as a given phenomenon. Examining the antinomies from this point of view, we cannot, as heretofore, treat them uniformly and summarily deny them. They are all, indeed, subject to the common error we have exposed; but there is among them this important difference, that some of them represent the world in a sense in which it can be nothing else but *phenomenon*, while the others represent the world in a sense in which it need not be a phenomenon. We cannot, then, introduce into the antinomies of the first class *any sense at all*; but we can introduce a right sense into the others, if we do not treat them as dogmatical cognitive propositions. Of the former antinomies we shall judge, that they must be false in every sense; of the latter, that their propositions may both be true in a certain sense, of course not the dogmatical.

Let us first distinguish the antinomies.\* The first two refer to the quantity of the world, and the number of its constituent parts; in both cases, a quantitative determination with regard to the world. The two latter refer to the causes of phenomena, to the conditions of their existence; in both cases, to a causal connexion. The composition of quantities, and the

\* The cosmological ideas in all cases involve series obtained by synthesis. So long as we merely regard the *extension* of the series, they all admit of the same answer: it is too great, or too small. But this answer omits all consideration of the *nature* of the series. This, when examined, is found to differ in the last two antinomies, hence the separate solution here offered. Cf. the Introduction for an analysis of the whole argument.

connexion of causes and effects are syntheses of quite a different description. In the former *homogeneous*, in the latter *heterogeneous*, representations are connected.\* The antinomies differ in this point of view, as did the principles of the pure understanding, with which they correspond, following the clue of the Categories. The first two antinomies are *mathematical*, the second two *dynamical*.

The mathematical antinomies judge the world as a phenomenon, according to the nature of their synthesis, they cannot judge it otherwise; they insist on changing the Idea of it into a phenomenon, and cannot therefore be corrected or solved in the critical sense. The dynamical antitheses judge the world, indeed, in the same way, but are not compelled to do so from the nature of their synthesis; they can be corrected in the critical sense.

The world is only an idea, never a phenomenon. Quantity is always the object or product of intuition, apart from which it is nothing; hence it must always be phenomenon. The quantity of the world is then a phenomenal thing *per se*, a square circle, a mere absurdity. Things *per se* and phenomena differ in kind. A synthesis, which only combines what is homogeneous, as mathematical synthesis does, cannot possibly connect things *per se* and phenomena. Yet this is what the mathematical antinomies attempt.†

\* Critick, pp. 328-30.

† While giving quite correctly the general solution of the antinomies, Dr. Fischer hurries over or mistakes the particular solution of the first two, to which Kant devotes a good deal of attention. It is not enough to say, that the answers in the antinomies are false (which the general solution does); we must also suggest what the true answers are to the questions then raised. Is the world infinitely great and divisible, or not so? Reason compels us to attempt an answer, and this attempt can only be made by the empirical regress of conditions; for the world-whole is certainly not given as an object. The whole question, then, turns upon the nature of this *regressus*. When we deprive this *regressus* of any *determinate* quantity, we may suppose it to proceed *ad infinitum*, or *ad indefinitum*. First, then which is here the case? Kant shows that

On the contrary, cause and effect are heterogeneous. It is possible for them to be *completely* so, the effect being a phenomenon, and its cause a thing *per se*. An Idea can never be a phenomenon; such a connexion is a logical contradiction; therefore an idea can never be a *quantum*. But there is no logical contradiction in an Idea being the *cause* of a phenomenon, the condition of sensuous existence. It is necessary that every phenomenon should have another for its cause; this necessity is the irrefragable law of natural causality. It is possible that a phenomenon has at the same time an Idea for its cause;\* that is, an unconditioned cause, or a causality through freedom.

The *world-whole* and *quantity* never agree; therefore the mathematical antinomies are in all cases false. On the contrary, *necessity* and *freedom* may very well agree. Hence the

if the whole be an object given in our intuition, its divisibility must be possible *ad infinitum*, from the nature of space as a *quantum continuum*. But the extended world in space is not given in our intuition; our regress is, then, here only indefinite. If we are asked, then, is the extent of the world finite? we answer—No. Is it infinite? We answer—No (for it has no determinate quantity). But if we are asked, can the empirical regress proceed *ad infinitum*? we answer—We do not know; we only know that it does proceed *ad indefinitum*. But as to the divisibility of matter, the case seems different; for here the whole to be divided (or of which the conditions are sought) lies before us complete as an intuition. Here, then, a regress *ad infinitum* seems warranted. But all we can say in such a case is, that such a regress *ad infinitum* is here *possible*; no man can ever perform it; hence, an infinity of conditions cannot at all be said to be *given* in this case either; so that we can give the same answers in this case also. In the first case, it is possible that the regress proceeds *ad infinitum*; in the second, the regress is possible *ad infinitum*; in neither case is it *given*. In other words, such a body is infinitely divisible; but we cannot assert it to be infinitely divided. And it is only to be conceived possible, in the second case, when the parts are regarded simply as portions of space; for we have no reason to think parts in any other sense are infinitely divisible, space and time alone affording us that notion. This is the substance of the discussion, which may be found in the Critick, §§ vii–ix. of the Antinomy.

\* I must caution the reader that Kant neither identifies Idea and thing *per se*, nor cause and causality (if by cause be meant the subject of causality).

propositions of the dynamical antinomies may be both true, though not in the dogmatical sense. In other words: the propositions of the first two antinomies must be contradictory and false, because they unite contradictory attributes in the same concept. The latter two need not be either, because they assert what can be reconciled. In the first case the antinomy arises, because what is contradictory is reconciled; in the second case the antinomy arises, because what is reconcilable is set up as contradictory. In the former case the antinomy was necessary, in the latter it is not so.

## VI. FREEDOM AS A COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM.\*

1. Freedom and Nature.—This brings us to the last and most difficult point in the solution of the antinomies. The thing *per se* can never be quantity, but may be in a certain

\* The discussion which follows is, undoubtedly, the most difficult in the whole Critick. It arises from the second part of the question in the third thesis. The difficulty as to the first cause at the *commencement* of the series of causes and effects is solved in the same way as before, by showing that the thesis is too small, and the antithesis too large, &c. For here only the *extent* of the series is considered. But there follows the far more difficult question as to the existence and action of a free cause *during* the course of nature. And this cannot be settled as before, but only by considering the *nature* of the series in which the successive members are (or may be) heterogeneous. Is there any possible way of meeting this difficulty? This much we know, that "phenomena must have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as phenomena; and, if this be so, may not this transcendental object have a causality, of which the effects appear in phenomena?" This is the case with both external and internal phenomena; and there are some facts in the latter case which may help us to explain the matter. Take an immoral action—a theft. There are empirical causes and motives; there is also the reason as a cause, perfectly independent of all motives. The whole illustration is very clearly put in the Critick, p. 342. Now, here is a distinct case of the noumenon, or intelligible character, acting as a free cause, and its effects appearing in nature without violating natural causality. Now, we know little more of the nature of this noumenon than we do of the noumenon of external phenomena; nay, we cannot be

sense the cause of a phenomenon ; for, as the cause is different from the effect, why may it not be *radically* different ? Let us grant what experience and the principles of the understanding demand, that all causes are only phenomena, and therefore conditioned causes and effects, preceded by other phenomena as causes ; in such a chain of natural causality every phenomenon is completely conditioned, and the faculty of freedom is totally excluded.

Let us suppose what the dogmatical philosophy assumes—that all phenomena are things *per se*, then (as has been shown in detail) neither nature nor experience can be explained ; but even freedom is then impossible ; for every thing, taken *per se*, is conditioned by all the rest. Dogmatical philosophers have, therefore, never been able to explain freedom, owing to their fundamental assumption, but could only deny it.

The matter, then, stands as follows : if all causes are merely phenomena (conditioned causes), there is *only nature*, and *no freedom*. If all phenomena are things *per se* (something outside our representation), there is neither *nature nor freedom*. The only possibility of freedom is this, that phenomena are

certain whether they may not be the same. “Perhaps [says Kant, p. 337] the intelligible ground of phenomena has only to do with pure thinking.” But, if the noumenon of internal phenomena shows this peculiarity, or at least makes it probable or possible, it cannot be impossible that the noumenon of external phenomena or objects does the same. If there be any part of the Critick where the realistic side of Kant’s philosophy comes out, it is here ; for throughout he speaks of *substances* having free causality, which distinctly implies it to be not impossible that there is a noumenon acting as a hidden cause of phenomena, as well as of the connexion of phenomena according to law (pp. 282, 333-4, 344). There seems no reason to think, because free action is conceived by us *only* in the reason, that therefore it must be the only free cause or intelligible character in nature. (This is the inference of Dr. Fischer and Schopenhauer.) At all events, we have not the smallest right to *infer* it. And hence the difficulty and obscurity of Kant’s discussion, which all through posits the noumena of objects as not impossibly free causes. I have explained myself more fully in the Introduction.

only representation, their cause no representation, but a thing *per se*, or Idea.

The first condition, then, of freedom is, that an Idea can be a cause, or have causality. The second, that the effect of this cause should appear, and so belong to the realm of nature. The third condition is, that causality through freedom and natural causality should harmonize completely; for, if nature be destroyed, then the phenomenon is changed into a thing *per se*, and so freedom is destroyed.

This much, then, is plain, that nature does not exclude freedom; that they are not mutually contradictory, and therefore do not form an antinomy; or, as Kant says: "nature and freedom form no disjunction."

Between two things which are *not* contradictory harmony is possible. But this fact does not bring them into harmony. How can we conceive it done? In no case can it be an object of possible knowledge; for all such objects are phenomena, which freedom never can be. We do not discuss the cognition of freedom, but merely the way and manner in which we must conceive it in harmony with nature and experience—merely the possible combination between freedom as an Idea, and nature as a phenomenon; in fact, the empirical use which can be made of this regulative principle. The problem of freedom—the most difficult of all speculative questions—may be analyzed into the following questions:—(1.) What is the Idea of freedom? (2.) What compels us to assert it as an Idea, since we can never assert it as an object? (3.) Under what condition only can this idea be conceived as in communion with nature?

2. *Freedom as a Transcendental Principle.* Freedom has been declared to be unconditioned causality, or a cause, which is not a phenomenon, and so cannot be met with in the series of events, but forms a faculty of commencing a series of events absolutely from itself. The faculty of original action Kant calls "transcendental freedom." Negatively expressed, this faculty is *independent* of all natural conditions. Positively ex-

pressed, it is the initiative of a series of events—the faculty of *original* action.

Let us suppose that every action is completely conditioned by natural causes, and that it must happen with absolute necessity; then it is absurd to require it to have been different. We then have merely the necessity of natural phenomena, and no freedom of action—no *practical liberty*, no will, independent of sensuous conditions. The will so bound and determined necessarily is not free. The will, when determined, indeed, and inclined by sensuous conditions, but not forced by them, is free. The first is the “*arbitrium brutum*,” the second, “*arbitrium liberum*.” This latter is practically free, so that it could have acted—and perhaps ought to have acted—differently in the given case. It is easy to see that upon the power of practical liberty alone depends that of moral action, and the possibility of judging actions morally. It is equally clear that in the reverse case no will, practical freedom, or judgments of obligation are possible. It follows, that if in any phenomena in the world we are compelled to allow practical freedom a place—if any actions can be correctly judged morally—that we must assert freedom in the transcendental sense.

But how can this freedom exist along with nature? How can we assert this freedom without, by the very assertion, denying the connexion of nature and its laws; that is, nature itself? There is no nature without continuity of experience; and this continuity ceases if in any point the chain of things gives way, and an unconditioned cause interferes. This latter cannot meddle with the natural course of things—can never step in and interrupt the course of events, or overthrow their laws. If, then, unconditioned causes are at all possible they cannot be themselves in time; and yet they must act as causes, and their effects—like all effects—must appear in time, and so enter into nature and its unalterable course. Here lies the extraordinary difficulty of the matter; here we may translate the problem into a determinate formula.

3. *Empirical and Intelligible Cause (Character).*—Every phenomenon in nature has an empirical cause, which is itself the effect of another. The unconditioned cause is no phenomenon, hence is intelligible. Every phenomenon is an empirical cause, and an empirical effect. This strict law does not admit of the least infringement without destroying nature, and with it the possibility of all knowledge. Every cause acts according to a determinate law. In this, its law of action, each phenomenon is distinguished from its neighbour. This law, according to which each particular cause acts, may be called its character. The empirical character must then be distinguished from the intelligible, just as empirical causes were from intelligible (intelligible and sensible causality). The whole question, then, as to the possible connexion between nature and freedom is comprised in the following formula: How can the intelligible character be combined with the empirical? In this formula Kant grasps the problem of freedom. As he did in the case of the psychological problem, so now he gives the cosmological problem its most accurate and profound expression.

4. *The Intelligible Character as a Cosmological Principle.*—We are in danger of totally confusing the difficult problem, which Kant himself designates as very subtle and dark, if we bring it forthwith under a moral aspect—if we proceed forthwith to assert practical freedom in man—if we confine transcendental freedom to the latter, and so refer the whole doctrine of the intelligible character merely to *man*. We cannot proceed in this off-hand way; for practical freedom cannot even be assumed without transcendental freedom. This latter is no anthropological or psychological concept, but a *cosmological Idea*, which, as such, refers to all phenomena without exception, or to none.\* Let us not suppose, for instance, that some

\* This is not the language of Kant. He evidently supposes it possible for *some* natural causes only to have intelligible causality (Critick, p. 337.)

phenomena are only empirical, others (suppose men) are intelligible characters; or that intelligible character denotes a particular class or species of phenomena, as it were an objective peculiarity, or mark of certain phenomena. Such an attribute could only be learned through experience. As objects of experience, all phenomena are empirical characters; there are here no intelligible characters. The whole question would be confused, and the cosmological problem totally missed, if we imagined the intelligible character to be *human liberty*. Kant, indeed, most clearly points to the latter—uses it as an example and a moral evidence; but in his discussion he speaks, not of human freedom, but of the *world as freedom*—of freedom as a principle of the universe, as a cosmological idea, which he carefully distinguishes from the psychological. If the intelligible character could only be laid at the basis of internal phenomena, Kant must clearly have treated this concept among the paralogisms of the Pure Reason, and not under its antinomies.\*

5. *The Union of the Intelligible and Empirical Characters as the Cosmological Problem.*—If, then, freedom and nature are to be united, every phenomenon must be both an empirical and intelligible character. As empirical character, it is nothing but a natural phenomenon (*causa phenomenon*), conditioned in its action by natural causes—a link in the chain of things, in the series of which it originates and passes away—an object of experience, or of the cognition of the understanding, which, as such, contains nothing unconditioned. As intelligible character, it is no phenomenon or representation, independent of time, and so of change, excluding all origination or decay, altogether unconditioned, and original in its action. The same subject we must also regard as both empirical and intelligible character, and the same actions as the effects of both, being at the same time events in nature, and acts of freedom. The union

\* Cf. above, p. 216, note.

of both characters in the same subject—this double cause of all actions—can only be conceived in one possible way. Clearly, both characters cannot contend for the same subject; they cannot contradict one another; they cannot, so to speak, meet in the same plane, and cannot, therefore, like concurrent forces, produce a joint result. The empirical character acts altogether on the arena of time. The intelligible character NEVER appears on this scene.

The possibility of combining the two characters can only be conceived by regarding all that happens in the subject—the whole series of its actions—as occurrences in time, to be merely consequences of the empirical character, which forms the common and natural cause of all these actions; but by regarding the empirical character itself to be a consequence of the intelligible, a sequence which excludes all succession in time.

In this way we should deduce all events only from the empirical character, and so not interrupt or violate the continuity of experience at any point. If at the basis of this empirical character we place the intelligible as its time-less cause, the series of phenomena or experience is not disturbed, and all opposition between nature and freedom avoided. It is obvious that this combination of the two characters cannot be pronounced as a cognitive judgment; it only contains the rule (regulative principle) as to how this combination can be conceived. The rule declares: the form described is the only one where nature and freedom do not contradict one another. As nature is immediately certain, and undeniable, it is the only possible form of asserting freedom in the world.

The whole question of freedom, then, turns upon this point: how can the intelligible make the empirical character? How can the empirical have its foundation in the intelligible? In other words: how can the cause of a phenomenon be conceived as a thing *per se*? How can the same subject be conceived as at the same time a phenomenon and a thing *per se*? In this form the cosmological problem remains. It corresponds accu-

rately to the psychological: how can external intuition of space take place in a thinking subject? These are the forms in which we are to grasp the problems, when rightly understood, and which cannot be solved by way of knowledge.

6. *The Intelligible Character as Rational Causality (Will).*—But how is it possible, we must ask, that from the critical point of view the cause of a phenomenon can at all be thought as a thing *per se*? How is the intelligible character even conceivable? Must not the cause of every phenomenon be itself a phenomenon? Does not the concept of cause hold only for phenomena—for objects of experience—to which it is confined by its schema? How, then, can a thing *per se* be thought as a cause? In other words, how can an Idea, a pure Reason-concept, have causality?

It has already been explained how the reason (understanding) generates the concept of causality, and through this concept produces experience. The question now is: how the reason itself can have causality—how it can itself be cause?

Causality is in all cases necessity and legitimacy. This is as much the case with unconditioned (intelligible) as with conditioned (natural) causality. The latter excludes all freedom, while the former includes it. The law which excludes the freedom of action is such an one as we cannot depart from—*the law of nature*. The law which includes freedom is such an one as we can depart from—*the moral law*. The law of nature says: it *must* happen; the moral law, it *ought* to happen. *Ought* also expresses the necessity of an action, but an action of which the subject is the *will*. Ought is necessary will. In natural events, or mathematical relations, *ought* has no sense. It has a meaning in moral actions, which would cease to be such without the law of freedom. Therefore, the cause of all moral actions is law of the pure Reason—an Idea—an intelligible cause. Moral actions, then, are only possible if the *reason possesses causality*. But they can here not serve

as proof, but as an example, to make it clear how the reason can have causality. For the intelligible cause ought not to be confined to moral actions. As a cosmological problem, it is valid of all phenomena. Now, if the intelligible cause can be nothing but a necessary will,\* it must be the *Will* which must be at the basis of *all* phenomena—of all representations. And this is the point of the Kantian philosophy from which Schopenhauer deduces his own. The real solution of the cosmological problem, which Kant declares to be insoluble, and therefore avoids, is, according to Schopenhauer, “*the world as will.*” Space, time, causality explain “the world as representation.” The intelligible character explains “the world as will.” Hence, we see how Schopenhauer lays most stress upon Kant among all philosophers—among all the Kantian investigations on the transcendental *Æsthetic* and the doctrine of the empirical and intelligible character. The latter he regards as one of the profoundest discoveries made by human intellect.

7. *The Intelligible Character of the Human Reason as an Object for the Critick.*—It was necessary for Kant to grasp the concept of an intelligible cause. He must clearly search after the cause, or basis, which produces representations. The cause which conditions a representation by determining its moment in time is one thing; the cause which produces the representation itself is another thing. The first is the empirical, the second the transcendental cause. The former is itself a representation—the second not so. Now, as from the critical point of view phenomena in general are nothing but

\* I have before remarked upon this false inference from Kant. Because he uses the will as an *illustration* of what may not impossibly be the case with all phenomena, and because we are unable to imagine to ourselves such a cause anywhere save within ourselves, I cannot see that we are entitled to infer that the will is the only intelligible cause of phenomena. This is part of the perverse interpretation of Kant which attempts to force absolute idealism upon him.

representations, the ground which makes the phenomena must be determined as an intelligible cause. The empirical cause explains why the phenomenon turns up in the course of things just at this point, and under these circumstances. The intelligible cause, if it could be conceived, would explain why the represented existence is [precisely] *this* [and no other]—this individual, determinate character.

In this sense the critical philosophy demands intelligible causes for phenomena. Let us call that which decidedly possesses causality, though it never appears as a phenomenon, an intelligible cause; and this concept is so nearly within the range of the Critick of the Reason, that it can deduce it from its own investigations. What was the basis of quantities, as the objects of mathematics? Space and time. And what was the basis of space and time? The pure Reason itself, so far as it intuits. Space and time are not phenomena, but the causes of all phenomena; the pure reason is the cause of space and time.\* How the reason is such a cause is absolutely inexplicable. If the reason were not the cause of its intuitions and concepts—if these intuitions were not the causes of phenomena, these concepts, of experience—all the researches of the Critick would be useless, and our whole labor nothing without those intelligible causes which it claims to have discovered. What did the Critick want to explain? The con-

\* I have before observed that these are very incorrect expressions, if intended for expositions of Kant. They ignore the *receptivity* of intuition altogether. Kant never asserts that space and time are effects or results of the pure reason. By the constitution of things it is so ordained, that the reason only intuits through space and time, that it *receives* the intuitions of space and time along with sensations; that is all we can say. In the argument of Dr. Fischer there is another error—the confusion of cause and necessary condition. The Critick can hardly be said to have investigated the *causes* of mathematics, at least in the sense in which we speak of an intelligible cause, but rather the *conditions*. On the receptivity of intuition I select from many passages in point, p. 45 (the opening words of the *Analytic*), and p. 308 (foot), which are perfectly decisive and explicit.

ditions (or causes) of mathematics and experience. These causes cannot be given in any experience, but only prior to every experience. They cannot be empirical, but intelligible. It is, then, the discovery of intelligible causes which the Critick prosecutes: *its whole problem is not to be solved from the empirical, but from the intelligible, character of the reason alone.* But why the human reason has this intelligible character, and no other—why its intuitions and concepts are exactly these, and no others—this is the extreme limit of all critical questions. So much only is clear: either the Critick of the reason has discovered nothing, or its real discovery is the *intelligible character of human reason*, and hence its unconditioned causality, and in this sense its *freedom*. In this way the subtle and obscure doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character is cleared up, and shown to be well founded in the spirit of the critical philosophy.\*

## VII. THE NECESSARY BEING AS EXTRAMUNDANE.

It has been shown in what sense freedom and nature may not be contradictory; so that the propositions of the third antinomy are not [necessarily] opposed, but may both be affirmed. The same is the case with the fourth antinomy. Condition and conditioned existence differ in kind—perhaps *totally*; conditioned existence, then, may be contingent, while its condition is an absolutely necessary being. It is conceivable that all phenomena, each of which is contingent as to its existence, may depend on a being which exists necessarily, not contingently—which is not a phenomenon, but a thing *per se*. The dependence of all phenomena does not exclude the possible existence of a necessary being, nor prove its impossibility.

\* Cf. Critick, pp. 333, *sqq.* "Possibility of causality through Freedom in harmony with the universal law of natural necessity." This whole discussion is the most inaccurate part of Mr. Meiklejohn's translation.

Neither does it prove its possibility; it merely does not forbid our assuming it. But, as no empirical existence appears as necessary, such a being cannot be cognized as a phenomenon, nor conceived as belonging to phenomena. In this point the necessary being is distinguished from causality through freedom. This freedom, or intelligible character, we were obliged to conceive as the basis of representations, and so belonging to phenomena and to the world. The absolutely necessary being can only be conceived as *not* belonging to the world (*ens extramundanum*). If the thesis of the fourth antinomy only asserts the necessary being in this sense, and the antithesis does not deny it in the same sense, then there is no longer any contradiction between these propositions.\*

The necessary being, conceived as absolutely extramundane, and quite independent of the world, is the concept we form of *God*. It is plain that this concept represents no phenomenon, nor combines any; so that we can obtain no experience or knowledge from it. It is no *concept of the under-*

\* The distinction between the third and fourth antinomies appears rather obscure, and both turn upon the question of an infinite series of causes, as opposed to a first cause. But Kant repeatedly insists that he is, in the fourth antinomy, discussing the question of the *existence* of contingent substances, whereas in the third he was discussing the *causality* of substances. He throughout distinguishes the substance itself (or cause, as he improperly terms it) from its causality. The cause is a phenomenon (viz., the state of a substance known by empirical criteria), its causality may be intelligible. And this is urged to explain the phenomenon of causality. But the very existence of these phenomena as substances is conditioned, and postulates a being incapable of being conditioned even in the modes of its existence, not only at the origin of the world, but now also. Such an existence must be totally apart from phenomena in every respect. It is not, like the intelligible causality, a sort of quality or element belonging to a phenomenal substance (or, perhaps, rather a co-ordinate result of the noumenon along with the phenomenal manifestation), but the unconditioned existence of substance itself. I am not sure whether this is the correct interpretation. Cf. the Critick, pp. 345, *sqq.*

*standing*. Still less can we draw this concept from experience, or prove it by experience; it is no *empirical concept*. Consequently, the concept of God can only be formed, and its existence only proved, by pure reason. In other words: the concept of God can only be an Idea (concept of the Reason); the proof of His existence, if at all possible, can only be an ontological one. To decide this is the last problem of the Critick.

## CHAPTER X.

THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA. RATIONAL THEOLOGY. THE  
IDEAL OF THE PURE REASON. THE DEMONSTRATIONS  
OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY.

AMONG the cosmical concepts was that of an absolutely necessary being. It is distinguished by remarkable characteristics from the other cosmological Ideas. This much it has in common with them, that it does not form an object of cosmological knowledge any more than the quantity, content, or cause of the world. But the concept of an absolutely necessary being is distinguished by the peculiar way we represent it from those other cosmological Ideas. The unconditioned quantity of the world and its simple parts were self-contradictory representations. The Idea of a necessary being does not imply such a contradiction, which destroys the concept. The Idea is conceivable, which the other two are not. It is just as conceivable as the Idea of an unconditioned cause, as causality through freedom. But the latter may be represented as belonging to the world as the indwelling basis of phenomena, which does not itself appear; the absolutely necessary being, on the contrary, can only be represented as *not* belonging to the world, as separate, and independent of the chain of phenomena. So that the representation ceases to be cosmological, and becomes *theological*. This necessary being, as distinguished from the world, we call God.

I. THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA AS THE IDEAL OF THE PURE  
REASON.

To represent a concept is to determine it by its attributes. By *what* attributes can we determine the concept of the Deity? Every concept can be determined by one of two contradictory

predicates. One of them it must contain. If *all* possible predicates are given us, a concept may be determined by all its attributes thoroughly. Now, all possible predicates are either affirmative or negative. If we are merely concerned with logical affirmation or negation, the content of the predicate is of no consequence; but if the content of a concept is to be really determined, the opposed predicates must not merely affirm or deny logically. The affirmation must refer to some real being—the negation to its contrary, to non-being. We call such affirmation *reality*; such denial, *negation*. In this sense Reality always expresses a positive existence; Negation, its absence, want, or limit; whereas mere logical affirmation can posit a negative in this sense, and *vice versa*. To posit A is a logical affirmation; but A, not being known, may very well be the opposite of reality. If I, with the sceptics, assert the want or absence of knowledge, my logical affirmation is as to content a negation. Hence Kant distinguishes logical from transcendental affirmation. The content of the first is of no consequence; it is a mere formula; that of the last is reality—real being.

All possible predicates are, as to content, all realities, and all negations. Now, it is obvious that an absolutely necessary being cannot be dependent on, or conditioned by, any other. All other beings must rather be dependent on and conditioned by it. The absolutely necessary being must then be regarded as the basis of all the rest, as the *original being*, which contains the real possibility of all the rest, to which limited and determinate things are related as figures to space. We must conceive it as *the sum total of all possible predicates*. Contradictory attributes the same being cannot possess together; so that the necessary being cannot combine in itself all realities and all negations, but either the one or the other. As the sum total of negations, it would be composed of nothing but conditioned predicates; for every negation presupposes a reality, and is conditioned by it. Consequently, the necessary being can only

be conceived as the *sum total of all realities*, as the most real and complete being. Dogmatical metaphysicians used to call it "*omnitude realitatis*," "*ens realissimum*," the original being (*ens originarium*, *ens summum*) the source of all others (*ens entium*).

In this way the concept of the Deity is determined. It is determined through *all* its attributes. These are all *realities*. Only the *singular* object can contain all attributes, not the universal. Species and genera always contain only a part of the attributes of the individual. The less they contain, the higher and more universal are the concepts. The individual alone is completely determined; and every such completely determined concept is the representation of an individual. Hence, as the concept of God can only be thought (as such) as the sum of all realities, it is the representation of a *single* being, or, in other words, an "*Idea in individuo*." Such an Idea Kant calls an *Ideal*. Hence, the theological Idea is called the *Ideal of the Pure Reason*. To grasp the concept of the Deity is at the same time to determine it: and, in so doing, we must represent Him only as an individual. To realize the concept of the Deity means also to individualize it.

The sum of all realities is an Idea *in individuo*, or Ideal. It is not the imagination which invents this Ideal, but the pure reason, which produces it by grasping the concept of the Deity. And as the sum-total of all realities makes up a single being, which is absolutely singular in its kind, and has no parallel, this Ideal is also the *only* one formed by the pure reason.\*

\* Cf. the Critick, pp. 352, *sqq.*, on the *Prototypon Transcendentale*. The argument by which Kant obtains and establishes the Transcendental Idea of God is very difficult. The following is an attempt to present his argument in a simpler form. Kant is always bent upon showing transcendental synthetical analogies to the analytical laws of logic. As he had previously shown the unity of apperception to afford us a synthetical principle parallel to the  $A = A$  (Critick, p. 85), so now he fixes on the law of Excluded Middle

## II. THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA AS RATIONAL THEOLOGY. TRANSCENDENTAL AND EMPIRICAL METHODS OF PROOF.

As long as this Ideal aims at nothing more than being an Idea, or pure concept of the reason, it rests on a firm basis. As soon as it assumes the illusion of being a real object, it becomes the object of a science—rational theology—the duty of which is to prove this reality—the real existence of God. These proofs form the proper business of rational theology, which must stand or fall with them. It is the duty of the

(as the principle of disjunctive syllogisms), and shows a transcendental parallel (p. 356). Just as a concept can only be completely determined by being compared with every attribute, and either affirmed or denied of it, so a thing can only be completely known by being compared with every predicate given us in experience, which is either affirmed or denied of it. Hence, as every concept derives determinability from its comparison with all possible attributes, so every thing is determined by being compared with all our possible experience, regarded as one whole, and which may accordingly be called the condition of the possibility of the thing; for, could it not be so compared, it could never be an object or thing, at least to us. And this whole of experience means all possible positive, or real predicates, as the negative ones presuppose the positive and merely affirm their absence. This is a necessary and sound principle for the determination of objects of experience. Now, by a natural illusion (p. 358), we extend it to things *per se*, and regard all things in general, as depending for their possibility upon a complete whole—of course not of experience—but of all reality. As the comprehension of this Idea is infinite, so its extension must be at the minimum—it must be an individual. Hence Kant calls it an Ideal. As it would be absurd to call finite beings or things limitations of this *ens summum*, or parts subtracted from it, we must rather regard them as limited effects, arising from it as their cause or basis (p. 357). Let us also observe, that this is the whole notion of the *ens summum* suggested by the natural illusion of the Reason. And as the concept of the whole of experience was its origin, which we know we can never meet in experience, or cognize as existing, so we have no right to introduce existence into the Ideal. It is only a necessary postulate of the Reason, which desires to conceive all things, as completely determined by their reference to one whole, which contains all their conditions.

Critick of the Reason to investigate these proofs. If they are proved impossible, rational theology itself is overthrown, and proved impossible.

God must be conceived as the most real being, and that which necessarily exists. In the combination of these two concepts—the most real being and necessary existence—lies the real point of all theological demonstration. This combination must be demonstrated. And here a twofold course is open. Either we demonstrate of the most real being that it necessarily exists, or we prove of necessary existence that it constitutes the most real being. Of course, in the latter case it must first have been proved that a necessary being exists. And, as it is conditioned existence only which is always given us, we must first infer from it a necessary being, provided such an argument holds good.

The proof, then, either takes its departure from the rational concept of the most real being, or from the empirical concept of conditioned existence. In the first case, it is *a priori*, or *transcendental*; in the second, *a posteriori*, or *empirical*. Both demonstrations, though widely separated in origin, converge to the same point; they meet, or desire to meet, in the demonstrated existence of the *ens realissimum*. The empirical proof, again, may start from two different points: Either it departs from the existence we can experience, quite independent of the form and order in which it exists; or it proceeds from the consideration of the order of natural existence. The first starting-point is the existence of the world; the second, the existence of the order of the world. The former proof is *cosmological*; the latter, *physico-theological*. Rational theology, then, proposes three demonstrations of the existence of God: the transcendental (ontological), the cosmological, and the physicotheological.

We can easily see at the very outset that the empirical demonstrations are a delusion. By way of experience we can meet nothing but empirical existence; hence, from empirical

grounds we can only infer in any case empirical existence, which, as such, never exists necessarily. If we infer an absolutely necessary being, we have left the path of experience—we have made a pure syllogism of the Reason, and all that remains is to attempt to demonstrate from the pure rational concept of the necessary being, its existence. Either the necessary being belongs to the chain of phenomena, and, if so, is a link in that chain, and only conditioned; or it is really necessary, and does not belong to that chain, in which case it must be a purely rational concept, and its existence can then only be proved ontologically. From this simple consideration it is plain that all demonstration of the existence of God must be fundamentally ontological; that there is really no other method of proof; that the empirical proofs, not only in their end, but also in their processes, fall in with the ontological demonstration. This point, therefore, decides the conflict between the Critick and rational theology. If the ontological proof is overthrown, the Critick has won the day.

In one of his earliest writings Kant had already set his array against rational theology. He had there shown that the ontological proof of the existence of God was the only possible one; he had attempted to construct this proof. The proof then proposed as such, was the inference from the necessary to the most real being—the same which he here refutes among the empirical proofs. His former proof was really empirical in its starting-point. But in this Kant had then been mistaken, that he had considered the inference from empirical to absolutely necessary existence as scientifically tenable.

1. *The Ontological Proof.*—The refutation of the ontological proof is just the same in the Critick as in his pre-critical treatise. This proof itself, which Kant is wont to call the Cartesian, but which were better named that of Anselm, or

the scholastic proof,\* <sup>idea</sup> infers directly from the concept of God His real existence. In the concept of the most real and perfect being there must be contained, amongst His other attributes, existence. For, suppose this property were not contained in the concept, it would in this respect be defective, and so not the concept of the most complete being. Either, then, this being exists, or there cannot be even a concept of Him.

If existence belongs to the attributes of a concept, the proof is quite valid. Its *nervus probandi* lies in the relation of existence to concepts—in the question whether existence is a logical attribute, or not. If it be a logical attribute, it follows immediately from the concept by mere dissection, and the ontological proof is an analytical judgment—an immediate syllogism of the understanding.

The question in this form has already been twice decided by Kant; in the earlier treatise to which we have referred, and again, in the “postulates of empirical thinking.”† If existence be a logical attribute, it must stand in the same re-

\* The distinction between these two demonstrations is very clearly given (from Des Cartes) by Schwegler, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 176 (Seelye's trans.) where, by the way, the original is grievously mistranslated. The sentence should read as follows: “This proof is essentially different from that of Anselm, which Thomas (*i. e.* Aquinas) opposed. It ran thus: An examination into the meaning we attach to the word God shows us that we understand by it that which must be conceived as the greatest of all [things]; now, to exist really, as well as to exist in thought, is more than to exist in representation [in thought] alone; hence, God exists not only in representation, but also in reality.” From what precedes this passage it will be seen that Des Cartes saw the difficulty urged by Kant, but solved it by urging that our Idea of the Deity was *sui generis*, and contained existence as an attribute (discussed in the Critick, p. 366, *sub. fin.*). He forgot both to examine what *existence* was, and at what stage of the process to look for inseparable association.

† Cf. above, p. 125.

lation to the concept that other attributes do; the content of the concept must be diminished if I subtract existence; increased, if I add it. In other words, the fact of a concept's existing really, or not, should change its content, i. e., should change the concept. But the concept, for example, of a triangle, is not changed, whether I merely represent it to myself, or whether it really exists without me. The attributes which make a triangle to be such are completely the same in both cases. It is the same with any other concept—with that of the Deity. It is clear that existence does not belong to the content of the concepts, that it is no logical attribute, that existential judgments are never analytical; so that in no case, not even in rational theology, is the ontological argument valid.

Existential judgments are always *synthetical*. The concept is exactly the same as to content, whether it exist, or not.\* This only changes its relation to our cognition. In one case it is merely the object of our thought; in the other, of our experience. The concept of £100 is exactly the same as to attributes, whether I have them in my possession or not. In this case existence does not alter the concept of the thing, but the state of my finances. From the mere concept of a thing existence can no more follow, than property can accrue to me from conceiving a sum of money. It is, then, absolutely impossible to demonstrate the existence of God ontologically. "Our pain and trouble [says Kant, in concluding his refutation] are completely thrown away upon the ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being from concepts, and a

\* "Otherwise not exactly the same, but something more than what I had thought in my concept, would exist; and I could not assert that the very object of my concept existed."—Critick, p. 369. Perhaps Kant should have separated existential judgments into a distinct class (as Locke did). They differ from explicative judgments in not being obtained by mere analysis of concepts; and from ampliative, in not adding to the attributes of the subject, but only changing the relation of the same concept to our knowledge.

man might just as well expect to increase his knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant the state of his means, by adding cyphers to the amount on the credit side of his cash book.”\*

2. *The Cosmological Proof*.—There is, then, no passage by pure concepts (or reasoning) from a concept to existence. The cosmological proof starts from an opposite point—from the empirical concept of conditioned and contingent existence. Something exists, which is conditioned by something else; there must then, ultimately, exist a being which is not dependent on anything else, but is absolutely independent and necessary; and this necessary being can only be the most real being—that is, the *ens summum* or God. This is, in brief, the course of the cosmological proof, which Leibniz called the proof a *contingentia mundi*. This demonstration has, as it were, two steps or halting places. First, we infer from contingent existence the absolutely necessary, and then from this the *ens summum* or *realissimum*.

Let us examine in detail the steps of this proof; every one of them contains a dialectical assumption; at every step the proof sinks deeper in the mire. It first infers from contingent, that there is absolutely necessary, existence, or from the conditioned the unconditioned. It infers from given existence, not-given existence; nay, existence which never can be given. Such a proof is impossible; the existence at which it aims is not an attainable object, but an Idea; it is never given by experience, but through pure Reason only. The cosmological proof is, then, at its very outset, misled by the illusion which pictures to it as objectively existing what can only be an Idea or rational-concept. This is its *first* dialectical assumption.

Why does it assert the existence of a necessary being? Because otherwise an *infinite* series of conditions must be given, and because this is impossible. Who says it is impossible?

\* Cf. Critick, p. 370, and also p. 392.

How can this be proved? Does an infinite series of conditions contradict experience? Nay, rather, it corresponds to these conditions; at least from the empirical point of view, the series of natural conditions is never completed. Of course, this does not warrant the dogmatical claim, that the series is in itself infinite. It is impossible either to assert or deny dogmatically the infinity of the series. If it be first dogmatically assumed, in order then to deny it dogmatically, two errors have been committed in one. The affirmation was the error in the antitheses of our antinomies; the negation was the error in the theses. This is the *second* dialectical assumption in the cosmological proof.

And, supposing this series of conditions could be completed, this could never be done by a being, which itself lies totally beyond and apart from the series. The cosmological proof has no right to complete arbitrarily the series of natural conditions. And the pretended completion is in all cases impossible; it is *false*; for it does not complete the series, from which the necessary being is separated by an impassable gulf. This is the *third* dialectical assumption.

Finally, having followed the cosmological proof to its first stage, how does it reach the second? How does it infer from the necessary being the most real? As the necessary being does not exist in experience, how is its existence proved? It proves that that necessary being, on which all the rest depend, must comprehend all the conditions of existence; that is, all reality, and so also existence. It proves of the necessary being that it is the most real, and therefore an actual existence. It infers the existence of the being from the concept; that is, it argues ontologically, it is guilty of a fallacy unwittingly; it falls into the ontological proof, while it still pretends to be arguing cosmologically. This *ignoratio elenchi* is its *fourth* dialectical assumption.\* And so the whole cosmological

\* In the third section of this chapter in the Critick, on the natural course pursued by the Reason as to these arguments (which I strongly commend

proof, when dissected and examined by the microscope of the Critick, is a "perfect nestful of dialectical assumptions," which conceal themselves therein.\*

3. *The Physico-Theological Proof.*—We have already seen that there can be no empirical proof of the existence of God. The physico-theological proof infers from the order and intelligent arrangement of natural things the existence of God. It starts from *determinate* experience, and is in this respect empirical as to principle. It infers God from the world, and is, in this respect, cosmological. What empirical proofs cannot achieve, what the cosmological proof failed to do, the physico-theological must also be unable to perform.

Yet this proof has the advantage of the cosmological, in starting to the reader's attention), there is an additional fallacy noted (p. 361), which Dr. Fischer has passed by. Even supposing the *ens summum* to exist, and to exist necessarily, we could not from hence infer that no other being exists necessarily; hence, allowing the inference from contingent to necessary existence, it still remains to be proved that the *ens summum* is the *only* necessary existence.

The whole discussion is, I think, one of the most satisfactory and complete to be found in any philosophical work, and forms a most weighty contribution to negative metaphysic. Those theologians who are still teaching with approval such works as Clarke "on the Attributes," would do well to consider this part of Kant carefully. It is, moreover, by no means a difficult portion of his work. Even M. Cousin is convinced by his refutation of the ontological argument, which he quotes from Leibniz, in the form specially considered by Kant (cf. *Leçons sur Kant*, p. 210).

\* Cf. Critick, p. 374. Let not the reader, who takes this commentary as his clue to the Critick, pass over the important section which follows (pp. 377–81). Sir William Hamilton's law of the Conditioned is there again explicitly laid down (cf. also Critick, pp. 302, 313), and the two regulative principles of our knowledge also explained. It is further shown how ancient philosophers, from considering matter under the first regulative principle alone, came to think its existence necessary. Kant then adds an additional analogy to that already mentioned above (p. 261, note), showing how space had been exalted by just such a *subreptio* as the Ideal, into an existing substance given *a priori*.

ing from an *exalted* view of nature. The beauty, harmony, and order of nature are dear to the human mind, and we love to harbour in our breasts these ennobling thoughts. Such considerations are, indeed, more æsthetic and religious than scientific in character. And it is this peculiarity which has always gained for the physico-theological proof popularity and respect in this world. But to exalt our moral nature is not to convince our intellect; we are not now discussing its ennobling, but its convincing power, and must estimate it by the light of sober criticism.

Let us then follow the course of the argument. It begins with the empirical fact of an intelligent arrangement, in which natural things harmonize, and are systematically connected. This order cannot be explained from mechanical causes in nature; hence, not from the things themselves; it is *contingent* to things, and postulates a being apart from the world, which produces this order. This ordering being cannot be a blind power, but must have understanding and will, or intelligence; in short, must be a *spirit*; and, as the system of nature is perfectly uniform, the spirit can only be conceived as *one*—as the highest cause of the world—or as God.

Now, supposing the whole proof to be valid, in any case it has proved nothing beyond the existence of a spirit that orders nature; it has proved the existence of an *architect*, or arranger of the world, not of a *Creator*, and has therefore missed the point in question. Assuming its validity, the physico-theological proof is too narrow. It proves the Deity only an arranging, not a creating, principle.

But the proof itself is everywhere unsound. Supposing such an arranging principle were necessary for the explanation of things, why must it be only *one*, and an *intelligent* being? Why might not nature herself produce this order by means of forces acting blindly? Just as little, says the physico-theological proof, as our houses, ships, watches, &c., could have made themselves. These things clearly prove the forming hand of an

architect, who has put them together. Nature is such a work of art, and points equally to an architect beyond itself. It is, then, the similarity or analogy between the works of man and those of nature which makes us infer from the order of nature the unity and intelligence of its origin. An argument from analogy can at best, strictly speaking, give us only probability, not certainty.

We may infer the cause from the effect; and, indeed, a cause in *proportion* to the effect. The physico-theological proof asserts, that God alone is the adequate cause for the evidences of design in nature. Grant it to be only a single power, combined with wisdom, which is competent to produce these effects. But who can in this case measure the proportion between cause and effect? Who is to determine how great the power and wisdom of the world-arranging cause is to be, in order to be adequate to the existing effects? For to say that it was *very great*, and far above all human power, would be quite undetermined and idle. But if we attempt to determine that cause accurately and clearly as the sum total of all realities (*i. e.* absolute power and wisdom), then the cause, so determined, is so completely removed from the natural scene of its effects, that we must give up all notion of a *proportion*, or of any *knowledge* of this proportion.

The physico-theological proof in no way suffices for proving the existence of a creator of the world. At best it could only prove the existence of an architect or arranger of the world. To prove this, it argues from an analogy, the force of which, under any circumstances, only attains probability; but in the present case has not even this merit, since it supposes a cause without any relation to its effect, nor any knowledge of this relation.

This proof then has no other course open than to infer from the *contingent* fact of natural order in things an ultimate necessary cause. That such an order really exists has not been proved, but assumed; it is not a scientific, but an æsthetic

experience, which is of no demonstrative value. Conceding such order to exist, and that things in nature are universally connected together, according to final causes, why could not this harmony have proceeded from the natural arrangement of things, why must it be altogether *contingent* with reference to things?

Neither the *fact* of the harmony, nor its *contingency*, have been proved. These two earliest starting points of the physico-theological proof are assumptions, neither demonstrated nor demonstrable. Even suppose them valid, and the argument proceeds by inferring necessary from contingent existence, which is merely the cosmological proof, which we know, and have already followed up into the ontological proof. In its influence upon the minds of men the physico-theological proof is far the strongest and most influential; scientifically speaking, it is the weakest, for it shares with the ontological and cosmological proofs all their faults, and has besides special defects of its own. After Kant has refuted the ontological proof, he reduces to it the cosmological, and the physico-theological to both. It is demonstrated, then, that there is no logical proof possible of the existence of God; in a word, there is no rational theology. This solves the last problem of the transcendental Dialectic and completes the proper business of the Critick.

### III. CRITICK OF ALL THEOLOGY.

1. *Deism and Theism.*—But there is one path still open for rational theology, which the Critick here merely notices, without following it up. It is proved that there can be no rational theology on *theoretical* grounds; but there might be on *practical* grounds. If the aim of theology in general be the cognition of God, two courses are conceivable: either through supernatural revelation, or through natural reason. Hence, we have *revealed* and *rational* theology. We here only speak

of the latter. Human reason, again, can attempt the knowledge of God in two different ways: either from pure concepts, or from the consideration of nature and of man. In the first case, rational theology is *transcendental*; in the second, *natural*. The pure concepts from which the knowledge of God can be derived are either the concept of the *ens realissimum*, or that of the world as a contingent existence, the cause of which must be an absolutely necessary being. Kant calls transcendental theology in the first case, "Ontotheology," in the second, "Cosmotheology." For even the concept of the world in general, as a contingent existence, is not drawn from the contemplation of nature, but is a mere concept formed by pure Reason. Whichever of the two concepts we make the basis of the cognition of God, in either case God is only cognized as the highest *cause of the world*, as the highest being. This conception of God, Kant calls Deism.

Natural theology, on the contrary, derives its knowledge of God, not from the mere concept of the world, but from the consideration of the order, and nature of the world, which is by no means a mere concept. The evidences of design in the world point to a *Spirit* as their ultimate source; they point to God, not as a mere cause of the world, but as an *originator* of the world—a living personal Deity. This conception of God, Kant calls Theism. And such Theism is twofold. It derives its proof either from the order of nature, or from that of the moral world. In the first case it is *physico-theology*; in the second, *moral theology*.

2. *Theoretical and Practical Theology*.—All rational theology is either deistical, or theistical. The deistical has been refuted in all its proofs—the theistical, in its physico-theological proof—by our Critick. There only remains theistical theology, based on moral proofs, or *moral theology*; as the last possible alternative for a rational cognition of God. Now, the order of the moral world is no fact of nature, but the act of the will—

an aim for the reason, of which we cannot say it *exists*, but it *ought* to exist. That which exists as a given fact may be asserted; that which *ought* to be, or happens, is a necessity, which is postulated. What we prove from assertions is proved *theoretically*; what we deduce from necessary postulates, *practically*. Moral theology can only have practical proofs, while all other rational theology is theoretical, based on assertions that something exists or happens. Practical theology rests on a proposition demanding that something *ought* to take place. The former is disproved—the question remains: whether the latter is possible?\*

3. *Theoretical, used as the Critick of Dogmatical, Theology.*—The Critick of the Reason is far from denying the existence of God; it only denies our *cognition* thereof, and only our *theoretical* cognition. On logical grounds there is no rational theology *quâ* science, but only *quâ* Critick. Such a science cannot itself dogmatically assert or affirm anything about the being and existence of God; it can only investigate, criticize, and overthrow the dogmatical assertions ventured by Reason. It is not at all *positive*, but only *critical*. If there be any positive theology at all, it can only be *practical* theology. If the being of God is to be at all affirmatively expressed, He must be represented as the source of the moral order of the world, as the moral originator of the world, as the moral end of the world. This concept—the highest possible—is the proper aim of the theological Ideas. The Critick has done what it could to turn rational theology into this direction. At least, it has cut off all other means of seeking for the concept of the Deity. Every fallacious cognition of God it has refuted, and destroyed from its very foundation. It has taught how God is *not* to be represented. This result is, and can only be, negative. But it has the important advantage of making way for the only pos-

\* Cf. Critick, p. 389.

sible positive concept of God—for the purely moral Idea—and of cutting away all spurious elements which might be mixed up with it in our representation. There being, then, no theoretical grounds of proof at all with regard to the being and existence of God, of course negative proofs are just as impossible as affirmative. The negative proofs are dogmatic atheism; the affirmative were either deistical, or they founded theism upon human analogies, and were anthropomorphic. And this expresses the whole negative result of the Critick with regard to theology—that the *atheistical*, the *deistical*, and the *anthropomorphic* representations of God are all equally recognised to be false, and so destroyed. As to anthropomorphism, Kant carefully distinguishes the *dogmatical* from the *symbolical*; the former transfers human attributes to God, the latter uses human relations of a moral kind, *e. g.*, the relation of a father to his children, to represent under this image the relation of God to man. Here the representation is consciously symbolical. And this symbolical representation does not refer to the being of God in itself, but merely to His relation towards the world.

Wherever the Critick proceeds negatively, it is a two-edged sword, which cuts away dogmatical teaching on both sides—both the affirmative and the negative. Thus, in psychology, *Materialism*; in cosmology, *Naturalism*; with regard to the concept of God, *Atheism*; and with it, *Fatalism*, have been just as vigorously opposed and overthrown as their opposites.\*

#### IV. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS. THE IDEAS AS MAXIMS OF KNOWLEDGE.

This is the place to give a general view of the end and use of the whole doctrine of Ideas, as it now lies before us. Their origin was the pure Reason as the faculty of Principles; their

\* Cf. Critick, p. 393.

history, that false use which the Reason makes of them, being misled by a natural illusion to regard them as objects of possible knowledge. What is their true, common end? What is their proper value for human knowledge, as they can never be its *objects*?

Regarded as objects, the Ideas appear as principles of *things*—as their absolute unity and system: the psychological, as the *single* subject lying at the basis of the internal phenomena; the cosmological, as the world-whole; the theological, as the highest unity of all things, or the highest being. They appear in all these cases as an objective unity; and this was the unavoidable illusion which misled the reason to undertake a metaphysic of the supersensuous. But, viewed correctly as mere Ideas, which are not objects, and only exist in our reason, they lose that illusive appearance of objective unity. This does not reduce them to hallucinations, without ground or meaning.\* They do not cease to be principles, which express and demand unity. But the unity which they demand does not refer to objective existence, but to our experience. They demand the unity, not of things, but of cognition; that is, a *subjective unity*, which still possesses a necessary use and value.

Principles, the value of which is purely subjective, Kant calls *maxims*. And the Ideas are just such maxims, after they have laid aside the false appearance of objective existence—maxims which refer immediately to our knowledge, or our cognitions of the understanding. These latter cognitions, being empirical, do not possess systematic unity. Nor is it possible that experience could ever conclude systematically in a complete scientific unity. But this does not prevent it from continually aiming at such a systematic completion; indeed, this completion is its necessary aim. Supposing knowledge had

\* Cf. Critick, p. 352, where he distinguishes "*Ideals of the Reason*" from "*creatures of the imagination*."

reached this aim, it would not be *experience*. Supposing experience were *altogether* without this aim, it would not be *cognition*. As certainly as there is empirical knowledge, this aim must be connected with it. And the Ideas, taken as maxims, exactly denote this goal, and continually direct our knowledge towards it. They do not legislate for it, like the concepts of the understanding, but only give it a clue; or, as Kant likes to express the distinction, the Ideas are not *constitutive*, but *regulative* principles; what they determine is no object, but an aim—a *problem* which belongs to science as such, and continually accompanies it on its path.\*

The final solution of this problem would be the system of human knowledge completed in all its parts—the completely developed and perfected universe of concepts. And this completed system could not be anything else than what Plato had clearly represented in his world of Ideas, as in a logical sketch—viz., that knowledge which commences from *individua* and the lowest species, and so mounts up through species and genera to the highest unity, which, as it were, forms the apex of this pyramid of science. This system, conceived as completed, would be the highest unity in the greatest diversity. Unity belongs to the genus, which comprehends under it *all species* and individuals; diversity, to the species, which as attributes and marks are contained *in* the individuals.

1. *The Principle of Homogeneity*.—In order to reach that unity, science must continually unify its concepts—must seek what is homogeneous in them, and place it above them as their higher genus; it must strive at the highest unity—at a concept of absolute comprehension. This striving is the necessary regulator of cognition. Expressing it in the form of a law: it is the *logical law of genera—of homogeneity*—which demands

\* These regulative principles Kant carefully distinguishes (p. 407) from the dynamical principles of the understanding, which he also calls regulative. The latter are regulative of phenomena; the former, of experience. Cf. p. 107.

that we should not unnecessarily multiply principles: *entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*.\*

2. *The Principle of Specification*.—In order to reach the greatest diversity, science must continually distinguish its concepts, search everywhere for specific differences, overlook no attribute, sound perfectly the content of its concepts, and investigate all their peculiarities. This distinction of concepts gives us profusion of species, which again subdivide into lower species, none of which may be the lowest. The continued combination of concepts produces the comprehension and unity, the continued distinction and division gives the extension and the content, of a scientific system. If we wish to express the second regulator as a principle, it is the *logical principle of species—the law of specification*—which demands that we are not carelessly to overlook, or hastily to diminish, the varieties in nature: *entium varietates non sunt temere minuendæ*.

3. *The Principle of Continuity (Affinity)*.—From the maximum of multiplicity to the maximum of unity, the path of systematic knowledge passes through the subordinate genera and species; between these extremes lies the infinite domain of intermediate species. We ascend upwards by means of a continually increasing unity and similarity of concepts; we descend by means of their increasing variety. Above, there is converging unity; below, diverging multiplicity. But experience, which describes this course, is concatenated and continuous; if so, its path must itself be continuous; that is to say, between any two points of its course—between a higher and a lower concept of species—there can be no *saltus*, but rather an infinity of intermediate members, which lead gradually

\* If Sir William Hamilton had studied the connexion in which this law is here introduced, and its explanation, he might have avoided the blunder of setting it up as a law of nature or of things (Lects. II., p. 409).

from the lower to the higher stage, and *vice versâ*. Without this continuity—this gradation of concepts—we could have no systematic order, far less any completeness in our knowledge. The Idea, which proposes as an aim to our knowledge systematic unity and completeness, must demand this continuous gradation of concepts as the necessary connecting link between the highest unity and the greatest multiplicity. It must demand that the highest genus be connected with the lowest species through gradations of intermediate concepts; that all concepts, all species, be connected with one another through this living bond of community; that all nature should form a great family, in which every member is connected with all the rest in nearer or more remote degrees. If we express this regulator as a principle—as if it were a law of things themselves, it is the *principle of affinity*—the *law of the continuous connexion of the laws of nature*; *lex continui specierum* (*lex continui in natura*); *datur continuum formarum*. For continuity in nature—this graduated increase of multiplicity, is at the same time the thoroughgoing affinity of all phenomena.

If this view of the world were a dogmatical one, and the system of our concepts and cognitions were at the same time the system of things, or the objective constitution of the world, then the world would be a continuous gradation of things, summated in the Deity as its highest and absolute unity; then everything would be an animated being, and the world a connected whole, with God as its highest and first cause. Then would the psychological, cosmological, and theological Ideas be objective, and Leibniz' view of the world be justified.

But it is simply a *critical* view. It is not the system of things, but of our cognitions. It is altogether subjective, yet not therefore a capricious, but a necessary, maxim—a regulative principle of our knowledge, which [knowledge] always remains *empirical*, and can therefore never reach or fully express its Idea, but which is nevertheless empirical *knowledge*, and therefore must have that Idea, and perpetually aim at it.

The Ideas only refer to our understanding and will, not to the nature of things. We are now only discussing their relation to our *understanding*. From this point of view they are the models of science, not its object; they are, as it were, the archetypes, not of things, but of our cognition of things. This is the distinction between the *Platonic* and the *Kantian* doctrines of Ideas; the former is dogmatical: the latter, critical. There the Ideas are the concepts and patterns of things; here, on the contrary, the aim and models of our concepts.

#### V. THE THEOLOGICAL IDEA AS A REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE IN SCIENCE. TELEOLOGY.

It is now perfectly clear what meaning the theological Idea assumes with reference to our knowledge, from the critical point of view. It is never the object of our knowledge—never a cognoscible object. This was the error of rational theology in its theoretical character; but it does denote the highest unity, and is as such the guiding star of science. Science may follow it, without ever in consequence transcending its empirical limit. This would be the case as soon as it pretended to know God Himself, or deduce and cognize the nature of things from the being of God. Then the human Reason becomes dialectical. If it uses the Deity to explain things, and produces theological grounds where it has only a right to physical grounds, it deserts the path of scientific research; it makes its business easy, and becomes *indolent*; it also acts quite *perversely* in taking for the starting point of its explanation what should in any case be only its last and extreme goal. Theological explanations are in science the evidence as well of a “*ratio ignava*” as of a “*ratio perversa*.” But science may very well combine the clue of the theological Idea with the principles of empirical explanation; for it does not hinder or narrow our empirical explanation if we deduce things purely from natural grounds, and at the same time consider them *as if* they proceeded from a Divine intelligence. And as the Di-

vine Being must be regarded as acting for an end—as the absolute final cause of the world—the theological point of view here coincides with the *teleological*. We can anticipate from this passage how the critical philosophy will combine the strictly physical (mechanical) explanation of things with the teleological aspect.

## VI. THE SUMMARY OF THE WHOLE CRITICK.

The task of the Critick is completed, and its results may be simply and compendiously summed up. It has completely surveyed the domain of human reason, as far as its cognitive relations reach, and distinguished its faculties according to their primitive conditions. These faculties were Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. Each of these faculties has, in its original nature, formative principles, by the co-operation of which scientific knowledge is produced. These principles are pure intuitions, pure concepts of the understanding, and Ideas. Each of them contributes, after its fashion, unity and connexion. They are distinguished as to *what* they combine. What each of these faculties has combined is its peculiar product. This product becomes the problem of a new connexion for another faculty of the human reason. So the product of intuition becomes a problem for the understanding; the product of the understanding, for the Reason. Intuition connects sensuous impressions, and makes of them *phenomena*. These, being the product of our intuition, are the object of our understanding. The understanding connects phenomena, and makes of them cognition, or *experience*. Experience is the product of our understanding; it is the object of our Reason. Reason connects experiences, and makes of them a whole—a scientific system—which continually progresses, without ever completing itself. Sensuous impressions can only be connected into phenomena by means of *space* and *time*; these are the form-giving principles of Sensibility. Phenomena can only be connected

into experiences by the *Categories* ; these are the form-giving principles of the Understanding. Experiences can only be connected into a scientific system by means of *Ideas* ; these are the form-giving faculties, or, more accurately, those which give a goal, or aim, to our Reason. In the development of human knowledge, impressions and their connexion are the first ; the formation and completion of a scientific system, the last. To pursue and explain this whole course of knowledge was the problem of the Critick.\*

\* The reader will find some further remarks on this part of the Critick in the Introduction (on Understanding and Reason).

## CHAPTER XI.

## THE TRANSCENDENTAL METHODOLOGY. TRANSITION TO THE SYSTEM OF PURE REASON. THE DISCIPLINE, CANON ARCHITECTONIC, AND HISTORY OF THE PURE REASON.

THE foundations of the critical philosophy are laid. The question was : under what conditions synthetical *a priori* cognition arises ? Such cognition is universal and necessary, and is not possible through experience, but through the pure reason. Synthetical cognition, as distinguished from analytical or merely logical, is real. The question then was : whether, and under what conditions, there is real cognition through the pure reason ? These conditions being explained, the critical philosophy has only one problem left : to construct the system of pure cognitions of the reason—to erect its structure on the newly discovered and critically established foundations. Of this structure the elements or materials alone have been as yet given. Before constructing it, we must determine its plan and proportions—as it were, give a design, according to which it must be built. We were before discussing the conditions or elements ; we are now concerned with the method, or clue, of our pure cognition of the reason. The first problem was solved by the *transcendental Stoicheiology* ; the second must be treated by the *transcendental Methodology*. This is the last question of the Critick. When it is solved, the critical philosophy may at once proceed to present to us the system of the pure reason itself.

## I. THE PROBLEM OF THE METHODOLOGY.

The Methodology does not determine the content of the pure rational cognitions, but only their form and connexion ; it indicates the way, or clue, which the reason must follow,

in order to erect upon its proper basis a safe and solid structure; it affords us the chief aspects which regulate the use of our cognitive faculties. Now, as the unconditioned application of these faculties to all possible objects is not allowable, the first problem of the methodology is twofold: it must accurately determine those points of view which prevent a *false* use of the reason; it must also lay down principles for the *proper* use. In the first aspect it gives the sum of the negative rules, which show the reason its natural bounds, and the use of which merely consists in avoiding error. In its second aspect it gives the positive rule, which determines the character of pure rational cognition. The negative rules bridle and discipline reason in the use of its cognitive faculties; they are, as it were, notices put up to warn off speculation from forbidden paths, and to obviate every possible trespass. The positive rule contains the principles of a right and valid use of the reason. Hence, Kant calls the negative, the *Discipline*, the positive rule, the *Canon*, of the pure reason. When the Methodology has completely explained these two points, and developed the clue for rational knowledge, as well in its negative as its positive aspects, it will then be easy to determine the systematic structure in all its parts; that is, in its whole "*architectonic*." As this structure is also based on a perfectly new foundation, so its independent position appears as opposed to all previous systems of philosophy; and therefore we may discuss the *historical* position occupied by the Critick of the reason.

These four parts make up the whole of the Methodology: the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and the History of the pure reason. The Methodology, then, is intermediate between the Critick and the System of pure reason: it sums up the results of the former, and gives a summary view of the latter; it must, therefore, necessarily repeat much which has been already discussed in the Critick, and anticipate much which the following system only can expound and establish.

This is a twofold reason for making our exposition here as brief as possible.

## II. THE DISCIPLINE OF THE PURE REASON.

1. *The Dogmatical Method.*—A cognition of things through pure reason we call dogmatical. Every cognitive judgment which relates to things, and asserts itself to be a doctrine, is in this sense a dogma. Now comes the question: can reason claim such a cognition—is there a *dogmatical use of the reason*? reason contains two cognitive faculties—sensibility, cognizing through intuition; understanding, through concepts. Cognition through intuition is *mathematical*; through concepts, *philosophical*. All pure rational judgments which as such are universal and necessary—all apodeictic propositions, then, are based either on intuition or on concepts; they are either mathematical or dogmatical. In other words, all apodeictic propositions are either *mathemata* or *dogmata*. That the former are possible, is clear; the question is: are the latter so? If not, then the Methodology as discipline will prohibit the dogmatical use of the reason.

If philosophical could proceed like mathematical cognition, then there would be just as certain and necessary cognitive judgments of things, as there are of quantities in space and time, and the dogmatical use of the Reason would be justified. This was the fundamental error of philosophy since Des Cartes, that of taking mathematics for a type, and erecting after this model its metaphysical structure. Philosophy used to demonstrate “*more geometrico*,” and imagined it could thus give the highest completeness to metaphysical cognition. Kant discovered and exposed this error. Even before he wrote the Critick, the distinction between the sciences of mathematics and philosophy was quite clear to him; in his Academic Prize Essay of 1764 he had shown that the cognition of metaphysic stands under quite different conditions from that of mathema-

tics; that the latter cannot serve the former as a model without its peculiar problem being mistaken at the very outset. The Critick had demonstrated this distinction from the first elements of the human reason itself. Sensibility and understanding are in nature different—the former intuiting, the latter thinking. The concepts of mathematics are intuitive; those of philosophy are absolutely not so. Mathematics must and can construct its concepts, which philosophy cannot; it can only think [conceive] them. It only cognizes through concepts; mathematics, by *construction* of concepts. Hence, these latter can be fully defined; hence, mathematics can set up judgments which are immediately certain, or axioms; hence it can make its proofs intuitive and clear—it can demonstrate. All these privileges and rights philosophy must waive on account of its radically different position. It cannot present in intuition, or construct,\* any of its concepts; hence, with reference to its objects, it wants the possibility of definitions, axioms, and demonstrations—the very things which make mathematical knowledge apodeictic.†

\* Let the reader note Kant's explanation of the expression *constructing* a concept. It seems somewhat similar to Mr. Mansel's use of the term *conceiving*: Proleg. Log., p. 24. He also adds an important remark on the nature of algebra. Abstracting altogether from the nature of the object, pure quantity is considered in this science. Now, first, general signs are adopted to denote symbolically the construction of concepts (viz., such signs as +, −, and  $\vee$ ). Then, arbitrary symbols (letters, such as  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $z$ ) are given to the concepts of pure quantity, according to their various relations. Constructions are performed in intuition with this apparatus, just as valid and more general than geometrical conclusions. Mr. Mill (Logic, I., p. 287) has given a similar account of algebra, but has omitted to explain the nature of the signs +, −, &c. The passage in the Critick (p. 437) is confused in the translation, and this point allowed to escape.

† Kant takes care to add, that it is the *act*, not the *result*, of the construction, which gives us the *a priori* intuition. Hence, even an empirical figure on paper suggests the general procedure of the mind, and so forms the basis of apodeictic proof; cf. Critick, p. 435. On Definition, cf. Appendix C.; and Critick, pp. 66 and 444.

It might be objected, that there are also principles of the understanding; that the Critick itself has set up such principles, and proved them by a series of the most laborious investigations. Shall we say that the proposition, every change in nature must have a cause, is not a fundamental principle of the pure understanding? Is not the proposition a purely philosophical one, and therefore a dogma in the required sense? We answer: there are certainly first principles of the pure science of nature, which, as such, depend, not upon intuitions, but concepts; the Critick has made it its special business to prove these principles. But in this very fact lies the difference between them and mathematical principles. They are not, like the latter, *immediately certain*: they are not *axioms*; but, if we except the Axiom of intuition\* (which concerns the mathematical part of the science of nature), they are Anticipations, Analogies, Postulates. If they were immediately certain, whence the necessity of first proving them? And how were they proved? what was the *nervus probandi* in all the demonstrations? It lay in proving that these principles were the necessary conditions of experience; experience being impossible, if we deny them. Either there is no experience, or these principles must be valid: this was the critical demonstration which Kant called "deduction." All the fundamental principles of the understanding require such a deduction, which forms a chief duty of the Critick; consequently, the objects to which these principles refer are by no means things, but merely and solely experience. Their value, then, is not dogmatical, but critical.†

\* Cf. the Critick, p. 447, for remarks upon the use of this term, which he admits himself to have used improperly in this case, and above, p. 99.

† The reader, if he have taken my advice, will be already familiar with the important discussion here very briefly disposed of. I forbear to add notes upon it, not because of its want of importance, but because there seems to me no difficulty in it likely to mislead the attentive student. The great distinction which Kant insists upon between the mathematical and philosophical de-

2. *The Polemical Method.*—There is, then [legitimately], no dogmatical use of the Reason—no rational cognition which refers immediately to things in themselves; hence, no apodeictic proposition about the nature and being of things. If such be attempted, it will immediately appear how far they fall short of being apodeictic; they are never universal and unconditioned, like really necessary propositions—like those of mathematics. Philosophical dogmas always call forth contradictions; the domain of metaphysic, if cultivated dogmatically, is forthwith covered with contradictions; affirmatives are flatly reversed by negatives with the same claim to validity; and, instead of being *one* clear and irrefragable science—as mathematics is and ought to be—metaphysic is merely the arena of opposed assertions and systems. Whosoever in this conflict joins either faction behaves dogmatically. Whosoever will not do this has, it seems, two alternatives left—either to attack and refute one of the two assertions, without for this reason defending the other, or else to deny them both equally. In the first case we proceed *polemically*; in the second *sceptically*.

Now, as a dogmatical use of the Reason is forbidden us, the question arises, whether a polemical one does not remain open to us. The conflict of opposed systems or dogmas is given in metaphysic, and given on the arena of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology. In cosmology, indeed—where a natural division of Reason against itself took place—the contradictions are solved, and so the illusion of antinomies destroyed. Here we had contradictions of such a nature that they must either not appear at all, or be perfectly reconciled with each other. There remain, then, only psychology and theology as the open arena of dogmatical systems. Both these sciences are

monstrations is this: that no mathematical theorem can be proved by mere analysis of given concepts, but only by an appeal to *a priori* intuition, as it is in all cases a *new* synthesis.

dogmatical when they make apodeictic declarations concerning the existence and being of the soul, or of God. But, because such assertions are not at all possible with regard to such subjects, there can be here no conclusive assertion—the affirmatives being immediately counterbalanced by their opposing negatives. If psychology claims to have demonstrated the existence, immateriality, and immortality of the soul, the exact reverse of this is asserted, and can be supported by just as many pleas. And the same is the case with the existence of God, which from this side is proved, arguing from a series of natural causes; from that side denied, also arguing from a series of natural causes. So in Psychology, Spiritualism, and Materialism—in Theology, Theism and Atheism—stand opposed in hostile array.

If reason takes up one of these parties as its own, it is dogmatical. If it defends neither, but attacks one, it is polemical. Our question is, whether a well-disciplined reason may be *polemical*.

On scientific grounds the existence of God and of the soul can never be demonstrated; just as little can they ever be denied upon the same grounds. Hence, the discipline of the reason demands that we should keep clear of such dogmatical affirmations and negations. But there is a moral interest of the reason—quite independent of the scientific—which turns the balance in favour of Spiritualism and Theism. Though reason can demonstrate neither the immortality of the soul nor the existence of God, yet it is spontaneously compelled to assert them: if, then, it proceed polemically, its attacks must be aimed against Materialism and Atheism. Is there against them a correct polemical use of the reason?

Such a polemic can only oppose and disarm its opponents, and not attempt to defend its own side. To do the latter, would at once be dogmatical. It is allowed to refute the scientific reasons of its opponents only *scientifically*; and not, for instance, to appeal to the moral interest on the opposite

side, far less to turn this interest against its opponent in a hostile way. Moral grounds prove nothing scientifically. Controversy becomes utterly inept as soon as it becomes moral—as soon as it hunts up moral reasons to oppose scientific reasons; and it transgresses all bounds of fair play, as well as those of the reason, when it errs so completely as to attack the *person of the opponent morally*, instead of opposing his reasons scientifically.

This very danger threatens us in the given cases. The moral interest which our reason takes in the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God, is bound up with the doctrines of religion; these, with the public beliefs; and these, again, so closely with the community, that it is not difficult to represent your opponent as immoral—opposed to religion—dangerous to the state—and so to ruin him, instead of refuting him. If we succeed in such a controversy, our opponent may indeed lose his social *status*, but reason cannot gain anything by it. And what does it gain by a scientific dispute? At least this much, that the opponent who can show no popular or moral reasons for his dogma, must be the more at pains to hunt out scientific reasons as yet unknown, and, as all appearance of authority is wanting to him, to arm himself with the greatest possible acuteness. By this reason can only gain. We may be perfectly persuaded that the materialist and atheist will never succeed in proving his case, and may still be very curious to hear the grounds he is able to assign. Kant well observes: “If I hear that some man of no ordinary ability has disproved the freedom of the human will, the hope of future existence, and the existence of God, I am most curious to read his book; for I expect, from his talent, that he will enlarge my views. The dogmatical opponent on the good side against this enemy I should not read at all; because I know beforehand that he will only attack the apparent reasons of his opponent, in order to make way for himself; besides, a common everyday illusion does not suggest so many new reflections

as a strange and ingeniously excogitated one." And, with regard to the favorite practice of declaring the opponent dangerous, Kant says: "Nothing is more natural or easy than the determination which you should make on this point. Let these people work away, if they show talent in new investigations—in a word, rational powers—reason can only gain by it. But if you take up other means than that of an uncoercing reason—if you cry treason, and call in the *profanum vulgus*, which knows nothing about such subtle speculations, as if to put out a fire—then you make yourselves ridiculous; for it is very absurd *to expect new light from reason, and at the same time to prescribe to it on which side it must declare itself*. Besides, reason is so well bound up and limited by itself, that it is quite unnecessary for you to summon special constables to oppose that side the superiority of which appears to you a cause of danger and anxiety."

Rational polemic is confined within right limits when it does not adopt either side in the conflict of dogmatic views, but confines itself to weakening scientifically the scientific proofs of its opponent. But such a proceeding we can hardly call polemical; it is rather critical. I am not to side with either of the opposed dogmas; then, neither of them is properly the *opposite side*; then, I can hardly be acting in a strictly polemical way. Polemic is war; and war exists only between two hostile parties, of which one deserves, and ought to conquer. But, if two parties are so opposed that a real permanent victory can never be gained by either side, under such circumstances no decisive, but only a perpetual, war is possible, as in the state of nature.

And this is the case in dogmatical philosophy. None of the opposed systems can refute the other—none can conquer the other—at least, rationally. But, if the conflict of systems never ends in victory, there remains only a perpetual war—that state of nature in which the strongest has the sway; so that, not permanent law, but accidental violence, settles dis-

putes. Hence, in the case before us, victory on the one side, and defeat on the other, is always caused by the influence of a foreign power, which brings other weapons than rational reasons to bear. Whoever can call in such an ally is for the time the strongest, and treats his opponent according to the brute law of violence.

It follows, then, that in reality there is *no* polemical use of the reason ; because all polemic in the long run comes back to dogmatism. This whole conflict of systems, fairly and impartially viewed, is rather a conflict for rational claims, or a dispute in equity, which can only be decided by an accurate investigation, and a judgment\* based upon it ; that is to say, legally and critically. The disputants cannot carry on war with one another, but only a *lawsuit* ; the final decision is not a victory, but a *sentence*. No polemic, then, for us, but a Critick ! And, as a critical attitude of reason is absolutely necessary, all the conditions also must be granted under which alone we can exercise criticism, and among them the untrammelled communication of ideas, which is only possible through a free expression of sentiments.

3. *The Sceptical Method*.—There being neither a dogmatical nor polemical use of the reason, it might appear that in the conflict of dogmatical systems the proper course for the reason were to side with neither, but turn away equally from both—adopting, to speak politically, the policy of *neutrality*, and maintaining, in presence of all dogmatical views, the *sceptical* point of view, which denies all rational knowledge, and substitutes, instead of an imagined and illusive science, the conviction of our ignorance. But upon what does this conviction of the sceptic rest ? From what grounds does he pretend to have discovered, or proved, the nescience of the human reason ? Either from those of experience, or those of pure reason. His conviction is either empirical or rational. In the first case,

\* *Sc.* in the legal sense of the word.

it is mere perception; in the second, real science. If the former be the case, as it really is with the sceptic, then scepticism rests on no necessary and universal basis or principle; it is merely an empirical judgment, uncertain as all such judgments are, and which itself becomes subject to doubt, and so destroys itself. But if the sceptical conviction is derived from an examination of the human reason, and so based on principles, then it is the *science of the limits of the human reason*—a real cognition, which as such is not sceptical, but critical. So that scepticism is either unscientific, and therefore unfounded; or, if scientific, it is no longer the sceptical, but the critical, point of view.

4. *The Sceptical and the Critical Methods.*—This distinction between the sceptical and the critical points of view may be made very plain by the following illustration. Both assert that the human reason is limited; these limits the one establishes through experience, the other through the nature of reason itself. Just in the same way the limits of our vision are at all times limited; our horizon at all times embraces only a small portion of the surface of the earth. If the question arose to prove the limitation of man's horizon, two explanations are supposable. The one is purely empirical; the other, geographical. The former explains the limits of the horizon from experience, which convinces us daily that the limits of our vision are not those of the earth also—that beyond the verge of the horizon the earth still extends. It would so extend itself even if its surface were a flat circle; and sensuous experience shows us both—as well the limit of our horizon, as the flat circle of the earth. The geographer, on the contrary, explains to us the limitation of the circle of our vision from the nature of the earth—from its spherical form, on the surface of which we occupy a point. The empirical explanation shows us the limits of our knowledge of the earth for the time being; the geographical, on the contrary, the limits of the earth, and

its description in general. As the empiric and geographer are related in the explanation of the human horizon, so are the sceptical and critical philosophers in the explanation of human knowledge. The critical philosopher is the *geographer of the reason*; he knows the diameter, circumference, and bounds of reason; while the sceptic only notices its external limitations, and knows as little of their real nature as the empiricist, who can only explain the limits of the horizon from sensuous experience, without knowing that the earth is a globe.

In the fact of our horizon being limited, both agree, but their explanations differ. So the sceptical and critical philosopher may also coincide in an assertion which they make in a totally different spirit. Compare Kant with Hume, of whom he himself speaks as "possessing of all sceptics the most genius." Both hold causality to be a concept which possesses only empirical, and never metaphysical, validity. But the sceptical philosopher makes this concept the result of experience, while the critical makes experience the result of this concept.

The sceptical method is opposed to the dogmatical; and in this consists its value. But it only contradicts dogmatism to prepare for criticism; it forms the transition from one to the other. When the reason knows itself properly, it must take up neither the dogmatical, nor the polemical, nor the sceptical, but the critical, attitude only.

5. *The Hypotheses of the Pure Reason.*—Dogmatical procedure is excluded from philosophical cognition. It is not allowed the reason, according to the measure of its faculties, to put forth judgments concerning the nature of things, of *unconditioned* validity. But, though of itself it cannot venture to judge apodeictically, perhaps it may do so *hypothetically*. None of its propositions being unconditioned or immediately certain, these propositions must be intended for proof, and demonstrable. What, then, are the hypotheses and proofs in accordance with reason? Or, of what kind must the hypo-

theses and proofs of the pure reason be, if they are not to contradict the critical point of view? These two questions still remain, in order to determine fully the scientific use of the reason, and completely develope its application.

A scientific hypothesis is an assumption to explain a fact. As an assumption, it only claims a preliminary and conditioned validity. We do not demand of the hypothesis that it should be established, but only that it be possible and useful. These two attributes determine it to be *admissible*. It is *possible* if the thing posited or assumed belongs to—or can belong to—real phenomena. Every hypothesis which starts from something which can never be the object of science (an impossible object) is itself impossible, and of no scientific value. It is *useful* if it explain what it intends to explain—if it gives a *satisfactory* account of the point in-question. It does not do so, and is therefore useless, if the fact in question is either not at all or insufficiently explained, so as to require auxiliary hypotheses. For example, we explain the *final causes* in the world by assuming an intelligent cause acting with design. But there are found in the world a certain number of exceptions to order, of irregularities—a certain quantity of evil. A new hypothesis is necessary to account for evil; the first assumption, then, is insufficient.

The objects of science must be empirical. That which is not, or cannot be, phenomenon, is, for that very reason, no object of scientific cognition, and ought therefore never form the contents of a possible hypothesis. Ideas are, therefore, never scientific grounds of explanation, nor ought they be assumed as such, nor have they any hypothetical value. In other words, scientific hypotheses may never be transcendental or hyperphysical. In *natural science* there is no appeal to the Divine power or wisdom.

It is only in *refuting* a philosophical dogma, itself based on impossible assumptions, that such transcendental hypotheses have a limited application. They are here lawful weapons

against the pretensions of the opposite side. Suppose the materialist denies the spiritual and incorporeal nature of the soul, by appealing to its dependence on the bodily organs, we may oppose him with the hypothesis, whether this whole sensuous life of the soul be not only a *preliminary stage and prior condition* of its spiritual life? Or, let him deny the immortality of the soul, and appeal to the origin in time of our life, conditioned by so many accidental circumstances, and we may oppose the hypothesis, whether life have a beginning at all—whether it be not eternal, or, “properly speaking, only intelligible, not at all subject to changes in time—neither beginning with birth, nor ending with death; whether this present life be not a mere phenomenon; that is, a sensuous representation of the purely spiritual life; and the whole world of sense a mere image, present to our earthly powers of cognition, and, like a dream, of no objective reality; that, if we could intuit things and ourselves as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our only real community with which neither began with birth, nor will it end with the death of the body.” If I may omit for a moment the consideration of the connexion in which Kant produces this hypothesis, its content is more nearly related than might be imagined with the deepest thoughts of our philosopher; for it is part and parcel of his doctrine of the intelligible character.\*

6. *The Demonstrations of Pure Reason.*—Reason desires to prove its propositions. What is the *mode of demonstration* of pure reason? Every proof requires principles for its completion. The principles of the pure proofs of the reason are the principles of the understanding, and these alone, if we want scientific proofs; for the principles of the Reason are only regulative, and have no scientific value. But the ultimate logical grounds of proof possess validity, not by being princi-

\* Cf. Critick, p. 473. The context would rather tend to show that he regarded it as a doctrine the only use of which is its *possibility*.

ples of things, but by being principles of *experience*, or of the cognition of things. All the demonstrations of pure reason run up into its Principles, and these principles were first themselves established as the sole conditions of experience. They are established as soon as it has been shown that they alone render experience possible. It is clear, then, that all the demonstrations of pure reason refer, not to things, but only to experience; they are not dogmatical, but critical.

They have only a *single ground of proof*. The thing is valid, because it is the absolutely necessary condition of our experience. If they produce any more reasons than this *one*, they betray that they do not really possess that *one* upon which the whole force of the proof must rest; that they are false or *sophistical*, or, as Kant calls them, *special pleading* [advocative]. Thus, the principle of causality can never be proved dogmatically, but critically. And it has only a single ground of proof. This single and complete ground is simply: without causality there is no objective determination of time, and therefore no experience. And the proof itself has only a single form: it presents its object as a necessary condition of experience, and deduces experience from it. The form then cannot be *apagogic*, but only *ostensive*, or *direct*.\*

### III.—THE CANON OF THE PURE REASON.

1. *Theoretical and Practical Reason*.—As regards cognition there is no pure judgment of the reason which can assert itself independently of all experience; or, to speak more accurately, without reference to experience. Not as though the first principles of the understanding were deduced from experience, rather it is they which condition our experience; in this sense they are valid prior to experience; but they are also only valid *for* experience, and not independent of it. Consequently, the possibility of experience is the critical clue, which the well-

\* Cf. above, p. 25.

disciplined reason follows in its cognitions, hypotheses, and proofs.

We call the sum total of the principles which determine and regulate the use of our cognitive faculties a *Canon*. Thus, general logic contains the canon for the correct form of our judgments and syllogisms; thus, the Principles of the pure understanding give the canon for our real or empirical cognition. There is no cognition of things by mere reason; that is, no dogmatical or speculative use of the reason, and, accordingly, no canon permitting or regulating such a use.

If, then, the reason be at all able to assert anything independent of all experience, and to assert anything apodeictically, irrespective of it, such use of the reason can in no case be speculative or dogmatical. It would be a canon of the pure *Reason* (in the narrower sense) and would in nowise concern cognition. All theoretical use of the reason is confined to experience, and so to the canon of the understanding. Besides the theoretical there only remains the *practical* use of the Reason. Theoretical reason (understanding) has no principles valid without regard to experience. If such be possible, and there be a canon of the Reason as distinguished from the understanding, its canon can only belong to the practical Reason.

2. *Pragmatical and Moral Reason*.—Human actions are the domain of the practical Reason. If these be mere natural phenomena, which, as such, follow the law of mechanical causality, then they belong altogether to the chain of natural events; then their explanation falls altogether under the domain of the understanding; they require no other grounds of explanation than mechanical causes, which determine all natural phenomena, and the assumption of a practical Reason is idle and superfluous.

Practical Reason is either an empty word, or it is the *power of freedom* which lies at the source of all human actions, and so

distinguishes them from the mechanical occurrences of nature. If human actions be free, they presuppose a will immediately determined, not by mechanical necessity—that is, by the laws of nature—but by representations and reasons; that is, by the Reason. It is related, then, to its grounds of determination or motives, not passively, but as deliberating and preferring. This preferring will is the *arbitrium liberum*, or free will. This will, so determinable, is *practical freedom*. This differs from transcendental freedom. The latter was freedom as a principle of the universe; the former, as a human faculty—that is, Reason determining itself to action by grounds of its own choice.\*

These reasons for determining the will may be twofold: either taken from experience, and empirical, or from the pure Reason. If taken from our sensuous experience or nature, they are *empirical*. In this case their only end is sensuous good, or happiness; in such a case the motives of our actions are nothing but the best means for this end. We act so that our earthly or sensuous welfare may be provided for in the best possible way. We do not act according to principles, but just as our circumstances or empirical relations for the time being suggest. Our end is merely *happiness*. The ends which attain this are the best. The choice of the best means belongs to *good sense*. If we act as sensibly as possible, in order to be as happy as possible, we act practically in the usual sense of the word. “*Pragmatical laws*” are what determine the will in this direction. If, on the other hand, the grounds of determination are drawn from pure reason, independent of all experience, and without regard to our sensuous good, then we act from principles, not conditioned by the nature of circumstances; our only end is virtue—our practical attitude, morality; and the laws of our will are not pragmatical, but *moral*.†

\* Cf. above, p. 243.

† Cf. Critick, pp. 484-7.

3. *Moral Laws and the Moral World.*—If, then, there is to be a canon of practical Reason—a sum total of the principles according to which we act—such a canon can contain nothing but moral laws. Pragmatical laws are the rules of wisdom, the object of which is our *happiness*; moral laws are those of our actions, the object of which is perfection of character, or our *deserving* to be happy.

There is a canon of practical Reason, if there are moral laws. Transcendental Methodology is not bound to prove that such moral laws, in fact, do exist. It can make the assumption, and under this condition proceed to sketch out its canon. To justify the assumption, it may appeal to the fact that we do judge men morally; that we estimate their real worth, not according to the measure of their wisdom, but that of their morality; that this estimation requires moral laws, which, accordingly, every man acknowledges by judging others after this standard.

If there be moral laws, they add nothing to the cognition of things; they do not tell us what happens, *but what ought to happen through us—what we ought to do*. They admit, then, of no speculative, but merely of a practical, use. What we ought to do, in the sense of the moral law, we ought to do *unconditionally*, and under *all* circumstances. We deduce, then, from the nature of these laws (*a*) that they explain no fact, but command an action; they do not refer to an object which *exists*, but to something which *ought* to exist or happen, and (*β*) they do not command that something should happen under certain circumstances, but they command *absolutely* what ought to happen unconditionally, as a necessity which excludes all contradiction, and must therefore be *possible*. It must be possible for the actions so commanded to occur in experience, and be objects of it. Possible actions are possible experiences. Moral laws, as necessarily demanding or commanding possible actions, are, for that reason, also principles of experience. They demand that experience should correspond to them.

Let us call the sum of all possible experiences the *world*, then moral laws postulate that the world should correspond to them—they postulate a *moral world*.

The moral world can only be that which realizes and accomplishes the moral end, which was the deserving happiness, or happiness only as a consequence of worth. Happiness is the natural good which we seek; worth the moral good which we strive to attain. Both being combined, we have the *highest good* which the moral Idea demands. If this Idea be conceived as completed *in individuo*, it is the Ideal of the highest good. And the moral world can only be governed by such an Ideal.

4. *The Moral Government of the World. God and Immortality.*—We cannot postulate the moral world without at the same time demanding this government thereof. It were absurd to postulate something unconditionally, and not to postulate the conditions under which alone it is possible. But what else can the moral government of the world be, than the world directed towards a moral end, which controls it unconditionally; or the world originated by a moral cause, which conditions the moral adaptation—a moral lawgiver for the world, a moral creator? We cannot, then, postulate a moral world, without also postulating, as its necessary condition, the *existence of God*.

We *ought* to attain the *summum bonum*, or the happiness consequent on worth. This moral perfection we can never attain in our present earthly existence, but only in our continued and increasing purification: we must, then, postulate a future state—a continuation after death, or the *immortality of the soul*—as the necessary condition under which we become conformable to the moral end.

If moral laws, then, exist, they postulate and demand absolutely a moral order of the world, and with it the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul. Our moral

worth ought to be our own doing; it ought to consist in that moral perfection which each man must attain for himself, as no one else can have or gain it for him. But the happiness which proceeds from worth is not our own work; this *summum bonum* rather postulates a moral order of the world, which does not lie in our power, but has its eternal origin in God. To deserve happiness is the aim of our *actions*; to enjoy it—to participate in it actually—is the aim of our *hope*. As it is moral worth which conditions, and has for its consequence, that happiness, so it is our actions and intentions alone on which our hopes are based. And here we stand at the outer limits of the domain of reason, which completes its circumference with this prospect into eternity. There are three spheres described by our reason: the first embraces knowledge; the second, action; the third, hope. Of these spheres, the first is the most circumscribed—confined within the limits of experience; the last is the largest, extending to eternity. There are, then, three questions, which the reason may propose to itself in its self-examination: *What can I know? What ought I do? What may I hope?* The first is answered by the Critick of the pure reason; the second, by its moral laws; the third, by its doctrine of faith. For hope, based upon a moral certainty, is Faith.\*

5. *Opinion, Knowledge, and Faith.*—When Reason in its canon asserts apodeictically, upon the basis of its moral laws, the faculty of freedom, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, it assumes these three propositions with a certainty which excludes all doubt. And yet reason itself has shown that they have no scientific value; that they are not properly assertions, but postulates. There must, then, be in reason a conviction securely established, though dispensing with all scientific grounds. What sort of conviction is this?

\* Critick, p. 487, *sqq.*

Every conviction is a belief based on certain grounds. But these grounds may differ widely, both as to sufficiency and as to origin. From the first point of view they may be sufficient, or not so; they may have a satisfactory, or a deficient basis. From the second, they may be only personal, or real also; that is, contained not only in us, but in the thing itself. In the first case the grounds are subjective; in the second, objective also.\* It follows, that every belief may be grounded in three different ways: either sufficiently, or not so; and the sufficient grounds may be only subjective, or objective also. These are the degrees, or steps, of conviction. Supposing the grounds of our conviction to be in no respect sufficient, then doubt is not excluded, and our belief is merely *opinion*, which at best pretends only to a high degree of probability—in no case to absolute truth. Supposing the ground of our conviction to be complete, we no longer opine—we feel certain. And these grounds may be either subjective only, or objective also. In the latter case our conviction has a scientific basis, and is demonstrable. We no longer opine, but *know*. But if the sufficient grounds be merely subjective, or personal, our conviction is indeed certain, but not demonstrable; it is neither opinion, nor science, but *Faith*.

These are the three forms of belief. If we are concerned with a pure proposition of the reason, its grounds are always universal and necessary. Hence, a conviction from purely rational grounds is never opinion. It is either (knowledge) or Faith. Now, all cognition through pure reason is referred to the possibility of experience. There are no rational grounds which, independently of experience, produce a cognitive, or establish a scientific, conviction. If there be, then, such a conviction independent of experience, it cannot be science, but Faith. Now, the only rational propositions which are

\* This passage (Critick, p. 457) shows how clearly Kant distinguished objective from subjective necessity, and what weight and validity he allows subjective necessity. Cf. Introduction on this subject.

valid independently of experience, and without any reference to it, are the postulates of practical Reason, viz., our moral convictions. Therefore, rational faith has only a purely moral content, and moral conviction can have no other form but that of faith.

6. *Doctrinal and Practical Faith.*—We use the word Faith\* in very different meanings, which must be carefully separated from that just explained. Rational faith is purely moral certainty. As such, it is merely practical, and is distinguished from all faith of a theoretical nature [*sc.* belief]. Certain assertions, which lay claim to a degree of probability, but have no proof for their truth, are assumed and believed. We may not say, “I *know* that the matter is so;” for we want the grounds of scientific conviction. But we have enough to hold it for true, and assume it for the present. We say, then, “I *believe* the thing is so.” Thus, we may believe that other planets also are inhabited, by considering their analogy with our earth; or we may believe from the well-known physico-theological arguments that God exists; but we can *only believe* it, because in neither case are there grounds for knowledge. This faith [belief], which is only an opinion, is distinguished from faith proper in two respects: (*a*) it is uncertain, while the latter is perfectly certain; (*β*) it is not practical, but *doctrinal*.

7. *Pragmatical and Moral Faith.*—We are here concerned with practical faith; but every faith of a practical sort is not necessarily moral—every practical faith is not certain. Under the head of practical faith, then, we must distinguish that

\* The Germans use one word (*Glauben*) for both Faith and Belief. The ambiguity is here commented upon; but, of course, an English translation must necessarily appear idle, as we possess both terms. The verb indeed “to believe,” has some of this ambiguity. We say, “believe in Christ;” and yet this belief is always called faith.

which is moral. All practical action is directed towards an end; therefore, also, towards the means by which it is to be attained. Can it really be attained by these means? Are they really the best, and will they produce the result under any circumstances? If the end is an effect, and the means to it the mechanical cause, then their connexion is the natural causal *nexus*, and falls under the domain of science. But, if my means be not such mechanical causes, then their appropriateness is not the object of scientific knowledge, but of practical belief. And here two cases are possible:—Either the means are of such a kind that they attain their end unconditionally—and I am perfectly convinced of it—in which case my practical belief is perfectly certain, although only faith, and not scientific knowledge; or else the means are only of the conditional description, depending on circumstances, so that the result only decides about their validity; and in this case my practical belief is itself uncertain, for its truth depends upon an uncertain result. It depends, then, upon this: whether the practical connexion of my means with their end is problematical or apodeictic; whether the result of my means is certain or not; whether I pursue an unconditioned, or a conditioned end?

Now, human reason has only one simple unconditioned end: to deserve happiness; hence, it is morality only which is quite certain of its result. This certainty is *moral belief* (faith). Practical Reason was either pragmatistical or moral. Just so our practical belief, if not moral, is only pragmatistical; and this latter has no certainty. It believes the result of its means, and counts upon such result with the greatest confidence; but is, nevertheless, always subject to error, even when the highest degree of probability is attained. This limit separates pragmatistical from moral belief; and, as probability can never be raised to certainty, these two sorts of belief differ not in degree, but in *kind*. The probability of the pragmatistical belief depends on the degree of wisdom with which reason computes

and calculates; the certainty of moral belief depends upon the state of the mind, which has no degree; being either moral or not so, there is clearly no gradual progress from morality to its opposite. Pragmatical belief—for example, the belief of a physician in the good effect of his method or medicines—is never certain; even when he shows his greatest confidence. He calculates upon the result—he would *bet* on it; but only up to a certain limit. Raise the stake, and he begins to hesitate. “Sometimes you see his conviction strong enough to be valued at a sovereign, but not at ten. For he readily bets the first; but when ten are proposed, he comes to notice what he did not before observe, that it is still possible for him to be wrong.”\*

Pure rational belief is thus confined to morality, and is accurately to be distinguished from opinion and knowledge—from all doctrinal and pragmatical belief. Moral belief is the only perfectly certain one. This security it shares with scientific conviction. But its certainty is so strictly subjective that, accurately speaking, we may not even assume the appearance of an objective formula in expressing ourselves. We may not say: “*it is certain* that God exists; that the soul is immortal,” &c.; but the formula is: “*I am certain*” that the thing is so. *Freedom, God, immortality*—these are the Kantian “expressions of faith,” which have found their poetical expression in the poem of Schiller.

This moral belief forms the basis and ground of religious belief. Now, if it is the problem of theology to explain religious belief, according to the canon of the pure reason there can only be a *moral theology*; that is, not a morality based on theology (theological morality), but a theology based on morals. And this was the only theology which the Critick of the Reason had still left as a possible alternative. So that the Methodology here falls in with the conclusion of the Doctrine of Elements (Stoicheiology).

\* Critick, p. 499.

## IV.—THE ARCHITECTONIC OF THE PURE REASON.

1. *Philosophical Cognition*.—Reason is now clear as to what it can know, what it ought to do, what it may hope. The domain of its knowledge and of its belief lies clearly before us, each with clear and well-defined limits. Those of the first were determined by the Discipline; those of the second, by the Canon. We are now in possession of all the necessary data for sketching out the structure of pure philosophy in its outline and details.

Let us first distinguish *philosophical* cognition from all other. Not every cognition is rational. Not every rational cognition is philosophical. In all cases grounds of cognition must be presupposed. These may be rational grounds, or principles; they may also be facts, or historical data. The cognition from the first is *rational*; from the second, *historical*. Supposing the latter attained, it is nothing but the correct representation of past events, when the given object is properly grasped and retained—that is, has been learned. Even of a philosophical system there may be such an historical knowledge, which, at best, is related to its object as an impression in plaster is to a living man.

We here speak only of rational knowledge. The principles or rational grounds upon which it rests are either intuitions or concepts. Consequently, we cognize rationally either by mere concepts or by the construction of concepts. In the first case the cognition is *philosophical*; in the second, *mathematical*.

We here speak of philosophical cognition. It is rational cognition through mere concepts. Now, these pure rational concepts are laws, which, according to their nature, are valid over a certain domain, but so far unconditionally valid. From this point of view we may explain philosophy to be the *legislation for the human reason*. The two domains of reason are the theoretical and the practical; the former is cognition or knowledge, which, if we except mathematics, is nothing but experience; the latter is freedom.

2. *Pure Philosophy or Metaphysic. The Aristotelian and Kantian Metaphysic. Metaphysic and the Critick.*—As regards principles of cognition, we must distinguish them into those which are at the basis of experience, and those which are based upon experience. The former are contained in the reason as such, and are pure; the second, empirical. There are empirical principles, such as, for instance, the laws of nature, from which a series of natural phenomena can be deduced and explained. Such a deduction is also a rational cognition through concepts, and hence a philosophical cognition. We must, then, distinguish philosophy, according to its principles, into *pure* and *empirical*.

We here speak of *pure* philosophy, the cognition of pure principles. This science is *Metaphysic*. And in this sense alone does Kant treat of it. It embraces a perfectly distinct domain, with fixed frontiers, and not subject to any attacks from other sciences. This firm and safe position it never obtained till Kant arose. Since Aristotle's time, it was held to be the science of *first* principles. With Kant it is the science of *pure* principles. Nothing can be more vague than the expression, "*first* principles." Where, in the gradation of principles, does the first rank cease? where does the second commence? We might as well talk of a history of the first centuries. How many centuries constitute the first? Nor is the matter mended by laying down a boundary; for this boundary is arbitrary. Why not admit the fourth and fifth centuries, as well as the second and third? This is no verbal dispute. We are here concerned with the whole distinction between the critical and dogmatical philosophies. What are *first* principles? Such as form the first member in the series of principles, and are thus related to the rest as a higher step

\* The reader should observe that I inadvertently used this expression above (p. 97) to translate *Grundsatz*, but in the logical, not in this chronological, sense.

to a lower, so that they differ from the rest only in *degree*. Pure principles, on the contrary, are transcendental; they are the conditions of experience, and so *before* it, or *a priori*. Empirical principles are based on experience. And on what is experience itself based? On pure principles. First principles, and all those which follow them, lie in the same plane. Pure principles, on the contrary, require a quite different species of cognition from empirical, being known through pure reason. The distinction is specific—of kind, and not of degree.

First principles differ from last only in degree—hence the science of one only in degree from the science of the other; it is not a science *differing in nature*. Why, then, does it call itself metaphysic? Aristotle was right in calling the science of first principles only *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*. The science of pure principles, on the contrary, is radically different from all empirical sciences, and is therefore, in fairness, to be distinguished from them in name also. In this sense alone metaphysic becomes a science of peculiar and independent character. In this sense Kant founded metaphysic. The Critick of the pure reason puts and answers the question: How is metaphysic possible? This question being answered in all its extent, the system of pure reason will complete or carry out the science as far as is possible. What is the relation of the Critick to the system? It is the foundation and introduction of it, and related to it so as to be its “propædæutic.” But this propædæutic does not lie in another plane of knowledge from the system. How could it? The Critick is the investigation of pure reason and its original conditions, hence of the cognition of the principles established by the pure reason. It is the foundation, and, as such, must surely be part of the edifice. We may call it propædæutic, but scientifically it is *metaphysic*; and Kant himself says expressly: “*That this name may be given to the whole of pure philosophy, including the Critick.*”\*

\* Cf. Critick, p. 509.

We put stress upon this remark, lest the relation of the Critick to the system should be confused. For in one of the offshoots of the Kantian philosophy, the Critick is considered the *psychological* basis of metaphysic. There being no psychology not empirical, the basis of metaphysic is thus an empirical science. So that this conception of the Kantian philosophy leads to the following absurdity: that Kant has distinguished all empirical science in *kind* from metaphysic, and then made an empirical science the basis of metaphysic!

3. *The Metaphysic of Nature and of Morals*.—The pure principles were the conditions of possible experience and the laws of moral action. Let us call the sum total of all empirical objects *Nature*; the sum of all moral actions, *Morals*; then the system of pure reason will build up its structure as “*Metaphysic of Nature and of Morals*.” In the first we are concerned with legislating for the realms of nature; in the second, for those of freedom. These are the two provinces which the human reason includes within itself: its metaphysic is then natural and moral philosophy.

#### V. THE HISTORY OF THE PURE REASON. THE CRITICAL AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE DOGMATICAL AND THE SCEPTICAL POINTS OF VIEW.

The critical philosophy has fully determined its character, and so established its historical peculiarity as opposed to all earlier systems. It does not follow any path previously pursued by philosophy; these paths being opposed to each other in the three points which determine the character of a philosophy, viz., in their views on the object, the origin, and the method of knowledge. The object of knowledge was to the one, the sensuous phenomenon; to the other, the nature of things. This is the difference between *sensational* and *intellectual* philosophers. As the leader of the first, Kant takes Epicurus; as leader of the second, Plato.

The origin of knowledge is sought either in sensuous perception, or in the mere understanding. This is the distinction between *Empiricism* and *Noologism*. The former is supported by Aristotle and Locke; the latter, by Plato and Leibniz. Kant should not have mentioned Aristotle in this connexion; but he did not know him better, and classing the Greek metaphysician with Locke was at that time usual. But, in the eyes of Kant, Locke does not present us with the fullest expression of empiricism; and, indeed, his proof of the existence of God is hardly in consonance with his sensualistic theory of knowledge. So it is again *Epicurus* whom Kant makes the leader of this direction, and whom, indeed, he greatly overrates as a philosophic genius, having ever since his school acquaintance with Lucretius taken up the idea that Epicurus was the most advanced and consistent thinker in the empirical spirit.

Finally, as regards the *method* of cognition, there have always been philosophers whose principle it was to have no principles—to make so-called sound common sense the only clue to knowledge. This method might be called the *naturalistic*; and its advocates, the naturalists of the pure reason. They cannot comprehend how such deep investigations are made to solve philosophical questions. They must find it just as useless and absurd to start so many mathematical computations to determine, for instance, the size of the moon. Why take these rounds, when we could always judge according to our natural sight?

Science has nothing to say to its complete and most extreme contradictory. We are only considering the *scientific* method of cognition. This may take three paths, which have been discussed at full length—the dogmatical, the sceptical, or the critical. So far it has been dogmatical or sceptical: dogmatical in *Wolf*, sceptical in *Hume*. But, after careful self-examination, reason cannot abide by either of them; the only remaining method is the critical. And with this remark Kant

concludes the Critick of the Pure Reason : “The *critical* path alone is still open to us. If the reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me along it, he may now determine (if he shall be pleased to add his own contribution in order to make this footpath a high road), whether that which many centuries could not reach may not be attained before the close of the present—I mean, the complete satisfaction of the human reason concerning that which has always occupied its desire of knowledge, but so far in vain.”

We had started in this work from the dogmatical and sceptical philosophies, the latter of which forms the transition point to the critical. We had shown how Kant in the course of his own development had gone through this very process. There was a moment when he agreed with Hume, from whom he gradually separated himself. Now, in the conclusion of his Critick, and in the retrospect upon its completion, Kant sees himself as distant as possible from Wolf and Hume—raised equally above the dogmatical and sceptical directions. The judgment we offered at the opening of this work upon the critical philosophy and its historical position has here found corroboration in the judgment of the critical philosopher upon himself. And here the first volume of this work finds its natural conclusion ; it embraces the whole development of Kant from its dogmatical and sceptical starting points up to the highest summit of the Critick.




# APPENDICES,

CONTAINING

A TRANSLATION OF THE PRINCIPAL PASSAGES IN THE CRITICK OF  
THE PURE REASON WHICH WERE SUPPRESSED, OR RE-WRITTEN  
IN THE SECOND (AND FOLLOWING) EDITIONS; AND A  
RE-TRANSLATION OF PART OF HIS CRITICAL  
SOLUTION OF THE THIRD ANTINOMY.

- A. ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
- B. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA.
- C. ON THE PARALOGISMS OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.
- D. ON THE INTELLIGIBLE AND THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER.



## APPENDIX A.

---

### DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

#### SECTION II.

##### *Of the a priori Grounds of the Possibility of Experience.*

THAT a concept should be generated completely *a priori*, and have relation to an object, without itself belonging to the [general] conception of possible experience, or being made up of the elements of possible experience\*—this is perfectly self-contradictory and impossible. For such a concept would have no content, because no intuition would correspond to it; since intuitions in general, by which objects are capable of being given to us, make up the field, or total object, of possible experience. A concept *a priori*, which did not refer to such intuitions, would be only the logical form for a concept, but not the very concept itself, through which something is thought.

If there be then pure concepts *a priori*, these indeed can, of course, contain nothing empirical; they must, nevertheless, be nothing but *a priori* conditions of possible experience, as upon this alone their objective reality can rest.

If we wish, then, to know how pure concepts of the understanding are possible, we must investigate what the conditions *a priori* are on which the possibility of experience depends, and which form its foundation, when we abstract from all that is empirical in phenomena. A concept which expresses this formal and objective con-

\* By possible experience Kant means that which can possibly become experience.—M.

dition of experience universally and adequately might be denominated a pure conception of the understanding. Having once obtained pure concepts of the understanding, I can, if I like, also excogitate objects, perhaps impossible, perhaps possible *per se*, but given in no experience; since I may omit in the connexion of these concepts something which still necessarily belongs to the conditions of possible experience (*e. g.* the conception of a spirit); or else I may extend pure concepts of the understanding farther than experience can reach (*e. g.* the concept of the Deity). But the *elements* of all cognitions *a priori*, even those of capricious and absurd chimeras, cannot indeed be borrowed from experience (or they would not be *a priori* cognitions), but must in every case contain the pure *a priori* conditions of possible experience, and of an object thereof; otherwise we should not only be thinking nothing by means of such chimeras, but they themselves, having no starting-point, could not even originate in thought.

Now these concepts, which *a priori* contain the pure thinking in each individual experience, we find in the Categories; and it will be a sufficient deduction of them, and a justification of their objective validity, if we can prove that through them alone can an object be thought. But, as in such a thought there is more than the mere faculty of thinking—that is, the understanding—concerned; and as this faculty, considered as a cognitive faculty, which must relate to objects, will also require some explanation, with regard to the possibility of such relation; we must, accordingly, first discuss the subjective sources which constitute the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of experience, not according to their empirical, but according to their transcendental, nature.

If each individual representation were quite estranged from the rest, so as to be, as it were, isolated and separated from them, such a thing as knowledge never could come into existence; for knowledge means a totality of compared and connected representations. If, then, I add to sense, because it contains multiplicity in its intuition, a synopsis, to this synopsis must correspond in every case a synthesis; and it is only when combined with *spontaneity* that *receptivity* can make cognitions possible. This spontaneity, then, is the foundation of a threefold synthesis, which necessarily occurs in all knowledge: first, the *apprehension* of representations, as

modifications of the mind in intuition; secondly, the *reproduction* of the same in the imagination; and, thirdly, their *recognition* in the concept. These point to three subjective sources of cognition which render possible the understanding itself, and through it experience also, as an empirical product of the understanding.

#### PREFATORY REMARK.

The deduction of the Categories is involved in such difficulties, and compels us to penetrate so deeply into the original causes and conditions of the possibility of our knowledge in general, that, in order to avoid the diffuseness of a complete theory, and at the same time to omit nothing in so necessary an investigation, I have thought it better, in the four following paragraphs, rather to prepare than instruct the reader, and not to lay before him the systematic discussion of these elements of the understanding till the succeeding third section. I hope the reader will not permit the obscurity he at first meets to deter him, as such obscurity is unavoidable in entering upon a wholly untrodden road, but will, I hope, be perfectly removed in the section to which I have referred.

1. *Of the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition.*—From whatsoever source our representations arise—whether through the influence of external things, or from internal causes\*—whether they originate *a priori*, or empirically, as phenomena they must nevertheless belong (being modifications of our minds,) to the internal sense; and, as such, all our cognitions must ultimately be subject to the formal condition of our internal sense—time—as being that in which they are all ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This general remark must be, above all things, kept carefully in view throughout the following discussion.

Every intuition contains in itself a multiplicity, which, nevertheless, would not be represented as such, if the mind did not distinguish *time* in the sequence of impressions, one upon another; for, so far as *contained in a single instant*, no representation could ever be anything but an absolute unity. In order, then, to make out of

\* This looks very like a plain statement of Realism in the First Edition.—M.

this manifold an unity of intuition (as, for example, in the representation of space), it is, in the first instance, necessary to run through the multiplicity, and then grasp it together—an action which I call *synthesis of apprehension*, as being directed immediately upon intuition, which indeed presents to us multiplicity, but which without a simultaneous synthesis, cannot produce it as such, and also as contained in one representation.

Now, this synthesis of apprehension must also be carried out *a priori*, that is to say, in the case of representations which are not empirical. For without it, we could not have representations either of space or time *a priori*, as these can only be generated by means of the synthesis of the manifold, which [manifold] the sensibility offers in its original receptivity. We have, then, a pure synthesis of apprehension.

2. *Of the Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination.*—It is, indeed, only an empirical law, according to which representations which have often accompanied or followed one another, at length become associated, and so form a connexion, according to which, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations produces a transition of the mind to another, according to a fixed rule. But this law of reproduction presupposes that phenomena themselves are really subject to such a rule, and that in the multiplicity of their representations there is a concomitance or sequence, according to a fixed rule; for otherwise our empirical imagination would never find anything to do suited to its nature, and would consequently remain hidden within the depths of the mind as a torpid faculty, not even known to consciousness. Supposing vermilion were at one time red, at another black—at one time heavy, at another light; were a man changed first into one, then into another animal—were our fields covered on the longest day, at one time with crops, at another with ice and snow—then my empirical faculty of imagination would never have had even the opportunity of thinking of the heavy vermilion, when red color was presented to it; or again, were a certain word applied first to one thing, then to another, or the same thing called by different names, without the control of a fixed law, to which the phenomena are already themselves subject, there could be no empirical synthesis of reproduction.

There must, then, be something which makes even the reproduction of phenomena possible, by being the *a priori* foundation of a necessary synthetical unity of them. But we very soon hit upon it when we reflect that phenomena are not things in themselves, but the mere play of our representations, which are, after all, only determinations of our internal sense. If now we can make it plain that even our purest *a priori* intuitions afford us no knowledge, except so far as they contain such a combination of multiplicity as can only be produced by a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then the synthesis of the imagination must also be founded *a priori* on a principle prior to all experience, and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which lies at the very foundation of even the possibility of any experience (being necessarily presupposed by the possibility of reproducing phenomena). Now, it is plain that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from to-day at noon to to-morrow at the same hour, or even wish to represent to myself any definite number, first of all I must necessarily grasp in thought these manifold representations successively. But if I lost out of mind, and could not reproduce the earlier parts (the first part of the line, the prior portions of the time, or the successively represented unities), whilst I proceed to the succeeding ones, there never could arise a complete representation, nor any of the thoughts just named—nay, not even the first and purest fundamental representations of space and time.

The synthesis of apprehension, then, is inseparably connected with that of reproduction. And, as the former is the transcendental foundation of the possibility of any cognitions at all (not only of the empirical, but of the pure *a priori* also), the reproductive synthesis of the imaginative faculty is one of the transcendental operations of the mind; and, in reference to these, we shall name this faculty the transcendental imagination.\*

3. *Of the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept.*—Without the consciousness that what we now think is identical with what we thought a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For what we now think would be a new

\* I use the word *imagination* throughout for the *faculty*, not for its *object*.—M.

representation at the present moment, not at all belonging to the act by which it should have been gradually produced; and the manifold thereof would never make up a totality, because it must want that unity which consciousness alone can give it. If in counting I were to forget that the unities which are now pictured to my senses were added by me gradually to one another, I should not cognize the generation of quantity by the successive addition of unit to unit, nor, consequently, should I cognize number; for this concept consists essentially in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis.

The very word concept might of itself lead us to this remark. For it is this *one* (single) consciousness which unites the *manifold*, gradually intuited, and then also reproduced, into *one* representation. This consciousness, too, may often be but weak, so that we perceive it only in the result and not in the act, that is to say, we do not join it immediately with the generating of the representation; but, notwithstanding these distinctions, we must always meet with *one* single consciousness, even though it does not stand forth with perfect clearness, and without it concepts (and consequently knowledge of objects) are quite impossible.

And here it is necessary to make it clear what we mean by the expression, the object of representation. We have said above, that phenomena are nothing but sensuous representations, and these again must be considered in the very same way, viz., not to be objects (beyond the faculty of representation). What do we mean, then, when we speak of an object corresponding to cognition, and yet distinct from it? It is easy to see that this object must be thought as something in general =  $x$ , because outside our cognition we surely possess nothing which we could place over against it, as corresponding to it.

But we find that our thought of the relation of cognition to its object carries with it some sort of necessity, since the object is considered to be that which prevents our cognitions from being determined at random, or as we choose, but *a priori* in some certain way, because, by being referred to an object, they must also necessarily, in relation to that object, agree among themselves; that is to say, they must have that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

But—since we are only concerned with the manifold of our representations, and the  $x$  which corresponds to them (the object), because it must be something different from our representations, must be to us nothing—it is clear that the unity which the object necessarily produces can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the multiplicity of representations. We say, then, “we cognize the object,” when we have produced in the manifold of intuition synthetical unity. But this unity would be impossible, except we were able to produce the intuition by means of such a function of synthesis according to a rule as renders necessary the reproduction of the manifold *a priori*, and also a concept in which it is united. We think, for example, of a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three right lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can at any time be brought before us. Now, this unity of the rule determines all multiplicity, and limits it to conditions which make the unity of a perception possible; and the conception of this unity is the representation of an object =  $x$ , which I think by means of the predicates already conceived in a triangle.

All cognition requires a concept, however incomplete or obscure; and this, in its very form, is something universal, and which serves as a rule. So the concept of body according to the unity of the manifold, which is thought by means of it, serves as the rule for our cognition of external phenomena. But it can only become a rule of intuition by representing, along with given phenomena, the necessary reproduction of their multiplicity, and conjointly the synthetical unity in the consciousness thereof. So the concept of body, when we perceive anything without us, makes the representation of extension, and with it that of solidity, figure, &c., necessary.

There is always a transcendental condition at the foundation of any necessity. Consequently, we must be able to find a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold in all our intuitions, and in all our concepts of objects generally—consequently, in all objects of experience. Without this it would be impossible to think any object as belonging to our intuitions; for such object is nothing else than that something, the conception of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis.

This original and transcendental condition is no other than the

transcendental apperception. The consciousness of self, according to the determination of our states in internal perception, is merely empirical—always changeable ; there can be no fixed or permanent self in this flux of our internal phenomena ; and this sort of consciousness is usually called the *internal sense*, or *empirical apperception*. That which is *necessarily* represented as numerically identical, cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data. There must be a condition, anticipating and rendering possible all experience. This condition only can render valid such a transcendental assumption.

Now, no cognitions can take place in us, nor any conjunction or unity among them, without this unity of consciousness, which is prior to all the data of intuition, and by reference to which alone all representation of objects is rendered possible. This pure, original, unchangeable, consciousness, I intend to call *transcendental apperception*. That it deserves this name is plain from the fact, that even the most purely objective unity, namely, that of *a priori* concepts (space and time), is only possible by the reference of intuitions to such consciousness. The numerical unity, then, of this apperception is just as much the *a priori* foundation of all concepts, as the multiplicity of space and time is the foundation of the intuitions of sensibility.

But this very transcendental unity of apperception forms connexions according to laws of all the possible phenomena which can ever appear simultaneously in a single experience. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in the cognition of the manifold, were not self-conscious of the identity of the function by means of which it connects this manifold synthetically in a cognition. Consequently, the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of self is at the same time a consciousness of just as necessary an unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to concepts ; that is, according to rules which not only make the phenomena necessarily reproducible, but *ipso facto* also determine an object for (their) intuition, and this object is a concept of something in which they are necessarily connected. For the mind could not possibly think its own identity in the multiplicity of representations, and this too *a priori*, if it had not before its eyes (so to speak) the identity of its own action, which subjects all the

empirical synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity, and is the necessary condition of the connexion of this apprehension according to rules. We shall now be able to determine more correctly our conception of an *object*. All representations have, as such, their object, and may themselves also become the objects of other representations. Phenomena are the only objects which can be given us immediately, and that which in the phenomenon refers immediately to the object is called intuition. But these phenomena are not things *per se*, but themselves only representations, which, again, have *their* object, and this we can no longer intuit; it may therefore be called the non-empirical, or transcendental, object =  $x$ .

The pure concept of the transcendental object (which really in all our cognitions is of the same sort =  $x$ ) is that which can obtain for all our empirical concepts in general reference to an object—that is, objective reality. Now this concept can contain no determined intuition, and can therefore refer to nothing but that unity which must be found in the multiplicity of a cognition, so far as it stands in relation to an object. But this relation is merely the necessary unity of consciousness, and also of the synthesis of the manifold by a general function of the mind, which connects the manifold into one representation. Now, since this unity must be regarded as necessary *a priori* (otherwise the cognition would have no object), then the relation to a transcendental object—that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge—depends on the transcendental law, that all phenomena (so far as objects are to be given us through them) must submit to the *a priori* rules of their synthetical unity, according to which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible.

In short, phenomena must in experience stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception, just as they must stand in mere intuition under the formal conditions of space and time; so that through the former every cognition first becomes even possible.

4. *Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as a priori Cognitions.*—There is only *one* experience, in which all perceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and regular connexion; just as there is only *one* space and one time in which all

forms of phenomena, and all relations of existence and non-existence, are found. When we speak of different experiences, they only mean so many perceptions, as far as they belong to one and the same universal experience. The thoroughgoing and synthetical unity of perceptions is exactly what constitutes the form of experience, and experience is nothing but the synthetical unity of phenomena according to concepts. Unity of synthesis according to empirical concepts would be quite contingent; and, were these not based on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our minds, without our ever forming experience from them. But then all reference of cognition to objects would vanish, because the connexion of experience according to universal and necessary laws would be wanting; it would then be thoughtless intuition, never amounting to knowledge, and so for us equivalent to nothing.

The *a priori* conditions of experience are, at the same time, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.\* Now, I assert, that the above-mentioned *categories* are nothing but the *conditions of thinking in possible experience*, just as *space and time are the conditions of the intuition* which is requisite for the same. The former, then, are also fundamental concepts which enable us to think objects in general for phenomena, and are, accordingly, objectively valid, which is just the point we wished to ascertain.

But the possibility, nay, even the necessity, of these Categories depends upon the relation in which the whole sensibility, and with it all possible phenomena, must stand to the primitive apperception; in which apperception everything must necessarily accord with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, which means that everything must be subject to universal functions of synthesis—synthesis according to concepts. By this means alone can apperception prove its thoroughgoing and necessary identity. For example, the concept of cause is nothing but a synthesis (of that which follows in the series of time with other phenomena)

\* That is to say, the [subjective] conditions of our minds, whereby alone we become capable of knowing objects, must also be the only possible [and therefore necessary] conditions of objects; for without submitting to these conditions, the objects cannot exist at all. It is idle to add *for us*, since no *noumenon* can properly be called an *object*.—M.

according to concepts, and without such an unity, which has its rule *a priori* and controls the phenomena, thoroughly universal and necessary unity of consciousness would not be met with in the multiplicity of phenomena: in which case these phenomena would belong to no experience, and therefore be without any object, but only a random play of representations, less even than a dream.

All attempts, then, to deduce from experience these pure concepts of the understanding, and to give them a merely empirical origin, are perfectly idle and useless. I waive the point that the concept, for example, of cause carries with it the feature of necessity, which could not be given by any experience, for this indeed teaches us, that something usually follows a certain phenomenon, but never that it must follow necessarily; nor could it teach us that we may conclude *a priori*, and quite universally, from the cause, as a condition, to the effect. But this empirical rule of association, which we must of course assume as universally applicable, when we say that everything in the series of events is so strictly obedient to law, that nothing happens without being preceded by something upon which it always follows—this rule I say, as a law of nature, upon what does it depend? How, I ask, is even this association possible? The foundation of the possibility of this association of the manifold, as far as it lies in the object, is called the *affinity* of the manifold. I ask, then, what makes this thoroughgoing affinity of phenomena conceivable to you (by which they stand under, and *must* be subject to permanent laws)?

Upon my principles it is easily understood. All possible phenomena belong, as representations, to the whole of possible self-consciousness. But, this being a transcendental representation, its numerical identity is indivisible and certain *a priori*, because we cannot possibly know anything, except through this primitive apperception. Now, as this identity must necessarily be introduced into the synthesis of all the manifold of phenomena, if they are ever to become empirical cognition, the phenomena must be subject to *a priori* conditions, to which their synthesis (in apprehension) must thoroughly conform. Now the representation of an universal condition, according to which a certain multiplicity *can* be brought before us (that is to say, the definite way in which it can be done), is called *Rule*; if it *must* be so brought before us, *Law*. Conse-

quently all phenomena stand in thorough connexion with one another according to necessary laws, and hence in a *transcendental affinity*, of which the *empirical* is merely the consequence.

That nature must conform to our subjective apperception—nay, even that its order must depend on this relation—probably sounds very absurd and strange. But, if we reflect that this nature is nothing in itself but the sum total of phenomena, consequently nothing *per se*, but merely a number of mental representations, we need not be surprised that we see it subject to the radical faculty of all our *knowledge*; that is to say, subject to transcendental apperception, and hence subject to that unity through which alone it can become the object of any possible experience; or, in other words, nature. It is for the very same reason that we can cognize this unity *a priori*, and therefore necessarily, which would be impossible were it given *in itself*, independent of the highest sources of our thinking. In this latter case, I know not whence we could draw the synthetical propositions of such an universal unity of nature; for then we must borrow them from the objects of nature themselves. As this could only be done empirically, nothing could be inferred but a contingent unity, which is very far from being the necessary connexion which we mean by the word nature.

### SECTION III.

*Of the Relation of the Understanding to Objects in general, and of the Possibility of Cognizing them a priori.*

The detached observations made in the previous Section we shall here unite and present in a connected form. There are three subjective sources of cognition, upon which rest the possibility of experience in general, and the cognition of objects; these are: *Sense*, *Imagination*, and *Apperception*. Each of these can be considered empirically, that is, in its application to given phenomena; but all of them are also [original] elements [of the mind], and *a priori* conditions, which make even this empirical use possible. *Sense* represents phenomena empirically in *perception*, *Imagination*, in *association* (and reproduction); *Apperception*, in the *empirical consciousness* of the identity of these reproduced representations with the (original) phenomena, that is to say, in *Recognition*. But at the

*a priori* basis of the whole of our perceptions lie pure Intuitions (or if we regard them as representations—the form of internal intuitions, time.) At the basis of association lies the pure synthesis of the imagination; and at the basis of empirical consciousness, pure apperception; that is, the thoroughgoing identity of self in all possible representations. If we wish, then, to analyze the internal causes of this connexion of representations, till we reach the point where all representations must meet (in order to start with unity of cognition, which is the necessary condition of possible experience), we must begin from pure apperception. All intuitions are for us nothing, and do not the least concern us, if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, whether directly or indirectly, and only through this means is cognition at all possible. We are *a priori* conscious of our own complete identity in regard to all representations which can ever belong to our cognition; and this we regard as the necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. (For these only represent anything in me, by belonging, with all the rest, to one consciousness, in which they *can* at any rate be connected.) This principle is established *a priori*, and may be called the *transcendental principle of the unity* of all the multiplicity of our representations (even in intuition). Now, the unity of multiplicity in one subject is synthetical. Pure apperception, then, gives us a principle of the synthetical unity of multiplicity in all possible intuition.\*

\* Let us pay particular attention to this proposition, which is of the greatest importance. All representations have a necessary reference to a possible empirical consciousness; for, if they had not this feature, and were it quite impossible to become conscious of them, this would be as much as to say, they do not exist. But all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to a transcendental consciousness (preceding all particular experience), namely, the consciousness of self, as the primitive apperception. It is absolutely necessary that in my cognition all consciousness should belong to one consciousness (of myself). Now, this is a synthetical unity of the manifold (of consciousness) which is cognized *a priori*, and which gives just the same basis for synthetical *a priori* propositions which relate to pure thinking, as space and time give to such propositions as relate to the form of mere intuition. The synthetical proposition, that the various empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is absolutely the first and synthetical principle of our thinking in general. But we must never forget,

But this synthetical unity presupposes or implies a synthesis ; and if the former is to be necessary *a priori*, the latter must be an *a priori* synthesis. Consequently, the transcendental unity of apperception points to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of any combination of the manifold into a single cognition. But it is only the *productive synthesis of the imagination* which can take place *a priori* ; for the *reproductive* depends on empirical conditions. Consequently, before apperception, the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination is the foundation of the possibility of any knowledge, especially of experience.

Now, we denominate the synthesis of multiplicity in the imagination transcendental, when, without distinguishing the intuitions, it aims at nothing but the combination of multiplicity *a priori* : and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental, if, as referring to the original unity of apperception, it is represented as necessary *a priori*. Now, as this latter lies at the foundation of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of all possible cognition, by means of which all objects of possible experience must be represented *a priori*.

*The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination* is the *understanding* ; and this very unity, in relation to the *transcendental* synthesis of the imagination, is the *pure* understanding. There are, then, in the understanding pure cognitions *a priori*, which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination, in reference to all possible phenomena. But these are the Categories, or pure concepts of the understanding. Consequently, the empirical faculty of cognition which belongs to our nature contains an understanding which relates to all objects of the senses, but this only mediately, through intuition and its synthesis by means of the imagination, to which understanding all

that the bare representation *Ego* is the transcendental consciousness in relation to all others (the collective unity of which it renders possible). This representation may then be clear (empirical consciousness), or obscure—a fact which is here of no importance ; nay, not even the fact whether it have any reality or not ; but the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge rests necessarily on the relation to this apperception *as a faculty*.

phenomena must consequently be subject, as data for a possible experience. But, as this relation of phenomena to possible experience is also necessary (because without this they would afford us no cognition, and not concern us at all), it follows, that the pure understanding, by means of the Categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and phenomena have a *necessary relation to the understanding*.

We shall now expound the necessary connexion of the understanding with phenomena by means of the Categories, by beginning from below—from the empirical extremity. The first thing given us is the phenomenon, which, if combined with consciousness, is called perception. (Without relation at least to a possible consciousness, the phenomenon could never be for us an object of cognition, and would hence be to us as nothing; and having no objective reality, and only existing as known, it would be absolutely nothing at all.) But, as every phenomenon contains a certain multiplicity—that is to say, as various perceptions are found within us, in themselves scattered and single—a connexion of them is necessary, and this they cannot have in mere sense. There is, then, within us an active faculty of the synthesis of this multiplicity, which we call the faculty of Imagination; and the action of which, when directed immediately upon the perceptions, I call apprehension.\* The province of the imagination is to unite the manifold of intuition into an *image*; it must first, then, grasp the impressions actively, viz., *apprehend* them.

But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold by itself could produce no image, nor connexion of impressions, if there were not present a subjective condition for summoning a perception from which the mind had made a transition to the next, to join this next, and so produce whole series of these perceptions—in fact, if we did not possess a reproductive faculty of the imagination, which

\* That the faculty of imagination is a necessary ingredient even in perception, has perhaps not as yet struck any psychologist. This arises partly from confining this faculty to mere reproductions; partly because it was thought that the senses not only gave us impressions, but even combined them, and so brought images of objects before us—a process which, nevertheless, most certainly requires somewhat besides the mere receptivity of impressions, namely, a function of their synthesis. [Cf. above, p. 86.—M.]

even then is only empirical. But since representations, if they suggested one another just as they chanced to meet together originally, would have no determinate connexion, but be a mere confused crowd, from which could spring no cognition; their reproduction must have a rule by which a representation enters into combination rather with this than with another representation in the imagination. This subjective and empirical cause of reproduction according to rules, we call the *association* of representations.

But, if this unity of association had not also an objective basis, so as to make it impossible for phenomena to be apprehended by the imagination except under the condition of a possible synthetical unity of this apprehension, then it would also be quite contingent that phenomena, when combined, should be adapted to human cognitions. For, although we had the faculty of associating perceptions, it would still be quite undetermined in itself, and accidental, whether they were also themselves capable of such association; and, supposing they were not, a quantity of perceptions, and even a whole sensibility, would be possible, in which the mind might meet with a great deal of empirical consciousness, but disconnected, and without belonging to a *consciousness of myself*, which is nevertheless impossible. For it is only when I attribute all my perceptions to one consciousness (of pure apperception) that I can say I am conscious of them. There must, then, be an objective ground, prior to any of the empirical laws of imagination, and *a priori*, on which depends the possibility—nay, even the necessity—of a law extending over all phenomena; which regards them universally to be such data of the senses as are in themselves associable, and subject to the general rules of a thoroughgoing connexion when reproduced. This objective basis of all association of representations I call their *affinity*. This we cannot meet elsewhere than in the principle of the unity of apperception, as regards all cognitions which can belong to me. According to this principle, every phenomenon, without exception, must so enter the mind, or be apprehended, as to agree with the unity of apperception, which apperception would itself be impossible, without synthetical unity in its connexion; this latter is, accordingly, also objectively necessary.

The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (of primitive apperception) is, then, the necessary

condition even of all perception ; and the affinity of all phenomena (proximate or remote) is the necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination, which is founded *a priori* upon rules.

The Imagination is, then, also a faculty of *a priori* synthesis, for which reason we give it the name of the productive imagination ; and since, as far as it relates to the multiplicity of phenomena, it has no further object than to produce the necessary unity in their synthesis, we may call it the transcendental function of the imagination. It is, then, sufficiently clear from what precedes, though it may sound rather strange, that it is only by means of the transcendental function of the imagination that even the affinity of phenomena, and with it their association, and through this, too, their reproduction in accordance with laws—in fact, that experience—becomes possible ; because without it no concepts of objects at all would coalesce into one experience.

For the fixed and permanent *Ego* (of pure apperception) constitutes the correlatum of all our representations, so far as the mere possibility of becoming conscious of them ; and all consciousness belongs just as much to an all-comprehensive pure apperception as all sensuous intuition (*quà* representation) belongs to a pure internal intuition—namely, that of time. It is, then, this apperception which must be added to the imagination, to render its function intellectual.\* For in itself the synthesis of imagination, though exercised *a priori*, is yet always sensuous, because it only combines the manifold as it appears in intuition—for example, the figure of a triangle. But it is only through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception that concepts can be formed, and this only by means of the imagination in relation to the sensuous intuition.

We have, then, the pure imagination, as an original faculty of the human soul, lying at the basis of all cognition *a priori*. By means of it we bring on the one side the multiplicity of intuition, and on the other the condition of the necessary unity of apperception, into mutual relation.† Both extremities—sensibility and understanding—must be necessarily connected by means of this

\* Cf. above, p. 87.—M.

† From this point I have attempted an explanation of the schematism of the Categories in the Introduction.—M.

transcendental function of the imagination ; otherwise, there might indeed be appearances, but no objects of empirical cognition or experience. Real experience, consisting of apprehension, association (of reproduction), and finally, of the recognition of phenomena, contains in this last and highest (merely empirical element of experience) concepts, which render possible the formal unity of experience, and with it all objective validity (truth) of empirical cognition. These fundamental causes of the recognition of multiplicity, so far as they concern merely the *form of experience in general*, are the very Categories of which we are speaking. On them is founded not only all formal unity of the synthesis of the imagination, but through it the unity even of all that belongs to its empirical use (in recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension), down to phenomena ; because it is only by means of these elements of our knowledge that phenomena can belong to our consciousness, and hence to ourselves.

The order, then, and regularity in phenomena, which we call *nature*, we introduce ourselves, and should never find it there, if we, or the nature of our mind, had not placed it there. For this unity of nature must be a necessary unity of connexion ; that is to say, certain *a priori*. But how could we possibly produce *a priori* a synthetical unity, if there were not contained in the original sources of knowledge in our mind subjective foundations for such unity *a priori*, and if these subjective conditions were not at the same time objectively valid, by being the very basis of the possibility of cognizing any object at all in experience ?

We have already explained the *Understanding* in various ways : by a spontaneity of cognition (as opposed to the receptivity of sensibility), or by a faculty of thinking, or of concepts, or even of judgments—all of which explanations, if properly understood, coincide. We may now characterize it as the *faculty of rules*. This attribute is more fruitful (in applications), and explains its\* nature better. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but the understanding gives us rules. This latter is always occupied in hunting through phenomena, in order to find any rule they may present.

\* The original is *derselben*, viz., *their* nature. My emendation, *desselben*, seems necessary.—M.

Rules, so far as they are objective (or belong necessarily to the cognition of the object) are called laws. Although we learn many laws from experience, yet are these only particular determinations of higher laws, among which the highest (to which the rest are subordinate) are derived from the Understanding itself, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather render phenomena subject to law, and by this very means make experience itself possible. The understanding is, then, not merely a faculty of forming for itself rules by the comparison of phenomena; it is itself a code of laws for nature; that is to say, without understanding there would be no nature at all, or synthetical unity of phenomena according to rules; for phenomena cannot, as such, take place without us, but exist only in our sensibility. But this sensibility, as an object of knowledge in experience, with all that it may contain, is only possible in the unity of apperception. This unity of apperception is the transcendental basis of the necessary regularity of all phenomena in experience. The same unity in relation to the multiplicity of representations (that is to say, determining it from a single representation) is the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding. All phenomena, then, as possible objects of experience, lie *a priori* in the understanding, and receive from it their possibility, just in the same way that, as mere intuitions, they lie in the sensibility, and, as to form, are only possible through it.

However exaggerated or absurd, then, it may seem to assert that the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature, and of the formal unity thereof, such an assertion is nevertheless equally correct and applicable to the object; that is, to experience. Empirical laws, indeed, as such, can by no means deduce their origin from the pure understanding, just as little as the infinite variety of phenomena could be adequately conceived from the pure form of sensuous intuition. But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which, and according to the norma of which, they first become possible; so that phenomena assume a fixed form, just as all phenomena, in spite of the variety of their empirical form, must nevertheless always accord with the conditions of the pure form of sensibility.

The pure understanding is, then, in the Categories, the law of the synthetical unity of all phenomena; and hence it first renders expe-

rience possible, as to form.\* But this was all we had in view throughout the transcendental deduction of the Categories, namely, this relation of the understanding to sensibility, and through it to all objects of experience; in fact, to render intelligible the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding, and so to establish their origin and truth.

#### SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE LEGITIMACY AND POSSIBILITY OF THIS DEDUCTION, AND NO OTHER, OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

WERE the objects with which our knowledge is concerned things in themselves, we could not have any *a priori* concepts of them. For from whence could we obtain such concepts? Supposing we took them from the object (without pausing to investigate how this could become known to us at all), then our concepts would be merely empirical, and not *a priori*. Supposing we took them from ourselves, then that which is merely within us could not determine the nature of an object distinct from our representations; that is to say, it could not form a reason why there should exist a thing to which what we have in our thoughts should correspond, rather than that such representations should be totally void. On the contrary, if we are altogether concerned only with phenomena, it is not only possible, but even necessary, that certain *a priori* concepts should antecede the empirical cognition of objects. For, as phenomena, they produce an object which exists only in us, because a mere modification of our sensibility is never met with without us. Now, this very representation—that all these phenomena, and objects with which we can employ ourselves, are all in me; that is, are determinations of my identical self—this representation, I say, expresses their complete unity in one and the same apperception to be necessary. But in this unity of possible consciousness consists also the form of all cognition of objects (by which multiplicity is thought as belonging

\* This important limitation saves Kant's system from absolute idealism. He never asserts that the matter of experience is created by the *Ego*.—M.

to *one* object). So that the relation in which the manifold of sensuous representations (intuition) belongs to one consciousness, precedes all cognition of the object, as being its intellectual form, and even produces a formal cognition of all objects *a priori*, so far as they are thought (Categories). Their synthesis, through the pure imagination and the unity of all representations, in relation to original apperceptions, precede all empirical cognition. Consequently, pure concepts of the understanding are only for this reason possible—may, even in relation to experience, necessary—that our knowledgeis concerned with nothing but phenomena, the possibility of whichlies within ourselves, and the conjunction and unity of which (in therepresentation of an object) are to be met with only in ourselves; sothat these must precede all experience, and first make it even pos-sible as to form. It is then on this basis, the only possible one, that our deduction of the Categories has been constructed.

## APPENDIX B.

---

(a) AFTER the words “under such conceptions,” p. 181, the following paragraph occurs in the First Edition:—

“Above, in the exposition of the table of the Categories, we saved ourselves the trouble of defining each of them, because our object, which concerned merely their synthetical use, did not necessitate it, and we should not, by needless undertakings, incur responsibilities which we can avoid. This was not an evasion, but an unavoidable rule of prudence, not to venture forthwith into definitions, and to attempt or pretend to completeness in the determinations of a concept, when one or two of its attributes suffice, without our requiring a complete enumeration of all that make up the whole concept. But it now appears that the ground of this precaution lies deeper, namely, that we could not define them if we wished to do so.\* For, if we get rid of all the conditions of sensibility which mark them as concepts that can possibly be used empirically, and take them for concepts of things in general (that is, of transcendental application), then nothing farther can be done with them than to regard the logical function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of things themselves; without there being the least evidence how they could then have their application and object, or how they could have any meaning and objective validity in the pure understanding, without intuition.”

\* I mean here real definition, which does not merely substitute for the name of a thing other more intelligible terms, but that which contains in it a distinct attribute by which the object (*definitum*) can always be certainly recognised, and which renders the defined concept useful in application. The real explanation would then be that which makes distinct not only a concept, but at the same time its *objective reality*. Mathematical explanations, which present the object in accordance with the concept in intuition, are of this latter sort.

( $\beta$ ) Instead of the note on p. 182, the First Edition has the following note :—

“It appears somewhat strange, and even absurd, that there should be a concept which is to have a signification, but is not capable of any explanation. But the Categories have been here so peculiarly treated, that, though they can only have a definite signification and reference to any object by means of the universal *sensuous condition*, yet this condition has been left out of the pure Category, which, in consequence, can contain nothing but the logical function of bringing the manifold under a concept. But from this function—that is, from the form of the concept alone—it cannot at all be known what object falls under it, because abstraction has been made from that very sensuous condition, owing to which alone objects in general can come under the Category. Hence the Categories require, beyond the mere concept of the understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility in general (*schemata*), and without this are not concepts by which any object can be cognized and distinguished from another: they are rather so many ways of thinking an object for possible intuitions, and giving it its signification (under conditions yet to be supplied), according to some function of the understanding; that is, of *defining* it: but these Categories cannot themselves be defined. The logical functions of judgments in general—unity and plurality, affirmation and negation, subject and predicate—cannot be defined without arguing in a circle, because such definition cannot but be a judgment, and must therefore contain these functions. But the pure Categories are representations of things in general, so far as the diversity of their intuition must be thought through one or other of these logical functions: Quantity is the determination which can only be thought through a judgment having quantity (*judicium commune*); Reality, that which can only be thought through an affirmative judgment; Substance, that which, in reference to intuition, must be the ultimate subject of all other determinations. But what sort of things they are, in reference to which we must employ this function rather than that, still remains quite undetermined. So that the Categories, without the condition of sensuous intuition (provided they contain the synthesis), have no definite relation to any object, hence cannot define any such object, and have not, consequently, in themselves the validity of objective concepts.”

The passage commencing, "but there lurks" (p. 184), and ending, "*negative sense*" (p. 186), was re-written in the Second Edition. Its original form was as follows:—

"Appearances, so far as they are conceived as objects, according to the unity of the Categories, are called *phenomena*. But if I assume things, which are merely the objects of the understanding, and which can, at the same time, be presented to an intuition, though not a sensuous one (as *coram intuitu intellectuali*), then such things would be called *noumena (intelligibilia)*.

Now it might be imagined that the concept of phenomena, limited as it was in the transcendental *Æsthetic*, suggests of itself the objective reality of the *noumena*, and justifies the division of all objects into phenomena and noumena; and so of the world into one of sense and of reason (*mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis*). And indeed the difference would not seem to be the logical form of the distinct or indistinct knowledge of one and the same object, but would start from the difference of the way in which they are given to our cognition, and according to which they must differ from one another in themselves as to genus. For, if the senses represent something only as it appears, this something must surely be also a thing in itself, and the object of a non-sensuous intuition; that is, of the understanding. In such case there must be a cognition possible, in which no sensibility can be found, and which alone possesses absolutely objective reality, viz., by which objects are represented to us *as they are*; whereas, on the contrary, in the empirical use of our understanding, things are only cognized *as they appear*. Accordingly, beyond the empirical use of the Categories (which is restricted to sensuous conditions), there would be still a pure and objectively valid one; and we could not assert, as we have claimed to do so far, that our pure understanding-cognitions are nothing but principles of the exposition of appearance, and do not reach any further *a priori* than the formal possibility of experience; for here quite another field would lie open to us, as it were a world thought in the spirit (perhaps even intuited), upon which we could employ our understanding just as much, and far more nobly.

Now all our representations are, in fact, referred to some object by the understanding, as phenomena are nothing but representations; and so the understanding refers them to *something*, as the

object of sensuous intuition ; but this something is so far merely the transcendental object. But this signifies a something =  $x$ , of which we know nothing ; nor can we (according to the present constitution of our understanding) know anything of it, as being that which can serve only as a correlate of the unity of apperception to obtain the unity of diversity in sensuous intuition, by means of which the understanding unites the diversity in the concept of an object. This transcendental cannot be at all separated from the sensuous data, because then nothing remains by which it would be thought.\* [This  $x$  then] is no object of cognition in itself, but only the representation of phenomena under the concept of an object in general, which is determinable by the diversity of the phenomena.

For this reason, the Categories do not represent any definite object given to the understanding alone, but only serve to determine the transcendental object (the concept of something in general), by what is given in sensibility, so as by it to cognize empirically phenomena under concepts of objects.

But, as to the reason why we (not satisfied with the *substratum* of sensibility) have added noumena to the phenomena, which the pure understanding alone can think, it rests simply upon this: Sensibility and its sphere (viz., that of phenomena) are restricted by the understanding to this, that it shall concern, not things *per se*, but only the way in which things appear to us according to our subjective constitution. This was the result of the whole transcendental Æsthetic ; and it also follows naturally from the very concept of a phenomenon in general, that something must correspond to it which in itself is not phenomenon, because phenomenon can be nothing in itself beyond our faculty of representation ; so that, if we are not to be involved in a perpetual circle, the very word phenomenon indicates a reference to something, the immediate represen-

\* This clause Dr. Fischer omits in his account of the matter (p. 131), and it also explains and limits Kant's meaning, in the passages quoted by him above (pp. 190 and 195) in italics. Because nothing is left *for us*, when we subtract all the subjective conditions of the object, it does not follow that nothing *at all* remains. Hence, throughout this passage Kant never asserts the thing *per se* not to exist. His private opinion seems to have been that it did exist ; and this is often *implied* in his language, though seldom explicitly stated, being just as indemonstrable as the opposed doctrine.—M.

tation of which indeed is sensuous, but which in itself, even without this constitution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is based), must still be something; that is, an object independent of our sensibility.

Now, from this originates the concept of a noumenon, which is, however, not at all positive, or a definite cognition of any particular thing, but only signifies the thought of something in general, by abstracting from all the form of sensuous intuition. But, in order that a noumenon should signify a real object, to be distinguished from all phenomena, it is not enough for me to rid my thoughts of all the conditions of sensuous intuition; I must, over and above this, have some reason for assuming another sort of intuition than sensuous, under which such an object could be given: otherwise my thought, though not self-contradictory, is still void. We have, indeed, not been able to demonstrate in the text that sensuous intuition was the only possible one at all, but merely that it was so *for us*; but neither were we able to prove that another kind of intuition was possible; and, although our thought can abstract from all sensibility, the question still remains to be settled—whether it is then anything but the mere form of a concept; and whether, when such abstraction is made, any object at all is left.\*

The object to which I refer the phenomenon in general is the transcendental object; that is, the totally undetermined thought of *something* in general. This cannot be called the *noumenon*; for I do not know what it is in itself, and have no concept of it at all, except as the object of sensuous intuition in general, which is, accordingly, of the same description for all phenomena. I cannot think it by means of any Category; for such is valid only of empirical intuition, in order to subject it to the concept of an object in general. A pure use of the Categories is indeed possible, or not contradictory, but has no objective validity, because it concerns no intuition on which it confers the unity of an object; for the Category is only a pure function of thought, by which no object can be given me, but by which only what is given in intuition is thought."

\* Here is the question of absolute idealism explicitly raised; and the following paragraph proceeds, not to solve it dogmatically, but merely to show that no possible data can be found for settling the question. There being such total absence of proofs, may not the necessary suggestion of noumena by phenomena be allowed some weight?—M.

## APPENDIX C.

## THE FIRST PARALOGISM OF SUBSTANTIALITY.\*

THAT, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and which consequently cannot be used to determine anything else [as predicate], is *substance*.

I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute* subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be used as the predicate of anything else.

Therefore, I, as a thinking being (soul), am *substance*.

## CRITICK OF THE FIRST PARALOGISM OF PURE PSYCHOLOGY.

WE have shown in the analytical part of the transcendental Logic that pure Categories (and among them that of substance) have in themselves no objective meaning at all, except when based on an intuition, to the diversity of which they can be applied, as functions of the synthetical unity. Without this, they are merely functions of a judgment, without content. Of anything in general, I may say it is substance, so far as I distinguish it from the mere predicates and determinations of things. Now, in all our thinking, the *Ego* is the subject, in which thoughts inhere merely as determinations, and this *Ego* cannot be used to determine anything else. Consequently, every one must necessarily consider himself as the substance, and his thoughts as the accidents, of his existence, and

\* The following discussion stood in the First Edition after the words "predicaments of pure psychology" (p. 241).

determinations of his condition. But what use can I make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a thinking being, exist permanently; that I cannot naturally either arise or pass away—this I cannot at all infer from it, and yet it is the only use of the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject, with which I could otherwise very well dispense.

We are so far from being able to conclude these properties from the mere pure Category of substance, that we are obliged to use as a basis the permanence of any object given in experience, if we wish to bring it [even such an object] under the empirically applicable concept of *substance*. Now, in the proposition we are discussing, we have not taken any experience for our basis, but have concluded simply from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the *Ego*, in which it inheres, as its common subject. Neither could we, supposing we desired to do it, establish such a permanence by any safe observation. For the *Ego* is present indeed in all thoughts; but there is not the least intuition connected with this representation, to distinguish it from other objects of intuition. We may then, indeed, perceive that this representation is ever occurring in every act of thought, but not that it is the fixed and permanent intuition in which thoughts (being transient) alternate.\*

It follows, that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology only palms off upon us an apparently new discovery, by setting up the continual logical subject of thinking as the cognition of the real subject of inherence. Of this latter we neither have, nor can have, the least knowledge, because consciousness is the only thing which makes all our representations thoughts, and where all our perceptions must be found, as their transcendental subject; and, beyond this logical meaning of the *Ego*, we have no knowledge of the subject in itself, which lies as *substratum* at the basis of this [representation of self], as well as of all other thoughts. The proposition, then, *the soul is a substance*, may be allowed to stand, provided we keep

\* He here approaches as closely as possible to the refutation of Idealism in his Second Edition. According to the First Edition, also, all change must take place in a permanent and (Second Edition) a permanent homogeneous with it. This permanent is not the *Ego* (First Edition, above); therefore, it must be an external permanent (Second Edition).—M.

in mind that this concept leads us no farther at all, nor can it teach us any of the usual conclusions of sophistical psychology; for example, its permanence through all changes, and even after death. It denotes, then, a substance only in Idea, but not in reality.

---

### THE SECOND PARALOGISM OF SIMPLICITY.

A THING, the action of which cannot be regarded as the concurrence of the action of several things, is *simple*.

Now, the soul, or the thinking *Ego*, is such a thing.

Therefore, &c.

---

### CRITICK OF THE SECOND PARALOGISM OF TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THIS is the Achilles of all the dialectical conclusions of pure psychology; not merely a play of sophistry ingeniously contrived by the dogmatical philosopher, to produce some show of argument for his assertions, but a conclusion which seems to withstand the most acute investigation, and the most circumspect consideration. Here it is:—

Every *composite* substance is an aggregate of many; and the action of any composite, or that which inheres in it as such, is the aggregate of many actions or accidents, divided among a number of substances. Now, an effect which arises from the concurrence of several acting substances is possible when this effect is merely external (as, for instance, the motion of a body is the joint motion of all its parts). But the case is different with thoughts, which are accidents belonging internally to a thinking being. For, supposing that this composite did think, each part of it would contain part of the thought; but all of them only when combined, the whole thought. Now this is contradictory. For, since the representations which are contained under the different parts (suppose the individual words of a verse) are never [by themselves] a whole thought (a verse), so thought cannot be inherent in a composite as such. Thought,

therefore, is only possible in a substance which is not an aggregate of many substances, but absolutely simple.\*

The so-called *nervus probandi* of this argument lies in the proposition : that many representations must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject, to make up one thought. But this proposition no one can prove *from concepts*. For how could he even commence his argument? The proposition: a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being—cannot be treated analytically. For the unity of a thought which consists of many representations is collective, and, as far as pure concepts go, might just as well refer to the collective unity of the co-operating substances (like the motion of the body being the composite motion of its parts), as to the absolute unity of the subject. Proceeding, then, according to the law of identity, we cannot see the necessity of presupposing a simple substance to account for a composite thought. But that this proposition should be recognised synthetically and perfectly *a priori* from pure concepts, no one will venture to assert, who understands the basis of the possibility of synthetical *a priori* judgments, as already set forth.

Now, it is equally impossible to deduce from experience this necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possibility of each single thought. For experience could give no necessity, not to mention that the concept of absolute unity is far beyond its sphere. Whence, then, do we get this proposition, on which the whole psychological syllogism of the Reason rests?

It is plain that, if we wish to represent a thinking being, we must put ourselves in its place, and so supply to the object which we wish to obtain our own subject (which is not the case in any other sort of investigation), and that we only demand the absolute unity of the subject, because otherwise we could not say: I think (the manifold of the representation). For, although the sum of the thought might be divided and distributed among many subjects, yet the subjective *Ego* cannot be divided or distributed, and this we certainly presuppose in all thinking.

\* It is very easy to give this proof the usual scholastic form. But it is sufficient for my purpose to present its ground of proof, though merely in a popular form.

Here, then, as in the previous paralogism, the formal proposition of apperception, *I think*, is also the whole basis, upon which rational psychology ventures to extend her cognitions—a proposition which is not experience, but merely the form of apperception, belonging to, and preceding, every experience. But, with reference to possible cognition, this must be regarded merely as a *subjective condition*, which we have no right to exalt to a condition of the possibility of objects; that is, to a *concept* of a thinking being in general, [merely] because we cannot represent such to ourselves, without putting ourselves with the formula of our consciousness in the place of every other intelligent being.

The simplicity of myself (as a soul) is not really inferred from the proposition, *I think*; for the former already exists in every thought. The proposition, *I am* [*a*] *simple* [*being*], must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as the supposed Cartesian conclusion, *cogito, ergo sum*, is really tautological, as *cogito* (= *sum cogitans*) expressly asserts existence. *I am* [*a*] *simple* [*being*] means nothing but this—that the representation, *I*, does not contain the least multiplicity, and that it is an absolute (although merely logical) unity.

Consequently, this celebrated psychological demonstration is merely based upon the indivisible *unity* of a representation which only directs the verb [*cogitare*] to refer to a person. But it is plain that the subject of inherence is only indicated as transcendental by the *Ego* attached to the thought, without noting in the least any of its properties, and without knowing or cognizing anything at all about it. It means something in general (a transcendental subject), the representation of which must indeed be simple, for the obvious reason that nothing at all is determined in it, since we cannot represent a thing more simply than by the concept of a mere something. But the fact of the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not, for that reason, a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself; for total abstraction is made from its properties, when it is merely signified by the perfectly contentless expression *Ego* (which I can apply to every thinking subject).

So much is certain, that I represent to myself by *Ego* always an absolute, though only a logical, unity of the subject (Simplicity),

but do not cognize through it the real simplicity of my subject. As the proposition, I am substance, means nothing but the pure Category, of which I can make no concrete use (empirically) ; so I may also be allowed to say, I am a simple substance, that is, one whose representation never contains a synthesis of multiplicity ; but this concept, or even this proposition, does not give us the least information with regard to myself as an object of experience, because the concept of substance itself is only used as a function of synthesis, without being based on intuition—that is, without any object ; so that it only applies to the condition of our knowledge, not to any object which we could name. Let us make an experiment with regard to the supposed use of this proposition.

Every one must confess that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is merely of value so far as I am able by it to separate this subject from all matter, and consequently exempt it from decay, to which the other is always liable. It is for this use that the above proposition is specially intended, for which reason it is often thus expressed : The soul is not corporeal. Now, if I can show that, even conceding to this cardinal proposition of rational psychology all objective validity (that all which thinks is simple substance), in the pure meaning of a mere judgment of the Reason (from pure Categories)—even conceding this, I say—not the least use can be made of it with reference to its dissimilarity or relation to matter, then I may fairly claim to have relegated this pretended philosophical truth into the region of pure Ideas, which are wanting in reality when objectively used.

We have proved irrefragably in our transcendental *Æsthetic* that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, and not things in themselves. In accordance with this we may say justly, that our thinking subject is not corporeal ; meaning that, as it is represented to us as an object of the internal sense, it cannot, so far as it thinks, be an object of the external senses, or a phenomenon in space. This is equivalent to saying : thinking beings, as such, can never be represented to us among external intuitions ; or, we cannot intuit their thoughts, consciousness, desires, &c., externally ; for all this must come before the internal sense. Indeed, this argument appears to be also the natural and popular one, which seems to have satisfied

even the most ordinary understandings, which have, accordingly, from very early times begun to consider souls as being totally distinct from bodies.

Now, extension, incompressibility, conjunction, and motion—in short, all that our external senses can alone give us—are not, and indeed do not contain thought, feeling, desire, or determination, which are not at all objects of external intuition. Nevertheless, *that* something which lies at the basis of external phenomena—which so affects our sense as to give it the representations of space, matter, form, &c.—that something, I say, considered as a noumenon (or perhaps better as a transcendental object), might also at the same time be the subject of thoughts, although we may not be able to obtain any intuition of mental states, will, &c. (but only of space and its determinations), through the means by which our external sense is affected. But this something is not extended, impenetrable, or composite, because all these predicates only concern sensibility and its intuition, so far as we are affected by that sort of objects (otherwise unknown to us). Yet these expressions by no means declare to us what sort of an object it is, but only this, that these predicates of external phenomena cannot be applied to it, considered as an object in itself, and without reference to external senses. But the predicates of the internal sense—representation and thinking—do not contradict it. Consequently, even by admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is not at all proved to be distinct from matter, as regards their respective *substrata*, if we regard it (as we ought) merely as a phenomenon.\*

If matter were a thing *per se*, it would, as a composite being, be altogether different from the soul, as a simple being. But it is only an external phenomenon, of which the *substratum* is not cognized by any predicates which could be suggested. I might, then, be quite justified in assuming of this *substratum* that it was in itself simple, although in the way in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of extension, and, along with it, of composition. It might follow, then, that this substance, to which extension is added by reference to our external sense, is accompanied by thoughts in itself, which through their own peculiar internal sense can be

\* Cf. above, p. 183.

represented with consciousness. In this way the very same thing which in one relation is called corporeal, is at the same time in another called a thinking being, whose thoughts indeed we cannot intuit, but only their evidences, in phenomena. We should thus get rid of the expression, that souls only (as being a peculiar sort of substances) think; we should rather use the ordinary phrase, that men think; that is to say, that the very same thing which is extended as an external phenomenon, is internally (in itself) a subject not composite, but simple and thinking.

But, without admitting such hypotheses, we may observe in general, that if I mean by soul a thinking being *per se*, the very question is improper, if we mean to ask whether it is of the same kind, or not, as matter (which is not a thing *per se*, but only a sort of representation in us); for it is self-evident that a thing *per se* must be of a different nature from the determinations which merely constitute its states.\*

But, if we compare the thinking *Ego*, not with matter, but with the intelligible something, at the basis of the external phenomena, which we call matter, as we know nothing of this latter, we cannot assert that the soul differs from it in any way internally.†

Accordingly, simple consciousness is not a cognition of the simple nature of our subject, so far as it is to be distinguished as such from matter as a composite existence.

But, if this concept of simplicity is useless in the only case where it might be of service (that is, to determine the peculiar and distinguishing feature of our subject, when I compare myself with the objects of external experience), we may fairly despair of ever knowing that *I*, the soul (a name for the transcendental objects of the internal sense), am simple. This expression, then, has no application

\* Cf. above, p. 56, note.

† The tone of the whole preceding passage corroborates the view I have taken (in the Introduction) of the intelligible and empirical characters, and shows that Kant (at least in his *opinions*) seems to have ascribed far more certainty and reality to the noumenon of internal, than to that of external, phenomena. At the same time, he never *asserts* this (because indemonstrable); it is also remarkable that, though he contemplates the possibility of noumenal monism, he never suggests the possibility of noumenal nihilism.—M.

extending to real objects, and cannot, therefore, extend our knowledge in the least.

If these remarks are true, the whole of rational psychology falls to the ground with its principal support; and we can as little here as elsewhere hope to extend our information by pure concepts (still less by consciousness, the mere subjective form of all our concepts). More especially, the fundamental concept of *a simple nature* is such, that it cannot be found in any experience at all; so that there is no way of reaching it as an objectively valid concept.

---

### THIRD PARALOGISM OF PERSONALITY.

THAT which is conscious of its own numerical identity at different times is, so far, a person.

Now, the soul has this consciousness.

Therefore, it is a Person.

---

### CRITICK OF THE THIRD PARALOGISM OF TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

IF I desire to cognize the numerical identity of an external object by experience, I pay attention to the permanent of the phenomenon, to which, as subject, all the rest refers as determination, and remark the identity of the former in time, while the latter changes. But I am an object of the internal sense, and all time is merely the form of the internal sense. Consequently, I refer my successive modifications, one and all, to the numerically identical self in all time; that is, in the form of the internal intuition of myself. Upon this ground the personality of the soul should be regarded, not as inference, but as a perfectly identical proposition of self-consciousness in time; and this, too, is the reason why it is valid *a priori*. For it says nothing but this: In all the time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time, as belonging to the unity of myself; and it is indifferent whether I say, the whole of time is in me, who am an individual unity; or, I am, with my numerical identity, present in all this time.

Personal identity, then, must be always met with in my own consciousness. But, if I consider myself from the point of view of another person (as an object of external intuition), this observer external to me first perceives *me in time*; for in apperception *time* is properly only represented *in me*.\* He will, consequently, not conclude the objective permanence of myself from the *Ego*, which accompanies all representations at all times *in my consciousness*, and indeed with perfect identity, even though he concedes its presence. For, as the time in which the observer places me is not that which is met with in my sensibility, but in his, the identity which is necessarily bound up with my consciousness is not bound up with his, which is an external intuition of my subject.

The identity, then, of the consciousness of myself at different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their connexion, but does not demonstrate the numerical identity of my subject, in which, notwithstanding the logical identity of the *Ego*, such a change might have taken place as to preclude its identity. We might nevertheless always attribute to it that *Ego*, which never varies in name, and which in every different state, even were the subject changed, could yet always preserve the thought of the previous subject, and hand it over to the succeeding.†

\* Kant's argument appears to be as follows: When I regard my own internal phenomena, I find them to be all subject to the condition of *time*; but this time, again (and the phenomena in it), I perceive always as in me; hence, in apperception *self* is a still higher condition, to which time is subject. Hence, the identity of self has been regarded as the necessary condition of my existence in time. This is true subjectively (in apperception), but not so objectively, or absolutely; for, suppose another man perceives me, he perceives me through his external sense, and I am also to him *in time*. But, though he readily admits and believes in my consciousness being accompanied with a full consciousness of identity, this identity is not to him the condition of the time in which *he* places me. He places *me in time*, instead of placing *time in me*. And the feeling of identity which he allows in me is to him no proof that my *self* is objectively permanent; for it is not necessarily implied by the time in which he places me.—M.

† An elastic ball which strikes full upon a similar one imparts to it all its motion, or all its state (if we merely regard places in space). Now, let us assume substances after the analogy of such bodies, where each imparted its

Although the proposition of some ancient schools—that everything is in a flux, and nothing permanent—cannot stand if we assume substances, it is not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness; for we ourselves cannot decide from our own consciousness whether we, as souls, are permanent or not, because we only consider *that* to belong to our identical selves, of which we are conscious; and so, of course, we judge necessarily that we are the very same in the whole time of which we are conscious. But from the point of view of a second person we cannot hold this to be a valid conclusion; because, as we meet in the soul no permanent phenomenon except the representation self, which accompanies and connects them all, we can never ascertain whether this *Idea* (a mere thought) is not subject to the same flux as the remaining thoughts which are connected by it.

But it is remarkable that the personality and permanence which it presupposes—that is, the substantiality of the soul—*must now be proved before all things*; for, could we presuppose it, there would follow, not indeed the permanence of consciousness, but the possibility of a lasting consciousness, in a permanent subject; and this is sufficient for personality, which need not itself cease, even though its action might be interrupted for a time. But this permanence is not given us at all before the numerical identity of ourselves, which we infer from the identity of apperception, but is rather inferred from that identity (and after this, to make the argument valid, should follow the concept of substance, which can only be used empirically). Now, as this identity of person by no means follows from the identity of the *Ego* in all time—in which I cognize myself—so we already found that the substantiality of the soul could not be based upon it.

states to the next representation, and a consciousness of them. We might thus conceive a whole series of them, the first of which imparted its state, and the consciousness thereof, to the second; this again its own state, along with that of the first, to the third; this again its own and the states of all the previous ones, &c. In such a case the last substance would be conscious of all the states of the previously changed substances as its own, since those states were transferred to it along with the consciousness of them; nevertheless, it would not have been the very same person in all these states.

Nevertheless, the concept of personality (as well as that of substance and simplicity, may remain (so far as it is transcendental, and means an unity of the subject otherwise unknown to us, but in whose states there is thoroughgoing connexion through apperception). And so far, indeed, this concept is both necessary and sufficient for all practical uses ; but we can never build upon it to extend our self-cognition through Pure Reason, as this concept always revolves about itself, and does not assist in solving a single question which is based on synthetical cognition. What sort of thing *per se* (transcendental object) matter may be is wholly unknown to us ; nevertheless, its permanence as phenomenon may be observed when it is represented as something external. But when I wish to observe the mere *Ego* in the variation of all representations—as I have no other *correlatum* for my comparisons except my very identical self—with the universal conditions of my consciousness, I can only give tautological answers to all questions by supplying my concept, and its unity, to those properties which I possess as an object, and so by presupposing what I desire to know.

---

#### THE FOURTH PARALOGISM OF IDEALITY (OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS).

THE existence of whatsoever we only infer as the cause of given perceptions, is only *doubtful* [problematical]. Now, all external phenomena are of such a kind that their existence cannot be perceived immediately, but we infer them to exist as the cause of given perceptions.

Consequently, the existence of all the objects of the external senses is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the ideality of external phenomena ; and the doctrine which holds this ideality is *idealism*, in contrast to which the assertion of the possible certainty of objects of the external senses is called *Dualism*.

---

#### CRITICK OF THE FOURTH PARALOGISM OF TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

WE shall first criticize the premises. We may justly assert that only what is within us can be immediately perceived, and that my

own existence alone is the object of a mere perception. Consequently, the existence of a real object without me (if this word be used in an intellectual sense) is never given immediately in perception, but can only be added in thought to the perception (which is a modification of our internal sense) as its external cause, and so inferred from it. Consequently, Des Cartes justly restricted all perception in the strictest sense to the proposition, *I* (as a thinking being) exist; for it is clear that, as the external is not in me, it cannot possibly be met with in my apperception, nor in any perception, which is properly only a determination of apperception.

I cannot, then, properly perceive external things, but only infer their existence from my internal perception by regarding it as an effect, of which something external is the proximate cause. But the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always unsafe, because the effect may have been produced by more than one cause.

Consequently, with regard to the relation of perception to its cause, it must ever remain doubtful whether such cause be internal or external—whether all so-called external perceptions are not a mere play of our internal sense, or whether they indeed refer to real external objects as their causes. At least, the existence of the latter is only an inference, and runs the risk of all inferences; while, on the contrary, the object of the internal sense (*I* myself, with all my representations) am perceived immediately, and its existence can be in no doubt.\*

By *idealist*, then, we must not understand the man who denies the existence of external objects, but only one who will not concede that it is known by immediate perception, and who concludes, accordingly, that we can never be absolutely certain of their reality by any possible experience.

Now, before I propound our paralogism in its delusive form, I must observe that we must necessarily distinguish two sorts of idealism—transcendental and empirical. By the *transcendental idealism* of all phenomena, I mean the doctrine according to which we regard them all as mere representations, not as things *per se*,

\* This is the very question discussed in the much abused Refutation of Idealism, in the Second Edition.—M.

and according to which space and time are merely sensuous forms of our intuition, not determinations given *per se*, or conditions of objects as things *per se*. Opposed to this doctrine is *transcendental Realism*, which regards space and time as something given *per se* (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental Realist, then, represents to himself external phenomena (if we allow their reality) as things *per se*, which exist independent of us and our sensibility, and which, accordingly, should be without us according to pure Categories. This transcendental Realist is the proper man to turn empirical idealist: and, after he has falsely assumed of objects of our senses, that, if they are to be external, they must possess existence in themselves apart from the senses, he then finds all the representations of our senses insufficient to guarantee the reality of these representations.\*

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical Realist, or, as he is called, a Dualist; that is, he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness, or assuming anything beyond the certainty of the representations in me, or the *cogito ergo sum*. For, since he considers this matter, and even its internal possibility, to be nothing but phenomena, which apart from our sensibility are nothing at all; he only considers them as a kind of representations (intuitions) which are called external, *not as if they referred to objects external in themselves*,† but because they refer perceptions to space, in which all things are reciprocally external, but which space itself is within us.

We have declared in favour of this transcendental Idealism throughout. Accepting our doctrine, all the difficulty of accepting the existence of matter upon the testimony of our mere consciousness vanishes, as well as of declaring it proved by this, just as the existence of myself as a thinking being is so proved. For I am

\* Cf. above, p. 189.

† Kant here asserts the doctrine of transcendental idealism to be this: that external phenomena do not refer to objects in themselves external to us. From this Dr. Fischer infers (above, p. 190) that Kant denied any noumenon to exist as the (hidden) basis of external phenomena. This inference is unwarranted; for, in Kantian language, neither could the noumenon be called an *object*, nor *external* (in this sense); so that the present argument does not touch that question. Cf. below, p. 352.—M.

surely conscious of my representations ; these, then, and I who have them, exist. But external objects (bodies) are mere phenomena, and nothing at all but a species of my representations, the objects of which only exist through these representations, and apart from them are nothing. External things, then, exist just as much as I myself do, and both upon the immediate evidence of my self-consciousness ; with this difference only, that the representation of myself as a thinking subject is referred only to the internal sense, but the representations which denote extended existences are referred also to the external sense. With regard to the reality of external objects, I have just as little need of inference as with regard to the reality of the object of my internal sense (my thoughts) ; for they are both nothing but representations, the immediate perceptions (consciousness) of which is also a sufficient proof of their reality.\*

The transcendental idealist is, then, an empirical realist, and allows matter, as phenomenon, a reality which cannot be inferred, but is immediately perceived. Transcendental Realism, on the other hand, necessarily becomes perplexed, and is forced to make way for empirical idealism, because it regards the objects of external senses as something distinct from the senses themselves, and mere phenomena as independent beings, which exist without us. However perfectly we may be conscious of our representation of these things, this is far from proving that, if the representation exists, its corresponding object must also exist ; while, on our system, these external things (or matter, in all its forms and changes) are nothing but mere phenomena, or representations in us, of the reality of which we are immediately conscious.

As all the psychologists who subscribe to empirical idealism are, as far as I know, also transcendental realists, they have been perfectly consistent in attaching great weight to empirical idealism, as

\* This is the precise doctrine of the refutation of idealism in the Second Edition (p. 167). The concluding limitation is also there distinctly implied in the statement (p. 166) that the *Æsthetic* has removed all possibility of making space a property of things *per se*. "For in such case both it and they become perfectly impossible and absurd." Yet the argument which follows has been interpreted by all Kant's critics as implying this absurdity!—M.

one of those problems which human reason can hardly solve. For, most assuredly, if we regard external phenomena as representations which are produced in us by their object—a thing *per se* existing without us—then how can their existence be known, except by inferring the cause from the effect, in which case it must always remain doubtful whether the former be within or without us. Now, it may indeed be conceded that something is possibly the cause of our external intuitions, which is without us in the transcendental sense ; but this is not the object which we understand by the representations of matter and corporeal things;\* for these are mere phenomena—mere species of representation—which are in all cases only within us ; and their reality rests upon immediate consciousness, just as the consciousness of my thoughts does. The transcendental object, as well of internal as of external intuition, is to us equally unknown. Not this, however, but the empirical object, is in question, which is called *external* if it is in space—*internal*, if it is represented in *time-relations* only ; but space and time are both only to be found *within us*.

But, as the expression *without us* is unavoidably ambiguous (meaning either that which exists as thing *per se*, distinct from us, or merely that which belongs to *external phenomena*), in order to secure to this concept the latter meaning—being that in which the psychological question about the reality of our external intuition is asked—we shall distinguish *empirically external* objects from those possibly so called in a transcendental sense, by denominating them simply things *which can be perceived in space*.

Space and Time are indeed representations *a priori*, present to us as forms of our sensuous intuition, before any real object has determined us by sensation to represent it under these sensuous

\* The theory which Kant is here opposing is, that there exist external objects, corresponding to, and resembling in some way, our perceptions. He does not here desire to refute his own doctrine, that there are possibly noumena at the basis of phenomena, but rather that these noumena can be objects in space. If this be the meaning of his argument (which is certainly obscurely expressed), Dr. Fischer is just as much mistaken in here asserting that Kant denies any special noumenon for external phenomena, as he is in interpreting the "Refutation of idealism" to be the assertion of noumena in space.—M.

relations. But this material or real something, which is to be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes perception,\* and cannot be in any way imagined or produced independently of this perception, which announces the reality of something in space. It is, then, sensation which indicates reality in space and time, as soon as this sensation has been referred to either species of sensuous intuition. Sensation, when applied to an object in general, without determining it, is called perception. This sensation being given, by means of its divisibility we can imagine various objects which, beyond imagination, have no empirical place in space or time. Whatever examples then of sensations we take, whether pleasure and pain, or external ones like colour and heat, this remains quite certain, that perception is that through which the material must be given, in order to supply objects to sensuous intuition. This perception, then (to keep to external intuitions at present), represents something real in space. For, in the first place, perception is the representation of reality, as space is of the mere possibility of simultaneous existence. Secondly, this reality is represented for the external sense; that is, in space. Thirdly, space itself is nothing but mere representation. Nothing, then, can be considered as real in space, except that which is represented in it;† and, *vice versa*, what is given in space (or represented through perception) is also real in it; for, were it not so—that is, were it not given immediately by empirical intuition—neither could it be invented, because the real element in intuitions cannot at all be obtained by *à priori* thinking.

All external perception, then, proves immediately that there is

\* Here is an assertion expressly contradicting Dr. Fischer's doctrine that the external thing is (in itself) nothing but our sensation. It *presupposes*, as a necessary condition of being perceived, our faculty of perception, but cannot be asserted to be identical with it. The sequel is still more explicit—M.

† This paradoxical, but true, proposition should be carefully noted—viz., nothing is in space except what is represented in it. For space itself is nothing but representation; consequently, whatsoever is in space must be contained in the representation, and there is nothing at all in space except so far as it is really represented in it. This assertion, no doubt, sounds strange—that a thing can only exist in its own representation; but the absurdity is here removed, since what we are concerned with are not things *per se*, but only phenomena—*sc.* representations.

something real in space, or rather it is itself this very reality, and so far empirical realism is beyond question ; that is to say, there corresponds to the external intuitions something real in space. It is true that space itself, with all its phenomena, only exists within me ; but, nevertheless, in this space reality, or the material of all objects of external intuition, is given really and independently of all invention. It is also impossible that in *this space* anything *without* us (in the transcendental sense) should be given, because space itself, apart from our sensibility, is nothing. The most extreme idealist cannot, then, call upon us to prove that the object without us (in the strict sense) corresponds to our perception. For, if such a thing did exist, it could not be represented or intuited without us, since this would presuppose space ; and reality in space, as being the reality of a mere representation, is nothing but the perception itself. That which is real in external phenomena is only real in perception, nor can it be real in any other way.

From perception we can produce objects, either by the play of fancy, or through experience. And so, no doubt, illusive representations may arise, not corresponding with objects, and we must ascribe the illusion either to images of the fancy (dreams), or to a mistake of the faculty of judgment (in the case of the so-called deceptions of the senses). To avoid these illusions, we proceed according to the following rule : *that which is connected with a perception according to empirical laws is real.\** But this illusion, as well as the caution against it, strikes at idealism, as well as dualism, as it only concerns itself about the form of experience. In order to refute empirical idealism, which falsely questions the objective reality of external perceptions, it is enough that external perceptions should immediately prove reality in space, which space, although it be the mere form of representations, nevertheless possesses objective reality with regard to all external phenomena, which are nothing but representations. It is enough if we show that without perception even invention and dreaming would be impossible ; so that our external senses, as far as the data for experience are necessary, must have their real corresponding object in space.

\* The substance of this remark is repeated in the end of the note on the refutation of idealism, in the Second Preface (p. xli).—M.

The man who *denies* the existence of matter would be the *dogmatic idealist*; he who *doubts* it, because it cannot be proved, would be the *sceptical idealist*. The former theory results from a man believing that he finds contradictions in the possibility of there being matter at all—a question with which we are not yet concerned. The following section, on dialectical syllogisms, which portrays the reason in internal conflict about the concepts which it has formed as regards the possibility of what belongs to connected experience, will help to solve that difficulty [of dogmatic idealism]. But the sceptical idealist, who only attacks the grounds of our assertion, and declares our conviction of the existence of matter to be insufficient—which we believe we can found on immediate perception—such a man is a benefactor to the human reason, since he compels us, even in the most trifling steps of ordinary experience, to keep wide awake, and not to annex as lawful property anything that we have obtained by foul means. The use, then, of these idealistic objections, is now quite clear. They force us, if we wish to avoid confusion in our most ordinary assertions, to consider all perceptions, whether internal or external, as merely the consciousness of what belongs to our sensibility; and their external objects not as things *per se*, but only representations, of which we are as immediately conscious as of any other representations. They are only called external because they belong to that sense which we call the external sense, the intuition of which is space; and this space is nothing but an internal species of representation, in which certain perceptions are connected with one another.

Supposing we allowed external objects to be things *per se*, it would be absolutely impossible to comprehend how we could obtain a knowledge of their reality without us, since we rely merely on the representation which is within us. For, since no one can have a sensation without himself, but only within, the whole of self-consciousness gives us nothing, but merely our own determinations. Consequently, sceptical idealism compels us to take refuge in the only course still left open—that is, in the ideality of all phenomena; and this we expounded in the transcendental *Æsthetic*, independent of these consequences, which we could not have then foreseen. If it be now asked, whether, in consequence of this, dualism must follow in psychology, we answer, certainly, but only

in the empirical sense ; that is to say, in the connected whole of experience, matter, as substance in phenomena, is really given to the external sense, and the thinking *Ego* is also given to the internal sense, as the substance of phenomena ; and in both cases phenomena must be connected according to the rules which this Category [of substance] introduces into the connexion of our external as well as internal representations. But, if we desire to widen, as is usually done, the concept of dualism, and take it in its transcendental sense, then neither this doctrine, nor *Pneumatism*, nor *Materialism*, which oppose it from different sides, have the least basis. We should then miss the proper determination of our concepts, and consider a difference in the mode of representation of objects (which remain unknown to us, as to what they are in themselves) to be a difference in these things themselves. *I*, who am represented through the internal sense as *in time*, and *objects without me*, are indeed phenomena totally distinct in kind, but need not therefore be thought as distinct things. The *transcendental object*, which lies at the basis of internal intuition as well as of external phenomena, is neither matter, nor a thinking being *per se*, but a (to us) unknown basis of phenomena, and these give us the empirical concept as well of the first as of the second.

If, then, as the present Critick plainly compels us, we keep faithfully to the rule we have established, not to push our questions any farther than possible experience has supplied us with objects for them, it will never even come into our heads to make investigations about the objects of our senses as to what they may be in themselves, out of relation to our senses. But if the psychologist takes phenomena for things in themselves, he may, as a materialist, accept for his doctrine nothing but matter ; or, as a spiritualist, nothing but thinking beings (according to the form of our internal sense) ; or even, as a dualist, he may regard both to be things existing *per se*—he is always under the same delusion as to proving how that is to exist *per se* which is no thing *per se*, but only the phenomenon of a thing.

# CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE WHOLE OF PURE PSYCHOLOGY, AS AN APPENDIX TO THESE PARALOGISMS.

IF we contrast the *doctrine of the soul* [psychology], as the physiology of the internal sense, with the *science of bodies*—as the physiology of the objects of the external senses—we shall find (in addition to the fact that in both we know a great deal empirically) this remarkable difference, that in the latter science much can be cognized *a priori* from the mere concept of an extended incompressible being; whereas in the former, from the concept of a thinking being, nothing can be cognized synthetically *a priori*. Because, although both are phenomena, yet the phenomenon presented to the external sense has something permanent, or fixed, which gives a *substratum* lying at the basis of changeable determinations, and so gives us a synthetical concept, namely, that of space and a phenomenon in it. Time, on the contrary, which is the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent in it; so that it only lets us know the change of determinations, not the determinable object. For in that which we call the soul everything is in a continuous flux, and nothing is permanent except (if you *will* have it so) the *Ego*, which is perfectly simple, merely because this representation has no content or multiplicity; for which reason it seems to represent or—I should rather say—indicate a simple object. In order to produce a pure rational cognition of the nature of a thinking being in general, this *Ego* should be an intuition, which, being presupposed in all thinking (antecedent to any experience), should give us synthetical *a priori* propositions.\* But this *Ego* is just as little an intuition as it is a concept of any object, being merely the form of consciousness which can accompany both kinds of representations, and raise them to cognitions, so far as something else is given in intuition which supplies the material for the representation of an object. Thus all rational psychology falls to the ground, being a

\* This important passage again anticipates (almost verbally) the refutation of Idealism of the Second Edition. It shows the superior dignity of external experience, as contrasted with internal, in affording us data for science.—M.

science surpassing all the powers of the human reason ; and there remains nothing for us except to study our souls according to the clue given by experience, and to keep within the bounds of such questions as do not go beyond the content which can possibly be given by internal experience.

But, though this science gives us no ampliative knowledge, but is composed (when it attempts to do so) of nothing but paralogisms, yet we cannot deny it an important negative use, if we consider it as nothing but a critical treatment of our dialectical syllogisms, and indeed of the ordinary natural reason. Why do we require a psychology founded upon pure principles of the Reason only ? Without doubt, for the particular object of securing our thinking self from the danger of Materialism. This is done by the rational concept of our thinking self, which we have set forth ; for, instead of there being any danger that, if matter were taken away, in consequence all thinking—and even the existence of thinking beings—would vanish, it is rather clearly shown that, if I take away the thinking subject, the whole world of matter must vanish, being nothing but that which appears in the sensibility of our subject, as a species of its representations.

Having proved this, I am, of course, not in the least better able to know this thinking self by its properties. Nay, I cannot even prove its existence to be independent of the transcendental *substratum* (whatever it is) of external phenomena ; for both one and the other are to me unknown. Yet, as it is possible for me to find a reason in other than merely speculative grounds for hoping that my thinking nature will remain permanent in the midst of all possible changes of state—as this is possible, though I openly confess my own ignorance—an important point is gained, since I am able to repel the dogmatical attacks of speculative opponents, and show them that they can never know more of the nature of my thinking subject to enable them to deny the possibility of my hopes, than I can, to enable me to maintain them.

On this transcendental illusion in our psychological concepts are based three additional dialectical questions, which form the proper object of rational psychology, and which can only be decided by the foregoing investigations. These are :—(a) The possibility of the community of the soul and an organic body ; *i. e.*, the animality of

condition of the soul in this life ; ( $\beta$ ) The commencement of this community ; *i. e.*, the state of the soul at and before birth ; ( $\gamma$ ) The end of this community ; *i. e.*, the state of the soul at and after death (the question of immortality).

Now, I assert that all the difficulties with which these questions are supposed to be beset—and with which, used as dogmatical objections—men pretend to a deeper insight into the nature of things than can be obtained by plain common sense—I say that all such difficulties are based on a mere delusion, by which what only exists in our thoughts is hypostatized, and, without its quality being changed, assumed to be a real object without the thinking subject : for example, extension, which is nothing but a phenomenon, is taken for a property of external things existing apart from our sensibility ; and motion is taken for their action, taking place really in itself, even apart from our senses. For matter, the community of which with the soul raises such difficulties, is nothing but a mere form, or a certain species of the representation of an unknown object through that intuition which is called the external sense. There may indeed, then, be something without us to which this phenomenon, which we call matter, corresponds ; but in its quality of phenomenon it is not without us [in the transcendental sense], but merely a thought within us, although this thought in the sense above explained represents it as to be found without us.\* Matter, then, signifies, not a species of substance, so distinct and heterogeneous from the object of the internal sense (soul), but only the difference in species of the phenomena of objects (which in themselves are unknown to us), the representations of which we call external, and of those which we refer to the internal sense, even though the former belong just as much to the thinking subject as do all the rest of our thoughts. They have, however, this illusion about them, that as they represent objects in space, they as it were sever themselves from the soul, and seem to exist separate from it, although space itself, in which they are intuited, is nothing but a representation, the object of which, in the same quality, cannot be met at all without

\* Here is a plain assertion of what I before explained, that Kant is refuting, not a noumenon *per se*, about which we can assert nothing, but such an absurdity as a noumenon in space.—M.

the soul. Accordingly, the question is no longer about the community of the soul with other known and heterogeneous substances without us, but merely concerning the connexion of the representations of the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensibility ; and how it is that these are connected together according to constant laws, so as to form one systematic experience.

As long as we conjoin in experience internal and external phenomena as mere representations, we find nothing absurd or strange in the community of both species of sense. But as soon as we hypostatize external phenomena, and consider them no longer as representations, *but as things existing per se without us, of the same quality as they are in us*, and refer their activity, which they exhibit as phenomena in mutual relation, to our thinking subject—if we do this, we have a character of efficient causes without us, which will not tally with their effects in us, because the former refers merely to the external, the latter to the internal, sense ; and, though these are united in one subject, they are still very different in species. Here, then, we possess no external effects, except changes of place, and no forces except efforts which concern relations in space as their effects. But within us the effects are thoughts, among which no relation of place, motion, figure, or any space-determination takes place ; and we lose the clue to the causes altogether in the effects, which they should manifest in the internal sense. But we ought to remember that bodies are not objects *per se*, present to us, but a mere appearance of nobody knows what sort of unknown object ; that motion is not the effect of this unknown cause, but merely the appearance of its influence on our senses ; consequently, that both are not anything without us, but mere representations within us. It follows, that it is not the motion of matter which produces representations in us, but that this motion itself (and matter also, which makes itself cognoscible by this means) is mere representation ; and, finally, that the whole difficulty we have conjured up amounts to this : how, and through what cause, the representations of our sensibility are so related, that those which we call external intuitions can be represented as objects without us, according to empirical laws. This question by no means contains the supposed difficulty of explaining the origin of the representations of causes which exist without us, and act in a foreign way—in that

we take the appearances of an unknown cause to be a cause without us—a proceeding which can produce nothing but confusion. In those judgments where there occurs a misconception rooted in long habit, it is not possible to bring the correction [of the error] within our grasp, in the same degree as in those other cases where no such unavoidable illusion confuses our concepts. Hence this our emancipation of the reason from sophistical theories, can hardly as yet have the clearness which alone produces perfect satisfaction. I hope to make the matter plainer in the following way:—

All *objections* may be divided into *dogmatical*, *critical*, and *sceptical*. A dogmatical objection is directed against a *proposition*; a critical, against the *proof* of a proposition. The former presupposes an insight into the nature of an object, in order that we may be able to assert the reverse of what the proposition states of the object; such a proposition, then, is itself dogmatical, and professes to know more of the property in question than its opponent. The critical objection, because it never touches the truth or falsity of the proposition, and only attacks the proof, does not require, or pretend to, a better knowledge of the object than the opposed assertion; it only proves the assertion groundless—not that it is false. The sceptical objection opposes mutually the proposition and its contradictory, as objections of equal value, proposing each in turn as a dogma, and the other as the objection to it; and so appears to be from two opposite sides dogmatical, in order to destroy completely any judgment about the object. Both the dogmatical and sceptical objections must pretend to so much insight into their objects as is necessary to assert something of them affirmatively or negatively. The critical alone differs from them, in that it overthrows the theory by showing that something worthless or purely imaginary has been assumed in its assertions, and by removing this supposed foundation, without wishing to assert anything concerning the nature of the object.

Now, according to the ordinary notions of our reason as to the community in which our thinking subject stands with things without us, we are dogmatical, and regard them as real objects, existing independent of us, according to a certain transcendental dualism, which does not attribute these external phenomena, as representations, to the subject, but transports them, just as we get them from

sensuous intuition, out of ourselves as objects, which it separates completely from the thinking subject. This *subreptio* is the foundation of all theories as to the community between body and soul; and the question is never raised whether the objective reality of phenomena be certainly true: this is rather assumed as conceded, and fallacious reasonings started as to its explanation or conception. The three ordinary systems invented to meet this difficulty, and indeed the only possible ones, are those of *physical influence*, of *pre-established harmony*, and of *supernatural assistance*.

The two latter explanations of the community of the soul with matter are based upon objections to the first (which is the representation of common sense), namely, that what appears as matter cannot by immediate influence be the cause of representations, which are a perfectly heterogeneous sort of effect. But when they argue in this way [it is clear that] they cannot mean by "object of the external senses" the notion of a matter which is only phenomenon, or in itself mere representation, produced by some sort of external objects; for, if they held this, they would merely state that the representations of external objects (phenomena) cannot be external causes of phenomena in our minds—a senseless objection; for it never could come into any man's head to consider that what he had already acknowledged to be a mere representation was an external cause. According to our principles, their theories must rather aim at this point, that that which is the true (transcendental) object of our external senses cannot be the cause of those representations (phenomena) which we understand by the word matter. Now, as no one can pretend with any reason to know aught of the transcendental cause of the representations of our external senses, their assertion is quite groundless. But, if the pretended correctors of the doctrine of physical influence regard matter as such (after the usual manner of transcendental dualism) to be a thing *per se* (and not the mere phenomenon of an unknown thing), and direct their objections to prove that such an external object, which exhibits no other sort of causality except motion, can never be the efficient cause of representations, but that a third being must interfere to produce, if not reciprocal action, at least correspondence or harmony between both; [if these theorists take this course] then their argument would begin by assuming the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of physical influence in their

dualism ; and so by their objection they would not so much refute the natural influence as their own dualistic assumption. For all difficulties which beset the connexion of thinking nature with matter arise, without exception, merely from the insinuation of the dualistic representation, that matter as such is not phenomenon, or a mere representation of the mind, to which an unknown object corresponds, but is that object in itself, as it exists without us, and apart from all sensibility.

There can, then, be no dogmatical objection made to the usually accepted physical influence ; for, supposing our opponent assumes that matter and its motion are mere phenomena, and therefore themselves mere representations, he can only raise a difficulty about this, that the unknown object of our sensibility cannot be the cause of representations in us—a thing which he has not the least right to assert, because nobody can tell of an unknown object what it can do, or cannot do. He must, however, after the proofs we have given above, necessarily concede this transcendental idealism, so far as he does not openly hypostatize representations, and place them, as real things, without himself.

But a well-founded *critical objection* can still be made to the common doctrine of physical influence. Such a pretended community between two kinds of substances—the thinking and the extended—presupposes a gross dualism, and makes the latter, which are nothing but mere representations of the thinking subject, into things existing *per se*. The misconceived physical influence may, then, be completely overthrown by showing its grounds of proof to be idle, and surreptitiously obtained.

The notorious question concerning the community of that which thinks and that which is extended—if we discard all fictions—would simply come to this : *How external intuition, viz., that of space (the occupation of it, figure and motion) can be at all possible in a thinking subject ?* But to this question no man can ever find an answer ; and we can never supply this gap in our knowledge, but only indicate it by ascribing external phenomena to a transcendental object (as the cause of this sort of phenomena), but which we do not know, and of which we can never obtain any notion. In all problems which may arise in the field of experience we treat these phenomena as objects *per se*, without troubling ourselves about the highest

ground [or condition] of their possibility. But, if we transgress this boundary, the concept of a transcendental object becomes necessary.

From these considerations about the community between extended and thinking beings there follows, as an immediate consequence, the settlement of all disputes or objections which concern the condition of this thinking nature before this community (this life), or after its cessation (in death). The opinion that the thinking subject could think previous to any community with the body would be thus expressed: that before the commencement of this sort of sensibility, by which something appears to us in space, the same transcendental objects—which in our present condition appear as bodies—can have been intuited in quite a different way. The opinion that the soul, after the cessation of all community with the corporeal world, can still continue to think, would announce itself in this form: that when the species of sensibility by which transcendental—and now wholly unknown—objects appear to us ceases, all intuition of them is not consequently removed; and that it is quite possible for the same unknown objects to continue being cognized by the subject, though, of course, no longer in the quality of bodies.

Now it is true that no one can produce the smallest foundation for such an assertion from speculative principles, nor even explain its possibility, but only presuppose it; but just as little can any one oppose to it any valid dogmatical objection.\* For, no matter who he may be, he knows just as little about the absolute and internal cause of external or corporeal phenomena as I do or anybody else. He cannot, then, reasonably pretend to know on what the reality of external phenomena depends in the present state (life), nor, consequently, that the condition of all external intuition, or even that the thinking subject itself, must cease to exist after this state (death).

The whole dispute, then, about the nature of our thinking being and its connexion with the world of matter, merely arises from our supplying the gaps in our knowledge by paralogisms of the

\* To assert of the writer of the preceding argument that he is an absolute idealist is surely very strange criticism. It is impossible to conceive a more distinct and official refusal to accept that extreme doctrine.—M.

Reason, in that we make our thoughts to be things, and hypostatize them, whence arises imaginary science, both as regards what is affirmed, and what is denied. We then either pretend to know something of objects, of which nobody has the least conception, or we consider our own representations to be objects, and so become involved in a perpetual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but the sobriety of a severe but fair Critick can free us from this dogmatical illusion, which enslaves so many in fancied happiness under theories and systems, and can restrict all our speculative claims to the field of possible experience—not indeed by ill-natured ridiculing of so many failures, nor by pious lamenting about the limits of our reason, but by determining these limits accurately according to fixed principles. By this means its “thus far, and no farther,” is most securely fixed at those pillars of Hercules which nature herself has set up, in order to allow the voyage of our reason to extend only as far as the receding coasts of experience reach—coasts which we cannot leave without venturing into a boundless ocean, which, after constant illusions, ultimately compels us to give up as hopeless all our laborious and tedious efforts.

---

We still owe to our reader a distinct and general explanation of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of the pure Reason, as well as a justification of the systematic arrangement of their running parallel to the Categories. This we could not undertake at the commencement of this section without the danger of becoming obscure, or clumsily anticipating ourselves. We now desire to discharge this obligation.

We can consider all illusion to consist in this—that the subjective condition of thinking is taken for the cognition of the object. We have farther shown, in the introduction to the transcendental Dialectic, that pure Reason merely employs itself with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now, as the dialectical illusion of the pure Reason cannot be an empirical illusion, found in determinate empirical cognitions, it must concern the

sum total of the conditions of thinking, and there can be only three cases of the dialectical use of the pure Reason—

1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general ;
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking ;
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking.

In all these three cases the pure Reason merely employs itself upon the absolute totality of this synthesis ; that is, upon that condition which is itself unconditioned. On this division also is founded the threefold transcendental illusion, which gives rise to the three divisions of the dialectic, and affords the idea to just as many apparent sciences arising out of pure Reason—to transcendental psychology, cosmology, and theology. We are here only concerned with the first.

As in the case of thinking in general we abstract from all relation of our thought to any object (be it of the senses, or of the pure understanding) the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general (No. 1) is not at all objective, but merely a synthesis of the thought with the subject, which synthesis is falsely held to be a synthetical representation of an object.

But it follows from this, that the dialectical inference of the condition of all thinking in general, which condition is itself unconditioned, does not make a mistake as to content (for it abstracts from all content or object), but that it is merely false as to form, and must be called a paralogism.

Furthermore, as the condition which accompanies all thinking is the *Ego*, in the general proposition, "I think," Reason must be concerned with this condition, so far as it is itself unconditioned. But this is only the formal condition or logical unity of every thought, in which I abstract from all objects, and yet it is represented as an object which I think, that is, as the *Ego* and its unconditioned unity.

Suppose any one were to put me the general question : Of what sort of nature is a thinking being ? I do not in the least know how to answer the question *a priori*, because the answer must be synthetical (for an analytical answer might, perhaps, explain thinking, but could not extend our knowledge of that upon which thinking depends as to its possibility). But for every synthetical solution intuition is necessary, a point which is wholly passed over in the

vague problem proposed. Just as little could any one answer, in all its generality, the question: Of what nature must a thing capable of motion be? For incompressible extension (matter) is not then given to us. Yet, although I know no answer in general to that sort of question, it appears to me that I might give one in the special case of the proposition, "I think," which expresses consciousness. For this *Ego* is the first subject—that is, substance—it is simple, &c. But these\* must all be empirical judgments, which, at the same time, could not contain any such predicates (which are not empirical), without a general rule to express the conditions of the possibility of thinking in general, and this *a priori*. Thus, what I at first thought so feasible, viz., judgments concerning the nature of the thinking being, and this from pure concepts, become suspicious, even though I have not yet discovered the mistake in them.

But the further investigation into the origin of these attributes, which I attribute to myself, as a thinking being in general, exposes the error. They are nothing more than pure Categories, by which I can never think a determined object, but only the unity of representations, in order to determine them as an object. Without being founded on an intuition, the Category alone can never provide me with a concept of an object; for only by intuition is the object given, which is afterwards thought in accordance with the Category. If I assert a thing in phenomena to be a substance, the predicates of its intuition must have been previously given to me, by which I distinguish the permanent from the changeable, and the *substratum* (thing in itself) from what is merely attached to it. If I call a thing in phenomena *simple*, I mean by this that its intuition, indeed, is part of my phenomena, but is itself not divisible, &c. But if anything is known to be simple only in the concept, and not in the appearances, then I have in reality no knowledge at all of the object, but only of my concept, which I make for myself about *something* in general, and which is not capable of being especially intuited. I only say that I think a thing to be quite simple, because I can really say nothing more about it, except merely that it is something.

\* I am unable to translate *Dieses* of Hartenstein's Edition, and so read *Diese*.—M.

Now, mere apperception (*Ego*) is in the concept substance, is in the concept simple, &c., and so far all these psychological dogmas have indisputable truth. Yet what we really want to know is not at all discoverable in this way about the soul; for, since all these predicates are not at all valid of intuition, and therefore can have no consequences applicable to objects of experience, they are quite void. For the above mentioned concept of substance does not teach me that the soul continues to exist by itself, nor that it is a part of the external intuitions, which cannot itself be further divided, and which can, consequently, neither originate nor pass away by any changes of nature: all of which are properties which would make the soul cognoscible to me in the connexion of experience, and might throw some light upon its origin and future state. But when I assert by the mere Category, the soul is a simple substance, it is clear that, as the mere concept of substance contains nothing but this, that a thing shall be represented as a subject *per se*, without also being the predicate of another, [it is clear, I say that] from this concept nothing about permanence follows, and that the attribute of simplicity could certainly not add this permanence; so that we are not in the least informed of what might happen to the soul in the changes of the world. If we could be told that it is a *simple part of matter*, we might, owing to what experience tells us, infer permanence, and along with its simple nature indestructibility. But about this, the concept of the *Ego* in the psychological first principle (I think) tells us not a word.

The following is the reason that the being which thinks in us imagines it can cognize itself by pure Categories, and indeed by those which express absolute unity under each of their classes. Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the Categories, which on their side represent nothing but the synthesis of the manifold in intuition, so far as it has unity in apperception. Hence, self-consciousness in general is the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet itself unconditioned. Of the thinking *Ego*, then, or soul (which represents itself as substance, simple, numerically identical at all times, and the *correlatum* of all existence, from which all other existence must be inferred), we may say, that it does not cognize *itself through the Categories*, but rather the Categories, and through them all objects in the

absolute unity of apperception, viz., *through itself*. It is indeed quite plain that what I must presuppose in order to cognize any object at all, I cannot also cognize as an object; and that the determining *self* (thinking) is distinguished from the determinable self (the thinking subject), as cognition is from objects. Still, nothing is more natural or seductive than the illusion of considering the unity in the synthesis of thoughts to be a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. We might call it the subreption of hypostatized consciousness (*apperceptionis substantiata*).\*

If we wish to give its logical name to the paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of rational psychology, so far as their premises are in themselves true, it may be called a *sophisma figuræ dictionis*, in which the major premiss makes merely a transcendental use of the Category with reference to its condition, but the minor premiss and conclusion make of the same Category an empirical use with reference to the soul, which has been subsumed under this condition. So, for example, in the paralogism of simplicity the concept of substance is a pure intellectual concept, which, without the condition of sensuous intuition, is merely of transcendental, that is, of no, use. But in the minor premiss the very same concept is applied to the object of all internal experience, yet without first establishing and laying down as a basis the condition of its application *in concreto*—that is, its permanence; hence, there is here an empirical, though illegitimate, application made of it. In order to show the systematic connexion of all these dialectical assertions in a fallacious psychology, as connected in the pure Reason—that is, in order to show its completeness—observe that the apperception is carried through all the classes of the Categories, but only applied to those concepts of the understanding which in each [class] supply to the rest the basis of unity in a possible perception, and these are—subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence; only that Reason here represents them as the conditions of the possibility of a thinking being, which conditions are themselves unconditioned. Consequently, the soul cognizes itself as—

\* I cannot but think Mr. Mansel's theory of self being presented as substance is here very well refuted. I have remarked upon this point in the Introduction.—M.

1. The unconditioned unity of the *Relation* ; that is, itself, not as inhering, but *subsisting* ;

2. The unconditioned unity of *Quality* ; that is, not as a real whole, but *simple* ;\*

3. The unconditioned unity in the *plurality in time* ; that is, not in different times numerically different, but as *one* and the very *same subject* ;

4. The unconditioned unity of *existence in space* ; that is, not as the consciousness of several things without it, but *only of its own existence*, and of other things, on the contrary, merely as its *representations*.

Reason is the faculty of principles. The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul, but those which, if they occur, should determine the object *per se* independent of experience—that is, through the pure Reason. They must, then, be fairly based upon principles and universal notions of thinking natures in general. Instead of this, we find that the single representation, I am, governs the whole of it, which, because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience (indeterminately), announces itself as an universal proposition, valid for all thinking beings ; and, as it is single from every point of view, assumes the appearance of an absolute unity in the conditions of thinking in general, and so extends itself farther than possible experience can reach.

\* How the simple here again corresponds to the Category of Reality, I am as yet unable to show ; but it will be explained upon the occasion of another rational use of the very same concept.

## APPENDIX D.

POSSIBILITY OF CAUSALITY THROUGH FREEDOM IN  
HARMONY WITH THE UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURAL  
NECESSITY.

*That* in an object of the senses which is not itself phenomenon, I term *intelligible*. If, accordingly, an object which must be regarded as a phenomenon in the sensuous world possesses in itself (or *per se*) also a faculty which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the *causality* of this existence may be regarded from two different points of view. The causality may be considered to be *intelligible*, as regards its *action*—the action of a thing in itself—and also *sensible*, as regards its *effects* as a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world.

We should, accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual concept of the causality of such a subject, which both occur together in one and the same effect. This twofold manner of cogitating the faculty of a sensuous object does not run counter to any of the concepts which we ought to form of phenomena, or of possible experience; for as phenomena—not being things in themselves—must have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere representations, there seems to be no reason why we should not ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property by means of which it appears, a *causality* which is not a phenomenon, although its *effects* are to be met with in the world of phenomena.

But every efficient cause must possess a *character*—that is to say, a law of its causality—without which it would not be a cause at all. Accordingly, in a subject of the world of sense we would have an *empirical character*, which guaranteed that its actions, as pheno-

mena, stand in complete and harmonious connexion, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these as conditions; and that they do thus, in connexion with these, constitute members of a single series in the order of nature.

In the second place, we should be obliged to concede to it an *intelligible character* also, by means of which it is indeed the cause of those actions as phenomena, but which is not itself a phenomenon, nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon; the latter, the character of the thing as a thing *per se*.

Now, this acting subject would, in its intelligible character, be subject to no conditions of time; for time is only a condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No *action* would *begin* or *cease to be* in this subject; it would, consequently, be free from the law of all determination of time—of all change—namely, that everything *which happens* must have a cause in the *phenomena* (of the preceding state). In a word, the causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form a part of the series of empirical conditions which necessitated the event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing could indeed never be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing except so far as it appears, but it must still be cogitated in accordance [or analogy] with the empirical character; just as we find ourselves compelled in a general way to place, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis of phenomena, although we know nothing of what it is in itself.

Accordingly, as to its empirical character, this subject, being a phenomenon, would be subject to the causal *nexus* in all the laws of its determination; and it would so far be nothing but a part of the world of sense, of which the results would irrevocably follow from nature, like every other phenomenon. When influenced by external phenomena—when cognized through experience in its empirical character, *i. e.*, in the law of its causality—all its actions must be explicable according to natural laws, and all the requisites for their complete and necessary determination must be met with in possible experience.

In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although

we possess only the general concept of this character), the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this subject—as far as it is a *noumenon*—and there does not, consequently, exist in it any change demanding the dynamical determination of time, and for the same reason no connexion with phenomena as its causes—this active existence must, in its actions, be so far free from and independent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in sensibility. It would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effect in the world of sense from itself without the action beginning in itself. We should not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions—but only by virtue of the empirical character (which is the phenomenon of the intelligible character)—and are possible only as constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and freedom—each in its complete signification—can be met, without contradiction or disagreement, in the same action, according as it is compared with its intelligible or sensible cause.

---

#### FURTHER ELUCIDATION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF FREEDOM IN HARMONY WITH THE UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURAL NECESSITY.

I HAVE thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course which Reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to exhibit the several *momenta* of this solution, and to consider them in their order. The natural law, that everything which happens must have a cause; that the causality of this cause, that is, *the action* (which cannot always have existed, but must be itself an *event*, for it precedes in time some effect which has then *originated*), must have its cause among phenomena by which it is determined; and, consequently, that all events are empirically determined in an order of

nature—this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience and of a connected system of phenomena, or *nature*, is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience, and make it a mere fiction of thought, or phantom of the brain.

Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in the regress of which, however, *absolute totality* cannot be found. But we need not detain ourselves with this difficulty; for it has already been removed in our general discussion of the antinomy of the Reason, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of transcendental realism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom is left. Here the only question is: Whether, admitting the existence of nothing but natural necessity in the whole series of the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider the same effect as, on the one hand, an effect of nature, and, on the other, an effect of freedom; or, whether these two species of causality are absolutely contradictory.

Among the causes in phenomena there can surely be nothing which could commence a series absolutely, and of itself. Every action, as phenomenon, so far as it produces an event, is itself an event or occurrence presupposing another state, in which its cause is to be met. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of the series; and no commencement, starting of itself, is here possible. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and presuppose causes preceding them in time. An *original* action—an action by which something happens which was not previously—is beyond the causal connexion of phenomena.

Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are phenomena, the causality of their cause, which (cause) is itself also a phenomenon, must belong to the empirical world?\* Is it not

\* The reader will observe that Kant uses the word *cause* for the subject of the causality both noumenal and phenomenal, and distinctly speaks of the causality of a thing as different from the thing (cause) itself. Here he differs from Hamilton, and, I must add, agrees with common sense.—M.

rather possible that, although for every effect in the phenomenon a connexion with its cause according to the laws of empirical causality is required, this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a cause, not empirical, but intelligible—its connexion with natural causes remaining, nevertheless, intact?

Such a causality would be considered, in reference to phenomena, as the original action of a cause which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, as regards this faculty, intelligible, although the cause must at the same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world.

A belief in the causality of phenomena among each other is necessary, if we are required to look for and give an account of the natural conditions of natural events; that is to say, their causes in phenomena. This being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which recognise nothing but nature, and is entitled to it, are satisfied; and our physical explanations may proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without opposition.

But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming it to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some\* natural causes in the possession of a faculty which is only intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical conditions, but solely upon grounds of the understanding; but so that the *action in the phenomenon* of this cause must be in accordance with all the laws of empirical causality.

Thus, the acting subject, as a *causa phenomenon*, would continue to preserve a complete connexion with nature and natural conditions; and only the noumenon of this subject (with all its causality in the phenomenon) would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the *transcendental* object, must be regarded as merely intelligible. For if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about what sort of basis is conceived for these phenomena and their connexion in nature, in the transcendental subject (which is completely unknown to us).

\* This is a distinct statement, and opposed to Dr. Fischer's account of the matter above, p. 243.—M.


This intelligible ground of phenomena does not concern empirical questions. Perhaps it has only to do with thinking in the pure understanding; and, although the effects of this thinking and acting of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these phenomena must, nevertheless, be capable of a full and complete explanation, in accordance with natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical, as the highest ground of explanation, and omit all consideration of their intelligible, character (which is the transcendental cause of the former), as completely unknown, except in so far as it is announced by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now, let us apply this to experience. Man is one of the phenomena of the sensuous world, and so far also one of the natural causes, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all other objects of nature. We remark this empirical character in his effects, which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely brute nature, we can discover no reason for conceiving any faculty to be determined otherwise than in a purely sensuous manner.

But man, to whom the rest of nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself (not only by his senses, but) also through pure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, indeed, a phenomenon; but on the other, in respect of certain faculties, a purely intelligible object—intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility. We call these faculties understanding and Reason.

The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties; for it considers its objects merely in accordance with Ideas, and by means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its conceptions, which indeed are also pure.\*

\* The remainder of the discussion is rendered much less inaccurately by Mr. Meiklejohn. I have, therefore, not thought it necessary to repeat it here.—M.







# DATE DUE

GRAHAM LIBRARY TRIN. COLL.

416-978-5851

DEC 05 2001

OCT 03 2003

NOV 17 2003

FISCHER , Kuno  
KANT

Fischer on Kant

(ed Mahaffy)

193.2/FIS

DATE	ISSUED TO
May 7	A. F. Thompson
June 8	GT Service
June 13	GT Service

193.2

FIS

