HEGEL AND ARISTOTLE

Hegel is, arguably, the most difficult of all philosophers. To find a way through his thought, interpreters have usually approached him as though he were developing Kantian and Fichtean themes. This book is the first to demonstrate in a systematic way that it makes much more sense to view Hegel’s idealism in relation to the metaphysical and epistemological tradition stemming from Aristotle.

This book offers an account of Hegel’s idealism and in particular his notions of reason, subjectivity, and teleology, in light of Hegel’s interpretation, discussion, assimilation, and critique of Aristotle’s philosophy. It is the first systematic analysis comparing Hegelian and Aristotelian views of system and history; being, metaphysics, logic, and truth; nature and subjectivity; spirit, knowledge, and self-knowledge; ethics and politics. In addition, Hegel’s conception of Aristotle’s philosophy is contrasted with alternative conceptions typical of his time and ours.

No serious student of Hegel can afford to ignore this major new interpretation. Moreover, because it investigates with enormous erudition the relation between two giants of the Western philosophical tradition, this book will speak to a wider community of readers in such fields as history of philosophy and history of Aristotelianism, metaphysics and logic, philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics, and political science.

Alfredo Ferrarin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University.
This series contains a range of high-quality books on philosophers, topics, and schools of thought prominent in the Kantian and post-Kantian European tradition. It is nonsectarian in approach and methodology, and includes both introductory and more specialized treatments of these thinkers and topics. Authors are encouraged to interpret the boundaries of the modern European tradition in a broad way and in primarily philosophical rather than historical terms.

Some Recent Titles:

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Karl Ameriks: Kant and the Fate of Autonomy
Cristina Lafont: Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure
To my parents

Luciana Marchetti Ferrarin and Giuseppe Ferrarin
During the meal Goethe was comparatively quiet. No doubt so as not to disturb the free speech of his very voluble and logically penetrating guest, who elaborated upon himself in oddly complicated grammatical forms. An entirely novel terminology, a mode of expression overleaping itself, the peculiarly employed philosophical formulas of the ever more animated man in the course of his demonstrations – all this finally reduced Goethe to complete silence without the guest even noticing. The lady of the house likewise listened in silence, no doubt somewhat taken aback, and glanced at “father” – as she always called Goethe. After the meal had ended and the guest departed, Goethe asked his daughter: “Now did you like the man?” “Strange,” she replied, “I cannot tell whether he is brilliant or mad. He seems to me to be an unclear thinker.” Goethe smiled ironically. “Well, well, we just ate with the most famous of modern philosophers – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.”

—From Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen
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I defended my doctoral dissertation at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa in 1990 and published it soon thereafter (Hegel interprete di Aristotele. Pisa: ETS 1990). Many friends and professors read my manuscript and helped me with their suggestions and criticisms at the time: from the members of my examining committee (Massimo Barale, Remo Bodei, Franco Chiereghin, Walter Leszl, Giuliano Marini, Adriaan Peperzak) to Claudio Cesa, Leo Lugarini, Vittorio Sainati, Alberto Calabrese, Stefano Fuselli, Alessandra Fussi, Vladimiro Giacché, Andreas Kamp, John Protevi, Gaetano Rametta, Leonardo Samonà, and Giuseppe Varnier. I had also taken advantage of two DAAD fellowships allowing me to pursue my research in Germany, at the Hegel-Archiv in Bochum (1987–8) and at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in München (1989–90). The conversations I had with Walter Jaeschke in Bochum and with Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Dieter Henrich in München were valuable and instructive.

However, I soon became dissatisfied with that work. My postdoctoral research at Pennsylvania State University (1990–2), and especially the work with Stanley Rosen and David Lachterman, urged me to reconsider my general approach to the relation between Aristotle and Hegel. After a few years, I decided to write a new book in English on the topic.

In this book I have used some of the philological and scholarly work of my 1990 research, especially the analysis of Hegel’s Lectures and unpublished manuscripts and the study of the Aristotle edition he used. But this book has a much broader scope, takes into account many more aspects of Hegel’s relation to Aristotle, and comes to more thorough, radical, and forceful conclusions.

I was helped in the writing of this book by several friends who kindly read the manuscript and provided their feedback and criticism. Klaus
Brinkmann, Dan Dahlstrom, Luca Illetterati, and Pierre Kerszberg read parts of the work and made useful remarks. Rémi Brague offered very valuable suggestions, as did the anonymous reviewers for Cambridge University Press. James Dodd read and edited the whole manuscript.

A special thanks to Ken Dove, who read an earlier version of this essay with a care, passion, and acumen that are rare. His comments were very sharp and helpful; most of the time they made it obvious to me that I had to rephrase my interpretation with greater clarity or rigor. I am afraid we still disagree on most of the substantial points he raised. I wish that once he makes his work public our divergences will be taken as a tribute to the richness and interest of a topic that philosophers and scholars have never examined systematically or taken seriously enough before.

I learned more from teaching the demanding, thoughtful, and keen graduate students at Boston University than in years of research. I have a deep gratitude to the students who took my classes on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (Fall 1995), Hegel’s *Encyclopædia* (Spring 1997), and Aristotle’s *De anima* (Fall 1998).

I would like to express my thanks to Dennis Berkey, the Dean of Arts and Sciences at Boston University, for a Research Grant that released me from teaching and administrative duties in the Fall of 1997.

I have presented earlier versions of parts of Chapter 8 at the conference “Hegel interprete di Aristotele,” held in Cagliari in April 1994, at the New School for Social Research in February 1995, and at Catholic University in September 1999. My thanks, respectively, to Giancarlo Movia, Richard Bernstein, and Riccardo Pozzo and Richard Velkley for inviting me to discuss my work, and to the audiences for their questions and comments. An earlier version of Chapter 7 was presented at the Symposium on Philosophies of Nature held at the Center for Philosophy and History of Science at Boston University, November 1995, and at State University of New York at Purchase, February 1996; thanks, respectively, to Fred Tauber and to Ken Dove for their invitations.

ABBREVIATIONS


PLATO

ARISTOTLE
ARISTOTELOUS HAPANTA. Opera, quaecunque hactenus extiterunt omnia, by Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. Basil 1531 (2nd ed. 1539, 3d ed. 1550).
ARISTOTELOUS TOU STAGEIRITOU TA SOZOMENA, new edition in Greek and Latin, from the library of Isaac Casauboni, Lugduni apud Laemarium, 1590.
Aristotelis opera, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy. 5 vols., Berlin 1831–70.

Single Works
Cat. and De int. = Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione, edited by L. Minio-Paluello, Oxford 1949.  

Indexes, Translations, and Commentaries
Bonitz, Index
Met.
De an.
F. A. Trendelenburg, Aristotelis De anima libri tres, Berlin 2nd ed. 1877.  
De anima transl., with introduction and notes by R. D. Hicks. Cambridge 1907.  
Aristotele, Dell’anima, select passages and commentaries by V. F. Allemayer, Firenze 1963.  
De Mem.

De somn.

Eth. Nic.

De Motu anim.
Aristotle’s De motu animalium, text with transl., commentary, and interpretive essays by M. C. Nussbaum, Princeton 1978.

ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE
PORPHYRIUS = Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, Greek commentaries on Aristotle, edited by A. Busse, Berolini 1887.
THEMISTIUS = Paraphrasis in libros Aristotelis De anima, Greek commentaries on Aristotle, vol. 5, edited by R. Heinze, Berolini 1899.
SIMPLICIUS = In Libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria, Greek commentaries on Aristotle, vol. 11, edited by M. Hayduck, Berolini 1882.
PHILOPONUS = On Aristotle on the Intellect (de anima 3.4–8), transl. by W. Charlton (English transl. of William de Moerbeke’s Latin version of Philoponus’s Greek commentary on De Intellectu, now lost), Ithaca 1991.

STOICS
ABBREVIATIONS

PLOTINUS

PROCLUS

DESCARTES

PORT-ROYAL

SPINOZA

NEWTON
*Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, transl. by A. Motte in 1729; revised by F. Cajori, Berkeley 1946.

LEIBNIZ

WOLFF

KANT
*KrV = Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Ak. vols. 3–4*).
*KU = Kritik der Urtheiskraft* (*Ak. vol. 5*).
FICHTE


SCHELLING


HUMBOLDT


HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY PRIOR TO HEGEL

Buhle = Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie und einer kritischen Literatur derselben, Göttlingen 1796–1804.

HEGEL


Single Works and Translations:

Dissertatio = (Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum, in Ja 1: 347–401), in the following editions:
Dissertatio Philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum, Philosophische Erörterung über die Planetenbahn, German transl., introduction, and commentary by W. Neuser, Weinheim 1986.
Abbreviations


PhS (= W 3) = Phänomenologie des Geistes; Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, with analysis and Foreword by J. N. Findlay, Oxford 1977.


NS = Nürnberger Schriften (W 4).

PhR = Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (W 7).

Knox = Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, transl. with notes by T. M. Knox, Oxford 1952.


ENZ.A = Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817), in JA 6, followed by § (number of section), A (Remark, Anmerkung), Z (oral addition, Zusatz).

ENZ.B = Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1827), edited by W. Bonsiepen and H. C. Lucas (GW 19).


BS = *Berliner Schriften* (= W 11).


VGPh = *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (W 18–20).


VPhG = *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (W 12).


Verzeichniss = Verzeichniss der von dem Herrn Dr. Hegel and dem Herrn Dr. Seebeck hintergelassenen Buchsammlungen, section 1, Berlin 1832.
INTRODUCTION

To bring latent reason to the understanding of its own possibilities and thus to bring to insight the possibility of metaphysics as a true possibility . . . is the only way to decide whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy – that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason . . . is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy.

(E. Husserl, Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften)

§1. Preliminary Notes

When Perrault, Fontenelle, Boileau, and Bayle inaugurated the quarrel between ancients and moderns, the confrontation with the ancients had been a marginal topic confined to literary questions. At the end of the 18th century, over a hundred years afterward, it was becoming a recurrent theme. Often such a confrontation was part and parcel of modern philosophy’s self-understanding; it helped define its identity by gauging its proximity and distance from old models. More frequently than in the previous two centuries, which were busy severing their ties with tradition, we find appeals to revitalize ancient philosophy or civilization. But all such appeals say less about the sources to which they refer than about the purpose they served at the time, in the conditions in which they arose, about the historical needs from which they originated. In other words, the proposal of resuscitating Greek or Latin models was instrumental to the dissatisfaction or crisis that spurred it.
The slogan of a return to the classics acquired opposite functions depending on how one filled the empty box which now came to be called “Greece.” For example, it is significant that Robespierre longed for the embodiment of virtue and frugality he found in the “free republics” of Rome and Sparta against the ancien régime’s curbing of freedom while forgetting, as his opponent Termidorian Constantin Volney pointed out, how deeply the massive use of slavery was rooted in the political structure of Greece itself.¹

The Greeks were not studied as an object of critical historical scrutiny; they were rather invoked in contemporary discussions, especially in political and aesthetic domains. This is even more the case in Germany, where the tradition of Greek studies was more continuous than in France (which was keener on the Latin tradition), and where a few years later Wilhelm von Humboldt proposed the study of Greek as a Bildungsfundament (foundation of education) for Germans in his project of education reform (1808–9).² The disputes in German classicism and early Romanticism, from Lessing to Winckelmann to Schiller and Goethe, were united by one trait: Greek art and society had experienced a form of harmony that the scissions of modernity had made impossible.

In this connection Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling studied classical antiquity, and Plato in particular, in a similar vein and with similar purposes. Along with Spinoza’s thought, a certain image of Greece – whether informed by Schiller’s ideal of beauty, Hölderlin’s hen kai pan, Schelling’s and Hegel’s idea of a natural harmony between polis and nature – had to be adapted to and brought back to life in the framework of the crisis of post-Kantian philosophy. Reflection is intrinsically unable to grasp the original unity from which stem all its oppositions: this primordial being is rather intuited as beauty. The fragmentation of unitary bonds between individual and community, reason and sensibility, nature and civilization, science and life, are for the young Hegel indicative of the need for a popular religion in which classical and Christian elements, a new understanding of life and love as immaterial bonds, are fused together.³

¹ Compare Canfora, Ideologie (1980: 7–19). Montesquieu’s and Rousseau’s reflections on Athens, Sparta, and Rome should form the background for a study of this phenomenon no less than Rollin’s widely read Histoire ancienne (1730).
A study of the formation of Hegel’s thought cannot fail to take into account his extensive readings in ancient philosophy in the context of what he perceived as the spiritual needs of his time. A more difficult task is that of delving into all the textbooks and handbooks used by Hegel in various disciplines in his early years to detect the traditional, Platonic or Aristotelian elements that he probably absorbed unwittingly at Stuttgart and Tübingen and that later proved to be influential for the genesis of his own thought on such diverse matters as logic and philosophy of spirit and of nature.

However important such investigations may be for the reconstruction of Hegel’s early philosophy, I think it is more fruitful for the light it would shed on the comprehension of the inner tensions in Hegel’s thought, as well as philosophically more relevant, to focus on yet another approach to the problem of Hegel’s confrontation with the ancients: his mature reading of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. This runs throughout Hegel’s post-phenomenological works; unlike in his formative years, this confrontation is from 1805 (or so) on less sporadic and instrumental (whether simply predatory or enthusiastic) and is based on a more attentive, thoughtful, and free, if periodical, study focusing on Greek philosophy in its own right.

Even if at first Hegel placed Plato higher than Aristotle but later reversed this order, he always coupled the two as “teachers of mankind” and would have extended to Plato as well Dante’s famous characterization of Aristotle as the “master of those who know.”

This book will concentrate on Hegel and Aristotle. Aristotle is such a recurrent figure in Hegel’s mature work that sometimes it is difficult not to be misled by Hegel’s praise. Hegel’s panegyrics of Aristotle sometimes tend to obscure the fact that his references must be understood in their polemical function as directed to contemporary topics, or in their pedagogical role; elsewhere, they may have the character of historical remarks externally supporting points that had already been independently established. At other times, though, the impression is that Aristotle is not quoted where Hegel develops his own thoughts, that is, where Aristotle’s philosophy has a decisive influence on Hegel, whether as an antecedent to theories developed by Hegel, a foil to his own thought, or anyway as an alternative model to keep in mind in relevant contexts.

Obviously there is no easy way to determine such different intentions; only a comprehensive study of the entirety of Hegel’s explicit and

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4 *Inferno* (IV: 131). Cf. also *Convivio* IV, II, 16.
implicit references to Aristotle can help refine our hermeneutical skills in this task. I hope this book will show in sufficient detail that Aristotle’s importance for Hegel, over and above the heritage of 18th-century philosophy, cannot be overestimated.

Why does Hegel claim that an adequate conception of spirit needs the revitalization of Aristotle’s *De anima*? Why does Hegel write in the preface to the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia* that understanding “Plato, and much more deeply Aristotle [. . .] is at once not merely an understanding of that Idea, but an advance of science itself” (*ENZ.B* 18, *EL* 17)? How does Hegel purport to retrieve the deep meaning of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*? Is it necessary to keep in mind Aristotle for an understanding of Hegel’s notions of teleology, nature, time, the Concept, thinking, sensation, passions, or ethical life? How does Hegel explain the relationship between what he calls Aristotle’s finitude of thought and what he takes to be its speculative culmination, the divine thought thinking itself?

These are some of the questions this book will try to tackle. This work does not merely intend to show the extent to which Hegel is indebted to Aristotle or the degree to which his interpretation of Aristotle is at times arbitrary or misguided. To be sure, it will also spell out such points, but it is not intended simply to be an exposition of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle. It can be characterized as a detailed analysis of the relation between Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle’s thought and his usage and elaboration on it. Its main task is to show the tensions that result from this contrast.

Even though an exact interpretation of Hegel’s relation to Aristotle is far from being a matter of unanimous consent, his indebtedness to Aristotle is common knowledge among Hegel readers. For example, according to Nicolai Hartmann, “Hegel perceived himself as the Aristotelian who . . . recognized and completed the work of the master.” Likewise, Glockner writes that Hegel was “modernity’s only great Aristotelian.” The impression of a profound speculative affinity between Hegel and Aristotle was common already among Hegel’s contemporaries: “in 1810 Bachmann, in his review of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, compared Schelling to Plato and Hegel to Aristotle.” Rosenkranz, who reports this judgment of Bachmann’s, probably the first to express this similarity, continues without hiding his

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own skepticism on the matter: “from then on such a comparison has become a stereotype.”

This should cause no surprise. Hegel had always praised Aristotle’s speculative greatness to his students. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel devotes to no other philosopher so much praise and such extensive attention; there is nobody whom he seems to admire as much.

At the end of what is considered his system, after the three syllogisms of the Berlin Encyclopædia, Hegel simply apposes one of the most famous passages from Aristotle’s Metaphysics; he does not translate the text, which he quotes in Greek, let alone comment on it or explain it. One can hardly imagine a stronger endorsement, especially given the rarity of such unqualified approvals in the Hegelian corpus: Aristotle’s passage on divine thought appears like an authoritative seal affixed to the system of the true.

In his preface to the second edition of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Michelet reminds the reader of a note written by Hegel in his Jena notebook, which was to provide the basis for all subsequent classes on the history of philosophy, which says that the treatment of Aristotle went well over the first half of the semester. Even a cursory glance at the catalog of Hegel’s personal library (Verzeichniss) suffices to show how in the list of books owned by Hegel the texts of ancient philosophy and the studies on Greek thought were of a preponderant and steady interest. The extent of Hegel’s debt and admiration for Aristotle was very well perceived by Hegel’s pupils, who while divulging and popularizing their teacher’s thought unfailingly emphasized the Aristotelian origin of many of Hegel’s points. Gabler’s and Erdmann’s books, intended as introductions, respectively, to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic, are rich with references to Aristotle.

According to Gabler, who audited Hegel’s classes in Jena, a thorough study of Aristotle on Hegel’s part has to be dated back to 1805. Since the publication of the Jena system projects in the critical edition (GW 6–8), many Hegel scholars concur on the necessity to shift back the date. This is not a question of a chronological ordering that could be the exclusive interest of philologists and scholars. What matters in this is the determination of the range and extent of the influence of classi-

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7 Hegels Leben (1844: 201).
8 See “Vorwort” (reprinted by Glockner in the Jubiläumsausgabe: JA 17: 13).
9 Gabler, Lehrbuch (1827); Erdmann, Grundriss (1841).
10 Quoted in Kimmerle, “Dokumente” (1967: 70–1).
cal metaphysics on Hegel’s thought in the most volatile moment of its shaping. Hegel shows signs of intensive reading of Plato’s *Timaeus* and *Parmenides* in the *Differenzschrift* and in the *Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie* (1801–2). This last work “is dominated throughout by nothing less than a myth of ancient thought as the golden age of speculation, but there is no trace of the preponderance of Aristotle which will succeed shortly thereafter.”

According to Heidegger, Hegel already construes his own concept of time on that of Aristotle’s *Physics* in 1804/5. Walter Kern, who has edited and published a translation made by Hegel of *De anima* III 4–5, dating it around 1805, notes that in 1806 Hegel was too busy writing the *Phenomenology* to have time to prepare the translations from Aristotle which he used during his first course on the history of philosophy: hence “Hegel’s study of Aristotle happened anyway even before 1804/5!” Ilting has studied Hegel’s confrontation with Aristotle’s *Politics* in the early Jena years. According to Chiereghin, the section on Metaphysics of Objectivity in the Jena *Logic, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Nature* (*JS* II: 138–54) is already influenced by Aristotle’s notion of soul.

Interpreters of different schools and orientations have repeatedly noted many such affinities, which also constitute the subject matter of several monographs, intended at times as an analysis of Hegel’s *Lectures*

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Unless otherwise noted, all references in this book are to be understood as references to the original sources utilized. Whenever English translations of the works used are recorded in the List of Abbreviations (before the Introduction) and in the Bibliography (at the end of the book before the Index), quotations will be from them (in case several translations are recorded, I will specify which one I will be adopting). Otherwise, translations from Greek, Latin, German, French, Italian, Dutch, and Spanish are my own.

15 Ibid., 60 n. It appears actually that the translation edited by Kern stems from Hegel’s Nürnberg years. Professor Pöggeler kindly informed me that the paper used by Hegel in Nürnberg, which is the same on which the translation is written, substantially differs from the paper used by Hegel in Jena. In a private conversation, Professor Meist argued that Hegel’s grammatical remarks in the margins of the translation can only be accounted for if we remember that the manuscript was conceived for a lecture on Greek language or philosophy to the students of the Nürnberg Gymnasium. For this reason, as Garniron and Hogemann report (“Vorlesungen,” 1991: 114 n.), the critical edition of the manuscript appears in vol. 10, *Nürnberger Schriften*. All this obviously does not rule out Hegel’s knowledge and study of the *De anima* in or before 1805.
on Aristotle and as a critical discussion of the plausibility of Hegel’s interpretation, at times as an evaluation of Hegel’s use of Aristotle, more rarely as a critical comparison of interpretation and assimilation of Aristotelian themes on Hegel’s part.18

§2. On the Object and Method of This Book

The leading thread of this book will be the notion of energeia. In contradistinction to the existing literature, this book does not limit itself to an analysis of Hegel’s lectures or even to a general discussion of energeia; rather, this notion will serve as a guide to show how the idea of a self-referential activity operates in the details of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle as well as in particular contents of Hegel’s own thinking on subjectivity.

Energéia, usually rendered in English as “actuality” after the Latin translation “actus,” is by and large translated by Hegel as Tätigkeit (activity) or as Wirklichkeit (actuality), even though in the context of single works he will prefer different words (e.g., in the Philosophy of Spirit and the Logic Aktivität, actvity, while in the Phenomenology a closely related notion is that of Entwicklung, development). However he translates it, though, he invariably means the same, an actualization of a potency originally immanent in the subject of the process or movement. Hegel interprets energeia as the self-referential activity that he finds at work in its several manifestations: from the self-grounding of essence to the Concept, from the teleological process to natural life, from the essence of man to the forms of knowing and acting down to its most obviously free and self-determining dimension, absolute thinking that has itself as its object. This latter notion is for Hegel to be found in Aristotle’s noê-

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Most works on Hegel and Aristotle are in German, French, and Italian. To my mind the best work on the topic in English is Mure’s unjustly forgotten Introduction to Hegel (1940). However, Mure’s book is virtually useless when it comes to a discussion of specific passages; the level of generality at which Mure keeps his considerations makes it sometimes impossible to understand if he is speaking of Aristotle or of Hegel. Taylor finds in Hegel’s notion of self-realization a convergence of two related strands, Aristotelian form and modern, Herderian expressivism (Hegel, 1975: 15–18, 81, 367–8, and passim). As I argue throughout the book, for Hegel the two strands are not parallel or alternative; self-realization is the core of Aristotle’s philosophy.
sis noêseôs,\textsuperscript{19} which is the prefiguration of absolute spirit and which as we saw is used as the closing quotation of the Encyclopædia itself.

In this connection Hegel appropriates and transforms the meaning of energeia to define spirit. Spirit is actuosity, the self or subject containing in itself its own movement and purpose and expressing in the actualization of its potentialities its identity with itself and its permanence in its dealing with ever new and different contents. In the Lectures on Aristotle Hegel says: “energeia is more concretely subjectivity” (VGPh 2: 154, my italics). This must sound striking to those who are used to the modern idea – reflected in the philosophical lexicon only after Baumgarten and Kant but originating roughly around Descartes – that subjectivity is par excellence the cogito opposed to a realm of objectivity standing over and against it. What we will have to discuss is therefore the Hegelian notion of subjectivity in its relation with the Aristotelian energeia.

Hegel’s exegesis of Aristotle found in the Lectures is naturally selective. Hegel does not write a commentary on Aristotle’s works or an essay on the unity of his philosophy. Yet his clear intention is that of presenting his students with a genuine Aristotle, in opposition to the philosophical historiography of his own age. His choice of some fundamental concepts is guided by what he sees as their convergence in a unitary interpretation, in light of what he takes to be the new Aristotelian principle, subjectivity. For him the return to, and close study of, the Greek text is crucial.\textsuperscript{20}

If it is therefore necessary to follow Hegel’s methodical and systematic reading of the Aristotelian philosophy as it is expounded and understood by Hegel, and to forsake any analysis of textual stratifications and any reconstruction of the evolution of Aristotle’s thought, we will nevertheless have to examine also some pivotal Aristotelian concepts in order to show the one-sidedness and the presuppositions of Hegel’s interpretation.

I will follow the order of the Lectures, focusing especially on Metaphysics, Physics, De anima, Nicomachean Ethics, and Politics. We will see how Hegel emphasizes the centrality of energeia in his reconstruction of the Metaphysics. Here Hegel finds a distinction of three types of substances,
the sensible *ousia* (substance) as a substrate of change, the finite *nous* (intellect) as a formative principle of a given externality, and the divine *nous*, the absolute activity of thinking itself and of manifesting itself in nature and spirit. If *ousia* is identical with its concept, and this is the subject of its own actualization, on the one hand God is, *qua* thought thinking itself, the complete identity of subject and object after which the entire cosmos strives. On the other, Hegel finds in *phusis* (nature), in the theory of the form which has in itself the drive to actualize itself or the movement to reach its own telos, his own idea of natural subjectivity. But if the peak of the *Metaphysics* is for Hegel represented by its speculative Idea, God, and yet thought thinking itself and substances in the sublunar world are two independent principles, then it is the *De anima* which represents for Hegel the Archimedean point allowing for the unification of natural subjectivity and spirit, from its finite to its absolute forms.

For Hegel, in the *De anima* ("the best or even the sole work of speculative interest ever written on the philosophy of spirit," ENZ.C §378), the subject of experience is understood as a *hexis*, an active potency, an Aufhebung or negation of externality. Hegel argues that in this work the different forms of life, knowing and acting, are unitarily conceived as gradual moments in the actualization of the same process, the entelechy of living spirit. Thus in the *De anima* Hegel finds the soul as life, an activity inseparable from its manifestations and a self-development in and through its relation to otherness (in the lexicon of the *Logic*, the immediate Idea); the negativity of spirit, for which each finite form becomes matter for the superior form of considering reality; the necessity for spirit to emerge from nature as the truth of the latter; sensation, qua identity of perceiver and perceived, as an activity within receptivity, and the actualization of the senses as spirit’s shaping of its own receptivity in determinate directions; the notion of the I as an abiding and formed power (potency) or *hexis*, which preserves and idealizes givenness in memory, warranting the continuity of experiences; the intellect that thematizes the inferior forms of knowledge, and in so doing comes to know itself; finally, the unity of will and reason.

There is much to be questioned about this interpretation and appropriation of the *Metaphysics* and the *De anima*, naturally, as will appear in due course. What is important to note here is that Hegel takes Aristotle to have made nature, change, and all becoming intelligible in and of themselves. We must not oppose substance as a passive substrate to movement, nor form or essence to becoming. In fact, Aristotle’s
progress over Plato lies solely in the concept of immanent form, in
which Hegel finds the principle of “pure subjectivity” that is “missing in
Plato” (VGPh 2: 153). Immanent form is for Hegel an archê or cause that
is not definable in abstraction and isolation; the cause does not also
happen to be subject to change, in addition to and independently of its
essence. Its very being consists in the process of its own actualization. If
the essence of the living being does not exist independently of it, it must
then be the form understood as end – Hegel calls this the concept –
that moves the living being in the process of attaining to its end or te-
los. Differently stated, in the living being the concept becomes con-
crete. Energiea is what Hegel means by subjectivity, the concept as a
cause of its being and movement, or self-actualizing form.

The concept exists realiter in nature, it is not our imposition; and yet
it is present in it only in a hidden form, in potentiality with respect to
its existence as an object of actual thinking. If the universal is the
essence of a natural being, of physical laws, and if it constitutes the ob-
jectivity of the living, it cannot at the same time be found as such in na-
ture. It is a moment of the Idea, a product of the activity of absolute
thought.

With a very arbitrary interpretive move Hegel identifies the existing
universal, the objective intelligibility of all that is, with the Aristotelian
passive nous, only to oppose to objectified thought-determinations the
active nous, self-consciousness, the concept as absolute I. The object as
a conceptual synthesis is produced in the I by the unity of thought; it is
posited by the Concept that in the object relates to otherness as to it-
self, and is the unity of itself with itself, the identity of subject and ob-
ject.

If in this relation between active and passive nous it is more difficult
to recognize Aristotle than the idealistic, especially Fichetean develop-
ment of the Kantian transcendental deduction, it remains true that for
Hegel Aristotle is retrieved as a model of Vereinigungsphilosophie (phi-
losophy of unification) over against the philosophy of reflection and
the scissions of modernity. The sensible is not opposed to reason; na-
ture is not opposed to spirit. It is rather its immediate substance (Grund-
lage), the otherness of the Idea, out of which spirit emerges to attain to
itself. It attains to itself in a process of actualization which is at the same
time God’s, that is, the self-thinking Idea’s gradual appropriation of it-
self. In all this spirit does not have to reach an end outside itself, for its
end is internal to it; if spirit is the movement of positing itself as its other
and of negating its otherness, then, in Aristotelian terms, its activity is
complete (*teleia*) even when it is a production, for production, like theory and practice, is for Hegel spirit’s *self*-production in reality. In the words of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, we can say that spirit’s *energeia* is its own *eudaimonia* (happiness), its activity is its own flourishing. “The eternal Idea which is in and for itself actualizes, produces, and enjoys itself as absolute spirit,” read the last words of the *Encyclopaedia* before the Aristotle quotation (ENZ.C §577, my transl.). In this *Beischelbstsein* or being-at-home with itself, it seems then that Hegel makes a strikingly un Aristotelian identification of Aristotelian *theòria*, *praxis*, and *poièsis* (knowing, acting, making).

The task of this book is to show why it is fruitful for a better understanding of Hegel to examine his thought against the backdrop of his comments on Aristotle. This sheds light on many of Hegel’s presuppositions as well as on the relation between natural subjectivity and spirit that I have just sketched.

In the remainder of the Introduction I discuss methodological questions surrounding the structure of this book (§2) before turning (§3) to Hegel’s understanding of *energeia* as subjectivity on the basis of a review of some attacks from its most prominent critics, and, subsequently, of an examination of Aristotle’s employment of the term.

In Part I, I discuss Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy and its place within the system of philosophy. The relation between historical and natural time, philosophy and history, as well as Hegel’s idea of a history of philosophy will be scrutinized and critically assessed (Chapter 1). Given the order and structure of the lectures on Aristotle, which mirrors the order of the *Encyclopaedia*, we will pass on to an examination of some systematic and architectonic questions turning around the presence of the logical element (*das Logische*) in the philosophy of nature and of spirit (Chapter 2). The very arrangement of the material expounded in the lectures will prove to be significantly biased on a few substantial counts. This chapter, which discusses Hegel at length, and in which textual and systematical exegeses are intertwined, forms the basis for my further interpretations and for my eventual conclusions on Hegel’s relation to Aristotle. In other words, understanding how Hegel conceives his system and the relation between thinking and *Realphilosophie* (philosophy of nature and spirit) will later be of crucial importance in helping us understand why Hegel misconstrues the analogous relation between philosophy and sciences which he thought he could find in Aristotle, and why he ignores that the *De anima* is not a philosophy of spirit in his sense.
In Part II, I examine the lectures on the *Metaphysics* and show to what extent Hegel’s understanding of form as cause can be read back into Aristotle (Chapter 3). After showing the tacit confrontation with the *Metaphysics* taking place in the *Science of Logic* (Chapter Four), Aristotelian and Hegelian treatments of essence, concept, definition, and composite substance are compared and contrasted (Chapters 5 and 6).

Part III deals with Hegel’s *Realphilosophie* in its relation to the Aristotelian supposed philosophies of nature and of spirit. While Chapter 7 focuses on teleology in nature, and on questions such as motion, matter, space and time, mechanics and organics, Chapter 8 concentrates on the teleological (self-)constitution of spirit. This ranges from the most elementary and seemingly heterodetermined forms in which spirit’s activity acts as an entelechial impulse (notably sensation, but the entire Anthropology in general), to knowing qua recognition of reality as the existence of the Concept, and then up to the self-referentiality of thought and the unity of intelligence and will which eventually finds in ethical life its second nature. Given Hegel’s extraordinary praise of the *De anima*, a good deal of attention will be devoted to the philosophy of subjective spirit. Finally, we turn to Hegel’s usage of the *Politics* in the Objective Spirit and Philosophy of Right and to his judgment on the difference between Greek and modern States (Chapter 9).

After, and thanks to, the comprehensive analysis developed up to this point, the conclusions (Chapter 10) show both the originality and legitimacy of many of Hegel’s points, but also the reasons why his implicit assumptions – such as a different “ontology,” a different concept of truth, a relation between divine intellect or absolute thinking and finite *nous* into which Hegel reads more than Aristotle was willing to concede – induce him to separate speculation and finitude in Aristotle’s philosophy in a way that should be called in question.

In Chapter 11 I discuss the historical question of the pictures of Aristotle during the time of Hegel’s formative period. I try to determine when and how Hegel comes to acknowledge a deep elective affinity between his positions and Aristotle’s, and thereby to revitalize before Bekker, Bonitz, Brandis, Trendelenburg, Zeller, and Brentano a philosophy that had been largely neglected in the previous two centuries.

Before we pass on to §3, let me dwell on some methodological points and clarify at the outset that this study shares some Hegelian assumptions, specifically the following three.

A first preliminary remark has to do with the usage in the history of philosophy of categories such as that of “influence.” Hegel can be said
to have been “influenced” by Aristotle on some relevant points. Yet we must be clear about the meaning of such influence. The employment of categories such as causality or external determination in the history of philosophy postulates the polarity of an active cause and a passive recipient; in this relation the recipient is understood as a matter shaped by a form imposed on it from without. However important genetic studies sometimes are, this often is the presupposition: namely, that through the reading of or exposure to a text a philosopher shapes his views on a determinate subject before eventually reaching his own position. This approach often seems to me to tend to bracket, if not insult, the philosopher’s intelligence and freedom; more importantly, it runs against the truth. A given author cannot influence me unless I let him or her speak to me, unless I have made myself recipient to his or her message. But even if and when I do, whatever I assimilate is transformed within the preexisting framework of my thought.

Hegel has shown that external causes only work in mechanism; living nature and especially spirit can only accept something from without once they are disposed and ready to do so. All talk of external causes, writes Hegel, should be banished and rephrased as an occasion, an external stimulus, if applicable at all (WL 2: 227–9, SL 561–3). Spirit transforms causes into stimuli for its own development; by inwardizing a cause, it transforms it into something else and eradicates it from its externality. Differently stated, Hegel is “influenced” by Kant or by Aristotle in the sense that he adapts and assimilates what he reads in them within the framework of his own thinking. Hegel does not arrive at thought’s self-consciousness because he reflects on Aristotle’s noësis noëseos; rather, he can at most find in Aristotle help for his own thinking once he is already on his way there. And what he finds is what he is looking for. At the risk of sounding trivial, what I mean to say is that different authors who may have been influenced by Kant or Aristotle find very different motives of inspiration in them, and no two of them come to the same conclusions.

Second, as Hegel put it in the Phenomenology, it is easier to judge and dismiss philosophers – that is, point out limits that only an external and cleverer observer can see – than to do them justice by understanding comprehensively and sympathetically the essence of their thought (W 3: 13, PhS 3). Whether Hegel actually practiced this teaching is a different question that we need not take up now.

A third point taught by Hegel is that thinking is by nature critical, in the sense that it negates the absolutization and self-subsistence of any
of its determinate contents. Thought affirms, denies, and then unites speculatively the first two moments it has produced. Again, whether one emphasizes the third moment at the expense of the second, turning thought into a ratification of the existent, as the Left-Hegelians thought Hegel eventually did, or one simply stops at the second moment suppressing the third altogether, as does Adorno’s negative dialectics, is a question to be left unanswered in this book.

Any serious study in the history of philosophy, as well as any comparative study and fruitful approach to similarities and differences between historical figures, must take its bearings with these three points if it does not want to run the risk of futility and externality to the thing itself. Accordingly, what I try to do in this book is to read critically Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle while trying to remain fast to the thing itself, that is, without stepping above Hegel or denouncing his mistakes, thereby pretending to a superiority over him that I think nobody can claim. If one stands on the shoulders of giants, one must not forget why it is that one sees farther.

Thus Aristotle is often examined in a different light than is Hegel, as well as contrasted with his reading. I believe the latter to be a very instructive and interesting overinterpretation, if not distortion, and an important chapter in the 23-century-long history of Aristotelianism. But my aim here is not that of chastizing Hegel for his supposed blunders, let alone that of opposing a truer Aristotle to Hegel’s. What I try to do is understand the reasons and contexts behind certain choices, interpretations, or transformations of Aristotle on Hegel’s part.

If on the preceding points the approach here adopted can be called Hegelian, two counts on which it is somewhat less so are the following: as I said, this work is not merely an exposition of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle; rather, it tries to bring together his interpretation of Aristotle with his elaboration and to highlight the resulting tensions of which Hegel was often unaware. Here my procedure is comparable to a study in chiaroscuro bringing into relief otherwise hidden similarities and differences by contrast. Contrasts are valued as a means for a better understanding of the specific arguments of each author, and for the identification of what sets them off from one another. For example, if Hegel says that only Aristotle has understood the nature and workings of sensation, and he, Hegel, must revitalize Aristotle’s doctrines, our task is to go beyond this simple assertion to test whether Hegel correctly understands Aristotle, and if he does, whether he simply repeats Aristotle while revitalizing him or significantly departs from him on matters of greater or lesser importance.
Part of this procedure involves a task that is definitely non-Hegelian in view of the way Hegel practiced his history of philosophy, but that could not be more Hegelian if we keep in mind his definition of truth as the adequation of a reality to its concept. I mean to say this: we will have to see how and why Hegel often neglects what conflicts with what he is interested in finding in Aristotle and does not evaluate whether there corresponds to some incidental programmatic assertions an actual, univocally and conclusively proven argument that in fact carries out such a program on Aristotle’s part. Differently stated, if Aristotle clearly wants, say, in the *Metaphysics* (E 1) a theory of being that is also a theory of pure actuality, but upon closer scrutiny it turns out that this synthesis is fraught with difficulties, then appealing to Aristotle for an “onto-theology” does not work – for Hegel or for us. Hegel often rests content with programmatic assertions that he does not test critically, judging philosophers more for their intentions than for the realization of those intentions. We have to do otherwise if we want to judge Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle fairly: if Hegel taught us that the only internal criticism is one that brings to its consequences the principle under consideration, then the only way to read Hegel critically is to judge his accomplishments against the standard of his intentions.

§3. Can *Energeia* Be Understood as Subjectivity?

An illustration of this kind of procedure is offered in this section. It has been repeatedly pointed out that Hegel’s translation of *energeia* by “activity” misconstrues the Aristotelian meaning. I agree it does in some crucial respects, most notably in the interpretation of the Aristotelian God. Hegel interprets, as we shall see in our examination of the *Lectures* on the *Metaphysics*, God’s pure *energeia* as an actuality that contains potentiality sublated in itself and includes reference to movement. However, if we try to understand the rationale and motives behind his reconstruction we perceive the importance of his connection between natural and spiritual subjectivity for a reading of *Metaphysics* Θ–Λ.

The first thing to clarify in this regard is the precise meaning of Hegel’s “activity,” which as I said is not his only translation of *energeia*.21 Kant had drawn a distinction between *Handlung* and *Tätigkeit* (*Critique of Judgment*, §43); nature operates (*agere, Handeln*), while man (vis-à-vis

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art or *technē* makes (*facere, Tun*). Hegel reverses the meaning of these words: activity (*Tun*) is a generic name applying to whatever change is initiated, no matter by whom or what. Thus it can denote both natural and spiritual transformations provided they do not happen, to use Aristotle’s language (*Phys. I 4–6*), by chance or automatically. An action (*Handlung*), in turn, is the result of deliberation and is that for which the agent claims full responsibility; it is the expression of rationality and spontaneity, or, in Kantian terms, of causality through freedom. Unlike in Kant, however, I am not only responsible for the maxims of my actions but also for their consequences. We see in Chapter 8 (§8) the measure of Hegel’s indebtedness to Aristotle’s theory of *eupraxia*, successful action; the stress on the importance of the deliberation of the means marks all the difference between Aristotle and Kant. But in Hegel’s theory of activity there is certainly nothing like Aristotle’s contrast between praxis and *poiēsis*, action and production; activity is often used synonymously with *Hervorbringen, Erzeugen, Wirken* (different ways of emphasizing production or efficient causality).

We can say that the distinction is both about the end and about the beginning of the action; thus it is both Aristotelian and Kantian, and neither. Activity, in sum, has to do with directed processes initiated by an agent as opposed to mere change happening to a patient. Further, it is not distinctively human: human beings can be patients (say, subject to sudden meteorological change), and an animal can be the agent of, say, its growth, reproduction, etc.

The second thing to notice is that Hegel’s translation of *energeia* as *Tätigkeit* is the same as that adopted by Humboldt in the same years. When he compares language to the infinity of an organic form against those who take it as a finished product (*ergon*), Humboldt – in a more Schellingian than Hegelian vein – advocated for this reason a genetic definition of language.22

This understanding of *energeia* as including process came very soon under attack. Back with a vengeance, Schelling poked sarcasm at Hegel’s absolute as a God who knew no Sabbath. Hegel’s God is an eternal incessant activity and not a simple final cause like Aristotle’s.23 On the occasion of the award of a prize on essays on the *Metaphysics* in the

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1835 contest organized by Victor Cousin in Paris, which crowned Ravaisson and Michelet, Schelling protests against the “condescending” award to Michelet, “one of the most limited heads generated by Hegel’s school.” The comparison between Hegel and Aristotle, continues Schelling, could only be established by “some ignorant people in Germany.”

Even though Schelling, just like Hegel, sees the progress from Plato to Aristotle in the notion of *energeia* over simple essence (*Philosophie der Mythologie*, 498), he takes great care to show that Aristotle’s God is not moved, but is *to prôton kinoun akinêton* (“the first unmoved mover,” *Münchener Vorlesungen*, in *Werke* 5: 138). And on this score he is obviously right.

It is all the more striking how Kierkegaard wants to preserve this immobility while denying it. In the *Philosophy Crumbs*, he writes that “God must move Himself and remain what Aristotle says about Him, *akinêtos panta kinei*.” In a note of his diary Kierkegaard writes: “as far as I remember Schelling drew attention to this in Berlin.” In any case, Kierkegaard’s study of Aristotle is no more inspired by Schelling than by Trendelenburg, as is his criticism of Hegel’s integration of movement in the logic in the *Conclusive Unscientific Postscript*.

Heidegger reiterates the same critique: “*energeia* has nothing to do with *actus* or with *Tätigkeit*, but with the *ergon* as experienced by the

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24 Letter to Cousin of April 1838, quoted by Courtine, “Critique Schellingienne” (1991: 217–18). Cousin was Hegel’s longtime correspondent and admirer. When he was arrested in Berlin in 1824 on charge of complicity with the Burschenschaften (fraternities), Hegel wrote to von Schuckmann, Minister of Internal Affairs and Police, to pledge his innocence. He spoke of him as a serious scholar, author of philosophical essays, and editor of Descartes’s, Plato’s, and Proclus’s works. Hegel reminded von Schuckmann that the fourth volume of the Proclus edition had been dedicated by Cousin to Schelling and Hegel (Briefe 486, Letters 634–5).

25 This is one of the points for which Hegel’s reading is widely accepted in the central decades of the century and is echoed even in the works of many interpreters who do not share his views. For example, Zeller (cf. Chapter 4 below, n. 1) and Haym agree that Aristotle’s progress over Plato consists in the notion of purpose and *energeia* is “Verwirklichung” (realization), “Selbstbewegung und Entwicklung” (self-movement and development; Haym, Hegel, 1857: 227, 228).

26 The Greek means “God moves everything without being moved,” a sentence that, although quite genuinely Aristotelian in meaning, I could not find in the *Metaphysics.*

Greeks and with its being-brought-forth in presence [Her-vor-gebrachtheit in das An-wesen].”28 In other words, the couple kinēsis-ergon (movement-work or finished product) is the paradigmatic context for the definition of energeia.

A few distinctions are in order here. First of all, when Hegel understands energeia as subjectivity he means nothing less and nothing more than what I have argued in §2: energeia is the actualization of a potentiality originally internal to the subject of the process. Hegel is quite adamant that Aristotle did not know the infinite subjectivity and the absolute value of individuality that were only affirmed by the Christian revolution in the post-Greek world (e.g., PhR §124 A, §185 A). “The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsisting personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself” (PhR §260). The modern state is far more complex and profound than the Greek city-state for the simple reason that it holds together dispersed individuals and is not shattered by differences. That means that individual freedom, the pursuit of individual ends with all its arbitrariness and potential conflict with the common good, is a principle internal to modern society, unlike in Greece. And this is not a necessary evil but a deeper, more pervasive and concrete existence of freedom and subjectivity: the reconciliation of metaphysics and politics.

Aristotle opposed such freedom that would pursue particular ends, calling it the random life appropriate to slaves; genuine freedom is only that of citizens caring for the common good (Met. Λ 10, 1075a 16–25). This is clear, and there is no way that this pivotal difference might be downplayed or underestimated (Hegel goes to the point of calling philosophy a “science of freedom,” ENZ.A §5). But it should be no less obvious that Hegel uses “subjectivity” in a general, “metaphysical” (“logical,” in Hegel’s words) sense and in a moral-historical (“objective,” in Hegel’s words) sense. (In the Lectures on Aristotle, he distinguishes between “particular” and “pure” subjectivity and says that the latter is proper to Aristotle: VGPh 2: 153.) The two concepts need overlap as little as the Hegelian concepts of in-itself and for-itself; the former acquires individual existence in the latter at a particular turn

in history (for Hegel, Christianity). I can only refer the reader to Chapter 1 for a closer discussion of the question; this should suffice, however, to counter the shallow argument so pervasive in the secondary literature on Hegel that subjectivity was in principle absent from Greece and that Hegel’s identification of *energeia* with subjectivity must have been a careless slip of his tongue, or pen, inconsistent with his standard doctrine.

A second remark necessary in this context is the following: that Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle is in many points arbitrary can hardly be doubted; but he certainly is no incompetent translator. Hegel reads, and correctly understands, the Greek edition edited by Erasmus. Hegel’s knowledge of Greek is quite remarkable. According to Rosenkranz, he loved Greek much more than Latin. At the age of nine he translated the Letters to the Thessalians and to the Romans from the New Testament (*Dok.*: 12, 20); at 15 Epictetus, and at 17 excerpts from Euripides, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and Sophocles; then, in Bern, Thucydides (Rosenkranz, *Leben* 1844: 11–13). According to Clemens Brentano, when Hegel was teaching at Nürnberg, he translated the *Ring des Nibelungen* into Greek. His competence was so well known that Friedrich Creuzer, professor of classical philology at Heidelberg, 29 Let me clarify at the outset that when I refer to Hegel’s Christianity or Lutheranism in this book all I mean is what he means: the reconciliation between divinity and interiority. The absolute is present and alive in the human community, which is God’s self-consciousness. Belief in this is equivalent to trust in the objectivity of reason. If the function of Christianity is so crucial, it is also instrumental to philosophy, the way representation first makes us familiar with truth and is a preliminary and defective version of thinking.

30 ARISTOTELIUS HAPANTA, Basileae 1531. According to Kern (“Übersetzung,” 1961: 79–80), Hegel uses the third edition (1550). Even though we cannot exclude it, according to the catalog of Hegel’s personal books he possessed the first edition (see *Verzeichnis*, n. 378). Wieland writes that “after a long time Hegel is the first great thinker who studies Aristotle in the original again” (*Physik*, 1962: 34). In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* Hegel says that “only after the Reformation was there a return to the original sources for Aristotle” (*VGPh* 2: 145). Actually the “return” was a widespread late Renaissance phenomenon. Aldo Manuzio’s first Greek edition was printed in Venice in 1495–8; later, Sylburg’s edition appeared in 1584–7 and Casaubon’s in 1590. Buhle’s Bipontine edition, in five volumes (Strasburg 1791–1804), which could have been easily available to Hegel, does not include the *Metaphysics* or the *De anima*, since it contains only the *Organon*, the *Rhetoric*, and the *Poetics*. Bekker’s fundamental edition begins to appear only in the year of Hegel’s death, 1831; Schwegler’s commentary on the *Metaphysics* and Bonitz’s works do not appear before the 1840s. Victor Cousin’s *De la Métaphysique d’Aristote* is printed in Paris in 1835, and the following year Michelet’s book *Examen Critique de l’Ouvrage d’Aristote intitulé Métaphysique* is printed, again in Paris.
agreed to translate Proclus’ *Theôlogikê Stoicheiôsis (Elementatio Theologica)* “provided he could be assisted by Hegel.”31

The third, and in this context the most urgent, remark concerns *energeia* and the criticisms of Hegel’s translation and understanding of it. Hegel understands, for example in the *Philosophy of Nature*, *energeia* and *entelecheia* in line with a long tradition from Cicero to Leibniz, namely, as *endelecheia* and thus abiding self-motion (see Chapter 7 below). This affects his reading of *Met. Α* and of Aristotle’s God. It is certainly true that divine *energeia* is beyond all potentiality, and that Hegel misinterprets God’s life (*hé gar nou energeia zôê*, *Met. Α* 7.1072b 27) as a principle that repeats itself in the sublunar world. I show in Chapter 3 how Hegel is misled in making this move by the Erasmus edition.

But more important for the purpose of an evaluation of the plausibility of Hegel’s interpretation and his possible contribution to our understanding of Aristotle, I believe we should reverse the question of the correct interpretation of *energeia*: Is it possible at all to understand Aristotelian *energeia* starting from its pure instance in first substance, an actuality (*and activity*, that of thinking itself) that is exempt from potentiality? Save in first substance, which is pure actuality and a simple undivided being, potentiality and actuality are always correlative concepts in Aristotle; actuality is always the actuality of a potentiality. If pure *energeia* is not directive for the standard understanding of actuality in Aristotle, then what should we take our bearings with when we interpret *energeia*?

Heidegger’s thesis that *energeia* is being-at-work should be understood literally to refer to the world of production, *poiêsis*.32 Other senses of *energeia* are derivative from this being brought forth. In this he is followed by Strauss (*Natural Right*, 1953: 127 ff.), Arendt (*Human Condition*, 1958: 301–2), Aubenque (*Prudence*, 1963: 175 ff.), just to name some distinguished and authoritative philosophers. By this interpretation, Heidegger suppresses any sense of finality from *energeia*: *actus* is a faulty translation just because it suggests an actualization, not to say a self-actualization, which is absent from Aristotle’s understanding of *en-“


In a similar vein, Aubenque stresses that for the Greeks any notion resembling a *causa sui* or self-determination is absurd.\(^{33}\)

That *causa sui* or self-determination is absent in the Greeks sounds at first quite right. To contemporary eyes, accustomed to celebrating the novelty of Spinoza’s self-enclosed substance, or the autonomy of reason as discovered by Rousseau and Kant, this is hardly questionable. But let us briefly inquire to what extent this can be maintained. Obviously self-creation is absurd, but not only for the Greeks; Freud studies it as the core myth of psychotics. What is probably absurd is to look for a Spinoza in Greece. Yet self-movement and self-motion are not at all so absurd or non-Greek; the soul’s self-motion is actually at the core of Plato’s *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus* and is as such criticized by Aristotle. But if one were to restrict Aubenque’s remark to say that self-motion is a notion to be found in Plato but which Aristotle showed to be absurd, we would still be off the mark. For one thing, it may well be far-fetched to read into Aristotle the existentialist idea that in his life man projects his most proper finite possibilities in a groundless void. Yet how one can make sense of the *Ethics* without taking action as a self-determination, an actualization of one’s potentialities with respect to the kind of life one chooses, is hard to see;\(^{34}\) happiness and virtue are identified with activities and the exercise of one’s excellences at one’s best. Besides, reflexivity should not be driven to absurdity for the sake of an argument. In ethics, for example, self-determination need not be reason’s determination of itself; both Hegel and Aristotle would say that reason influences passions, and that thereby the self shapes its life.

Movement, or change (*kinêsis*), is a good showcase for Aubenque’s point. Aristotle shows at first that movement is never self-movement. But, Aristotle asks, does not a physician cure himself? When such a phrase is used we must indicate that what we actually mean is that the physician heals himself qua patient, not qua physician. Here the doctor is an active principle of change in another thing or in the same qua other. The distinction of respects is crucial, and such examples can be multiplied. Yet *Met. Θ 8* proves that this does not extinguish the question. This “active principle of change,” *dunamis*, must mean generally “every active principle of change and rest. Nature . . . is an active prin-


\(^{34}\) Not only for me, but for Aubenque as well. Aubenque’s understanding of *praxis* in his book on prudence in Aristotle, among the most beautiful and convincing scholarly works on Aristotle I know, does not rely on the model of *poiēsis* or production.
ciple of change but not in another thing but in the thing itself qua itself” (1049b 5–10). So there do seem to be cases in which agent and patient are the same, and in which different respects cannot be distinguished. Such cases still have to do with becoming, but with a highly qualified notion of becoming. If I use a tool, say, a saw to cut a piece of wood, here agent, means, and patient fall asunder; but in the case of a living being, agent and patient are identical; the animal acts on itself qua itself. Such cases have to do with a peculiar kind of activity, an activity in which the end and the agent are the same; but in such cases the idea of a self-actualization of sorts, a becoming that is not external to the patient because it is effected by and directed to itself, is central.

Heidegger’s thesis eliminates any relevance of movement, telos, and finality because it rightly emphasizes the gap between movement and its result. In movement, energeia is the actuality of the end to be achieved and must not be confused with the process of getting there, which is only instrumental; in this case actualization differs from actuality, and energeia clearly indicates the latter, not an activity. As in Marx’s famous phrase “production is extinguished in the product,” here potentiality disappears once it has reached its end. Movement “is and is not energeia” (K 9, 1066a 25–6; compare Phys. III 1); it is energeia atelēs or incomplete actuality, for it is directed outside itself. A potential state of something is replaced by another state (for example, the body, a stone falling, is now at rest, has reached the completion of its motion; I have lost five pounds and reached my standard weight). Here actuality supersedes a potentiality and brings it to being; the potentiality is defined with reference to the state to which it is directed.

However, if movement draws its meaning from its clearly identifiable end, there are also energeiai that consist in perfecting and completing or revealing the being of something. “All things are not said to exist in actuality in the same way, but by analogy; . . . for some are as movement in relation to potentiality, others are as substance to some sort of matter” (Θ 6, 1048b 6–9, my transl.). Dunamis and energeia are said with respect to movement or to substance (a duality announced at Θ 1, 1046a 1–2). In the latter case, a quite different sense of bringing to being is at stake.

Kinēsis, energeia, dunamis are all said in different ways. Paschein, to suffer or be acted upon, is in this respect synonymous with the passivity of a dunamis and must be understood in the same duality of senses. For example, even sensation is a kinēsis, an alloiōsis (“alteration,” literally a “becoming other”); yet it is not the same alteration we have in movement, an exchange of states, and it is not sheer passivity; the medievals called it “alteratio perfectiva.” They were inspired by a passage that I here quote at length:

Also the expression “to suffer” is not simple but may mean a destruction of one of the contraries by the other, or rather the preservation (sôtēria) of what is potential by an actual being which is like it as potentiality is like actuality; for the knower becomes an actual knower either by something which is not an alteration (this is a progress into its self and into its entelechy [eis hauto gar hê epidosis kai eis entelecheian]), or by an alteration of a different kind.36

Clearly, here Aristotle wants to distinguish a becoming-other from a self-development. And this distinction is in accord with the one on which Aristotle insists most in Met. Θ, that which pertains to perfect and imperfect energeiai. It is in light of this distinction internal to ends that we can understand movement as an imperfect actuality, not the other way round. If we started from the opposition kinēsis-ergon, we would never reach that comprehensive concept of which Aristotle wants to show the internal articulation and differences. In sum, I think that Heidegger’s claim on the priority of meaning of energeia should be reversed.

In the De anima passage, the relation between potentiality and actuality is that between a capacity and its exercise; the actuality is the strengthening or actualization of the potentiality, not a change or a becoming other as in movement or in production. Here the end, the telos, is internal to the subject of the activity.

Obviously the Nicomachean Ethics is the paramount locus of such perfect or complete activity. Virtue or excellence is a purposive disposition and is reached through habituation; habituation is nothing other than the repetition of activities addressed to an end, so that dispositions derive from and are directed to activities. Activities are ranked according

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36 De an. II 5, 417b 2–7 (transl. and emphasis mine). Probably because of an error in the Greek, Jannone and Barbotin’s edition has eis auto (instead of eis hauto). I follow Ross’s text, which rightly understands the line as reflexive; on the other hand, the French translation is correct even though it is of an incorrect text.
to whether their ultimate end is internal to the agent or outside of the agent. The end of production is the product, an object external to the producer; here the activity is instrumental to the usage, so that the ship captain’s expertise and knowledge of the form and end is architectonic and directive for the ship builder’s art. In action, by contrast, producer and user are the same, for good action is the end (Eth.nic. VI 2, 1139b 3–4; 5, 1140b 7), and action has no end outside itself (Pol. VII 3, 1325b 15 ff.). An end that is chosen for its own sake is a complete and perfect end in an absolute sense (haplōs, Eth.nic. I 5, 1097a 30). This praxis or action is a complete activity (Met. Θ 6, 1048b 18 ff.), which gives a determinate meaning to individual existence.

Among the best examples of such an activity are pleasure as an enduring immobile activity (energeia akinēsias, Eth.nic. VII 15, 1154b 26–8), and, strikingly, not an action but a theoretical activity, seeing. It appears that vision is complete at every moment: it lacks nothing which, coming later, would make complete its essence. Something similar holds for pleasure too. It is a whole [holon], and one cannot at any given moment find a pleasure whose essence would be made more complete if it were to last a longer time. And this is why it is not a motion [kinēsis]. For all motion takes place in time and is directed at an end – take building, for example – and it is only complete when it has accomplished that at which it aims. In other words, it is complete either in the whole time or in the moment it reaches its end. The parts and moments of any motion are all incomplete and each is different in its essence from the whole and from the others. (Eth.nic. X 4, 1174a 14–23)

While in motion time is the sum of its parts and culminates in its completion, seeing cannot be divided in constitutive moments with different value and nature. Seeing is complete and a whole in each moment of its being (1174b 6); in activities like seeing, “what takes place in a moment is the undivided whole” (to gar en tōi nun holon tì, 1174b 9). In Met. Θ 6, the example of seeing returns along with that of happiness and of thinking. They are opposed to losing weight, learning, healing, walking, building, as energeia is opposed to kinēsis (1048b 28). Here too time is an important factor for the distinction. While in movement a process is subordinated to its end, and reaching the end is the conclusion of the process that is thus extinguished, in energeia (I find it difficult not to translate it here as “activity”) time does not bring any new content. I can say I am and have been happy, “at the same time” (hama, 1048b 23). How does Aristotle mean this?
For Solon (Eth.nic. I 10), happiness is of a past (for us too, by and large: take Proust’s immemorial past); you have to step out of happiness to judge it. For Aristotle instead the happiness of a good life spans through a lifetime; it is the exercise of a permanent possession, not a movement that ceases once it reaches its end; it is a being, not a search, an actuality and not a result. While in a search the moment at which I attain the result is the completion of the process, the time of action does not differentiate perfect tense from present tense, for it is complete at each moment and its end is its activity itself. As Brague writes, the present tense “recapitulates in itself the past.”

One may of course object that the happiness attainable through man’s efforts fails, as in cases such as Priam’s, and that Aristotle should have taken more seriously the question of moral luck than his distinction between happiness and blessedness allows (Eth.nic. I 11, 1101a 6–8). Aristotle wavers substantially on the relation between happiness and virtue (see I 12). But the gist of his point is clear: one has to be able to exercise one’s excellences – to be active – in an unimpeded manner. Happiness and virtue are not a simple possession, but its exercise.

That the present recapitulates the past is only possible when the end is internal to the activity. As we know, this is typical of action. Yet action involves change and movement; accomplishing virtuous deeds sometimes seems close to production, especially if we emphasize the role of good and successful action, eupraxia. In the Eudeman Ethics action is even called a kinēsis (1222b 29). Besides, the examples mentioned are not of activities but of theory.

Alexander’s commentary helps clarify the first point: action happens meta kinēseōs, production dia kinēseōs (in Met. 182: action is accompanied by movement, while production is through movement). About the second point, while theory and action are distinct in their object, they are not divorced insofar as they are both potentialities of a life available to man; because virtues and dispositions or habitus are not of character alone but also of the intellect can Aristotle argue in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that theory is the only pure case of action as a way of life that is the highest end for man.

On Heidegger’s reading it is impossible to account for ends and final causes in human conduct; Heidegger thus abolishes not only all actualization, but also what defines praxis in contradistinction to produc-

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37 For a discussion of the being one of the two tenses and the identity of seeing and having seen, see Monde (1988: 466–79). The quotation is at 473.
tion, that is, he suppresses any concern with the goodness of ends. But, more importantly and more generally, on the reading I have been criticising it is impossible to account for *energeia* as activity addressed to one’s entelechy (*epidosis eis entelecheian*). This subjectivity, this movement is exactly the central point for Hegel. It is true that he does not differentiate these two modalities of time; in fact, by understanding both incomplete and complete activities as processes, he turns action and theory into forms of movement. He thereby downplays or misses precisely Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of rest, of coming to a stand in the concept of *kinêsis*.

However, Hegel rightly sees that actuality cannot be understood independently of actualization; in fact, an actuality without activity is for him unthinkable. For him, Aristotle has made movement intelligible and made room for becoming within being. Yet, Hegel hardly touches upon Aristotle’s notoriously obscure definition of movement in the *Physics* (he only mentions this definition – “movement is the actuality [or entelechy] of what exists potentially as such,” Phys. III 2, 201a 10 ff. – in the *Lectures*, at VGPh 2: 181–2), or on privation in relation to form. What matters for him is that Aristotle has discovered that being is full act, its own actualization; that reality or actuality is *self-grounding*, a *self-producing end*. If substance is the actuality of some matter (*Met. Θ 6, 1048b 9*), and this actuality is its end (*Θ 8, 1050a 9*), so that substance and form are act (*1050b 2*), then for Hegel this shows that Aristotle understands *ousia* as active, not inert or fixed; reality is an inner movement, being is activity. This movement is a development within the same and not a transition into an other; and, just as Aristotle’s *energeia akinêsias*, it does not necessarily involve change, motion, or effort. It is rather what Hegel calls the adequation of a being to itself. By this expression he means that being is innerly divided; each being is the movement of fulfilling its concept, its end, its actuality, or its standard, which is directive for and prior to its individual existence.

Actuality is prior to potentiality; all becoming is understandable in light of its concept or end. That we judge things according to their standards means that we take singularities as instances of kinds, and we judge these as adequate or, conversely, defective when we relate them to their full-blown actuality, to their complete and mature form. For example, a human being is a good and functional human being, that is, one that can fulfill one’s activities well; hence, a child or an incapacitated or sick person are defective or inadequate relative to their concept. But it is only because we take our bearings from an understand-
ing of the concept or actuality, of full being, that we can make judgments on degrees of health, functionality, ages of life, and so forth. For Hegel Aristotelian essences will then have to be understood as *causes of their actuality*, rather than as the intelligibility of their composites – as active principles rather than pure forms (whether “Platonic” or otherwise). This movement of adequation, which Hegel calls subjectivity or self-relating negativity, manifests itself in the various forms that we see in this book, from logical categories to nature to spirit.

Hegel never comments on the *hama* or simultaneity of present and past in *praxis*. Yet he always stresses that Aristotle thinks speculatively insofar as he does not take his bearings from the understanding’s principle of identity. Development and activity aimed at one’s self through one’s relation to otherness are for him the paramount examples of such speculation.

This is an instance in which his intuition, however partly mistaken, seems to me to point farther and deeper than some of the most authoritative readings of Aristotle.
I

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PLACE WITHIN THE SYSTEM
§1. The Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Editions and Sources

Hegel, who offered courses on the history of philosophy more regularly than on any other subject from 1805 until his death, never published a “history of philosophy.”

As Michelet reports,¹ Hegel wrote two notebooks on the history of philosophy for use in his university courses. The first, written in Jena and used in the winter semester of 1805/6, Hegel would always use in his later courses, as a basis to integrate or supplement or for oral improvisation. At times he would add more extensive explanations, for example, by writing notes in the margins; other times he would change the very substance of his exposition according to changes in his judgments about philosophers he happened to have in the meantime studied more deeply (as happened in the cases of Jacobi, Descartes, and Hume). After the Jena notebook Hegel wrote a general sketch on the introduction to the history of philosophy for his first course on the topic.

¹ See his “Vorwort” (JA 17: 1).
given in Heidelberg (winter semester 1816/17), to which he would append in the years that followed additional pages. Dissatisfied with the Jena introduction, he would constantly reelaborate this second notebook at the beginning of his courses in Heidelberg and Berlin.

The material we still read today is the result of Michelet’s compilation of these sources, along with notes taken by students who attended Hegel’s lectures in Berlin. There are many questions that are difficult to answer satisfactorily because the Jena notebook is no longer available. The evolution of Hegel’s views on his predecessors, and more importantly the changes in his very understanding of the history of philosophy, are hard to discern. The conception of the history of philosophy, which in the Differenzschrift still had a roughly Schellinghian inspiration (in which every philosophy was a total perspective on the Absolute, complete in itself, and was therefore comparable to a work of art), at some point becomes a teleological progression that is parallel, and analogous in its results, to the phenomenological procession of consciousness in the Phenomenology.

Michelet, who was in the habit of disposing manuscripts after their publication by entrusting them to people often unrelated to the edition of Hegel’s works, is not only responsible for the loss of the precious Jena notebook. To the eyes of the 20th-century scholar, he is also responsible for the hasty publication of an edition that satisfies none of the fundamental philological criteria any work should have of which the supposed author never had a chance to print a single page. Indication of the sources is often missing; notebooks from different years are mixed up; sentences handwritten by Hegel are confused with passages from notes of his not always reliable students. In making oral improvisation, thought-out written reflection, and student transcriptions virtually indistinguishable, Michelet postulated an equivalence in value of sources of very different levels of dependability, as well as a definitive unity of Hegel’s views in regard to questions on which Hegel’s stance changed over the years.

Reading Lasson’s or Hoffmeister’s criticisms of Michelet’s work, one hardly imagines he could have done worse. He actually did. In the second edition of the Lectures (1840–4), Michelet garbled the concision of the previously (1833) published text. He inserted here and there foot-

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2 G. Lasson in Fischer, Leben (1911: 1246, n. to 1012); J. Hoffmeister, “Einleitung” (SW 15a: XXIII-XXXI).
notes, even simply quotations from texts, with which Hegel would not necessarily have agreed. He moved passages from chapters to others where they made less sense and at times confused a clear order of paragraphs. He suppressed or reshuffled entire paragraphs. In particular, he suppressed most of the Greek words mentioned by Hegel and translated by him into German. In all of this he often made the text (which was never meant to be a book to begin with) more inconsistent and inaccurate. Unfaithful to his teacher’s warning to beware of noble intentions, he accomplished all this in the desire to make the text more easily readable and to avoid cumbersome repetitions. For all these reasons, and especially to check the Greek text that Hegel had before his eyes and how he translated it, it will be necessary to read the first edition of the Lectures.\footnote{For the benefit of the reader not versed in German, the English edition of the Lectures (Haldane and Simson, hereafter HP), based on Michelet’s second edition (1840–4, reprinted by Bolland in Leyden in 1908), will often be cited and contrasted with the first edition. But the primary text will remain, for all the reasons mentioned above, the 1833 edition (Werke 18, 19, 20; hereafter VGPh), which was also preferred by Lasson. Unless otherwise noted, I will always refer to the second volume both of the German and of the English editions. All translations from VGPh are my own.}

I wish to add that before the unanimity with which everybody who writes on the Lectures finds it indispensable to be pitiless with Michelet, I believe that the first edition, for all its limitations, is an unparalleled and rich text, a more concise exposition than the more “readable” second version. Besides, Michelet could still use the Jena notebook and other now lost sources. His edition is therefore still indispensable for the Hegel student.

Even the latest edition of the Lectures published by Jaeschke and Garniron does not aim at replacing Michelet’s.\footnote{See Jaeschke, “Einleitung” (in J: XXX.) I wish to thank Professor Walter Jaeschke for letting me read his transcription of several manuscripts on Plato and Aristotle well before they were printed.} It presents less material, but it finally reads like a critical edition: variations are accurately noted, sources are indicated thoroughly and scrupulously. This edition uses several manuscripts from different years, sequentially arranged, for the introduction (J/G 1); the part on Aristotle (from Plato to Proclus, J/G 3, hereafter; J/G) is based on five sources from the 1825/6 course. Von Griesheim’s text is the primary text; relevant differences in the other four transcriptions are noted.
§2. Hegel’s Idea of a History of Philosophy: An Antinomic Side and a Misleading, Unproven Assumption

The history of philosophy as we still practice it today is heavily influenced by Hegel; it did not exist before him. It was neither a recognized discipline in the university curriculum nor an established genre. There were, to be sure, several histories of philosophy; but a philosophical treatment of the history of philosophy was never practiced, let alone theorized.\(^5\)

Still for Kant, for example, philosophy is a *cognitio ex principiis* that cannot be learned historically (*KrVA* 836/B 864). Historical knowledge is a *cognitio ex datis* that cannot help relate rules to instances and which therefore does not improve judgment. On the other hand, for Kant we cannot learn any philosophy to begin with. We can only learn to philosophize, because “philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science that exists nowhere *in concreto*” (*KrVA* 838/B 866).

Hegel does not share the “cosmic concept” of philosophy put forth by Kant, let alone the sharp distinction between philosophy and history, or between an anthropological and a transcendental consideration of the ends of reason, because there is no gap between reason and the absolute, between human spirit in its historical unfolding and truth. Thus what the history of philosophy studies is the same content which informs philosophy itself.

Hegel invariably begins his courses by distancing himself from other histories that report on past philosophies in the manner of a narrative enumeration of dead opinions. Past thought can be brought back to life only by living spirit: only the philosopher, and not the historian, can make texts speak. This continuity between philosophy and its history has a few distinctive assumptions that we must now clarify.

For Hegel different philosophies are all expressions of the truth. Truth is a whole, it is one and concrete.\(^6\) It must be conceived as a substance in which differences inhere as would predicates. But a substance

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\(^6\) A demonstration of the unity and manifestivity of the Idea can only be given in the system, not in the history of philosophy. See Chapter 2, §2, below.
is independent and at rest, so predicates would inhere in it as accidental external determinations. For this reason, it has to be understood instead as a \textit{subject}, the subject of its own development in which differences bring to light essential features. All determinate philosophies are essential modifications of the Idea; they are informed by a \textit{principle} that spreads to the whole of their particular contents. Further, it is not the predicates that are the origin of the movement; it is the Idea itself whose nature is to develop itself in a multiplicity of determinations. Hegel uses metaphors from anthropology and from vegetative nature: different philosophies are all expressions of the same truth the way “the man, the youth, and the child are all one and the same individual” (VGPh 1: 47, HP 1: 46), or the way branches are all branches of the same tree (ENZA §8; ENZ.C §13). In a very Spinozistic expression, “it is the one Idea in its totality and in all its individual parts, like one life in a living being, one pulse throbs throughout all its members” (VGPh 1: 65, HP 1: 28).

Hegel is not saying that differences do not exist or are merely apparent. But the conception of difference must be clarified in a threefold sense: difference is not otherness; difference is particular; and difference is temporary. (1) It is not otherness because no philosophy is ever altogether other than its predecessors. (2) It is particular because it is a different expression of the same Idea, which is the universal ground specifying itself in a variety of different forms, in different epochs and cultures. (3) It is temporary because the one Idea, being infinite, cannot find rest in one particular shape or expression. Historical concretizations are naturally sublated by further, more developed figures; their finitude is doomed to resurface and mark the end of their success.

The first consequence is that both philosophy and its history are “system in development” (VGPh 1: 47, HP 1: 29; J/G 1: 24–5). While philosophy becomes more and more concrete, that is, specified and articulated in thinking, the history of philosophy shows how this concretization and development advance historically in time. The Idea is by itself eternal, and at the same time it must appear in finite form. This also introduces the idea of an irreversible progression of truth. Tradition is, as in Herder’s phrase, a holy chain (\textit{heilige Kette}); using a different metaphor, it “swells like a mighty river, which increases in size the further it advances from its source” (VGPh 1: 20; J/G 1: 7; HP 1: 2–3). The more developed a philosophy, the more concrete and true it is.

The philosophy that is the latest in time is the result of all the preceding philosophies; and it must therefore contain the principles of all of them;
for this reason, it is the most unfolded, the richest, and the most concrete one – provided that it does deserve the name of philosophy. (ENZ.C §13; see also VGPh 1: 61, HP 1: 41)

Every philosophy transforms its past while appropriating it. This in turn means that no philosophy originates out of the blue, and that in appropriating a philosophy we make it different than it was. In the genuine history of philosophy every going back to the tradition is a leap forward, a transformation that is a function of the current age.

If our reading of past philosophies is a living engagement, and if in the past we look for the one Idea in some particular aspect, then the history of philosophy cannot be historical scholarship. It must be speculative; and the past for the speculative philosopher is a living present. A speculative interpretation of the past does not aim at sterile tautological repetition. But if so, then its most pressing task is that of discerning in past philosophies what is transient from what is eternal. In other words, in a given philosophy we must be able to tell the difference between what is accidental and the unitary new principle coming to light and shaping the different aspects of its concreteness.

A branch of a tree or a child in the man are not dispensable phases; they are necessary stages of development. A necessary stage of development is not gone or erased once it is no longer present. This is why Hegel says that no philosophy is ever refuted; what is refuted is the appearance of absoluteness and definitiveness of a particular principle.

This question of the necessity of past historical philosophies comes up again in the most disputable conclusion drawn by Hegel. “The same development of thinking that is presented in the history of philosophy is presented in philosophy itself, but freed from that historical outwardness, that is, purely in the element of thinking” (ENZ.C §14); “the sequence in the systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical deduction of the thought-determinations in the Idea” (VGPh 1: 49, HP 1: 30; J/G 1: 27, 115, 157, 220, 293).

What does “freed from the element of outwardness” mean? What is the precise relation between time and the Idea? Is the Idea itself temporal? Finally, is all this plausible?

Hegel says that there is an inner conflict (Widerstreit) between the eternity of truth and its appearance in time (VGPh 1: 24; J/G 1: 9). This antinomy runs throughout Hegel’s idea of history. But the antinomy turns out to be only apparent. Hegel praised Kant for showing the necessity of reason’s antinomies, but he thought that Kant’s solution, that
contradiction was an appearance, was disappointing. He seems to con-
struct his own discussion of the conflictual relation between time and
eternity along similar lines. The solution of the antinomy is the elimi-
nation of time in its accidentality – or, what comes to mean the same,
the raising of time to an absolute present (ENZ.C§258 A). Time as suc-
cession (Zeitfolge) is precisely the outwardness, the clothing of the Idea
that we must strip bare or divest (entkleiden, VGPh 1: 49; J/G 1: 27; HP
1: 30; see also VPhG 20–1) in a speculative consideration of the history
of philosophy. In this way the history of philosophy loses its historical
meaning. On the other hand, only thus does the idea of necessity pre-
serve its validity. History has to do with singularity, accidentality, and
contingency; in history the concept cannot reign, here we can give
“only grounds” (ENZ.C§16). The passage from the Introduction to the
Encyclopædia continues thus: “history, too, belongs here [to the positive
and accidental side of science], inasmuch as, although the Idea is its
essence, the appearing of this Idea takes place in contingency and in
the field of freedom of choice.” The necessity we find at work in history
seems to be set up by the retrospective judgment of the philosopher re-
flecting on the past; but at the same time this post festum chain of ne-
cessity is understood and saved as the necessity of the unfolding of the
autonomous, self-developing Idea.

The temporal is, as it were, the necessary accidentality of the eternal.
What is necessary here is the Idea’s manifestation in time, or the rela-
tion between time and eternity; but time remains accidental inasmuch
as it does not substantially affect the eternity of the Idea.

In this separation, which intends no less to be an attempt at the re-
union of the eternal and the temporal, the necessary and the accidental,
the philosopher interprets history as informed by the never-changing
truth. Time is notionally reconstructed as the totality of its dimensions,
and transformed into a true infinity.7 Thus what is most essential to the
ordinary conception of time, succession and open-endedness, is dis-
carded. But how can that be if becoming, the becoming of the true, is
essential? Becoming, though unfolding externally and historically, is re-
constructed in essence as occurring at the level of thought alone, the
realization that what we are discovering was always already implicitly
there. Time is thus the external theater of the manifestation of the ab-
solute, which has the form of an accidental frame that contributes noth-
ing of its own to the process. The course of history “does not show us the

7 Compare below, Chapter 7, §5.
becoming of things foreign to us, but the becoming of ourselves and of our own science” (VGPh 1: 22; HP 1: 4). The conclusion of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which concerns comprehended history (*begriffene Geschichte*) as an inwardization (*Er-innerung*) of the calvary of the absolute spirit through finitude occurring at the inward level of thought, is directive for this notion of history (W 3: 590–91, PhS 492–3).8

Unfortunately, in this context Hegel refuses to discuss what he calls the “metaphysics of time” (VGPh 1: 51; J/G 1: 29; HP 1: 32) underlying all this. Elsewhere, for example in the transition from the logical Idea to nature, he suggests that time is the fallenness of the Idea into externality. Thus the eternal would not be beyond or after time, for that would reduce eternity to one of the temporal dimensions, the future (ENZ. C §258 A). The paradox here is that the future, and mankind’s deeds, have the function of bringing about what was there; they add nothing new or unexpected to the true – apart from what is most crucial, the consciousness that spirit has of itself and of its freedom.9

The *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* constantly warn us that there is a difference between natural, external time and spiritual time (VPhG 29 ff.). While the first is repetition of itself and spontaneously corrodes givenness, spiritual time is the cumulative time in which we make progress, in which we both look backward and forward. But the progress is in consciousness and inwardization, which again means that it is spirit’s self-consciousness that progresses and sets up the very difference between natural and spiritual time. Even here, then, time is an external frame above which spirit rises for its comprehension of itself. That amounts to saying that time is not the true element of the Idea.

This liberation from time through time, or realization of the infinite starting from the finite, should be contrasted with other statements made by Hegel. We are our “time apprehended in thoughts” (PhR 26, Knox 11); we can no longer be Platonists or Aristotelians (VGPh 1: 65, HP 1: 46); “we cannot escape out of our time any more than out of our

8 Notice the fundamental ambiguity underlying Hegel’s use of “history.” History is irrelevant to the Idea, and yet the Idea’s appearance in history is more adequate than its appearance in nature. In the first case, by history Hegel means time as the Idea’s outward clothing; in the second, history is synonymous with the rational result of spirit’s self-constitution in time, the systematic civilization of the world. It is no wonder that Hegel has been taken as the absolute defender of timeless logos and as the father of historicism.

9 Bodei argues that this relation between eternity and time is inspired by Saint Paul’s notion of *aiôn mellon* (“Zeit,” 1984: 92). If so, this seems to me to make the clash between eschatology and *parousia* of the eternal – the “kingdom of God” made present and manifest here according to the gospels – even more paradoxical.
skin” (VGPh 1: 65–6; HP 1: 45–6). If this were the whole story, however, philosophy would be merely an expression of the spirit of the time (as is literally said at VGPh 1: 74, HP 1: 54), and we could not transcend the limits of finitude and know the Idea, let alone understand past philosophers as they understood themselves. Hegel should have avoided this confusion by differentiating, within this context, between culture and philosophy. Without such a differentiation the very history of philosophy would not be philosophical but would itself be a cultural enterprise unable to rise above its time – a quite self-defeating claim if philosophy is knowledge of the eternal truth.

However this may be, this contrast is mirrored, again, in Hegel’s speculative notion of the history of philosophy. On the one hand, Hegel criticizes Brucker for lack of historical sense and his imposition of contemporary concerns and problems on Thales and in general. Yet he also says that “we must know in ancient philosophy or in the philosophy of any given period what we are going to look for” (VGPh 1: 67, HP 1: 48). History is not in itself a standard or unity of measure. Past philosophers, I think we should conclude, are studied as means and not as ends; in them we study philosophy, not philosophers. And this is quite consistent with Hegel’s antiromantic idea that the individuality of philosophers is irrelevant; they should not try to be original but rather work as the spokesmen of the Idea.

I believe we should put in question most of the assumptions I have just sketched, as the next section will show – first, because we should not accept them uncritically; second, because Hegel did not follow them.

§3. A Critique

One of the theses of this book is that Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle is much more mediated by Kantian, Spinozistic, and Christian Neoplatonic assumptions than he would admit. In part this should cause

10 VGPh 1: 62, 134; HP 1: 44, 112. Here Hegel says: “Brucker’s manner of procedure is entirely unhistoric, and yet nowhere ought we to proceed in a more historic manner than in the history of philosophy.”

11 See GW 4: 121, quoted in Düsing (Geschichte, 1983: 17 n.). Hegel’s works abound with puns on the privacy of Meinung (opinion); whatever is personal in his philosophy is false, as he reminded a lady interrogating him at a dinner. Plotinus, writing in very different times, when the Zeitgeist was ostensibly going the opposite direction, defended himself from the charge of originality and of departing from Plato’s philosophy (Enneads V 1, 8–10) by insisting on his adherence to Pythagoras and Plato.

no surprise, given what we saw about the sterility of a purely historical approach and the proposal to revitalize philosophies at their best, that is, with regard to their timeless content. In part, though, this runs against Hegel’s intention to present us with the genuine Aristotle against the distortions of his time as well as of twenty-one centuries of Aristotelianism. Sometimes it will appear that Hegel is saying the same as Aristotle, and yet by disregarding differences in context, concerns, and starting points, he means something else entirely. One has to decide whether in an external manner to oppose Hegel with an altogether alternative view of philosophy or to criticize Hegel starting from his very assumptions. I think we should opt for the latter before deciding whether the former is also necessary.

The relation between unity and difference is central in this respect. If we insist too much on the difference between Hegel and Aristotle, or between the ancients and the moderns, we run the risk of making the two positions incomparable. If we emphasize difference over unity, we may end up with sheer diversity, and a private language. If there are only paradigm shifts and different perspectives, then we are simply not talking about the same phenomena as our predecessors – or anyone else, for that matter. If we cannot step in the same river twice, every comparison will be guided by personal taste and inclinations, and all past philosophers would be merely our contemporaries.

Yet a river is not necessarily and at all points swelling and increasing the further it flows from its source. Rivers also stagnate; they flow through dams, coves, rapids, and shoals that accelerate or slow down their course. Sometimes this happens suddenly, and, more importantly, unexpectedly. What this consideration purports to stress is that tradition is certainly unitary, but it may be more discontinuous, multifarious, varied, and shaped by historical contingencies and individualities than Hegel’s statements would allow for.

While the consideration that otherness is always the otherness of what it opposes, of that from which it comes, explains the unity of tradition, so that we should not rule out the possibility of a development of the same thought by different authors, I think that understanding all changes as negations of given positions, and all differences as stages of a continuous chain, is the opposite extreme, which is just as unnecessary and unproven.

Sometimes philosophers are not the expression of their time in thought; they may anticipate their time (Nietzsche is a natural example) or consciously resist some progress or novelty in the name of other
ends (think of Hegel himself and Goethe versus Newton, or Plato versus sophistry). Often some notions handed down to posterity along with others, which are taught and assimilated wearily as empty shells of thoughts once powerful and living, survive in a latent and virtual way in the history of philosophy. They are like ambers buried under ashes covering both what ends up dying and what is simply lying temporarily inactive. Such ambers, once agitated in a critical mass, may burn again with a shine and strength they did not possess at first.

It may happen that some concepts are appropriated or, vice versa, formulated by disciplines that take them as their guide, and that, after successfully exploiting and profoundly transforming them, apply them to quite different contexts and regions – or to authors who freely draw upon such concepts and assimilate them within their own frames of thought, in a scope quite heterogeneous from the original one. Think of the secularization of theological concepts in the philosophy of history and politics; or, vice versa, think of modern philosophy’s appropriation of the concept of function, which had originally been elaborated by 16th- and 17th-century algebra.

There is a discontinuous virtuality of tradition that should not necessarily be interpreted as a succession of uniform stages of a supposed progress or a supposed regress. Sudden accelerations, or renaissances of once forgotten ideas, are sometimes irreversible breaks, not accidents or moments of a basically uniform process. Sometimes what appears as a repetition of the familiar is a masked conceptual turn en couched in traditional language. The new springs up in old clothes. Think of Descartes’s revolutionary *Regulae*, which at first blush appears to be embedded in Aristotelian-Scholastic terminology and concepts.

Sometimes, however, the old is not just the clothes of the new. Hegel’s confrontation with Aristotle and more generally with classical metaphysics after the modern revolution – that is, after the reduction of knowledge to legality, first of the world, then of reason – compels us to face the problem of the meaning of a revitalization of Greek philosophy in a radically changed context. If philosophy were not in contact with something non-transient, it would be subject to its time without the possibility of understanding it; thinking would be a function of the historical process. It is true that tradition determines the way we ask questions; but the meaning we give our answers is not predetermined by inherited conceptions. It preserves a character of insuppressable overdetermination and unpredictability. For this reason even the use of geological metaphors when speaking about tradition, such as sedi-
mentation of contents or stratification of meaning, as in Husserlian phenomenology, or hereditary conglomerates, as in classicists such as Murray or Dodds, is partly reductive. The task of the historian of philosophy is to respect and understand this discontinuous virtuality of tradition, thereby emphasizing both identities and differences. This is especially the case if similarities are misleading, hiding sudden breaks, turns, or reversals with respect to tradition. The task is, in other words, to resist all conciliatory temptations to posit homogeneities between different epochs and positions.

This also means that we should put in question the implicit assumption present both in Hegel and in Heidegger, the thesis of a basic continuity, interpreted, respectively, as the progressive revelation of reason to itself or the progressive oblivion of origin and reification of ontological difference.

If all this amounts to a call for a less “voracious”13 appropriation of the past, we should remark that Hegel himself did not always hold the same views about progress in history. In the Differenzschrift the notion of progress in the history of philosophy is absent. It would be wrong to say that in this text philosophy has no history;14 it does appear in time, and Hegel writes that philosophy must find itself and the same living essence in the particular historical forms. But what is not there is the notion of teleological progress. We find an aesthetic comparison that is missing from the spirit of the later conception of the history of philosophy. Raphael and Shakespeare would have considered the works of Apelles and Sophocles as the expressions of kindred spirits and not as useful preparatory exercises (Vorübungen) for their own achievements. Likewise, reason does not consider past philosophies as a preparation for the present; with regard to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors, because each philosophy is, like an artwork, a totality complete in itself (GW 4: 10–12). What seems still possible in 1801 is to approach past philosophies without having to see them in the light of the mediation of a tradition understood as a necessary, progressive revelation.

The identity or parallelism between the succession of systems in history and the logical deduction of the Idea’s thought-determinations is an assumption which Hegel never proves. Since this principle often has a polemical function against the loose collections of opinions that were

13 The expression is used by Peperzak (in Platonic Transformations, 1997: 5).
14 Kimmerle argues this much in Abgeschlossenheit (1970: 301).
passed off as “histories” by his contemporaries and predecessors, I believe it should be taken as a rhetorical device meant to emphasize that it is not chance that rules history. But if one denies one extreme it is not necessary to advocate the other; there is no reason for an either/or. Even once we get rid of the outward form and concentrate on the essence of philosophical systems, it is impossible to take such parallelism seriously. Let it suffice for the reader to think of the particular succession found in the *Science of Logic* and in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*: with the possible exception of the beginning (being and Parmenides), practically no two stages are comparable.

Not only is this parallelism an unproven assumption. I would argue that it is also misleading, because Hegel did not even practice what he theorized.

The identity of chronological with ideal or logical order can be justified only on the basis of an adequate knowledge of the entire history of philosophy, on the possibility of epitomizing all significant facets of past philosophies in the vectorial unity of a guiding concept, and finally on Hegel’s synoptic ability to reduce the different philosophical systems to their principle while expounding them.

The fact that, to give two examples, Hegel changes the periodizations of modern philosophy steadily over the years, or that he presents the epoch from the end of Neoplatonism to the late Renaissance as irrelevant to the development of the Idea, even though he never studied seriously medieval philosophy (whether Latin, Arabic, or Jewish), should suffice to see that he could not follow the idea he advances. But not only could he not do it – he didn’t. Every rigorous historiography must question what Hegel says about past philosophies and verify their presence and actual importance in Hegel’s thought, over and above the judgments we find in the *Lectures*. For example, Plato, praised as a master of skepticism, who dissolved the particular both in his political philosophy and in his negative-rational dialectic, seems to constitute a permanent challenge that surfaces almost everywhere in Hegel’s works. To paraphrase Hegel, we can say that not only are all claims of Heraclitus present in the *Science of Logic*, but also those of Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, and Kant. And most of all those of Aristotle.

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16 With regard to the question of progress and the parallelism thesis, it is significant that the same expression used about Heraclitus (“Here we see land,” *VGPh* 1: 320) is repeated when Hegel introduces Descartes’s philosophy (*VGPh* 3: 120). Sometimes it ap-
Aristotle’s philosophy is not reducible to any one of the categories expounded in Hegel’s system; for him, more than for anyone else, the parallelism thesis seems unwarranted. Aristotle does not appear as a shape of consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (as do scepticism or stoicism for example), or as a position of thought with regard to objectivity in the “Preliminary Concept” of the *Encyclopaedia*. Even though Hegel writes Niethammer that his own objective logic roughly corresponds to Aristotle’s ontology (W 4: 406–7), upon closer investigation it appears that the heritage of Aristotle accompanies Hegel throughout the Logic (not to mention the Philosophy of Nature, of Subjective Spirit, ethical life, etc.). Hegel’s remarks on Aristotle, scattered throughout his works, would not make sense if Hegel had taken his bearings with the parallelism thesis, or even the idea of historical progress; his confrontation with Aristotle is by and large ahistorical and purely speculative. Of course, it is a particular Aristotle, raised to a systematic necessity of which he had been unaware; and, of course, Hegel had no intention of simply translating the *Metaphysics* into his language. But this is what makes Marcuse say that “Hegel simply reinterpreted the basic categories of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and did not invent new ones.”17 It is just too bad that Marcuse does not further argue or give textual evidence, as we could have expected him to do, for such a peremptorily affirmed dependence.18

If the idea of a progression of a plurality of principles sublating one another does not direct Hegel’s reading of past philosophies, it is nonetheless true that one shift of principles was all-important for Hegel: the shift from Greek thought to modern philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy begins where thought can exercise itself freely. It begins in Greece, where such freedom of thought made its appearance; the progress is the transition from ancient to modern, from Greek philosophy to Christian-German philosophy, where freedom becomes universal. This progress is all-pervasive and is found everywhere in Hegel, from objective spirit to religion to art to world history to the logic itself. Given that it lies at the heart of the first full-fledged theory of moder-

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17 *Reason* (1941: 122); see also *Ontologie* (1932: 42–3, 54–5, 103–4).
18 Marcuse limits himself to repeatedly quoting Hartmann (“Aristoteles,” 1923) and Frank (“Leben,” 1927).
nity as a decisive break with the past,\(^1\) let us briefly consider its particulars.

The Greeks philosophized in light of the truest foundation of thinking, the identity of concept and objectivity (\(ENZA \S 139 \text{A; LPhR 2: 354--8}\)). This absolute thinking, the metaphysical, absolute Idea, is superior to the modern principle. But the ancient point of view is more abstract, while the modern principle is “more advanced,” in that it starts from the concrete and individual subjectivity.\(^2\) The transition is from Idea to spirit, or from the absolute truth assumed in thinking to the knowledge of the truth pervasively affirming itself and shaping mankind’s individual, everyday life. What is true must now be experienced and lived by individuals in their interiority.

Greek philosophy (a disconcertingly loose umbrella that for Hegel spans a language more than a period, extending from the Presocratics to late Neoplatonism, from Greek colonies to Athens and Alexandria) starts from the assumption that thought is being. Bacon, Böhme, and Descartes, whom Hegel considers the first “Christian-German” philosophers (sic: even here, despite appearances, the designation does not cover a geographical area or a language), began with the opposition between thinking and being, of which “\textit{cogito ergo sum}” is the best illustration. This opposition extends to the oppositions of individuality and substance, nature and spirit, or in its most general characterization: subject and object. The subject is for itself free, man is free as man because he is in his individuality divine spirit. The Greeks did not know this principle, which was brought about only by Christianity (\(ENZ.C \S 482 \text{A; VGPh 1: 121--32, HP 1: 99--110}\)). For Hegel it is no accident that slavery disappears only with the dawn of Christianity. With it man is infinite spirit regardless of birth, citizenship, rank, race or even culture.

This progress in principles is thus operative at all levels of political history. Modern societies can tolerate separation and conflict within themselves, while Greek states, being an immediate unity between whole and parts, were shattered by differences. Differences for the Greek city-states had the form of factions or seditious parties trying to subvert the whole; but the whole was too weak to actually be a sovereign whole. In cases of crisis, it turned out to be itself only a part. The con-

\(^1\) As agreed upon by Habermas, \textit{Diskurs} (1985) and Pippin, \textit{Modernism} (1991).

\(^2\) See the letter to Cousin of March 3, 1828: “As for Kant being so much lower than Plato, and the moderns so much below the ancients, in many connections this is undoubtedly true, but for depth and breadth of principles we are generally on a higher trajectory” (\textit{Briefe} 575, \textit{Letters} 666; compare also \textit{WL} 1: 33, \textit{SL} 42).
tradition or insoluble conflict was thus between one particularity and another; whichever prevailed became the new city-state. Something like the distinction – which is simultaneously a harmony of conflicting opposites – between state and civil society is unthinkable for the Greeks. In Greece one regime succeeded another; the modern state is strong enough not to be destroyed by inner conflicts and to be able to put up with a complexity and plurality of powers. This is due to the more global and less particular structure of states, and to the informing principle of the supremacy of universality over particularity, which alone articulates differences into the parts of an overarching and sovereign whole.

Here we see that opposition is not only necessary, but also beneficial, to the otherwise abstract Idea, especially the oppositions between nature and spirit, between universality and individuality.

A very important passage in this connection, from the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, reads as follows:

The manner of studies in ancient times differed from that of the modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation of the natural consciousness. Putting itself to the test at every point of its existence, and philosophizing about everything it came across, it made itself into a universality that was active through and through. In modern times, hinge-gen [“instead,” not “however,” A.F.], the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; the effort to grasp and appropriate it is more the direct driving-forth of what is within [Hervortreiben des Innern] and the truncated generation of the universal than it is the emergence of the latter from the concrete variety of existence. Hence the task nowadays consists not so much in purging the individual of an immediate, sensuous mode of apprehension, and making him into a substance that is an object of thought and that thinks, but rather in just the opposite, in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart to it spiritual life.21

Hegel’s system will have precisely the task of showing the actuality of the Idea, the Greek identity of thought and being, in the individual, in spirit; this means also beyond the modern opposition between subject and object. The task is thereby that of showing the subjecthood of the Idea and the substantiality of spirit: the reconciliation of ancient and modern philosophy on a higher level, without the limitations marring

21 W 3: 37, PhS 19–20, transl. Miller. For a discussion of this passage, see below, p. 109.
their respective principles, or the combination of Aristotelian theôria with the Christian finite embodiment of the divine.

§4. Hegel and Aristotle: The Constraint of the Thing Itself

As we saw, for Hegel we can no longer be Aristotelians. In this sense it is easy to show that Hegel’s praise of the ancients and of Aristotle in particular is no resuscitation of dead dogs, to invoke Lessing’s remark about Spinoza that was later taken up by Marx, but the necessary counterbalance to Kantian and Fichtean subjectivism. If it is clear that Hegel attacked what Nietzsche called the “antiquarian” way of doing history, it is also symptomatic that in the Greeks he always looked for the same principle progressively coming to light, from Parmenides to Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and Proclus: the Idea, the identity of subject and object, or objective thought (VGPh 1: 49). And it is significant that his misinterpretations or mistranslations of the Sophist, the Metaphysics, and the Enneads all point to the same effect.

If one has to evaluate past philosophies in light of their truth, the suspicion is legitimate that the unity of measure adopted becomes eventually nothing other than the philosophy of he who interprets. Predecessors turn out to be partial anticipators who take tentative steps in areas where the interpreter in the end has established a safe and certain conclusion. But the fact is that the principle of Dilthey’s hermeneutics, that we must understand an author better than he understood himself, is already somehow at work in the idea of completion shared by Aristotle and Hegel.

It is true that Aristotle did not know the concept of history as a progress in conformity with laws. He makes an instrumental usage of past philosophies to get what help he can in the aporias he has set for himself to solve. In the “contributions of others before us who . . . philosophized about truth,” we look for the “profit in our present inquiry” (Met. A 3, 983b 1–3, transl. Apostle; compare also A 5, 986a 13–5). Schwegler is right in saying that “instead of deriving his own system from the systems of the preceding philosophers, he [Aristotle] rather reduces their positions and principles to his own categories,” so that the vision of philosophy as “an evolutionary process ruled by conceptual necessity is alien to Aristotle” (in Met. 3: 26–7). If there is a logos ruling the cosmos, it does not extend to human affairs and even less to history, where types do not exist and it is impossible to give a philosophical account.
However, in both Aristotle and Hegel we find the idea of a constraint that is internal to the thing itself (auto to pragma, die Sache selbst), and that makes philosophy and its historical development continuous. If for Hegel philosophy is one because it is the science of truth, for Aristotle it is the thing itself (Met. A 3, 984a 18) that guides thinkers, “forced by truth itself” (ibid., 984b 9) and “forced to conform to phenomena” (A 5, 986b 31), in their investigation (compare also De part. anim. I 1, 642a 18–20, 27; Phys. I 5, 188b 29–30; notice how truth and phenomena are united).

Just as in Hegel the latest philosophy is the result of the preceding ones (VGPh 1: 56); also for Aristotle the maturity of a philosophy goes hand in hand with its concreteness and stability. We must discuss the aporias left unsolved by philosophers who “talked about these vaguely” (Met. A 10, 993a 13), and advance philosophy, because “philosophy about all things at the start seems to falter, inasmuch as it is at first both new and just beginning” (993a 15–16).

In both Aristotle and Hegel the philosopher both brings to light and completes a common tradition. Predecessors become, to varying degrees, interlocutors in a common debate. Aristotle incorporates and transforms Plato’s notion of dialogue: we no longer have a living exchange among interlocutors, but a discussion among given positions handed down by tradition, which is a discussion led by one thinker and from his standpoint. Predecessors have stated more or less authoritative opinions (endoxa) that form the starting point of the inquiry that is then carried out independently. Aubenque says that for Aristotle philosophy is a cumulative effort in which nothing gets lost.²² Nothing preserves its original meaning, but the contribution of every philosopher, even if it only opens up a path others will follow, when judged retrospectively helps truth reveal itself. Sometimes by recapitulating others we can avoid repeating their mistakes (Met. M 1, 1076a 12–16); sometimes truths are forgotten, then rediscovered (A 8, 1074b 10–13). In Hegel philosophies are not refuted, as we saw, by subsequent philosophies; but successors do show the finitude of preceding principles and undermine their pretension to having achieved definitive conclusions (VGPh 1: 56).

If Aristotle is often tendentious and unfair, showing little interest in considering what the author he criticizes actually had meant, Hegel wants to make the principle internal to the determinate philosophies

appear as a finite aspect of the truth. His study of philosophers is always guided by an idea rather than scholarly or historical scruples of doing justice to the entirety of significant details of other philosophies. For both, the notion of completion and of the emergence of truth accounts for the necessity of confronting predecessors with what they should have said, and of appropriating predecessors in their own thinking, passing over that which conflicts with such an assimilation. In such a description of stammering precursors to one’s positions we should not look for a neutral, detached and sympathetic reconstruction; just like Hegel, when looking at past figures Aristotle is also considering truth itself in its stammering attempts to emerge and affirm itself. The medieval idea of seeing farther thanks to the possibility of standing on the shoulders of giants, or the Renaissance idea of a dialogue with the classics, is as far from both as is scholarly accuracy.

In this connection we should also note that alternative conceptions to “progress,” however conceived, were known to both Aristotle and Hegel; both consciously opposed them. The notion that history is a decline from an original beginning, and not progress, was standard in Greek mythology, but often appears also in the Platonic dialogues. In Hegel’s age a picture of the history of philosophy as negative development from an original revelation (often found in oriental religion), a decline from a mythological unity between nature and spirit, is a guiding theme for many historians inspired by the later Schelling, such as Rixner and Ast, and is a tenet of the philosophy of history of Romantics such as F. Schlegel, Windischmann, Görres, and Novalis.

This remark purports to show that the notion of teleology in history is neither an inevitable destiny nor a topic for philosophical unanimity. What remains at this point is to see whether this notion of the self-revelation of the true is actually identical for Hegel and Aristotle.

The notion of a *vis veri*, a force or power of truth, is like an Aristotelian arché, a principle; all attempts to prove it would be circular. As such, it is an unverifiable presupposition. That truth must and does appear is precisely what modernity, and the Enlightenment in particular, set out to criticize. In modernity, truth comes to mean what survives sceptical objections. Truth is not naturally available for uncovering, as Husserl would put it; we must set ourselves to work to make it emerge.24

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24 See the discussion of the notions of truth and labor in Bacon, Descartes, and Hume in Blumenberg, *Metaphorologie* (1960: chs. 1, 2).
Truth and phenomena, as it now turns out, say opposite things and stand to one another in the same relation as the treasure waiting to be conquered and the veil leading us astray.

The first main difference between Hegel and Aristotle on the power of truth seems to me to consist in this: Hegel incorporates modern scepticism to overcome it and wants to ground in his system what in Aristotle he would have called a trust in reason. Also for Hegel, truth does not appear naturally, but it does eventually appear. Truth regains phenomenality in the notion of the conformity of an object to its concept (something I develop in Chapter 10).

A second difference, which can only be mentioned in this context and will be developed fully in what follows, is this: for Aristotle truth is one of the four meanings of being; truth reveals itself when we understand the way things, *ta pragmata*, are (Met. *Θ* 10, 1051b 1–9; Δ 7, 1017a 31–5). For Hegel truth is always the mediation and result of an adequation between an object and its concept, between an ‘is’ and an ‘ought’ (or, in the *Phenomenology*, between in-itself and for-itself). A reality is true when it corresponds to its concept and destination and can sustain itself independently. For example, the category of becoming is the truth of being and nothing, which taken in isolation cannot sustain themselves; *this* work of art is truly a work of art while *that* one is not—insofar as it corresponds to the concept that it was originally meant to express and is not defective with regard to its ought.

Besides, while for Aristotle philosophy naturally grows out of man’s desire to know, to invoke the opening line of the *Metaphysics*, where thinking is not separate from but is deeply rooted in experience, thus where philosophy has its genesis in the sensible, for Hegel philosophy arises instead out of the need for reconciliation. This need can take on a historical as well as a theoretical aspect: philosophy is most needed in times of scissions and separation (a theme running from the *Differenzschrift* to the *Philosophy of Right*). Also, philosophy has a negative relation to its starting point in experience: it must find satisfaction in itself only, removing the contradictions in which the understanding gets entangled while rising above experience (*ENZ.C*§11–§12). While for Aristotle natural desire is the dawn of philosophy, for Hegel the need for philosophy is an evening thought, as in the well known image of the owl of Minerva.

One could argue that if it is so, fulfilling a desire is worlds away from satisfying a need, and this is a *toto coelo* different idea of philosophy.²⁵ I

²⁵ Despite Hegel’s conflation of the desire to know with the satisfaction of spiritual need
would like to postpone judgment until the conclusion of the book. But what I would emphasize is that the conception of the truth imposing itself upon us regardless of our particularity remains a common feature between Aristotle and Hegel. Something similar can be found in Plato as well. When Socrates asks Adimantus in the Republic whether tragedy and comedy should be admitted in the city, he says: “I certainly do not yet know myself, but whithersoever the wind, as it were, of the logos blows, there lies our course” (III: 394d 9–10).26 We follow something higher than ourselves, over which we have no power. But only logos is authoritative; there is no continuity between logos and tradition. Plato did not share Aristotle’s notion of endoxa, authoritative opinions. Consensus seems to take place mostly among the many, hoi polloi. And if the many agree on something we should rather mistrust it (e.g., ibid., VI: 492b–c), for the many who will not embark on “the passage through all things” (Parmen. 136e 1–3) cannot attain to the truth. We are partially active and partially passive with regard to logos, inasmuch as only an active search can disclose truth, and yet truth has a power over us that we cannot help.

I should indicate at this stage that for obvious reasons of space this book does not engage in any extensive discussion on the Platonic dialogues in relation to Aristotle and Hegel. I occasionally mention the Platonic origins of some of Aristotle’s or Hegel’s points when they prove to be relevant to our discussion. For example, we see below (in Chapter 6) how deeply Aristotle and Plato differ with regard to opinion (doxa) and consider Hegel’s judgment on the matter. However, some of the following considerations are necessary to gauge Hegel’s attitude on the relation between Plato and Aristotle.

Hegel is perfectly aware of the extent to which Aristotle is indebted to Plato. He remarks “how far Aristotle in his philosophy carried out what in the Platonic principle had been begun, both in reference to the profundity of the ideas there contained, and to their expansion” (VGPh 132, HP 117). Yet, given Aristotle’s 20-year-long familiarity with Plato, he “had the best possible opportunity of becoming thoroughly acquainted with Plato’s philosophy, and therefore, if we are told that he did not understand it, this is shown, by the evident facts of the case, to

in the Foreword to the 3rd edition of the Encyclopædia, where Aristotle is quoted (ENZ.C, W8: 38, EL 22).

26 Shorey’s translation. This translation of logos by “argument” is ambiguous, for arguments can be understood as human devices that can be manipulated, unlike the wind or logos.
be an arbitrary and quite unfounded assumption.”27 I must say this strikes me as one of those assurances that Hegel says are as good as their opposites.28

Yet Hegel is convinced that “Aristotle’s philosophy was deeper and more worked out” than Plato’s (VGPh 134, HP 120) and that “Aristotle is far more speculative than Plato” (Briefe 514a, Letters 520).

Personally, I believe that using Aristotle as an authority on Plato is as absurd as reading Hegel through Marx: it may at best give us a true judgment about Hegel, but it does not help us much in understanding him. But given that philosophy is not about personal opinions, let us see if I can make my point more persuasive. Aristotle, more a friend of veritas than of Plato, saw himself as committing parricide in the name of truth. Actually he ignored the dramatic structure of the dialogues and often indifferently attributed to Plato views expressed by Socrates, the Eleatic Stranger, and other interlocutors in the dialogues; he ignored or passed over differences between myths and “arguments,” or reduced the former to a disguised version of the latter; and most importantly he ignored the theme that is most recurrent and pervasive in almost all of the dialogues, the problem of Socrates – that is, the inevitability of a quarrel between politics and philosophy. He thereby inaugurated a tradition of reading the dialogues that is still in place and has only recently been put into question.

In all of these respects, Hegel is no different from Aristotle, even though he had a very important, positive, and original interpretation of the so-called dialectical dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and Philebus, in particular). He does think that Aristotle is right about Plato: but not, as we shall see, because of the criticism of the theory of ideas, but rather because of the progress represented by the notion of energeia over the supposed identification of being and intelligibility that Hegel finds in Plato.

Hegel echoes a classical German view first made popular by Melanchthon and best expressed by Kant, with which he is in partial agreement: Plato is an enthusiast, while Aristotle is “serious work.”29 Even though

27 VGPh 134; HP 120. Elsewhere, Aristotle is declared a most reliable authority on his predecessors (VGPh 1: 190; HP 1: 166–7).
28 This is not so nearly as incomprehensible as Heidegger’s claim that we must go through Aristotle to understand Plato, like going from the clear to the obscure, because “what Aristotle said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and developed more scientifically.” See Heidegger, Sophistes (1924/5: 7, passim).
29 Compare Kant, Von einem neuerdings erhobenen . . . , in Ak 8: 393, quoted in Rosen, “An-
Hegel recognizes that Platonic myths are not fairy tales, he still thinks that they are beautiful and playful images not suitable for philosophy, and that where Plato is serious about the matter in question he “expresses himself otherwise, as we see in the Parmenides” (VGPh 1: 103–9, quotation at 109; HP 1: 82–8, quotation at 88). He then quotes Aristotle, who says that “it is not worthwhile to treat seriously of those whose philosophy takes a mythical form (Met. III, 4).”

Platonic myths are often more important, and their truth more deep than arguments, especially when they refer to origins – where the requirement of evidence, or a well worked-out argument, is out of the question. One could regret that Hegel never makes a philosophical use of his friend Creuzer’s Symbolik and its interpretation of myths apart from his aesthetics and philosophy of history.

Certainly Aristotle in part wanted to be read in this light, that is, as someone who put philosophy on a more serious and less mythical or supernatural foundation. This is apparent with regard to the question we have been considering in this section. While for Plato’s Socrates in the Symposium philosophy is rooted in erôs, which is a manic desire not amenable to any rational source, Aristotle naturalizes this desire to learn by turning it into an appetite or tendency (orexis) that can be cultivated, and in which any supernatural or extraordinary quality has been erased.

In the Nicomachean Ethics he writes that being good and serious about one’s life is an involving work (ergon esti spoudaion einai, II 9, 1109a 24). This comes up in a discussion of means and after the negative judgment on irony, which is self-depreciation and mock modesty (II 7, 1108a 22). If this helps explain his lack of sensitivity to Socratic-

30 Hegel is quoting from Met. B 4, 1000a 18–19. Aristotle’s passage refers to Hesiod, not to Plato.
31 See the letter to Creuzer in Briefe 450a, Letters 370; VGPh 1: 103, HP 1: 82.
32 In Aristotle the presence of a non-human element – of an active intellect or nous thurathen – in thinking accounts for how we think, not for how we are drawn to thinking (see below, Chapter 8, §8).
Platonic irony, it is also in keeping with his low esteem for comedy. Poetry is more philosophical and noble than history (Poet. I 9, 1451b 5), but comedy is the imitation and debasement of vulgar people; its territory is to kakon, the ugly or base (Poet. I 5, 1449a 31 ff.).

Hegel valued not only ancient scepticism but also ancient tragedy much higher than their modern counterparts. He also unreservedly admired the comedies of Aristophanes, in which he saw the dissolution in benevolent laughter of Greek ethical life and religion. There is nothing base or kakon in that for him. It is rather modern comedy that is full of malice, mercilessly laughing at the petty vices of its characters, while in Aristophanes it is the characters who undermine themselves and the seriousness and haughtiness with which they present themselves on stage. As Hegel says in the Aesthetics, “if we have not read Aristophanes we hardly know how man can have fun” (W 15: 552–6, quotation at 553).

Aristotle, of course, did not only know and appreciate seriousness. What he said about the spoudaios should be confined to the characterization of that kind of human existence. Differently stated, there is nothing of the modern grave, Protestant sensitivity in Aristotle, as Hegel would be the first to argue. In contrast to the requirement of seriousness in politics, for Aristotle other activities, like thinking (theôria), are first and foremost a pleasure. Possible only given the basis of leisure, scholê, thinking is certainly not strenuous work but rest, and the highest mode of human happiness.

In this connection, one of the most striking reversals of meaning we can find in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, and in one of the most revelatory instances of his own penchant for Sorge (care), we read that “attending to the aeí” (unchanging) cannot be continuously sustained, and that “man needs recreation and relaxation from theôrein” (Sophistes 92). If thinking is work, then its difference from prudence lies in this: phronèsis or practical intelligence, wrongly (but significantly with a view to the weight Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics has for the genesis of Being and Time) interpreted as “the highest mode of human knowledge,” is taken by Heidegger to be “the gravest of all knowledge, since it is concerned with human existence itself” (Sophistes 93).

This is going farther than even Kant ever did. If Spinoza’s motto – nec ridere nec lugere sed intelligere (neither laugh nor cry but understand) – was shared by Aristotle, we can say he would probably have smiled at that imposition of gravity onto human existence.
THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE *LECTURES ON ARISTOTLE*: ARCHITECTONIC AND SYSTEMATIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF HEGEL’S INTERPRETATION

All reification is indeed a forgetting.
(T. W. Adorno, *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*)

§1. The Purpose of This Chapter

Hegel presents Aristotle’s philosophy in the same order as his own encyclopaedic system. After an introduction about Aristotle’s biography and the “manner” (*Manier*) and “idea” of his philosophy, Hegel discusses the *Metaphysics*; then the *Physics* and *De coelo* under the heading of *Naturphilosophie*; then psychology (*De anima* and *Parva naturalia*) and practical philosophy (including ethics and politics) under the heading of Philosophy of Spirit (*Philosophie des Geistes*); and finally Logic (*the Organon*).

It is not important to establish whether these headings are Michelet’s; they clearly correspond not only to Hegel’s order of treatment but also to his intentions as far as the interpretation of the content is concerned (see *J/G* 68–99). Hegel does emphasize that Aristotle did not have a system (*VGPh* 145 and 244), which means that the correspondence with the order of the *Encyclopaedia* in Hegel’s interpretation must not be taken too strongly. Nevertheless, he does stress repeatedly the connection between Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and his own Logic, between the *Physics* and his Philosophy of Nature, as well as between the *De anima* and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, and of course between the *Politics* and objective spirit/Philosophy of Right. For this reason I bring the structure of the *Encyclopaedia* to bear on the arrangement of the *Lectures* and treat the two together.

In this connection, understanding why philosophy must be systematic and why the inner partition of its exposition is of paramount importance is crucial. This chapter sets the systematic backdrop for the
rest of the book. It is part exegesis and is meant to provide our examination with a broad foundation; but its conclusions are directly relevant to the discussion in all subsequent chapters. I first deal, in §2, with the structure of the Hegelian system (§2.1), the relation between logic and Realphilosophie (§2.2), the meaning of thinking (§2.3), and the relation between logic and metaphysics (§2.4). Next (§3), I move on to the unity of the sciences and the tripartition of theory, practice, and production in Aristotle, before finally (§4) focusing on Hegel’s misconstrued arrangement of the unity of Aristotle’s philosophy in the Lectures.

§2. Logic and System

§2.1. The Introduction to the Encyclopædia and the System of Philosophy. There are several reasons why we should not repeat the mistake made by Hegel’s pupils, who published and read the Encyclopædia with its oral additions as if it were Hegel’s system: not only because the Encyclopædia is merely a series of theses for use in the classroom,¹ and because the oral additions traditionally read as supplements are often as unreliable, if not more so, than Michelet’s compilation for the Lectures on the History of Philosophy; but, more importantly, because Hegel himself warned us against identifying the system of truth itself with the specific order of the Encyclopædia.

In one of the most important and overlooked “meta-theories” of the Encyclopædia, the concluding three syllogisms (ENZ.A §475–§477, ENZ.C §575–§577), Hegel suggests that the order of the Encyclopædia is that of a didactic exposition.² At the end of the progression followed in the Encyclopædia, thought looks back to itself (ENZ.A §473; ENZ.C §573; compare NAG 32) and realizes it is finally what the introduction to the work had claimed it was: a circle returning to itself. Philosophy is both the result of the two preceding moments of absolute spirit, art, and religion, and the totality of the three parts of the Encyclopædia: logic, nature, and finite spirit as different manifestations of the self-knowing absolute.

The three syllogisms are different connections of logic, nature, and spirit. What Hegel suggests is that the progression of the Encyclopædia

¹ See the famous letter to Cousin (Briefe 547, Letters 640) and the Preface to ENZ.A (JA 6: 3–4, reprinted also in W8: 11–12).
(the first syllogism) is potentially misleading, that is, it is an “appearance” in which the mediation of the concept has the external form of “transition” and succession (ENZ.A §475; ENZ.C §575). The transition from Idea to nature, then to spirit, or from Idea in itself to Idea outside of itself, then to the Idea returning to itself as spirit, is now characterized by Hegel as having been presented in the insufficient terms of the Logic of Being. In the second syllogism, in which spirit is the middle that brings together nature and Idea to science, the presentation acquires the relational character of the Logic of Essence and is thus higher. The second syllogism also has a limitation, though, that science appears as a human construct, a subjective cognition producing freedom and absolute knowledge. Only the third syllogism, the idea of philosophy become concrete, would be an adequate exposition, for it would not presuppose the givenness and isolation of any of its members. In it, self-knowing reason is the middle term dividing itself into nature and finite spirit, exhibits the self-diremption of the idea that characterizes both nature and spirit as manifestations of self-knowing reason. Here reason differentiates itself; the end of the process is reason knowing itself in nature and spirit. Here we have an internal articulation or judgment (Urteil) within (and of) reason itself. The logical element (das Logische) is neither a starting point nor an instrument, but rather spirit itself as the result of science. Only in this syllogism are logic and spirit entirely identical – as we realize at the end of the Encyclopædia they must be.

All of this has to do with how we recognize reason in nature and how the logical element shaping our thoughts and actions comes to the fore. This is Hegel’s meta-theoretical commentary on the relation among the three moments of the concrete Idea (as opposed to the abstract Idea seen in the Logic independently of its relation to nature and spirit) or of absolute spirit fully knowing itself (as opposed to finite spirit, subjective and objective). What this clearly indicates is that the Encyclopædia is not the only way to find rationality in reality; it is one of three possibilities, the one that Hegel judged most suitable for expository purposes. The Encyclopædia’s claim to truth should not be belittled; but its order is a construction. It does not purport to mirror reality as it is. In this sense it is far from any descriptive or ontological foundation of reality. Thus there is nothing positive, that is, historical or actual about the unfolding of the Idea in nature and finite spirit (as for example is

3 On the differences between dialectical movement in Being, Essence, and Concept, see below, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, §4.
the case in the representational language of religion – God’s creation of a world and man). Yet the Encyclopædia must be the true understanding of reality, which it can achieve insofar as it excludes all arbitrariness from its edifice.

Thus completeness and systematicity are of the essence, no less than the removal of all presuppositions and beginnings: at the end, the circular form must round out the necessarily finite and discursive form of the exposition. We can oppose system to method, the closure of a monolithic whole to an open-ended dialectic, as did with widely different intentions Schelling, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Feuerbach as well as Bloch and Adorno, only once we understand the construction of the system. The only thing I wish to point out in this context is that a supposed opposition between negativity and reconciliation is the least adequate starting point for such an understanding. Criticism, scepticism, and negativity are the motives animating dialectic, and thereby the ground for the transition from one finite form to another. The only absolute is the Idea, and it cannot find an adequate, final embodiment in anything other than the absolute, nonfinite thinking of it.

That philosophy can be true only in a system and as a totality is a constant requirement posited by Hegel since his earlier years. But this is a point largely shared by his contemporaries. For Kant, all a priori cognitions had to be united in a system of which the critique was the propædeutic (KrV A 841/B 869); Fichte’s 1794 Doctrine of Science was the science of the philosophical principles of sciences; Novalis wanted to connect different branches of the sciences in the unity of a system; in his Lectures on the Method of Academic Study (1802), Schelling gave a sketch for a general encyclopædia of all sciences, from the rational to the empirical; at this time Troxler was teaching in Bern a philosophical encyclopædia that purported to revitalize the old idea of a universal education. All of this played a polemical function against the Enlightenment encyclopædia of sciences, arts, and crafts interpreted as the history of the ways in which nature had been tamed by mankind. For the Idealists, for whom nature was petrified spirit and not a dead commodity, the relation between nature and spirit had to be expounded in a philosophical system whose aim was to know nature through the principles of the sciences of nature, and at the same time to promote human freedom (as political, but also in, and not against, nature). This requirement of systematic form led to a proliferation of encyclopædias in the 1810s: in 1812 and 1813 Schulze and Schleiermacher published
encyclopædias of philosophical sciences as university compendiums for lectures. But only in Hegel are the different problems, issues, and results available from the sciences joined together in an organic construction that aspires to a philosophically systematic knowledge of the Absolute.⁴

In his *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences*, Hegel contrasts a scientific or philosophical encyclopædia with an ordinary encyclopædia. While the latter takes the empirical disciplines as it finds them in ordinary life, and groups them together according to affinities and similarities, the former is the science of the necessary connection of sciences. The positive or ordinary encyclopædia derives its scientific status from the sciences it brings together, while a philosophical encyclopædia *is* science, in that it forms the conceptual order and relations among the sciences as well as demonstrates how their principles first arise.

Another distinctive trait of Hegel’s concept of the encyclopædia is that it is comparable to an organism. Again this is no novelty. The traditional idea of an *arbor scientiarum*, a tree of sciences in which different disciplines stood together in an organized connection, was renewed by Bacon, Descartes, D’Alembert, and Diderot.⁵ Hegel appropriates the image and combines it with the idea of a scientific history of philosophy, as we saw (*ENZ.C* §13). This implies a necessary unity in contrast to an aggregate of sciences. Significantly, Hegel refers to it as the tree of science, in the singular. Science is one insofar as it is the scientific exposition of the whole.

Even this is not new with Hegel. Schleiermacher also understood the encyclopædia as an organism; and before him Kant contrasted, with regard to the idea of a system, a *coacervatio* (aggregate) in which we advance *per appositionem* (by external addition), with an *articulatio per intussusceptionem*, that is, a growth from within “like an animal body” (*KrV A* 833/*B* 861). When we establish a science we must have “an idea upon which to base it” (*KrV A* 834/*B* 862). Reason brings order to the cognitions of the understanding, and relates it to its ends. But, unlike Hegel, Kant divorces science from metaphysics. Metaphysics concerns the superior destination of reason, while science borrows its status from

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⁴ This paragraph summarizes Cesa’s excellent reconstruction of the notion of encyclopædia before Hegel (“Introduzione,” 1975: XII–XXXII).

⁵ See Bignami’s valuable and very instructive study of the historical antecedents of the notion of encyclopædia, including the Greek notion of *en kuklôi paideuein* and the later *artes liberales*, in “Enciclopedia” (1995: 23–61).
mathematics and physics (cf. the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, Ak. 4: 470; *KrVA* 851/B 879).

Only philosophy is science for Hegel. For him all particular sciences have an irreducible thematic scope. Sciences are the starting point and negative touchstone of truth. Unlike modern thinkers from Descartes to Kant, Hegel does not measure the degree of scientificity and the legitimacy of the status of the sciences against the yardstick of mathematical method. Sciences adopt a method from without, that is, without necessity, and rely on the givenness of their objects and of principles of which they cannot give a definition or foundation.

In the Introduction to the *Encyclopædia*, Hegel clarifies the relation between philosophy and the sciences and shows the superiority in comprehensiveness and necessity that marks philosophy. Let us turn to this point. I will not give an exhaustive commentary, but focus on some relevant passages.

The Berlin Introduction, which unlike the Heidelberg Introduction stresses the relation between religion and philosophy and much less the definition of philosophy as the “science of freedom” (*ENZA* §5 A), has 18 sections. The first five discuss the identity of content but the difference in form between philosophy and religion. Unlike religion or the sciences, philosophy is presuppositionless; philosophy transforms representations into thoughts. Sections 6–14 stress the relation between philosophy and experience. Philosophy must be in accord with experience in a twofold sense: it cannot create a world of its own but must grasp actuality, and its content must be found to be at one with man’s certainty of himself. Empiricism and the “principle of the north,” that is, inward, Lutheran subjectivity, are the two distinctively modern sides of the necessity for individuals to be at home in, to experience, the content. Sections 15–17 are about the notion of encyclopædia and its fundamental characteristics: circularity, totality, and scientificity. §18 presents the division of the work.

Hegel writes that philosophy cannot presuppose either its objects or method; what it does presuppose is some familiarity with its objects, because “in the order of time consciousness produces representations of objects before it produces concepts of them” (*ENZ.C* §1; cf. *KrV* B 1). But philosophy must show the necessity of its content. As in Aristotle, what is first in itself or by nature must become first for us. Philosophy is the thinking consideration of things (*ENZ.C* §2). Thought is here under-

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stood in a very broad sense. There is no gap between thought and other forms of mental life; they are all the sublation of, or negative relation to, otherness and are thereby differentiations of the self. As the philosophy of subjective spirit will show, even the will is the self-actualization of thought, in that we determine ourselves to action on the basis of some representation. Animals do not think, for example, do not represent to themselves the object of their desire. Thinking is an overarching principle that includes action. Further, it is itself an activity which includes will. For example, the first moment of conscious voluntary rational thought is attention, characterized as a self-determination, or the determination to keep something before one’s consciousness. Not only are will and thought not opposed, but neither are feeling and thinking, or religion and philosophy. The difference between all these moments within thinking is thus one of form.

In reflection (Nachdenken) we explicitly have thoughts as such as contents and bring them to consciousness. Hegel stresses the continuity between representational or non-reflective thought and reflection, because philosophy is characterized by a broader concept of thought than the isolated realm of universals that reflection assumes for itself. But reflection cannot be the condition for attaining truth, for reflection severs itself from all other forms of mental life and ends up in opposition to them.

Whatever content we have in consciousness remains the same, whether it is a determinacy of feeling, intuition, images, purposes, duties, or of concepts (§3). What we are used to regarding as a difference in content is actually a difference in form. In this connection, representations can be called metaphors for thoughts. It is therefore crucial to be clear about the difference between what Hegel contrasts as pure and sensuous thoughts; comprehension is usually taken to be the translation of the abstract into the familiar, the concept into the representation, in the name of the demand that truth become meaningful. But pure thoughts, unmixed with anything sensible, are the prerogative of philosophy.

In the second part of the Introduction, Hegel writes that the content of philosophy is the domain of the living spirit made into the world (§6). This is what actuality means. It is not whatever happens to be, contingent existence and appearance; it is what grounds itself (in the remark Hegel points to the Logic, where this notion will be defined). Thus actuality is the highest object of philosophy in that it is the manifestation of reason, and reason and its manifestation are not two isolated or different realms.
The thrust of these sections is the modern principle of individual freedom. The Greeks confined thought to the abstract. In modernity—“since the times of the Lutheran reformation” (§7)—our reflective thinking threw itself upon the measureless material of the world of appearance. Now, for a content to be accepted and held as true “man must be actively involved with it, more precisely, that he must find any such content to be at one and in unity with the certainty of his own self.”\footnote{“[M]an must be actively involved with it” is the translation of “der Mensch selbst dabei sein müsse,” §7 A (italics in the original).} Truth and certainty must be one—even though, as we shall see, reflection denies itself this unity because it cannot grasp truth.

In modernity, philosophy comes to be equated with the thought (laws, universal principles) of what is given in experience. Experience does not mean what is given to the senses, but more generally what is in and for (or experienced by) consciousness (§8). This includes everything, even God and spirit; in this way also an infinite content can exist finitely in my consciousness. But this is not only a modern idea; Hegel refers to Anaxagoras when he says that nous is the cause of the world. Experience thereby becomes the experience of actuality, of institutions, feelings, and everything as the manifestation of reason. Thus Hegel makes both mottos, “nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu” (nothing is in the intellect that had not been in the senses) and “nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu” (nothing is in the senses that had not been in the intellect), necessary: experience is rooted in thinking in the broad sense already mentioned, and thinking must be in experience, it must speak to our interiority.

Subjective reason pushes for the satisfaction not only of its desire to experience the abstract, but also its demand for the necessity of its cognitions. Empirical sciences know laws and principles but not necessity; they know the universal at the expense of the particular and presuppose given objects and methods. They are thereby always open to criticism and doubt (ENZ.A §3, §5). Necessity is here lacking—that is, where necessity is a self-sustaining, self-grounding articulate unity that Hegel calls the Concept. Necessity is not a product of the mind, but that which animates and sustains the categories employed by the sciences. Philosophy does not leave “the empirical content of the other sciences aside, but recognizes and uses it” (ENZ.C §9 A). Laws and categories of sciences are the content of philosophy, but philosophy introduces an al-
teration of the categories used by the sciences, as well as preserves and transforms the laws and objects of the sciences with further categories. Conversely, philosophy has no direct immediate contact with any supposedly raw, original material; philosophy deals with representations and concepts that have been handed over to it by empirical sciences or by lower modes of thinking.

The justification of the necessity of philosophical knowledge cannot be given up front but has to be shown as we go along. The foundation cannot be external or transcendental (§10). Thought must remain faithful to itself and not give up when faced with the contradictions it finds in its way. It must look for its own presence and activity in the lower forms of involvement with things; it must integrate and resolve the contradictions that the understanding sets up everywhere (§11).

As for Kant, what reason makes thematic is the understanding. But the role of reason is not simply regulative. Section 12 shows the development of philosophy out of experience, and the equal necessity of immediacy and mediation, of a priori and a posteriori. As we saw in the first chapter, though philosophy requires an empirical beginning it proceeds in negative relation to it. Like eating, thinking owes its existence to the object, but it behaves ungratefully towards it by denying its independence. At first, thought is immediate or a priori (§12 A), inwardly contented: the universality it establishes is indifferent to its particularization. This is the formalism of philosophy: not only Parmenides and Heraclitus, which Hegel here mentions, but every philosophy that repeats its principle as invariant in its parts is formalistic (Hegel also has in mind Spinoza, and Schelling). If repetition at different levels of one’s thought is empty identity, true speculative philosophy is development, a constitutive, not merely regulative, articulation of its principle in its different aspects. Experience and the empirical sciences are just such a stimulus for philosophy to develop itself out of itself by advancing to the particular.

They prepare the content of what is particular so that it can be taken up into philosophy. And, on the other hand, they contain the Nötigung [‘constraint,’ not ‘invitation’ as in EL 37] for thinking to advance to its concrete determinations. The assumption of this content, through which the immediacy that still clings to it, and its givenness, are sublated by thinking, is at the same time a developing of thinking out of itself. Thus, philosophy does owe its development to the empirical sciences, but it gives to their content the fully essential shape of the freedom of thinking (or of what is apriori) as well as the validation of necessity. (ibid.)
Thought is thus the movement from the a priori to the a posteriori, from the universal to the particular, in order to reflect upon itself and give its object its independence and necessity. But its object is nothing other than itself, in the form of categories and thought-determinations. The passage just quoted continues thus: “the fact becomes the presentation and imitation of the activity of thinking that is original and completely independent.” The really autonomous, free, and original subject of the whole process is thinking. Here, freedom is not opposed to necessity; as in Spinoza, or in Kant’s distinction between will and arbitrariness or choice (Wille and Willkür), freedom and necessity are coupled in the notion of autonomy and opposed to the arbitrary. But unlike in Kant, the a priori is not a condition of possibility but the first moment in the validation of necessity. Nothing is prior to experience; the only subject is thinking, while abstraction and experience are its moments.

That philosophy is development means that it is concrete, that is, that it is the unity of all differences from which it has returned to itself. This, as we know from Chapter 1, includes a temporal dimension. Philosophy and its historical development are continuous (§13). This entails a different understanding of universality than the modern nominalistic conception. Universality is the identity of differences. We must not hypostatize the particular against the universal, or else the universal is turned into a particular;8 and we must not hypostatize the universal against the particular, or else we end up with a sterile opposition and cannot find the universal developed in its particular forms. Between the many and the one there is no unbridgeable gap; rather, the two notions are relative to each other.

If the true is concrete, a universal substantiated by differences, then the proper form of the exposition of the true is a system, a totality as the unity of the self-unfolding of the Idea (§15). Whereas nonsystematic thinking is contingent with respect to its object, in that thought depends on its content to be taken as the absolute touchstone not only for its inception but for its development as well, the system cannot rely on a beginning dictated by a given object. The system must be circular. All parts of the system must be circles, and the totality a circle of circles. All parts are circles because they are self-enclosed (logic, nature, and finite spirit point to realms other than themselves, but can each be understood as a whole, the totality in one aspect), and the totality is a circle.

8 The self-assured rigidity of the understanding wants fruit but rejects cherries and pears because they are cherries and pears and not fruit, as §13 A has it.
of the particular circles because the choice of beginning and end is indifferent; what counts is that science or thinking is the principle, activity and end, and that we get to it no matter what our starting point. The only beginning we can talk about is therefore the decision of the finite subject to philosophize (ENZ.A §36 A, ENZ.C §78 A). Whether we access the system through logic, through nature or spirit, we get the same result: science is the beginning and the end, a self-contained whole, a returning to itself – or, as in Hegel’s adoption of Aristotle’s phrase, an archê kai telos (principle and end). This section grounds the metatheoretical reading of the three syllogisms at the end of the book and the possibility of a plurality of points of access to the system.

Philosophy is an encyclopædia in that it has particularized itself (§16, A). Empirical sciences stand to thinking as the particular to the universal. However, the encyclopædia is an encyclopædia of philosophical sciences; the presentation is limited to the principles of the sciences. Such an encyclopædia differs from ordinary encyclopædias in that it is not an aggregate of sciences taken up contingently and empirically. Thus it must exclude from its consideration unordered aggregates of information (such as philology, according to Hegel), completely arbitrary positive disciplines, and those positive sciences that nonetheless have a rational principle. Geography, medicine, and tax law are among Hegel’s examples. But history is included here as well: the Idea is the essence of history, as we saw, but here the Idea manifests itself in contingency and arbitrariness. The positivity of the sciences is tantamount to their finitude. There are three kinds of such finitude: material finitude, formal finitude, and the finitude of our way of knowing. While in the first two cases sciences take their determinations to be absolutely valid, the third case reduces all content of knowing to a fixed form, for example, representation. The finitude here is subjective, which can also include the finitude in dealing with the absolute, while the other two kinds are finitude in re, grounded in the object.

§2.2. Logic and Realphilosophie. From Jena to Nürnberg to Heidelberg and Berlin, Hegel changed and revised the structure of his system in many important respects. Without going over the details of this evolution in Jena, which has been thoroughly reconstructed by many commentators and Hegel scholars, I would like to remind the reader of a.

9 See, for example, Horstmann’s commendable overview (“Jenaer Systemkonkeptionen,” 1977: 43–58).
few points. In 1803/4 and 1804/5, logic for Hegel was the introduction to metaphysics that undermined and destroyed, as in his interpretation of Platonic dialectic, the conceptual fixations incapable of rising above the oppositions and finitude of reflective forms of thought. Metaphysics, in turn, had to grasp the absolute as the speculative standpoint that allowed for a rational consideration of reality. Nature and spirit—which in 1802 were the object of a philosophy of nature, a philosophy of intelligence and a philosophy of indifference, including art, religion, and speculation—became two sides of a finite nature: a natural nature and an ethical nature, from which the concept of spirit arose as a theory of consciousness organizing itself in three different potencies (language, instrument, and family patrimony).

Once Hegel shifted, after 1805, his understanding of logic to include metaphysics as a theory of the absolute in relation to which “life” and “knowing” were no longer external, he needed an introduction to the speculative standpoint of the logic. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* was written with the purpose of satisfying such a need. The process bringing finite consciousness to the speculative standpoint is guided by a necessity that is not for consciousness; consciousness employs speculative determinations without knowing them. A logic is operative in this process which is only for us. The history of consciousness brings about the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness that is necessary for a scientific knowledge of the Absolute, but in itself it is only preparatory. In Nürnberg, Hegel again changed his approach. Spirit is treated as erscheinend, appearing, and as in and for itself; this leads Hegel to the gradual reelaboration of the material from the earlier *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the reduction of its systematic scope to its first section, and to the genesis of the mature philosophy of spirit.

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* no longer acts as an introduction to the system. We are not carried to the Absolute through the stages of consciousness thinking itself. Now the decision to think purely, the freedom to abstract from everything, is sufficient for us to enter the system. The *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in many respects Hegel’s most impressive work, is later reinterpreted by Hegel as an introduction to pure thinking, the overcoming of all oppositions of consciousness and all presuppositions external to thinking. We will see this in Chapter 8, §5; what needs to be stressed at this point is that instead of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an external introduction, we now have a “Preliminary Conception” to the logic. The three dominant modern positions of thought
with regard to objectivity become the pathway to the speculative consideration of absolute spirit in its abstract logical essence.

Why spirit? How can spirit be absolute if spirit is, from the Heidelberg period on, divided into subjective, objective, and absolute? And why spirit, if spirit is only the third part of the system? What is the relation among the three parts of the system? And, most importantly, if the Science of Logic is Hegel’s scientific masterpiece, and the only part of the system he developed fully in print, what is the relation between the logic and the other two parts of the system, and between the Idea and spirit?

Logic is the pure structure of reality, the science of absolute form: not as a formal logic, but as a logic of form, that is, of the soul of the world prior to its body, as it were. Categories, what Hegel calls pure thought-determinations, are not the constructions of a subject; if thoughts are irreducible to the thinker, then Hegel can say that I do not think as a particular finite subject, it is the Idea that thinks and progresses from one form to another (WL 1: 25, SL 35). I find logical categories operative everywhere and use them in everyday life. Thus the concepts operative in the world are active in me. This means that I should not reduce them to my intellectual product, but rather think through and understand this objective movement that is unfolding itself in all facets of reality. Logic, the foundation of all that is, is what makes the inner essence of all reality transparent to thought. In this sense logic is the first and most important science, and that is why Hegel accords it such primacy in his exposition; thus logic takes on itself the task, which was traditionally that of metaphysics.

The absolute Idea, which at the end of the logic shows to have ruled and generated the entire logical movement, can be the object of philosophical consideration in itself, thus be considered formally, or, alternatively, it can be considered in its embodiment in finite natural or spiritual forms. It can, in Hegel’s metaphor, be considered, respectively, as the concept of God (WL 2: 572–3, SL 842–4) or as the objectivity of God. Absolute spirit is just the stage at which the two are thought together as one truth. In this sense absolute spirit is superior to the absolute Idea, just as the return to itself of concrete thinking is superior to its bare structure. Truth is known by absolute spirit both as pervading all aspects of reality and as spirit’s innermost nature. The Idea is only concrete as this spiritual self-knowledge.

The various thought-determinations we read about in the Logic are not attributes of an abiding subject, whether it be the I or God, as the
well-known simile from the Introduction to the *Science of Logic* would seem to imply (the Logic is called “the exposition of God . . . before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit”; WL 1: 44, SL 50). The very distinction between subject and attributes is grounded in the Logic as one stage of the unfolding of the Idea. And the Idea is an underlying universal before it is distinguished and articulated in its aspects or moments.

The Logic is not an isolated first part of the system but the conceptual foundation of the whole system, as I have said. The system, however, is not a progression from logic to *Realphilosophie* (philosophies of nature and of spirit) that actually takes place, since that would make the Logic an immediate starting point. The Logic is instead the study of the pure form that we also find at work, or animating, nature and finite spirit. This is comparable to Aristotle’s distinction between *logoi* and *logoi enuloi*; while essences only exist as “enmattered,” as essences of composites, thought isolates essences and views them in their own right. Hegel’s *Realphilosophie* is applied logic in that it shows how the development of logical categories in growing completeness is exactly what lies behind the principles and concepts that sciences use unreflectively. And the *Realphilosophie* is not just a reduplication, but it is necessary: if we only knew the Logic, we would not know how the Concept becomes concrete in all empirical facets of reality. We would be left, in other words, with a non philosophical gap between the true logical element and a dispensable, if not irrational, external skin – like a statue of Silenus that only masks and does not also reveal the gods hidden inside.

For this reason, the way we approach the Logic differentiates its meaning (even though its structure remains unaffected). If the Logic is read at the end of the *Encyclopædia*, the appearance of an initial, prior immediacy which then needs to substantiate itself in externality (e.g., through the falleness or self-alienation of the Idea in nature) is removed. What the three syllogisms point to is similar to what Hegel repeats every so often about the reading of the Logic: a proverb, known by a youth but not understood in its meaning, epitomizes the wisdom of an entire lifetime when uttered by an old, experienced man. The grammar of a particular language is dry and abstract, and learning it is so boring that it requires extreme patience; but to the linguist, who knows the extent to which it is the expression of a people, it shows the spirit innervating a culture. Once the logical element is seen as the result of the sciences, it is “the universal truth, not as a *particular* knowledge *alongside* other matters and realities, but as the essential being of all these latter” (*WL* 1: 55, *SL* 58). Hegel broadens what he takes to be
Aristotle’s notion of first philosophy: first philosophy, an investigation of the senses in which being is spoken about and of the causes of what is, becomes an investigation of the absolute, which can be both the first and the last philosophy.

I used the word “structure.” That is an inadequate word because it suggests a fixed form, while the Logic is animated by a dialectical movement. Inherent in the concept is a negativity or dialectical which moves it from one form to another. Negation is not the negation of a predicate; it is not discursive negation but a more general principle obtaining in all reality. There can be identity only insofar as it is opposed to, or is the negation of, otherness; and nothing escapes this relativity apart from thinking itself or the absolute Idea. But thinking, the concept, can be negation, process, or movement only insofar as it is understood as subjectivity. Subjectivity is self-relation: a relation to self that sustains itself by negating otherness. Every finite thing is contradictory in this sense, not just Kant’s antinomies.

It is about time to clear the ground of some ambiguities. The first has to do with the loose use made by Hegel of the term “concept” (or “thought”). Strictly speaking, it is an expression that should be used in the singular only. Concepts are determinate thoughts; but they inhere in thought or the Concept as particulars in the one universal. Another ambiguity which we must now clarify is the use of words like “logic” or “logical element” (das Logische).

§ 2.3. What Does Hegel Mean by Thinking? Everybody knows that Hegel’s logic begins with being, as did Aristotle’s Metaphysics. But Hegel’s being is not immediately divided into genera (as in Met. Γ 2, 1004a 4–5); it is before all plurality. Plurality, if only the plurality of pure categories, is an unwarranted presupposition. Likewise, no supposedly inviolable laws of thought can be assumed as governing – and prior to – thinking. Aristotle, or Kant for that matter, assumed a plurality of categories and laws of thought; the relation between these laws and thinking is doomed to remain unexplained. Thoughts are instead the determinations of an original thought. And logic must show how even being is a particular moment inherent in thinking, a step in the self-thinking of the Concept. In order to present itself as the concrete universal of all thought-determinations, thinking must begin with its emptiest thought,

10 Düsing’s book on the Logic as a theory of subjectivity is very important in this connection (Subjektivität, 1976).
without any presupposition – an immediate, abstract beginning devoid of all determinations. The only presupposition we can allow is a trust in reason, and that reason is just as one as reality itself.\footnote{It is, and must remain here, an open question whether Hegel in the end managed to sublate the second presupposition and to ground it systematically; whether, in other words, the totality is discursively attainable in its unity or, since any series, as taught Jacobi, conditions its members, its \textit{unity} is not rather the object of some intuition or comprehensive vision (“\textit{wie im Kunstwerk},” “as in the work of art,” as Hegel writes of the unitary grasp of the Absolute as a whole in his notes on \textit{ENZA} §477 at NAG 37; cf. \textit{ENZ.C} §237: the absolute Idea “intuits \textit{its content} as itself”).}

Hegel’s understanding of thought is the same as much of our philosophical tradition: thinking means to liberate ourselves from our particularity and rise to the level of the one intelligence. But unlike the traditional conception, there is no given identity which we must discover. Thought \textit{produces} its determinations, its content; in Hegel’s words, the infinite finitizes itself.

The universal foundation that is thought is not a form indifferent to its content; it is “the soul, . . . the very heart of things, their simple life pulse . . . To focus attention on this \textit{logical} nature which animates spirit, moves and works in it, this is the task” (\textit{WL} 1: 27, \textit{SL} 37). If concepts were simple forms independent of content, they would be fixed representations the truth of which lies in what is outside of them. Logic, instead, in that it has thought as its object and content, does not know of any distinction between form and content and has no use for external criteria. In logic method and object are the same thing, pure thought thinking itself.

Logic deals with pure thought-determinations. But more precisely the logical nature or element (\textit{das Logische}), the rational soul or life pulse of all that is, is the proper content of the logic. Thus the logic does constitute the first or an individual part of the system; but the logical element pervades \textit{all} parts of the system, which makes the logic not a part (first or otherwise), but the foundation of the whole. In this sense everything that we know is the Idea in different guises of manifestation.

Hegel believes himself to be continuing Kant’s project. Kant had transformed metaphysics into logic, and Hegel emphasizes that his objective logic in part corresponds to Kant’s transcendental logic (\textit{WL} 1: 45, 59, \textit{SL} 51 and 62). Recall that he had written Niethammer that it also corresponds to Aristotle’s \textit{Organon}. On the next page after the General Division in the \textit{Science of Logic}, he writes that his objective logic “takes the place rather of former metaphysics which was intended to be
the scientific construction of the world in terms of thought alone” (WL 1: 61, SL 63). At this point Hegel takes up the Wolffian form of that metaphysics, saying that the logic deals not only with what Wolff called ontology but also with the three branches of special metaphysics: the soul, the world, and God (ibid.).

Since Hegel’s logic is not an ontology but the logic of thinking, it considers such subjects in their truth, free from the substrates of representation. Thereby the logic is the critique of metaphysics such as the kind found in Wolff. What thought thinks is no longer a given realm or object because its object does not precede thought, but is thought itself investigated in its content.

The whole concept must be comprehended in the logic, both in the form of being and as the concept. As being and essence, and in inorganic nature, the concept is in itself; in thinking man and in organic individuality in general the concept is for itself. This determines the division of the logic into objective and subjective (WL 1: 58, SL 61). Thought-determinations are, respectively, hidden or implicit in the matter at hand, or free and active in their own right, as subjects of a teleological movement.

How does the logical, dialectical movement take place? Thought determines itself. This means that thought is neither determination of an object nor the operation of a subject; neither things nor finite or

12 Several important reconstructions of the progressive “method” of the logic and the productivity of negation have been attempted. See, among others, Fulda, “Unzulängliche Bemerkungen” (1973), for whom new categories are produced through a meaning-shift from their first appearance to their developed form. For the logic as a theory of “proleptic-anamnestic” movement exploiting the ambiguity of natural language, see Lachterman, “Formalization” (1987: 177 ff.). See also Marconi, Contradiction (1982), Horstmann, Wahrheit (1990), and the admirable work of Henrich, where we first find the originally epistemological concept of meaning-shift applied to a study of Hegel (“Reflexion,” in Hegel im Kontext, 1971: 95–156, revised in 1978: 203–324; “Geist,” 1980: 103–19). I cannot discuss these contributions, or the issue in general, in this context. The only difficulty I have with regard to Henrich’s thesis of a formal logical relation underlying the self-conscious character of the Absolute is the following: Isolating a rule, however nondeductive (“Reflexion,” 1971: 143), establishing when and how a transition is to take place successfully within the logic, allows for it to govern thought as would an independently given law of thought. It seems to me that thought gives itself rules in the course of its own making; necessity or lack of arbitrariness cannot derive from isolated methods or rules, for that would make thought dependent on something prior to it. On the other hand, if no rule can be specified as valid throughout the logic, the suspicion is likely to emerge that arbitrariness is, after all, a moment of necessity. Thought understood as self-consciousness should entail the constant check of thought and its awareness of its products – if necessity and lack of arbitrariness mean letting the thing unfold itself without superimposing on it anything subjective.
transcendental subjects exist over and above thought’s self-determination. Thought acquires reality in such determination; yet this reality is not preexistent, but the reality of the Concept, and for this reason Hegel calls it the actualization of the Concept. Thought is the concrete universal; this means that the differences or particular thought-determinations it produces are all determinations of the same concept. The progress, in other words, is a development within the same; logical movement is internal to the whole of the logic, and thereby functional to an identity articulating itself concretely – movement is functional to rest, to the one self-enclosed Idea.

This immanence of thought to itself implies that negation is a moment within a superior unity. Determination is negation; but determinate negation, by negating a determinacy, produces a new determination. The categories are not pure concepts that are fixed; they examine themselves and determine their limits by reflecting on their consistency and self-sufficiency until they realize their own inadequacy. As I pointed out above, negation is not the external negation of a given proposition but the negation or contradiction internal to each thought-determination as it shows itself in action.\footnote{In Henrich’s words, the finite as such is the other of itself ("das Andere seiner selbst"). See “Andersheit,” in Selbstverhältnisse, 1982: 160.} This dialectic confirms that categories are not empty or distinguished from content, because their content is exactly what they determine when they fulfill what is implicit in them.

Concepts, in turn, are not abstract universals externally supervening on things that would otherwise be taken to be bare particulars or bundles of sensible properties. Objects do not have to wait for the synthesizing activity of a mind or transcendental subject to be unities. They are unities and concrete universals, that is, not sums of features but self-specifying universalities that constitute the truth and essence of the objects they identify. Therefore a given universal is the same as its occurrences; it manifests and specifies itself in its occurrences. Whatever is has a kind or essence thanks to which it is understandable. This means that every particular is the same as the particular of a universal; pure indexicals do not exist. This dog is a dog; an objective unity, not the result of an empirical intuition and a discursive rule brought together through a schema of the imagination and produced through the logical operations of abstraction, comparison, and reflection (as Kant would have it, \textit{Logik} §6).

In the “Preliminary Conception” to the \textit{Encyclopædia Logic} Hegel is
more specific about thinking. His constant interlocutor is Kant. Let us take a look at the introductory sections in detail. In §19 he writes that logic is the science of the pure Idea in the abstract element of thought. This must be understood in opposition to externality, not to content. Thought produces its content, as we saw; this further implies that the object of thought is truth, and that the Kantian separation between thinking and knowing does not hold.

If Hegel here thinks Kant shies away from truth and shows too much of a soft spot (Zärtlichkeit) for the things of the world, in the next section he depicts him as the new beginning that philosophy must appropriate. Thought appears as, but is not, one spiritual activity among others, such as sensation, desire, etc., because all activities have the I, the universal self-relation, as a foundation (ENZ.A §12; LuM 5; ENZ.C §20). Qua reflection, thinking produces universalities, abstract concepts in general; qua activity, it is the active or self-actuating universal (ENZ.C §20). Represented qua subject that thinks, this activity is an I. Like Kant, in this remark Hegel places activity on the side of thinking and passivity on the side of sensibility, the object of which is singularity in the external form of juxtaposition and succession (Kant’s definition of space and time at KrV A 22/B 37 ff. and A 30/B 46 ff. is tacitly adopted by Hegel here). Representation is an intermediate stage; its determinations are not external to each other, they are simple and isolated, and in their more articulate form they are the concepts of the understanding that relate universal and particular. The I accompanying all representations is Kant’s awkward expression for the true concrete universal; it is awkward in that it construes the I as an external relation, a relation of possession or having of representations instead of being in identity and difference with them (it uses categories for Hegel typical of the Logic of Essence and not of the Logic of the Concept). But nevertheless the true concrete universal of thought begins to dawn: the I is present in all my thoughts and “pervades them as category” (ENZ.C 20 A).

Why the I? and what kind of category can it be? For Kant, the “I” was no category at all. For Hegel, “I” does not refer to anything exclusive or private about me, for everybody says “I.” And “I” means this empty pit or night, a universality that contains everything within itself. In other words, it is self-consciousness, that is, the identity within difference between I and my thoughts, my possibility of identifying myself with or devoting myself to whatever content is for my consciousness and at the same time of knowing myself as distinct from it. Kant was onto something crucial in his theory of the original synthetic unity of appercep-
tion. However, as usual, he refrained from understanding its constitutive and real synthesizing function; instead of seeing in it the spontaneous production of the content of thought he reduced it to a simple form opposed to an unknowable in-itself forever beyond our reach. Just as for Heidegger a century later but with opposite intentions, for Hegel Kant did not dare enough.

In the Addition to §20 Aristotle is mentioned as the founder of logic qua the science of subjective, finite thinking. A few sections below he will be considered as one of the three fathers of a true, objective thought that reflection cannot reach. The contrast is between the Organon and Aristotle’s speculative philosophy.

While §20 shows the production of the universal, §21 shows how reflection as active on objects produces determinate universals that contain the essential, inner truth of the thing. This is how the I becomes plural, how the Concept differentiates itself into concepts, thought into thoughts, the one universal into the many universals.

This pluralization is produced at a cost, if a quite natural one: reflection changes the given into an object for us. The true does not pre-exist our search for it and does not remain inalterable and unaffected by it. We cannot grasp something in itself save through an elaboration, an inwardization; but over and above such reworking of immediacy there is no in-itself left. By investigating all thought in the synthetic unity of apperception Kant brings about the new principle; by reducing all knowledge to a phenomenality against which the in-itself stands opposed, as the truth we will never reach, Kant prevents his great discovery from being effective.

Section 23 shows how spirit produces its freedom in thinking. Being at home with thought is being free from finite and particular subjectivity. The ban of opinion and particularity from philosophy is a well-known and constant theme from Plato to Frege and Husserl; in his remark to this section, Hegel quotes Aristotle as an authority.

We see in §20 that thought could appear as subjective. Thought should instead be understood as objective thought. This expression means that thought has reality, that reason rules (or, better, is) the world, and that logic is the essence of reality. Section 24 reads that thereby “logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentialities of things.”

Logic does not deal with concept, judgment, and syllogism only, but with all categories, both subjective and objective, that is, categories of being and of subjective thought (ENZ.C §24 A). We see how the uni-
universal is introduced by reflection, now Hegel writes that the universal is one form in which we become acquainted with objective thoughts. If thought at first appears as a product of the I, now we see that this is only possible insofar as there is a logical nature shaping the world. Absolutely speaking, then, first is the Concept, then its manifestations, and finally the particular philosophizing subjects who reflect and appropriate the Concept. Historically speaking, first you need care for truth and trust in reason (religion is one of the paramount cases of such a trust to be made true and validated by philosophy), then you find the determinate universals thanks to observational reason or empirical sciences, then you comprehend determinate universals as particular moments of thought, and finally you comprehend the universal as one logical form, among others, of thought thinking itself. Thereby objective thought and my thought turn out to be the same identical content, apart from the fact that I have to rise to the first in itself through a series of finite steps and transformations of form.

Objective thoughts are what Hegel in the Logic calls thought-determinations. They do not imply ascribing consciousness to natural beings. They point to the necessity of essences for speaking and understanding anything in the world. They are not “concepts” in the nominalistic sense of the word, but Aristotelian eidê, essences. However, thought is not only objective in this sense; it is also the universal substance of what is spiritual. A determinate universal, an eidos, exists as the form and cause of the thing; but it exists in isolated consideration only for the I who thinks it. The universal can be a universal in itself or a universal for the universal, that is, for the thinking subject. Hegel passes over centuries of meditation on the continuity between animals and man14 and holds the Aristotelian as well as Christian view that reason distinguishes man from animals. As for Aquinas, an animal cannot think inasmuch as it cannot say “I,” cannot reflect on itself; everything is for it a singularity in sensation. Only man reduplicates himself such that the universal is for the universal.

To recapitulate, we have seen that we must reach the standpoint of objective thought to understand the logic. That implies getting rid of all presuppositions, in particular all opposition between objective truth and subjective certainty, between form and content, subject and predicate, universal and particular, thinking and things, determinations and substrates – or in the most comprehensive characterization, which at

14 About this see Ferraris’s rich and instructive “Analogon Rationis” (1994).
the same time is the result of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: the removal of the opposition between subject and object.

In the Logic all thought-determinations are examined as possible expressions of the Absolute or truth (*ENZ.C* §85). Naturally, all determinations turn out to be finite and inadequate to this task. But this does not lead to scepticism, for all such determinations are the finite expressions of the only true infinite in which they inhere, thought thinking itself. Scepticism, finitude, and negation are a necessary moment, not a result.

The logical has three sides: (a) the side of abstraction or of the understanding, (b) the dialectical or negatively rational side, (and) (c) the speculative or positively rational one. These three sides do not constitute three parts of the logic, but are moments of everything logically real; i.e., of every concept or of everything true in general. (*ENZ.C* §79, A).

The understanding, which abstracts and separates its universal determinations as true, is not simply a dispensable moment. Hegel’s criticism of the understanding should not be taken to diminish its crucial importance. Without fixed determinacies to resolve dialectically, thought would know nothing, and action, which adheres to and brings about something determinate, would be impossible.

Dialectic is the self-sublation of finite determinations; the destruction of their pretense to absolute validity. Through dialectic the finite shows it is in relation to its other. Dialectic is the urge that every determination lead to one that is more complex. In nature and spirit it is the life-pulse, the seed of death and change in things and the urge to fill a void (need and pain are examples of dialectic at *LuM* 12–13; *WL* 1: 145–7, *SL* 134–6). Aristophanes’s picture of love as an infinite striving for an impossible completion would be a perfect example of what Hegel means here by dialectic and finitude.\(^{15}\)

Yet dialectic is rational dialectic; it does not stop at its negative result. The negative contains sublated within itself what it came from. Whereas the finite is contradictory and points beyond itself, reason has no op-

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\(^{15}\) See Aristotle’s *Eth. Eud.* II 4, 1262b 10–14. Again, however, this should be contrasted with the self-sufficiency and completeness of finite excellences in Aristotle; and if desire has always an intrinsic relation to the good, which is essentially transcendent, need is the relation to the lack one feels within oneself and tries to overcome. Diotima’s criticism of Aristophanes (*Symp.* 205d 10–206a 1) marks the difference between the ancient Platonist-Aristotelian and the modern understanding of strive. See below, Part 3, Chapter 8, §8, and my *Artificio* (2000).
posite. It is not opposed to the finite, for it sublates it and comprehends it in itself. Thought is the only exception to the contradictory, finite nature of all that is.

If the speculative is the essence of what is, if the Idea is process (ENZ.C §215), the process of validating its necessity and pervasiveness, then we can only express truth as a movement of returning to itself, and thus cannot begin with the Idea, or the I (WL 1: 76–8, SL 75–8). Statements such as “the logical is the true” should be understood as the speculative sentence discussed in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, that is, the dialectical movement dissolving the rigid elements of predicative syntax: the copula does not relate a fixed subject and a predicate external to it, but should be understood as a becoming identity, the subject’s progressive self-actualization. We must show what is concrete, that is, fully articulate, as the result of its development. If we take it as the first stage and express it in a proposition or first principle, we turn it into something finite and posited by reflection, which still has to prove itself against that to which it stands in opposition (Fichte). As such, this beginning is supposed to be immediate, but already containing mediation and opposition. Instead, it is only at the end that we can realize that the beginning was a vanishing semblance, and that all movement is within the same, one Idea (ENZ.C §242). Thus, by beginning with immediate, indeterminate being, we fulfill the most important requirements: completeness and circularity. Nothing essential falls outside the system, and the end shows itself to have been operative throughout, in and from the beginning.

§2.4. Preliminary Conception and Metaphysics. The task of the “Preliminary Conception” is to prepare the way to a speculative consideration of objective thought, beyond all the oppositions we mentioned above. I had also pointed out that Hegel here criticizes three dominant modern positions of thought with regard to objectivity. In other words, Hegel is not writing an abridged history of philosophy as an introduction to the logic – first, because the history of philosophy is part of the philosophy of absolute spirit looking back on the progression of its self-understanding; second, because here we have three selective positions which all share the modern, reflective standpoint.

How is this possible if the first position is that of metaphysics? This is the question we will address in this section.

Thought produces its determinations, and these determinations are the essentialities or inner natures of things, as it was in the old meta-
physics. We saw how Hegel appropriates Kant as the new beginning for a theory of thought. The Concept, first understood as being, initially acquires existence as the concrete universality of the I (WL 2: 253, SL 583). All thoughts are particular determinate thoughts of the underlying absolute Idea, which has the essence of self-consciousness. Kant misunderstands his own principle when he treats it as a subjective and psychological I opposed to a world of things in themselves. He thereby misses the absolute, infinite, and unconditioned character of self-consciousness. Instead of taking self-consciousness as productive thinking, he turns it into a condition for the experience of empirical subjects. In the doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant had sketched the true theory of the identity-in-difference of universal and particular, of subject and predicate. But since he began with empirical intuition, stressing its absolute alterity to thought, he could not proceed to the unity of that which he had severed. If Kant had thought through the relation between intuition and concept, he would have understood the relation between universal and particular – he would have grasped the immanence of thought.\textsuperscript{16} He would not have ruled out the possibility of an intuitive understanding embodied in a productive imagination.

The Hegelian theory of thought appropriates the Kantian transcendental deduction. All forms of finite knowing and acting must be ascribed to the originary synthetic unity of apperception interpreted as absolute self-consciousness or infinite reason. Only thus, if the critical philosophy is not a cushion for the indolence of thought (see WL 1: 59, SL 62) but the necessary, one-sided yet irreversible turning point, can we understand how Hegel construes the relation between divine or absolute thinking and human thinking as the concretization of the universal and as the presence of the infinite in the finite. Only thus can the finite be rational, the empirical speculative.

If all of this is true, what still remains to be seen is how Hegel understands objective thought against the background of ancient, and in particular Aristotelian, metaphysics. According to many recent interpretations, Hegel has offered the final critique of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{17} I think this is true; what I said about the logic not being an ontology, and pure thought being a critique of the objects of special metaphysics and a lib-

\textsuperscript{16} For one of the best accounts of Hegel’s critique of Kant see Priest, “Introduction” (1987).

\textsuperscript{17} Such an interpretation is argued for, among others, and in very different ways, by Klaus Hartmann (“Hegel,” 1972); Theunissen, \textit{Sein} (1980); Longuenesse, \textit{Critique} (1981); Pippin, \textit{Idealism} (1989); Brinkmann, “Critique” (1994).
eration of thought from fixed substrates, however conceived, points to the same.

However, this interpretation – if and insofar as it understands critique to be a critique of metaphysics in all its forms, a continuation of Kant’s destruction of metaphysics in a theory of absolute subjectivity – becomes disputable on the following counts. First, Kant is not only the Robespierre of thought and religion that Heine took him to be.\(^{18}\) The *Critique of Pure Reason* is indeed a fatal blow to metaphysics, but only that form of metaphysics that Kant knew and criticized, the Wolffian; furthermore, the *Critique* is itself a propædeutic to the metaphysics of nature and of morals as the system of the ends of reason.

Second, no critique is possible for Hegel that is not also an appropriation and sublation within itself of the previous principle. To put it another way, Hegel does not want to do away with metaphysics altogether. If he did, it would have made no sense for him to grapple throughout his Jena years (and in his mind finally solve) with the question of the relation between logic and metaphysics. Logic “constitutes metaphysics proper or purely speculative philosophy” (\(WL\ 1: 16, SL\ 27\)) precisely insofar as critique and metaphysics go hand in hand (when they don’t, the result is the hypostatization of the fixed substrates of representation, e.g., God in rational theology). Further, it would not make sense for Hegel to deplore an epoch that has forsaken metaphysics in its culture like the shrine for its temple (\(WL\ 1: 14, SL\ 25\)).\(^ {19}\)

On the contrary, I think Hegel wants to integrate Kant with Aristotle; or, better, sublate both and all previous forms of metaphysics as one-sided, proposing a completion of metaphysics through a new and final logic of it.

In order to do this he cannot begin with a set of given categories, as Aristotle and Kant had done. Unity is prior to multiplicity because the many can only be understood as the many of the one, and that is pure thought. This is the origin of his emphasis on the I or pure thought as the original category that subsumes all categories under itself. The genealogy of categories must show the identity of being and self-consciousness developing itself in absolute thought through all its different moments.


Hegel does not advocate a return to German, pre-Kantian metaphysics, to be sure. The true metaphysics is scientific and presuppositionless, and eschews the presuppositions that had made Kant’s critique itself subject to criticism. Kant’s critique of rationalistic metaphysics is correct in Hegel’s view, but it also shows the extent to which Kant is still operating within the framework of that metaphysics. For Hegel it is true that the notions of soul, God, or world involve themselves in contradictions, as the Transcendental Dialectic had shown; but that does not rule out all talk of soul, God, and world. What vitiates Kant’s criticism is that he takes the categories as given and does not consider them in themselves, as pure and unfolding in a systematic connection; instead, he applies them to given substrates as pure forms to contents coming from without.

We can have synthetic a priori judgments in metaphysics, simply given that such judgments have a different sense than they did for Kant. Metaphysics as a science is possible insofar as it is logic, the logic of productive thought. We cannot separate metaphysics from logic, critique from speculation, negativity from rationality, analytic from dialectic. The logic must deal with all thought-determinations, including that which Kant had isolated as the objects of metaphysica specialis. And, most importantly, it has to be a theory of pure thought – unlike Kant’s subjective idealism, which had as its object finite thought and an empirical logic that derived categories from the forms of judgment.

Usually this is overlooked because Hegel begins his critique of the positions of thought toward objectivity by a critique of metaphysics, much in the Kantian sense. Faithful to his principle that every philosophy is derived from the philosophy it criticizes, Hegel deals with Wolff through Kant’s interpretation and critique of his philosophy; curiously, he also deals with Kant through Fichte’s eyes, and his reading of Kant is here more simplistic and loose than in other texts published by him, such as Faith and Knowledge or the Science of Logic.

This is not something we can take up in detail. What we will examine is the many different reasons why it would be wrong to group together Aristotelian and Wolffian metaphysics.

Hegel repeats time and again that metaphysics is a natural disposition. But in contradistinction to Kant, who shared this view, Hegel does not think that we must watch the limits of what we can legitimately think, being careful not to venture into the treacherous and illusory seas that surround the territory of the understanding (KrV A 235/B
294). Even less does he think that reason has a “fate” of being “burdened” by questions to which it must find the solution (KrV A VII). Hegel does not share this Baconian idea. Philosophy is work, but also the enjoyment of Greek theôria. Reason is a tribunal or a police force (KrV A XI/B XXV) at the same time as it is positive speculative thinking. Negative dialectic and speculation are the two co-present sides of rationality.

Metaphysics for Hegel is present in whatever we do or say, as a diamond net of categories silently operative in us and immersed in our material life. It all depends on what kind of metaphysics one is employing, even while criticizing metaphysics, as in the cases of Newton or Kant.20

For the metaphysics criticized as the first position of thought with regard to objectivity, thought is the naive reproduction of the content of experience in thinking. This metaphysics, which does not know of any opposition, can be speculative as well as intellectualistic. In §27 Hegel, who has Plato and Aristotle in mind as examples of the former (cf., e.g., VGPh 1: 129, HP 1: 107), qualifies the object of his criticism by saying he is going to be concerned only with the latter, “the metaphysics of the recent past, the way it was constituted among us before the Kantian philosophy.” This metaphysics of the Wolffian school remained finite, in that it was the way in which the mere understanding views the objects of reason. Wolff is like Plato and Aristotle insofar as he regards thought-determinations to be the fundamental determinations of things. However, these determinations are taken by Wolff to be valid in their abstraction and to be predicates of what is true in judgments about the soul, God, etc. “This metaphysics presupposed that cognition of the Absolute could come about through the attaching of predicates to it; and it investigated neither the proper content and validity of the determinations of the understanding,” nor whether the form of the judgment could be the form of truth (ENZ.C §28). Judgment for Hegel is incapable of expressing the truth: it finitizes its content by remaining entangled in its original division between subject and predicate. And all judgment is a judgment on preexisting substrates assumed as given.

For Hegel, this reflective metaphysics is no free, objective thought. The Greeks, on the contrary, were at home with thought (ENZ.C §31

20 About the diamond net see ENZ.C §246 Z (W 9: 20; “Man is a born metaphysician”), VGPh 1: 77, HP 1: 57; about the necessity of metaphysics even in the criticism of it, see ENZ.C §98 Z 1.
Z): “Plato is not a metaphysician of this sort, and Aristotle still less so, although people usually believe the contrary” (ENZ.C §36 Z and LuM 25; emphasis mine).21 Aristotle did not have a general metaphysics, let alone a special metaphysics of the world, of God, and especially not of the soul in this intellectualistic sense (VGPh 199).

I give a fuller account of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics in the next chapter. The object of this section was to show that Hegel in the “preliminary conception” criticizes the metaphysics of the understanding, not classical metaphysics. The contemporary reader, coming after historicist, hermeneutical, analytical, deconstructionist, or Heideggerian Überwindungen or overcomings of metaphysics, may find this puzzling or displeasing, just as today one may find it more than disconcerting that Hegel thought he was a true Lutheran. The only difference I find here is that whereas I think we have everything to lose both with respect to our thought and our understanding of Hegel, by disregarding how Hegel regarded himself as a metaphysician, I find it hard to see how anyone who takes religion seriously can be satisfied by a religion without transcendence – or, more to Hegel’s point, as Karl Barth put it, by a Christian God denied grace.22

§3. Systematicity in Aristotle

§3.1. Aristotle and the Idea of a System. It is time to turn to Aristotle. After what has been argued above, it will be obvious that Aristotle would hardly have recognized himself in such a systematic philosophy. This consideration, however, is secondary. What is to be seen is not whether Aristotle shared such a system or its fundamental inspiration, but whether he could have. What I mean is that, for Hegel, the lack of systematicity in Aristotle is a defect of his philosophy that is accounted for by considerations that have more to do with the “manner” of his philosophy and the historical circumstances of the development of the Concept in Greece than with any conscious theoretical resistance to the form of a system on the part of Aristotle.23 For him Aristotle’s “manner of philosophizing” explains the lack of necessity. Aristotle begins with the world of appearance; he investigates thoroughly the object in the

richness of its sides, establishes a series of particular truths and finally grasps the essence of the object in its simplicity, in conceptual form. What results is a deep, speculative concept that is the product of the meticulous search of a speculative thinking observer who leaves nothing behind and holds fast to the particular – without, however, affirming the universal as the truth of the particular, and without bringing the speculative idea of thought thinking itself to bear on the particular objects of his investigation (VGPh 145–9).

I would argue instead that there are thematic considerations which explain why the lack of a system is not an accident but is rooted in some basic principles of Aristotle’s philosophy, and why the correspondence between Aristotle’s works and the moments of the Encyclopædia is partly based on Hegel’s misconstruction of his philosophy.

Hegel thinks that in his own epoch Aristotle is virtually unknown; “thoughtless traditions” did him no justice (VGPh 133). Hegel is especially polemical with respect to Tennemann, who turned Aristotle into an empiricist of a Lockean sort (ibid.). Aristotle must be carefully distinguished from the five forms of Aristotelianism mentioned by Hegel: (1) Cicero’s popular philosophy, (2) Neoplatonic philosophy which “might as well be called Neoaristotelian” philosophy, (3) medieval scholasticism, (4) the return to sources that characterized the confrontation with Aristotle during the Reformation, and finally (5) the Aristotle of unphilosophical minds such as Tennemann (VGPh 144–5). Of all these, only the second form is philosophically important in its own right for Hegel.

For Hegel, the Metaphysics is an exposition of the speculative idea, God’s thought thinking itself. Its lack of systematicity is apparent when Aristotle emphasizes the nobility and superiority of its speculative principle without saying it is the truth of the whole (VGPh 151, 164). However, the speculative principle is active and visible in the first heaven and in thinking reason (denkende Vernunft, VGPh 167). The Physics, which is an investigation of the “principles” of nature (VGPh 171) understood as “self-producing entelechy” (VGPh 175), follows the Metaphysics, where its principles are more clearly and comprehensively worked out in an “ontology or, as we call it, logic” (VGPh 152). Hegel is aware that what we call metaphysics was not Aristotle’s formula, which had been “first philosophy.” Hegel is also aware of the difficulty of talking about a book that is no more than a collection of “different writings” without a clear order (ibid.).

However, dissociating Aristotle from Aristotelianism is an even more
problematic and paradoxical enterprise than Hegel had thought. The status of the *Metaphysics* itself suffices to show this. Aristotle never wrote a metaphysics; what he had was lecture notes that he constantly rephrased as he reelaborated his views on first philosophy. Thus, we have additions of different kinds and lengths, with notes and references to other works, or other passages in the same work, according to the development of his thought. The editors copied, with the greatest care and exhaustiveness, footnotes, marginal remarks, and short introductions to the problems Aristotle was elaborating, in the main body of the text. Most of Aristotle’s works were ordered and edited first by Eudemus and Theophrastus, then later by Andronicus. As is well known, it is to Andronicus that we owe the title of *Metaphysics*. Andronicus organized Aristotle’s writings – both those found in the *Metaphysics* and those forming the corpus at large – in an order that, if not systematic in Hegel’s sense, was certainly more systematic than anything Aristotle had known.

Aristotle offered a comprehensive account of problems and their treatment. His thought acquired a different tone once his works were edited, in the Hellenistic period, with a unitary plan in mind. The criterion that guided Andronicus, and that explains the genesis of the word “metaphysics,” is the ordered sequence of such an edition. After the works on nature in all its forms came a group of independent treatises that had to do with first philosophy in its thematic unity, distinct from physics. What comes after the sensible is at the same time the supersensible; metaphysics is a well-known, serendipitous coinage. Another move of incalculable consequences is Andronicus’s isolation of the logical works in an *Organon*. Now Aristotle suddenly becomes the founder of logic as an instrumental and independent discipline, a status it did not have for Aristotle. With Porphyry the Aristotelian logic was adopted in the Neoplatonic curriculum as a requirement before students moved on to the study of the Platonic dialogues and the theology of the One found in the *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*. As Sorabji puts it, it is no wonder that Boethius in the early 6th century, like the early Augustine, did not distinguish between Neoplatonism and Christianity.\footnote{“Commentators” (1990: 14).}

All this is only to comment on the textual status of a work; no consequences on the unity of first philosophy should be drawn from it as of yet. What should be concluded, however, is that, as Jaeger wrote, the
constructive self-sufficient and totalizing character of the later stoic sustêma is absent from Aristotle.\textsuperscript{25}

A few considerations about the question of the relation between physics and first philosophy set up by Aristotle are important in this context. Neither Aristotle nor Hegel understood physics as a science that leaves all philosophical questions to speculation. Aristotle does not write that first philosophy should come before physics, as if it borrowed principles from a higher science. Nor does he write that the distinction between first for us and first by nature explains how we move from physics to first philosophy, since the distinction in priority is internal to all disciplines. Physics is for him a science investigating \textit{ta prota kai tas archas tas protas} (\textit{Phys.} I 1, 184a 10–15), the first beings and principles of sensible substances subject to change. As such it is the highest and universal theoretical science. It proves to be limited in scope only if we establish that there is an immaterial substance not subject to motion and change. If there is one, then physics is wisdom of a secondary genus of being, and first philosophy is not physics but is prior to it (and to mathematics: \textit{Met.} E 1, 1026a 13; \textit{Γ} 3, 1005a 32). But this priority is only established from \textit{within} physical investigation. Since change is eternal and presupposes an eternal mover which will turn out to be a pure, immaterial substance within a physical analysis of motion, physics reduces \textit{itself} to secondary wisdom and gives way to theology. There is no metaphysical consideration which reduces physics to its less universal role.\textsuperscript{26}

The central books of the \textit{Metaphysics} on the unity of sensible \textit{ousia} could very well have appeared in the \textit{Physics}.

But is it really the case that Aristotle has no system? Are sciences all different and isolated from each other? Is there no unity among sciences? And how are we to understand the word “science” to begin with? Doesn’t the lack of systematicity pose a very serious problem for the universality required of first philosophy?

In the \textit{Meteorologica} we read that we must proceed in our investigation “according to a plan.” “When that has been done we may say that the whole of our original undertaking will have been carried out” (I 1, 339a 6–10). Aristotle never completed the plan of an exhaustive investigation of nature. Theophrastus developed a botany, which Aristotle

\textsuperscript{25} Aristoteles (1923: 373 ff.). The word \textit{sustêma} does actually appear in both Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle (see Liddell/Scott 2: 1735; Bonitz, \textit{Index} 736), but Jaeger is right that the connotation familiar to us today is a hellenistic novelty.

\textsuperscript{26} See Wieland, \textit{Physik} (1962: Introduction), and Berti, “Physique” (1969: 20 ff.).
never pursued, for the sake of the completeness of natural inquiry. Yet Aristotle’s work on the seemingly infinite realm of living nature was later regarded as an encyclopædia to serve as a model for all subsequent investigations. Aristotle was less interested in a taxonomy or Linnean-type classification than in the understanding of all organic and vegetative functions in terms of a holistic consideration of living nature. And his aims in this were neither practical nor technical but theoretical. Observation had to be guided by methodical rules. Only thus could the knowledge of the *hotti* or of empirical evidence lead to knowledge of the *dioti*, the cause.

If this speaks for the methodical unity of a theoretical investigation, this unity is not itself the unity of a method or of a conceptual procedure. Physical investigation draws its unity from the hierarchically ordered whole that is nature. The “plan” is useful for following the inner articulation of nature – in this sense it is comparable to the *diaireseis* of the late Platonic dialogues that divide their object at its “natural joints.”

A problem is posed by the presence of degrees within species. The overlap of morphological types must be discussed with respect to species that are difficult to classify once we posit a rigid distinction among definitions. An example of this is the case of the seal or the dolphin, where it is difficult to say whether they belong among sea or land animals (*Hist. anim.* VIII 2, 589b 12–14). That means we must refine our definition of aquatic; it does not lead us to give up the idea of order and the givenness of fixed species. Essences remain as distinct as the sciences investigating distinct genera.

For Aristotle, the scientificity is guaranteed by the finite steps on which a science is based. Premises are first and immediate (*An.Post.* I 2, 71b 21). The necessary first elements, which are true, better known, and the cause of the conclusion, along with hypotheses and indemonstrable axioms, form the starting point of apodictic science. The principles must be proper to the genus under investigation, otherwise conclusions from premises do not express necessary connections and per se properties, the *sumbebêkota kath’ hauta*. It is impossible to pass from one genus to another (*An.Post.* I 7, 75a 38); the genera within which demonstration is carried out are incommunicable. To want to demonstrate a geometric proposition through arithmetic is a *metabasis eis allo genos*, an unwarranted transition to another genus. It is not scientific to apply a cognition to heterogenous fields.

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This principle seems to rule out not only an overarching system of separate sciences, but also all universal science of being. In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle demonstrated that being cannot be a genus because species are said of the genus, but not vice versa. Neither the one nor being are universals; if it were otherwise we could not say of a species that it is or that it is one (*Met. B 3, 998b 26–7*). Being is said in many ways, but all with reference to a fundamental principle, *pros hen*. The comprehensiveness of being is that of the convergence of different meanings in one that is primary, *ousia*. This means that we cannot have an apodictic knowledge of being; we can and do, however, have a knowledge of the principles and concepts underlying all being.

This highlights the plurivocity of the word *epistêmê*, which is used both for apodictic sciences and for first philosophy. Further, it shows that all sciences, by drawing on one genus, derive their status and rank from the object they are a science of. Science is a relation for Aristotle (*pros ti, Met. Δ 15, 1021b 6*).

First philosophy is called a science at several different points in the *Metaphysics*. It is a science or wisdom (*sophia*) of first causes and principles (*A 1, 981b 28–9*); a science of truth (*α 1, 993b 19–31*) in that it knows causes (*A 1, 981a 29–30*); as such it is knowledge cultivated for its own sake, the furthest removed from use and practical consequences and an end in itself (*982b 24 ff.*). This is the most divine of sciences (*theiotatê, 983a 5*). God is both the object (or subject matter) and the subject (the most suited possessor) of first philosophy (*983a 5–7*). *Theôria* is divine and gives the fullest happiness to the one who engages in it.

Aristotle adds that the object of this science is the universal, extending to the principles of all things (not to all things in their particularity; *A 2, 982a 22*). Further, wisdom is the most authoritative (*archikotatê*) of sciences because it knows the good of each thing, or that for the sake of which each thing should be done (*tinos heneken esti prakteon hekaston*) as well as the supreme good of nature as a whole (*A 2, 982b 5–7*).

This may seem puzzling. Wisdom is authoritative, but, as we know from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it does not issue commands (*VI 2, 1139a 35–6*). What is the supreme good of nature? Do theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom or prudence (*sophia* and *phronêsis*) eventually coalesce in the orientation of all thinking toward the Good, as for Socrates, or is there an irremovable hiatus between wisdom and prudence? Further, does the plurivocity of *epistêmê* mean that practice and production are also sciences?

I take Aristotle here to refer forward to *Λ 10, 1075a 11–2* (cf. Ross
in Met. 1: 121). The supreme good of nature is its final cause, which is at the same time the guarantor of the natural order (1075a 11–25). Nature is the realm of the accidental and indefinite that strives for perfection and deathlessness.

Does this mean that wisdom (sophia) is practical? Aristotle rules this out when he writes that wisdom is theoretical and unrelated to action. Can it be practical in a derived or indirect sense? Compare the definition of wisdom as authoritative with what Aristotle calls the architectonic science in the Nicomachean Ethics (I 1, 1094a–b 11): politics. Their difference is rooted in the different realms to which the different sciences refer, namely, to what can be otherwise and what is eternal. The criterion on the basis of which we distinguish these realms is the nature of causes and the manner of their givenness. Causes are in the things themselves, or in us qua principles of actions; things can be given and contemplated in themselves, or alternatively, they can arise by way of our activity. They either preexist or come to the fore through us. There is a division in the soul and in the intellect, which can be either logistikon, calculative and deliberative, or epistémonikon, scientific. This distinction grounds the subsequent distinction between ethical and dia-noetical excellences (Eth.nic. VI 2, 1139a 12).

Then how is wisdom “architectonic”? It has to do with a primacy in value; wisdom rules practical sciences insofar as they are virtues or excellences of the soul and concern the end of human life. The problem seems to be that of the controversial relation between practical and theoretical sciences qua different human excellences. I mean that we can choose to live according to either our human or our divine possibilities. Aristotle writes that, if man is not the best being in the cosmos, then it is absurd to hold politics as the highest science (Eth.nic. VI 7, 1141a 20–2). At X 8 we read that the happiness of exclusively human activities is secondary when compared with the happiness of life in pursuit of theôria, which is the divine life. At the end of VI 13 (1145a 9 ff.), Aristotle writes that phronēsis does not control wisdom but disciplines actions for the sake of sophia. Since all hierarchy presupposes commensurability, we must have both a separation (difference in realms and status) and a unity (the higher dignity of wisdom governing prudence); both a discontinuity (between political activity and transpolitical wisdom) and a continuity (within human values). What continues to constitute the unity of sophia and phronēsis is what we would call a question of value. For Aristotle there is no objective science – comparable to, for example, the modern mathematization of nature, or Weberian or his-
toricist polytheism of values in a neutral explanatory investigation – which would be indifferent to its content and meaning, to the value of its own function, thus divorced from man’s quest for self-understanding. Though this may be clearer in the case of Socrates and Plato, it also holds for Aristotle.

§ 3.2. Aristotle’s Tripartition of Sciences: Necessity and Contingency. The tripartition practical/productive/theoretical, which sometimes is a bipartition practical/theoretical, is not only germane to the ethical and political works. Aristotle does not arrive at this point once he has to cut practice and production off from an independently established first philosophy, precisely because practice and production are not divorced from theory. They are themselves sciences. The tripartition appears pertinently as internal to theory itself in most Aristotelian works, including the Metaphysics. At E 1\textsuperscript{28} we find the tripartition of sciences into theoretical, practical, and productive. While theory refers to what lies outside and exists independently of us, practice and production have as their object that which has its origin in us. Theoretical sciences are ends in themselves, while practical and productive sciences have an end beyond the knowledge upon which they are based; the practical has action as its end, production the finished product we bring about. While theoretical sciences are concerned with the truth of something we cannot alter, practical and productive sciences ensue in an ergon, an action or product.

Yet they all remain forms of science and knowledge (although not in the apodictic sense of the Posterior Analytics) insofar as they all share in the order of knowledge, from premises to justified conclusions, and insofar as they all involve knowledge of universals and principles. Aristotle does not take his bearings on an absolute division within reason or by limiting it to science at the expense of supposedly irrational realms such as action and production. However, even if an emphasis on unity is important to avoid a number of modern presuppositions, such as the gap between science and phenomena, or reason and action, nevertheless the distinction seems irreducible and fundamental. It involves, as I said, different realms; and the realms qualify the status of the respective sciences, not vice versa.

The distinction within the intellect between the calculative and the

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scientific depends on the different modalities of the realms of respective sciences: calculative reason knows what can be otherwise, while scientific reason knows what is always or by and large the case (hôs epi to polu). What can be otherwise is the realm of action; we deliberate only what is in our power, not what is necessary or by chance, but on what is by and large the case insofar as it admits of indeterminacy (Eth.nic. III 5, 1112a 31–b9). That implies both a different temporality from natural time, as well as a different relation between universal and particular. The superiority of theoretical science is also its limit in relation to the course of human events (ta anthrôpīna). The universality of science cannot help us make decisions in the realm of the contingent and particular, which are not the object of science but of opinion or of sound deliberation.

Aubenque advances an instructive comparison between Aristotle and the Stoics. Contingency for Aristotle is “residual.” It is not the absence of laws but the distance forever separating laws from their actuality in the particular. Whereas for the Stoics the wise man follows the course of the world, which is in itself thoroughly rational, the Aristotelian phronīmos (man of practical intelligence) acts on and changes the world, which is only rational insofar as it imitates the order of what is superior. In the sublunar world, where human affairs take their course, “contingency is both the disease [le mal] and its cure” (ibid.: 90).

Phronēsis, practical intelligence, is precisely this ability to relate universal and particular and to respond to situations. In view of practical ends the relation obtaining between the two in science is actually reversed. It is more important to know the particular than the universal, the “that” than the “why,” because actions are always here and now (Eth.nic. I 2, 1095b 6–7). Practical intelligence is far from deductive; strikingly, the practical nous is perception of the particular, the intellect is a species of aisthēsis. The universality of prescriptions – and this helps us gauge how far Aristotle is from Kant – is not at all their ideal nature. We all share reason (let us suspend judgment about slaves for the time being), but what we do with our appetites and habits differs

29 Brague rightly underlines the notion of kaires in human affairs: deliberations are made at the right time and in the appropriate circumstances, and thereby break the continuity of natural time (Monde, 1988: 129 ff.).
31 VI 12, 1143b 5. At VI 9, 1142a 25, prudence was opposed to the intellect. Clearly Aristotle meant the scientific intellect there, while here he speaks of the intellection of particulars which is analogous to the intellection of archai (principles).
considerably from individual to individual and must be taken into account if all actions are particular and not noumenal.

In theoretical sciences the particulars must be known, not as particular but rather as instances of universals, so that a demonstration carried out abstractly applies to particular cases yet is not said of any one of them exclusively. In practical matters, however, the conclusion of a syllogism is a particular action done by an agent here, now, and in this course of events. Here the reasoning is internal to the agent (I am both a thinker and an agent), as opposed to theory, in which reasoning is indifferent to the preexisting things it tries to grasp.\footnote{See Leszl, “Sapere pratico” (1990: 107 ff.).}

The principle of change in natural things is internal to them, while in products and actions it is the object of our deliberation and choice (\textit{Met.} \textDelta \textup{1}, 1013a 20). The difference between practice and production is again rooted in their objects: politics and the public sphere on the one hand, and the world of nature insofar as it can be changed and subjugated to use on the other. This further entails for Aristotle the instrumental character of production with respect to action as its end, as well as the subordination of the unfree technical realm to the higher realm of free political life.

To recapitulate, we have seen that the unity in knowledge is dependent on the unity of its object. The tripartition of sciences is also relative to the different realms. It is an ultimate and definitive division; but practice, production, and theory are alike both in the scientific nature of their knowledge and the hierarchical order within the excellences possible to mankind. We will now draw this chapter to a close by analyzing what Hegel made of all this.

\S 4. The Unity of Philosophy: The Assumptions of Hegel’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy

There are many things in Hegel’s exposition of Aristotle’s philosophy that strike the contemporary reader as peculiar. For example, while relating Aristotle’s biography Hegel devotes a lot of attention to the relation between Aristotle and Alexander the Great. For Hegel this relation, far from being accidental, shows how empty the chatter about the uselessness of philosophy is (\textit{VGPh} 136). Alexander did not simply conquer Asia; he expanded the superiority of the Greek “principle” and made it effective where it was not yet known (\textit{VGPh} 136–41). In the
course of his conquests he never forgot to capture and send Aristotle several varieties and species of animals and plants for his natural investigations (VGPh 140). In all this Hegel relies on Philip’s apocryphal letter reported by Aulus Gellius and Pliny’s Natural History,\(^3\) sources we today find somewhat unreliable, especially considering Alexander’s very young age when under Aristotle’s instruction, as well as Aristotle’s long-standing interest in and investigations of nature that would not have waited for Alexander’s conquests. We should also realize how this encounter was understood by Hegel in light of his theory of cosmic-historical individuals. Cosmic-historical individuals transcend the particularity of their age, initiating historic transformations that will be brought to completion by others. They can do this insofar as they have been “educated at the school of philosophy” (Dok. 345–6). Their individuality is inextricably linked with destiny and the objectivity of spirit. Alexander had always been a favorite example of Hegel’s: he “passed from Aristotle’s school to the conquest of the world” (ibid.).

But another striking feature is the absence in Hegel’s considerations of any emphasis on the tripartition we dealt with above. The unity of Aristotle’s philosophy is privileged over its internal distinctions. This section focuses on some consequences of this, but at the same time shows the extent to which Hegel is not at all alone in this attitude. Neoplatonism is an illustrious antecedent to Hegel’s search for a unity above distinctions in Aristotle. First I take up the unity of sciences and the tripartition we have already considered, then Hegel’s placement of the De anima, and finally I consider Hegel and Neoplatonic developments of the Aristotelian unity of sciences.

As we see in greater detail in the chapter on the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel believes he shares with Aristotle the understanding of nature as a whole with inner differences that can be presented in progressive degrees of concreteness and self-sufficiency. But what he means by this is quite different from the scala naturae that tradition had found in Aristotle. For Aristotle, we can say that there is a teleology internal to each species, but also that there is a teleology in the cosmos at large, so that each species strives for the greater perfection of its superior. For Hegel, nature is a “system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other and being the proximate truth of the stage from which it results” (ENZ.C §249). However, for Hegel the criterion and the principle around which the philosophy of nature is structured is at the same time the ac-

\(^3\) See Jaeschke/Garniron’s notes at J/G 282–4.
count of nature as a whole and the emergence of spirit (human subjectivity) that unifies and mediates all aspects of reality. In Hegel there are also two different forms of teleology, but not that of the individual within the species and of the species in the cosmos. The first is internal to nature, as the first type of Aristotelian teleology; but Aristotle’s cosmological teleology is discarded and replaced by a conceptual, systematic teleology. The systematic teleology dictates the structure of the system and orders sciences, laws, and natural regions to show in them the progression of the Idea.

Thus Hegel writes that the ancient (and also recent) philosophy of nature (Aristotle is not mentioned in this context) is mistaken “to regard the progression and transition of one natural form into a higher as an outwardly-actual production,” such as the origination of plants and animals from water (ENZ.C §249 A). It is impossible to find a rigorous differentiation of classes and orders in nature, which always provides material for arguments against rigid distinctions and “blurs the essential limits of species and genera by intermediate and defective forms” (ibid.). To consider forms as defective, one must presuppose a fixed, invariable type. While this point could have been made by Aristotle himself, for whom the complete actuality (energeia) of a being is the standard relative to which all specifically identical beings must be measured, for Hegel the type as such cannot be furnished by experience, but rather “presupposes the self-subsistence and dignity of the determination stemming from the notion” (ENZ.C §250, A). It is, in other words, the dialectical Concept that develops the degrees of progression in natural beings and finds the progression of the Idea within nature. In nature the concept is hidden and simply internal (ENZ.C §249); only philosophy can order nature and the categories of natural sciences according to a hierarchy that runs from what is most external and abstract to what can sustain itself and is most concrete, that is, developed and independent.

Every essence vanishes into what comes next until it can exist as a thinking individual. To the philosopher’s eyes separate genera cannot exist; all thought questions itself and its premises, including the first archai or principles. The model of apodictic science in the Posterior Analytics is the main obstacle to the circular nature of philosophy for which no beginning is a set and given principle that functions as a starting point for the inquiry. Hegel says that Aristotle did not at all follow his theory of science, let alone his syllogistic, when he was being speculative, and that the theory of energeia and thought thinking itself are demonstrative of Aristotle’s idealism. To drive a sharper wedge between
apodictic science and anapodictic philosophy searching for first causes, we can add the pivotal importance of Aristotelian dialectic that has been recognized in recent scholarship, something that Hegel seemed to be aware of but not willing to appropriate in depth. All this may be true, and the substantial difference between transgeneric first philosophy and apodictic sciences – restricted to one genus, taking for granted the existence of their objects and demonstrating properties of a given genus (Met. E 1, 1025b 6–15) – suffices to confirm this.

However, by arguing that the principles of sciences are all logical categories which differ in concreteness, Hegel subverts the character of theôria. Thinking reelaborates the thoughts that sciences and experience prepare for it, but it cannot rest content with their separation and givenness. What is non-Aristotelian in this is that the progression from the categories of one science to those of another turns out in the end to be a self-articulation of the Idea, which is the true subject and causa sui. The transgeneric unity of principles and causes in the Metaphysics stops short of this: the givenness prior to thought of principles and of modally different realms is an irreducible datum. Not only is the degree of accuracy and rigor demanded of each discipline dependent on its object (Eth.nic. I 2, 7; Met. α 3, 994b 32 ff.), but there is no universal method stretching across the board – as the generic Greek expression tropos, which is hardly compatible with all the connotations of the modern conception of “method,” indicates in the context of α 3 (995a 14; here the different approaches dictated by their object refer to mathematics and physics).

What I want to emphasize here is the modern framework within which Hegel understands this. Philosophy differs from theôria in that it does not assume any such separation and givenness in its objects. What it assumes is the opposite, a homogeneity – not in its objects, which may well differ, but in its approach to them. Differences all become immanent or internal to thought; and thoughts do not derive their status and objectivity from the objects to which they are relative, but from their connection with and contextual place among other concepts. If this is Hegel’s only point of contact with the Cartesian mathesis universalis, it is strange that Hegel never acknowledged it or seemed to recognize its

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34 For a different interpretation (the Topics as fundamental for the genesis of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Hegelian dialectic), see Chiereghin, Dialettica (1980: 451–61).
importance. For him the unity of thought is so basic and fundamental that he depicts differences in realms argued for by other philosophers either as unimportant accidents in light of the unitary principle in which they all inhere or as inopportune divisions within reason.

Let me point to one example. As we will see in the chapter on the philosophy of spirit, Hegel does not accept the Kantian separation between theoretical and practical reason, knowing and acting, rational will and inferior desires, nor a right of reason and a positive right. All such distinctions are relative to and only understandable in light of the unity of subjectivity shown in Hegel’s Psychology. We will see in detail how, in this connection, Hegel thought that Aristotle had a superior conception of the unity of spirit than the moderns, who remained entangled in their divisions and oppositions. Again, unity over distinction. But there is something arbitrary in Hegel’s reading of De anima (a reading that on the whole is often very illuminating): the De anima is read as the first part of a supposed philosophy of spirit.

Neither for Hegel nor for Aristotle does an isolated consideration of the forms of perceiving, knowing, and desiring make sense. In this sense we can say that Hegel does go back to a pre-Kantian or Leibnizian continuity within subjectivity: no absolute demarcation between sensibility and understanding can be affirmed as an ultimate truth. And it is Aristotle who is the ancestor of this thesis for Hegel. Differences between inferior and superior within subjectivity are differences of degree, not nature. But while for Aristotle such forms are discussed as the forms proper to the phusis of the living being within a meditation that is closer to the medical/pre-Socratic tradition than the religious tradition, for Hegel such forms are not understandable independently from the metaphysics of free spirit and of thought thinking itself. The result is that Hegel translates the De anima into a philosophy of spirit understood in light of the superiority of spirit over nature, while for Aristotle the De anima was the cornerstone of one part of a physical investigation from whose scope only the chapters on nous had to be excluded.36 That allows Hegel to combine topics and works that for Aristotle had no homogeneity: the De anima with the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics; and, further, the De anima with the Metaphysics. This he does both in his

36 De an. I 1, 413a 16–25 and 403b 15–16. The second book of Theophrastus’s De anima was at the same time the fifth book of his Physics (quoted in Hamelin, Intellect, 1953: 29). In modern times, in contrast to this, Melanchthon first adopted the De anima in the curriculum of German Protestant universities as the foundation for a theory of spirit (see Chapter 11 below).
Lectures on Aristotle and in his use of his philosophy in the theory of subjective spirit.

Certainly in doing this Hegel does not mean to affirm everywhere a logical necessity and eliminate contingency, which after all constitutes the finitude of spirit as well as the outward existence of nature. Nor does he follow Descartes’s path. There is no cogito opposed to a res extensa, or a transcendental opposed to an empirical, as we will see. Spirit arises out of nature, and for Hegel this is one of the great principles of Aristotle’s conception in the *De anima*. However, ethical, “psychological,” and metaphysical questions are united for Hegel; individual thought and action and universal logical nature are united in the notion, which is determinant for both, of self-determination, of self-manifesting freedom. The true and the good are both moments of the Idea; they are not dissociated with regard to ends and regions. Unlike for Aristotle, principles are unifiable in an absolute monism in which reason manifests itself in finitude.

I think there are many paths that lead to this result. In the remainder of the chapter I will concentrate on two: Hegel’s conflation of theory, practice, and production, and Hegel’s indirect debt to Neoplatonic readings of Aristotle.

As is well known, the dramatic change in mankind’s relation to nature at the beginning of modernity goes hand in hand with the redefinition of science and of philosophy. We can summarize this shift in the reversal of the Thomistic motto operari sequitur esse (work follows being). While for Aristotle the world of production was subordinate to practice, thus to the realm of freedom, and production could not pretend to change nature but at best to imitate it, for modernity art becomes instrumental to mankind’s liberation from nature. Even though Hegel is no Hobbes, Descartes, or Bacon, for whom art, in its superiority over nature, must conquer or neutralize nature through a political Leviathan or through science, Hegel does complete the dissolution of the traditional Aristotelian tripartition. Production and activity become two sides of spirit’s historical self-objectification that are unified in the concept of work. And the negation of an immediate givenness is Hegel’s definition for both work and thought itself.

The inclusion of modern political economy in practical philosophy

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38 Especially Stewart (and Smith); see Hegel’s commentary preserved by Rosenkranz
is one of the motives behind Hegel’s reformulation and dissolution of the Aristotelian tripartition. Work is a self-externalization – that is, we do not transfer a form alien to ourselves, an *eidos* or *morphê* independent of us, into external matter; we externalize *ourselves*. In Hegel, as Riedel puts it, there is a reflexive connection between work and the worker that is absent from the Aristotelian notion of *poiêsis*, making. “Hegel does not interpret the process of labour in terms of its outcome, as does Aristotle and the pre-industrial tradition of poietics (artisanship or technology) which follows him; instead he interprets it in terms of its origin.”

This comes to the fore especially in the *Realphilosophien* of 1803/4 and 1805/6, and in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where the master eventually succumbs to the slave because he does not objectify himself in the product. This dialectic between master and slave both introduces a becoming (with its famous final reversal) and historicizes what for Aristotle was a natural hierarchy. The ego frees itself from naturality because it can detach itself from its needs and desires, and because it can mediate its relation to nature through the use of the tool (and the machine), thanks to which it acquires a distance from nature and in turn makes it the product of its will (*GW* 6: 300–1; *GW* 8: 203–7).

Thus work is the double negativity transforming both the object and our desire; it is formative, and not just lacking in freedom like Aristotelian production. Work is formative precisely because we objectify our will in a product that will be consigned to externality and lead a life of its own, independent and beyond the power of its originator. At the same time, we are not bound to identify ourselves once and for all with the product. Incidentally, this is closer to what Diotima says (*Symp.* 206c–208b) than to Aristotle’s conception: we give birth in body or soul because we are finite and at the same time we participate in immortality – as Hegel would say, individuals perpetuate life and a spiritual tradition in *mnêmosunê*, collective memory. The obvious difference with Diotima is the absence in Hegel’s account of beauty, the replacement of anything divine with the more prosaic worldly notion of work, and the replacement of *erôs* with need in the mediation with external natural objects through labor.

*(Hegels Leben* 1844: 85) and reprinted by Hoffmeister (Dok. 280, cf. 466). In our century Lukács emphasized the importance of the study of classical political economy for Hegel’s formation (Der junge Hegel, 1947–8); but see Rosenzweig, *Staat* (1920, vol. 2: 120).

In sum, the notion of a *causa sui* by which Hegel understands both logic and spirit presents a quite different model from Aristotle’s. The paradigm is that of *Entäusserung*, self-externalization. The Idea and spirit mirror themselves in their own products; their self-knowledge is their knowledge of themselves in and through their finite products. Products are the finite configurations of their infinite essence. This infection with externality has, however, lost the central aspect that for Aristotle made it an inferior mode of activity, that is, the fact that it is a *kinēsis* that derives its meaning from an external end. Spirit does not extinguish itself in the product, in the outward production of itself. It retains its infinity and the self-relation of Aristotelian *energeia*, especially in thinking.

If aesthetic and poietic understandings of self-objectification have been emphasized by Hegel scholars, I think it more important, just to underline this point, to stress the theological origin of the concept of *Entäusserung* (externalization). At the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel writes that spirit “empties itself out (*entäussert*) into time” (W3: 590, *PhS* 492). This self-externalization is complementary to *Erinnerung*, by which Hegel means spirit’s gathering and recollecting in thought its calvary and all the shapes it has gone through.

I find – for once – Miller’s translation felicitous. Hegel calls *Entäusserung* a *kenōsis* (emptying) immediately thereafter. The translation of *kenōsis* by *Entäusserung* was first introduced by Luther.40 He rendered Saint Paul’s expression “*heauton ekenōsen*” (in the Latin of Vulgata, “*semetipsum exinanivi*”), referring to Christ’s “self-spoliation or self-emptying,” as “*entäusserte sich selbst.*” Even though of a divine nature, Christ was not jealous of it. He assumed the form of a slave and made himself man.41

The movements of descent and ascent are complementary. God, or – in speculative and nonreligious language – the infinite, finitizes itself so that finite individuals can know themselves as identical with it by going through the particular stages of the Idea’s self-manifestation in thought. This is not only the key idea of Hegel’s reading of the New Testament, but also of the One’s procession and conversion (*proodos/epistrophē*) in Plotinus and Proclus, and of Aristotle himself.

For Hegel, Aristotle first sketched a principle that was later devel-

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oped by Neoplatonism, the principle of *noêsis noêseôs* or divine self-consciousness. Aristotle’s God is the supreme being, but along with it and outside of it are the rich and multifarious thoughts of spirit and nature which are a different and independent content (*VGPh* 413). God is not yet identical with the living spirit. Only with Plotinus is God perfect identity of essence and existence. Its concept exists *realiter* in nature, and purely in our thought of it (*VGPh* 443–4). For Hegel, Plotinus showed the necessity for the One to be the source of the intellect, self-thinking thought (in the language of representation, “the father produces the eternal son”; *VGPh* 448; *J/G* 182). The third hypostasis, the soul, generates the sensible world in order to develop and to contemplate the ideas found in it. For Plotinus, intelligence is creative; the intellect generates the intelligible world and is actually in its product (ibid. 451).

If in Aristotle the content of the world fell asunder of the Idea, in Proclus – for Hegel, the peak of Greek philosophy and culmination of Plato and Aristotle – the Idea is posited as a concrete trinity of triads (ibid. 485) in which God emanates its essence to its products and lives in them (ibid. 487–8). What lacks the necessity of the concept is the notion of emanation and participation, which is empty and unsatisfactory. Proclus and Plotinus do not say how the procession from the One is to take place; they express in imaginative and enthusiastic language the true understanding of the Absolute, but they miss the full-fledged notion of negativity and infinite subjectivity.43

Was Hegel right in his interpretation of Plotinus and Proclus? Is this homogeneity between Aristotle and Neoplatonism legitimate? The first question is too far-reaching for the limited scope of this book, but I refer the reader to Beierwaltes’s excellent investigations.44 About the second, virtually all Aristotle scholars would agree that the answer has to be negative. What I think is important is to see why Hegel could read Aristotle in a Neoplatonic, more specifically Plotinian, light.

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42 *VGPh* 463. See the famous passage in Porphyry about the *Enneads* and the *Metaphysics* (*Life*: 14, 5–6).

43 For Hegel, Neoplatonism “might as well be called neoaristotelianism” (*VGPh* 438; the sentence appears in all *Nachschriften* of the 1825 course, *J/G* 178). Plotinus and Proclus develop the Aristotelian *noêsis noêseôs* (*VGPh* 463). In this century, the image of Aristotle as the first Neoplatonist sharing in the Academic *Ableitungssystem* is central in Merlan’s studies on the *Metaphysics* (*Platonism*, 1953: ch. 7).

That the One is a source flowing out of itself, without thereby extinguishing itself or losing anything of its nature, is driven home by Plotinus on several occasions (Enn. III 8, 10; V 2, 1: 8; VI 8, 9: 32 ff.). The One is beyond being, but being can only proceed from the One (Enn. V 2, 1: 9–12). Being is as complete as the intellect; nothing can be added to them (Enn. III 6, 6: 15–31; III 8, 8: 41 ff.). The two are identical: “intellect insofar as it thinks, being insofar as it is thought” (V 1, 4: 32–3). Being is the intelligible world, and the intellect is the thought of this world that draws permanence from being (V 2, 1: 10 ff.; V 9, 9: 6 on kosmos noêtos).

Otherness is absent from the simplicity of the One, while the intellect, both one and many (V 3, 15), is the first otherness of the One (Enn. II 4, 5: 28 ff.). Number, of which the One is the principle, is the source of multiplicity (Enn. VI, 6, 15). The intellect wanders in such multiplicity, the Platonic “plain of truth” where ideas are its internal differences (VI 7, 13: 35); but since all differences are ideal and internal to thought, the intellect does not go out of itself in its wandering (ibid.). This pure identity/alterity is the essence of thought and generates all subsequent beings which partake to a lesser and lesser degree of the highest one (V 1, 4: 32–3). The intellect, by thinking its ideas as well as its origin in the One, is always and only thinking itself and returning to itself (Enn. V 3, 5–7).

This is Plotinus’s conflation (Enn. III 8, 8: 1–9) of Parmenides’ fragment on the identity of being and thinking (B 3) and Aristotle’s identity of intellect and intelligible with the intellect’s self-knowledge as it thinks forms (De an. III 4). Ideas, unlike for Plato, are not outside the intellect (the title of Enn. V 5). Again as in Aristotle, the intellect is the place of ideas (De an. III 4, 429a 28). Ideas relate to themselves and to other ideas in such a way that every idea is and is not the intellect, the totality in one aspect (Enn. V 9, 8: 2–4).

Multiplicity, first introduced by thought, is absent from the One (V 3, 13). But if the genesis of multiplicity is ideal, then there can be no bare particulars in the sensible world. Everything in the sensible world is an image of the intelligible (Enn. III 2, 1–2). The ideas, understood as divine thoughts, emanate down to the lowest orders of being.

Despite Plotinus’s paganism and Proclus’s criticism of the creation of the world, which the Christian Philoponus later attacked, the conciliation between Neoplatonism and Christianity was widespread soon after Proclus’s death. Plotinus’s distinction between the ineffable One-beyond-being and intelligence was erased by the anti-Christian Por-
phyry; and with Victorinus, who identified being with the Father, life with the Son, and thought with the Holy Spirit, it became indistinguishable from the Christian monotheistic trinity.\textsuperscript{45} Pseudo-Dionysius adopted Plotinus’s negative theology and even Proclus’s theurgy for Christianity.

As we see when we discuss Aristotle’s theory of the intellect and Hegel’s interpretation of it, Aristotle never clarifies the relation in us between divine and active intellect. This became the source of endless disputes. But what matters most in this context is that, for both Plotinus and Proclus, the principle of divine thought emanates in man as the indivisible intuitable totality of forms becomes a finite, step-by-step divisive intelligence, more and more entangled in plurality (\textit{Enn. V} 9, 8–9). Alexander of Aphrodisias emphasized the link between the \textit{nous} of \textit{De anima} III 4–5 and that of \textit{Metaphysics} \textit{Λ}. Plotinus takes intelligence to be the same, whether in divine or human thought: Not only does human intelligence mirror divine \textit{nous}, and not only is the soul the generative principle of nature; but heaven also moves in circular fashion because it imitates thought returning to itself (\textit{Enn. II} 2, 14: 10). Thus the Aristotelian distinction between psychology and theology collapses; just as in Hegel metaphysics is indistinguishable from the logic of a philosophy of spirit, for Plotinus metaphysics is an absolute, nonfinite form of psychology.\textsuperscript{46}

While Hegel is obviously aware of the pagan content of Neoplatonic philosophy, he treats Plotinus, Proclus, and Aristotle as abstract and one-sided anticipations of the true understanding of the infinite as self-finitization in nature and spirit. In doing so, and despite his criticism of Plotinus and Proclus, he introduces negativity in the One; he annuls the crucial gap between the One and thought and cannot take seriously the reason why the intellect is only a second hypostasis for Plotinus (\textit{V} 1, 7: 5; \textit{V} 3, 13).\textsuperscript{47} As we will see, negativity is not absent from Hegel’s Aristotelian God either.

That divinity is not jealous but communicates itself to the first heaven and to finite thought is a central point in Hegel’s interpretation of the \textit{Metaphysics}. This is the object of Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{45} See P. Hadot, \textit{Porphyre et Victorinus} (1968).

\textsuperscript{46} See Merlan, \textit{Monopsychism} (1963: 71).

\textsuperscript{47} See Beierwaltes (ibid.: ch. 2, §4).
Part II is divided into four chapters. Chapter 3 is an examination of the Lectures on the Metaphysics. After showing the confrontation, tacit or explicit, with the Metaphysics that takes place in the Science of Logic (Chapter 4), Aristotelian and Hegelian understandings of the intelligibility of being are contrasted on the basis of their respective treatments of essence, definition, and composite substance (Chapters 5 and 6).
he could plunge back into his chaos and drag out of it, with all its wet stars, his cosmos

(V. Nabokov, *Pale Fire*)

_Fue como un dios que creara el cosmos y luego el caos._

(J. L. Borges, *El Aleph*)

§1. Being and Becoming

For Hegel the *Metaphysics* expresses the speculative idea (*VGPh* 151–2, *HP* 137), especially in book Λ where Aristotle speaks of divine thought. Hegel prefaces his exposition by recalling how Aristotle, even though he had no system, wrote that divinity cannot be jealous (*Met. A* 2, 983a 2–3). For Hegel this means that God communicates essence to the world (*VGPh* 150, *HP* 135–6; *J/G* 67). God and the world, reason and nature, do not fall asunder.

He proceeds to his analysis and begins by quoting Π 1. First philosophy is the “science of that which is insofar as it is and what belongs to it in and for itself.”1 In Z 1, Hegel continues, Aristotle determines being

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1 *VGPh* 152 (*HP* 137); the quote is at 1003a 21–2. For obvious reasons of precision, in this commentary I give a literal translation of Hegel’s translation from Aristotle’s Greek, and not rely on those of Ross or Apostle (or Haldane/Simson’s). All translations from Hegel’s Lectures are also mine, but I indicate the pages in *HP* where the passages can be found (the *HP* translation is neither literal nor accurate). Hegel does not quote his sources from the *Metaphysics* (see *J/G* for the absence of any indications). Michelet writes that Hegel for the most part gave the pages from his Erasmus edition (*JA* 17: 10); the indication of books and chapters is supplied by Michelet.
more precisely as *ousia*. “In this ontology, or, as we call it, logic, Aristotle investigates and distinguishes four principles: (1.) the determinacy or quality as such through which something is a this; (2.) matter (*hulê*); (3.) the principle of motion (*Bewegung*); and (4.) the principle of the end or the Good (I, 3)” (ibid.). It seems clear that in Hegel’s mind the four principles are Aristotle’s four causes, and that these are expounded in the books on which he will mostly concentrate, Z, H, Θ, and Λ. The “principle of the Good” is the passage from A 2 (repeated at A 3, which Michelet quotes in this case), which has been discussed in Chapter 2; and “quality” is Aristotle’s form, not his *toionde*, the second category dependent on *ousia* (put another way, quality is understood in the sense of the *Science of Logic*, as a basic determinacy of being, not as a more or less accidental property). What is less clear, and in fact far from being a matter of unanimous consent, is the centrality of movement in the *Metaphysics*. What Hegel means by movement is, first, efficient causality, and then the notion of *energeia*, certainly not Aristotelian *kinēsis*. We have to see why for him movement is internal to *energeia*.

After this brief introduction, Hegel contrasts Plato’s Idea with “Aristotle’s Idea” (sic). The Platonic Idea is objective and concrete, determined in itself (recall that for Hegel the Platonic dialectic is an unsurpassed model showing the inner negativity and limits in determinations); but it lacks vitality and activity, the “activity of actualization.” The Platonic Idea lacks the principle of pure subjectivity which is proper to Aristotle (*VGPh* 153, *HP* 139; *J/G* 69–70); it is quiet and identical to itself. In the Idea, opposites are sublated in one of the extremes, not in a superior unity. Like Plato’s, Aristotle’s Idea also has “the Good, the end” as the substantial foundation (*VGPh* 153, *HP* 139); but in contrast to Plato’s, it makes the end effective. This is stressed by Hegel as a contrast with the Eleatics and Heraclitus. The end is a determinacy and the *principle of individuation*; this is negativity insofar as it relates to otherness while actualizing itself. Thereby, unlike Parmenides and Heraclitus, who had respectively held fast to the abstractions of being and becoming, it includes not only being but also nonbeing in the unity of determinacy.

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2 *VGPh* 152, *HP* 137; note that *J/G* 68 begins with this point, without the brief introduction just mentioned.

3 Implicit is the identification between end and *ousia* (*VGPh* 153, *HP* 140). In this connection Michelet, whether acting out of editorial concerns or pasting a reference to be found in *Nachschriften* now lost, inserts a quote from *Met.* Z. 13, 1039a 7 – “entelecheia chorizet,” entelechy separates – among Hegel’s remarks in the second edition (*HP* 140).
“What is, substance,” is activity; but the change is internal to a universal, to a unity which remains identical with itself; it is a “determining which is a self-determining” (ibid.).

Let us try to shed some light on this. For Hegel, Aristotle is as convinced as Plato that being is intelligibility, but he finds that ideas, posited to guarantee the univocity of meaning and to answer the question of the being of things, do not fulfill their function once we dissociate 

\[ \text{tode ti} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{ti esti}, \]

the thing and its essence. If the Idea, the world of being, is other than the world of becoming it is supposed to explain, it ends up being an unnecessary reduplication of what it had been declared to be separate from. The \textit{eidos} is not the paradigm of the thing but the form and cause of its existence. Not only is all talk of participation of the many in the idea vacuous, but it also destroys the unity of substances (\textit{Met. H 6}, 1045b 8, 20). The form must then be understood as immanent in matter, in the thing; reality and intelligibility are not separate. Aristotle’s form has the active meaning of differentiating and determining (“Unterscheiden, Bestimmen,” \textit{VGPh} 155). The scission is posited within the essence, so that it is not just a being-for-other, negativity against unity, but more precisely an internal scission subordinated to the unity as to its end. Negativity is neither simple change, nor is it nothing, but rather self-determination, the sublation of negativity within the unity (\textit{VGPh} 155, \textit{HP} 141). The lack of this is what I understand Hegel to see in Plato: negative dialectic stops short of the speculative moment. Things have internal differences but are subject to becoming, not subjects of becoming, since they are not a self-actualizing universal.

This is understandable only if we anticipate that Hegel is thinking of actuality (\textit{Wirklichkeit, energieia}). For Hegel the identification of form

\[ \textit{VGPh} \ 153. \] The inevitable problem in translating \textit{ousia} by substance, as is common from the Latin translation still prevalent today, is that it underlines one character of \textit{ousia}, its being a substrate, to the detriment of its character of form or essence (of course, the same shortcoming applies to the translation “essence”: e.g., Aubenque, \textit{Être}, 1962: 131–6). What is worst about it is that it makes us lose sight of the etymological link between being and \textit{ousia} that underlies the delimitation of being to \textit{ousia}. \textit{Ousia} is, as well known, the feminine abstract substantivization of the present participle of \textit{on}, being. (Hegel never says this, but it would be to the advantage of his interpretation to stress that substance is, so to speak, the crystallization of a verb, hence of an activity – a self-grounding activity.) That is why Owens opts for “entity,” which better respects the undifferentiated unity of existence and essence (see Ricoeur, \textit{Être}, 1982: 260). Since Hegel, though aware of this undifferentiated unity, sticks to the traditional “substance,” I follow his translation.
and *energeia* is Aristotle’s only real advance beyond Plato. Unlike Plato’s Idea, an affirmative self-same principle, Aristotle’s *energeia* is self-relating negativity, a determination that is self-determination, hence a universal end actualizing itself (*VGPh* 153, *HP* 141). This explains why Hegel says that “*energeia* is more concretely subjectivity, possibility is the objective” (*VGPh* 154; *HP* 138 slightly differs). What is objective is the concrete idea that, however determinate, is separate from becoming and is thereby a sheer potentiality. On the other hand, *energeia* is the activity of positing itself in actuality as the objective, the good, the end (*VGPh* 153; *HP* 139).

Why does Hegel say “the end,” if the end is already characteristic of Plato? According to Aristotle, Plato knew only formal and material causes (*Met. A* 6, 988a 10); in the *De anima* (I 3, 407b 5–6) Aristotle writes that in the *Timaeus* the cause of the revolution imparted by the soul to the heavens is obscure. It is indeed very strange to say that Plato, the philosopher of the Good beyond being, did not know the final cause. In the *Philebus* (54c–d) Plato writes that the Good is the end, and that it differs from pleasure because it is not for the sake of something else. In the *Timaeus*, rotation and revolution, the circle of the identical and the different, are the intelligent motion of the soul for the sake of the highest good (40b); without mortal souls the universe would be *atelês*, incomplete (41b; cf. *Phaed.* 98a-b).

Yet if Aristotle misses the presence of final causes in the dialogues, Hegel does not find it decisive or detrimental. Actually, Hegel is not terribly interested in Aristotle’s criticism of ideas per se. In *VGPh* he devotes ten lines to it altogether, by way of a cursory summary of *Met. A* 7, 9 (*VGPh* 155, *HP* 141). What matters for him is that the end contain in itself the activity to actualize itself in the world. For him the Platonic end remains ineffective, or in itself; it is a being external to becoming. Aristotle’s great new principle is the consideration of *energeia* as the self-determining Concept, the universal in its concretization. What is lacking in the Platonic Idea is the principle of living subjectivity that is present in *energeia* (*VGPh* 153). For Hegel, Aristotle conceives of the end as did Plato and Socrates, but in Aristotle the end is the true, the concrete, in contradistinction to the abstract Platonic Idea (*VGPh* 149). For Hegel the *Timaeus* expresses Plato’s speculative Idea (*VGPh* 147, *HP* 134), the rational self-motion of the world-soul, but in a mythical and defective form, while Aristotle “expresses purely and conceptually” the speculative Idea (*VGPh* 148, *HP* 134), the absolute as divine thought.

Let us pause and reflect on a few things we have seen so far. First,
with respect to the end as principle of individuation, Hegel would agree with all those who have rejected Zeller’s critique (the gap between individual and universal in Aristotle): substances are individuated through their form, which gives them determinacy (the \( ti \) \( esti \) constitutes the \( tode \) \( ti \)). Hegel also knows individuation through matter, which is what constitutes accidentality and finitude for him and marks the difference between actuality and mere existence: the inadequacy of things to their concepts.

Second, Hegel’s identification of being and intelligibility, although not at odds with the passage from the Preface to the Phenomenology quoted in Chapter 1 above, nevertheless qualifies it in an important way. There Hegel had said that education in ancient times consisted of the formation of a natural consciousness that philosophized about all the immediate and sensuous sides of things as it apprehended them. It now turns out that Hegel meant that everything was turned into a concept, and that we moderns must in turn give actuality and life to the universal (\( W3: 37; PhS19–20 \)). This is in keeping with Hegel’s idea that thinking begins with immediate concepts that then go on to concretize themselves. The question is this: is this compatible with Aristotle’s own understanding of the beginning of philosophy? Is the intelligibility of being what Aristotle is after?

In the second Preface to the Science of Logic, Hegel quotes Metaphysics A 1, 2 to indicate that it was only once science was liberated from men’s subordinate needs that it could rise to the “silent regions of thought which has come to itself,” in the freedom of its pure element (\( WL1: 22–3; SL33–4 \)). The education reached by a people and the liberation from external necessities (the \( scholê \) of Egyptian priests dedicating themselves to mathematics was Aristotle’s example) are the conditions for spirit to know the universal. They are also the only presuppositions needed by philosophy for the pure knowledge of the forms of thought with which we are familiar from representation, and which we unconsciously use all the time, since they are “submerged” in whatever we say or do (ibid.). It is “an infinite step forward that the forms of thought have been freed from the material in which they are submerged . . . and have been brought into prominence for their own sake and made ob-

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jects of contemplation as was done by Plato and after him especially by Aristotle” (ibid.).

One may object that being and intelligibility are separate for Plato and Aristotle just as are being and becoming. Being is not intelligibility because it is divided into matter and form, and this internal split within being does not seem to be acknowledged by Hegel. But is this what Hegel really means? Does Hegel undermine Aristotle’s beginning in immediacy to the point of reading an intellectual concept into our first apprehension of things? What is the relation between natural consciousness and philosophy, and between immediate experience and concepts for Aristotle? How far is the empirical divorced from the essential?

We will be able fully to answer this only once we turn to an analysis of the central books of the *Metaphysics*, in Chapter 5 below. In this context we limit ourselves to the question of the beginning of philosophy; thus we shall now take a closer look at *Met.* A 1.

We desire by nature to know. Philosophy has its genesis in the sensible for Aristotle; thinking is not separate from, but is rooted in, experience. We love our senses, sight in particular, because they illuminate the differences in the thing (the common sensibles of the thing as a whole, reads *De sens.* 1, 437a 5–7). Learning and recognizing things is a great pleasure (*Poet.* I 4, 1448b 5–20). Experience (*empeiria*) is not opposed to abstraction; it is a disposition stabilized in our soul through repeated acquaintance with the same things. Unlike the modern notion of experience, which is often no more than a chaotic multiplicity ordered by the superimposition of concepts of the understanding, *empeiria* is the permanence of a cognition acquired cumulatively and retained in memory. While sensation gives us the differences in the thing, the multiplicity of the various sensations of the same thing, thanks to the disposition or *hexis* of memory, become the meaningful retention of a cognition of such differences. Art (not our “art,” but *technê*, an instrumental knowledge of universals) and science (theory cultivated for its own sake) are a different consideration of the same material we have in sensation and experience. In this sense a concept is not an intellectual product opposed to sensation; it is the knowledge of the “why” of a “that.”

We do not begin with particulars from which we abstract a universal. The particular is an individual instance seen in the light of its form. In the example of the *Physics* (I 1, 184b 12 ff.: children call “father” and “mother” all male and female adults before restricting the names to
their real fathers and mothers), we have at first an indeterminate whole that we progressively differentiate. Admittedly, Aristotle never explains what he means by “induction.” He gives some sort of phenomenological description, which he concludes by saying that the soul is so constituted as to be capable of seeing the identity underlying the particular instances of a form (\textit{An.Post. II 19}, 100a 13–14). But given all this, it is hard not to agree with Hegel that in Aristotle the empirical is the basis for the speculative. There is a continuity between natural consciousness and concepts that at first are intuitive and later become thematic in their own right. Hegel would say that Aristotle both acknowledged the intelligence of experience and then proceeded to isolate philosophically pure thought forms. Further, when Hegel equates the thing with its concept, being with intelligibility, he does not ignore that composites are not their forms only, because the concept is \textit{not an intellectual concept}, but a mediation of form and matter understood as teleological cause, as we will see in greater detail shortly.

If there is a difference between Hegel and Aristotle on this score, it does not have to do with the beginning of philosophy. For both, we are always immersed in a world, and there is no \textit{fundamentum in concussum} or beginning from scratch that would do away with this world and reconstruct a new one in imagination, as for example in Descartes’s \textit{Le Monde}. Rather, their difference lies in their respective understandings of immediacy. Natural phenomena were grasped as such for Aristotle; for Hegel every immediacy involves some form of mediation. It is in fact the problem of modern consciousness (as well as source of its nostalgia for immediacy) \textit{and} its greater depth that it can have no direct relation to anything that is not filtered through our cognitions. Wonder is missing from the historical situation of modernity; the estrangement from nature is the product of culture. But if so, the difference is not theoretical but historical; and we are simply expanding on the very point made by Hegel in the \textit{Phenomenology}, not disputing it.

A third important remark about what we have seen so far of Hegel’s interpretation has to do with the unity of the \textit{Metaphysics}. Hegel, as we saw, is aware of the composite nature of the text we read as the \textit{Metaphysics}. Yet he thinks that the general framework of first philosophy is a

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relatively homogeneous whole (VGPh 151–2), so that we must read it in its systematic unitary conception and not fixate on oppositions internal to the text (let alone on Jaegerian and post-Jaegerian genetic and developmental studies, we should infer). Let me also remind the reader that Hegel does not write a treatise on the unity of the Metaphysics. He reads it entirely in Greek and does not have all the auxiliary means we possess for understanding it – from indexes to critical editions of codex variants to translations to commentaries to a bibliography that grows exponentially year by year. We saw above how for him the science of being is delimited to the science of ousia (VGPh 151), which is understood with a truly speculative concept, energēia, and which culminates in its supreme instance, God. But Hegel does not dwell at all on the topic that has bitterly divided scholars of different traditions in this century, the unity of the metaphysics. That being is said in many ways; that it is said with reference to one (pros hen), which is neither a species nor a genus but, as in the example of health, the first element in a multiplicity of senses (Met. Γ 2); that quality, quantity, and all other categories are insofar as they are modifications of an underlying ousia, so that first philosophy is the science of the principles and causes of ousiai (Γ 2, 1003b 18–9); finally, how the science of ousia is universal in its being first (E 1, 1026a 23–32) – of all this there is virtually no trace in Hegel.

Problematic is not a word that applies to Hegel’s reading. In the third aporia of book B (B 2, 997a 15 ff.), Aristotle sets the problem of unity in the terms of the plurality of substances and the unity of their science. In Γ 1, being qua being, and all change and predication, are always expressed with reference to ousia. This thesis claims an intrinsic order in being itself, which is divided not in a plurality of unrelated meanings, but in a web of relations among categories and different senses of being. We do not have five highest genera that include being, for genera are what being is immediately divided into (1004a 5: “genera” meaning “categories” here). All modes of being refer to ousia; therefore it belongs to one science to investigate being qua being and what belongs to it.

This is further discussed in E 1, which articulates Aristotle’s so-called solution to the aporia (which many reasonably doubt is viable) mentioned in Γ 1. Here Aristotle speaks about mathematics, physics, and theology as the three branches of theoretical science and argues that theology is superior to the other two because of the superiority of its object. This problem of their unity is different from the problem to which the pros hen is the solution. The pros hen relation holds among the cate-
categories; here we do not have a relation of categories but of genera (meaning ‘types of substances’ existence’ here). In Γ 1 Aristotle had distinguished the pros hen relation of all categories to ousia from the consecutive (tôi ephexês) unity of a series in which we distinguish prior and posterior, understanding the posterior with reference to the prior (1005a 10 ff.). This can be rephrased as a distinction between a transcategorial unity and a transgeneric unity applying across a plurality of realms. Different realms are hierarchically ordered; in the consecution of a tôi ephexês unity we have a series in which a plurality of terms are ordered and ranked together.

But if all sciences investigate one realm or sense of being, how can first philosophy be universal because it is first, that is, investigates the divine, as reads E 1 (1026a 23–32)? Unity by consecution is based on a successive reduction (being – substance – form – actuality – first actuality) that progressively restricts the scope of the object we set out to investigate. What we gain in specificity at each new reduction, we lose in scope. In the end, the universality of being is replaced, not explained or grounded, by its highest instance. That the first is universal would be easier to understand if Aristotle were a creationist; everything would then be known in God, as created by Him. It is no wonder that Christianity adapted this Archimedean point of the Metaphysics. But for Aristotle the world is ungenerated and eternal. God is not its creator, its efficient cause, but only its final cause. Thus it makes sense to say that first philosophy in the Metaphysics is universal despite its being directed to one region of being; both in the pros hen and in the tôi ephexês we refer whatever is to what is prior to it and to which it owes its existence. However, from knowledge of pure form and actuality we cannot derive any knowledge of physical substance, that is, of a being intrinsically divided into form and matter, potentiality and actuality. Whether the unity of first philosophy is pros hen or tôi ephexês, we must say that first philosophy reduces progressively its scope from the multiplicity of principles applying universally to all being to the principles of pure actuality and thinking that apply to God, and, more specifically, from the four causes to the final cause.

The four causes are constitutive of all salient aspects of a thing. Unlike in modernity, when we ask for the cause of a thing, we do not ask for a principle external to it, with respect to which the thing is an effect. In natural beings formal and final causes are sufficient to define the internal essence of a thing (H 4, 1044b 1; Θ 8, 1050b 2). But final cause is used equivocally by Aristotle. Remember, as we saw in Chapter 2, that
Aristotelian teleology is twofold. A telos is both an internal end and a limit (peras). The whole cosmos tends toward its unmoved mover, and all individuals within a species realize the end they have within themselves (Physics II 1). Thus Aristotle is both the father of internal teleology and of the later physical-cosmological theology, the ascension from the physical world to its transcendent principle. But the two teleologies are quite different, just as an instance of being is different from universal being. True, this difference is not as drastic as that between Wolffian ontology and theology, or general and special metaphysics. But still, knowing that causes constitutive of things are also subordinated to an overarching final cause as the limit of the motion of the universe does not say anything specific about things and their principles.

As I have said, Hegel does not say anything about all this. Maybe Hegel credits great importance to a passage from Λ 10, according to which the affirmation of a succession of substances one after the other with distinct principles for each kind is “to reduce the being of the whole to a series of episodes” (1076a 1). But he seems uninterested in delving into the countless problems of the Metaphysics, from the unity of theology and universal science of being to the possibility of knowing God as noêsis noêseôs. What seems clear is that for him Aristotle delimited being to substance, substance to its form or concept, its concept to its movement of actualization, and finally gathered the entire universe in its telos and highest principle, God. In this sense Hegel would have subscribed to Heidegger’s characterization of metaphysics as onto-theology (“Identität,” 1957): the metaphysics is not an external fusion of two independent disciplines but the science of being in general and of being in its supreme instance.

Hegel never mentions the nongeneric unity of being. Expressions such as Owen’s focal meaning, Patzig’s paronymic flexion of the pros hen, or the unity toi ephexês, which remains the most common attempt to save the unity of the Metaphysics, and which is also the reading closest to Hegel’s, do not attract his attention. Yet, as we see in the next section, he does understand his own system as the demonstration of the ways in which being is said. Being with all its categories is the pollachôs legomenon (what is said in many ways) of Hegel’s logic (ENZ.C§85). Only

8 Owen, “Logic” (1960); Patzig, “Theologie” (1960); for an example of unity by consecution close to Hegel, see Brinkmann, Metaphysik (1979: 69 ff.).
the criterion cannot be the *pros hen* for which each category *is* in a different sense than the other categories; rather, the determinacy of thought-determinations will be understood in the context and at the level of intrasystematic concreteness at which the Idea is considered.

A fourth point to note in this connection is that being is an irreducible fundamental category, for Aristotle as well as for Hegel. Many contemporary readings either do away with being altogether or reduce it to a linguistic functor, interpreted as the copula of a judgment, be it qua identity, predication, or existence. All of these meanings had been adumbrated by Aristotle, but for him they were supervenient on a more fundamental, pre-linguistic understanding. Arguably, such a reduction has been dominant since a certain reading of Kant; being is a copula, a connection I set up in a judgment with different meanings and different modalities according to the content of the judgment and the relation of this content to the subject. Such a reduction – which, incidentally, is at the heart of Trendelenburg’s critique of Hegel as well as his interpretation of Aristotle – is something Hegel explicitly rejected.

The last thing I want to stress is that the unitary principle of Hegel’s interpretation has so far appeared to be substance interpreted as *energeia*. For Hegel, every philosophy can be summarized in its principle, as we saw in Chapter 1. How problematic this can be and how loosely a “principle” must be understood – is apparent from the simple consideration that *energeia* does not explain form, substance, thought thinking itself, nor all of the principles and categories relevant in the *Metaphysics*. However, for Hegel all do share some reference to *energeia*. To see why this is the case let us resume our commentary.

§2. From Sensible Substances to Thought Thinking Itself

At this point (VGPh 154, HP 138), Hegel mentions the importance of the “two principal forms” of potency and actuality, which he translates by “Möglichkeit (dunamis, potentia), und . . . Wirklichkeit (energeia, actus)” (ibid.). He has just commented on these, so he does not further define them; he says they resurface everywhere in Aristotle, and then he immediately moves on to speak of them in reference to substance. The principal concept of substance is that “it is not only matter (VII, 3).” Aristotle began Z 2 by saying that it is common opinion (*dokei*) that substance belongs to bodies (1028b 8–9); Hegel probably quotes Z 3, because he rightly understands that here Aristotle not only speaks in his own voice, but also says that substance is itself predicated of matter (1029a 23–4).
But matter is only potency, while actuality is the form (VGPh 154, HP 138); “that matter is depends on form, activity” (ibid.). *Dunamis* is not an indeterminate possibility but the in-itself, or capacity (ibid.); it is a modal category only because it is a form of being.⁹ “*Energeia*, form, is activity, that which actualizes (das Verwirklichende), self-relating negativity” (ibid.). For Hegel the form is considered in the hierarchy of ends that all tend to pure actuality. Thus he interprets the different modes (“*Weisen*”) of substance on the basis of the internal relation of form to matter, of activity to potency (VGPh 156, HP 141; J/G 70). However by so doing he misunderstands Aristotle’s text, in which the criterion is matter, not the relation between matter and form.

He quotes Θ 2, Λ 1–2, and Z 7 as authoritative passages confirming his tripartition of the kinds of substances into (1) a sensible substance, (2) human *nous*, and (3) divine thought. Θ 2 does talk about the soul as the principle of contraries, and Z 7 does mention thought as a principle of change. Aristotle writes that since the essence transferred in generation and production to a new composite is an immaterial substance (1032b 14) that exists prior to composites, in production it is thought (“the form in the soul,” 1032b 1) that is the origin of motion. But this is relevant within an analysis of change, not as a remark on the status of substances. If we turn to Λ 1–2, the reasons for Hegel’s misunderstanding become clear. Aristotle writes that substances can be sensible (either (1) corruptible or (2) eternal, *aïdios*) or (3) unmoved. But by eternal sensible substance Aristotle does not mean the incorruptible form in the intellect, which becomes sensible by realizing itself in prior sensible matter; he means the stars, as confirmed by Λ 8, 1073b 3–5 (sensible eternal substances are the object of astronomy).

If this tripartition of substances is in part based on a misunderstanding, in part it is also quite puzzling. Sensible substances are here described by Hegel as divided into matter and form relating externally to one another. Matter is a substrate indifferently undergoing change and all opposite determinations. This is “the nature of the finite” (VGPh 156, J/G 70), the division between form and matter. Contraries just happen to change matter in the manner of a transition without any stability. Notice that Hegel is relying here on Λ 3 and on the principles of

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⁹ Cf. also Hegel’s notes at the margin of his translation of *dunamis* at De an. III 4: “possibility too little . . . totally silly and trivial.” *Dunamis* is not the possibility that “here is a house where was a tree”; this is a “most external chance” (Kern, “Übersetzung,” 1961: 53). *Dunamis* is instead determinate possibility or Hegel’s notion of in-itself.
matter, form, and privation that are discussed there. What is puzzling is that if Λ 3 were all Aristotle had to say about sensible substances, not only could substance and form never coincide (contrary to the thesis of Z 6), but more importantly, on the basis of this chapter alone Hegel could never have reached his understanding of energeia as self-determination or self-relating negativity. Beings of nature are subjectivity in that they actualize their form and bring about their own ends. In natural being form subsumes matter teleologically, according to Hegel’s interpretation. If matter and form are mutually external and change happens to matter, then there is no place for an independent energeia. In the terms of the Science of Logic, this is tantamount to a relapse from the logic of the concept to the beginning of the logic of essence, where all we have is negative dialectic and where transition into the opposite (“das Übergehen ins Entgegengesetzte,” J/G 71) is the sublation of opposed nonindependent determinations. Why Hegel chose to lecture on Λ 3 and not, say, on Z 17, H, or Θ, from which he typically takes his bearings, especially in the Science of Logic, is unclear. My conjecture is that he saw in Λ – not very thoughtfully, I must admit, if the conjecture holds – not only the peak of the Metaphysics, but also a sort of general summary of the entire work.

The second kind of substance, as anticipated, is productive or poietic thought (“Wirksamkeit”), which brings about its content (qua its form and end) in matter. The opposition here is between matter, which all production must presuppose as a material to be shaped, and the active universal, “the abstract negative, but containing that which ought to become” (VGPh 157). Here energeia is understood as free activity, the determination and actualization of an end. The relation is still between two opposites. But by actualizing its contents – as the architect actualizes a project he or she has in mind by building a house, and as the physician heals because he or she knows the form of health and strives to restore it in the patient – the intellect determines itself in reality. The soul, principle of change and of contraries in production, is an efficient cause. The second substance is just this: a free efficient cause. Or, in the language of the Science of Logic, it is the finite teleology of subjective ends subsequent to the internal teleology of life.

It is certainly true that the intellect has no “substantial” status within the Metaphysics, and that it is intermediate between sensible substances and the divine intellect. Hegel’s love for and recurrent intensive study of the theory of the intellect in the De anima, as well as his emphasis, alien to the Metaphysics, on poietic activity, ostensibly serve to facilitate
the transition from the substances of the sublunar world to the first substance and divine intellect, and thereby to underline the thematic continuity of the *Metaphysics*. In other words, as is often the case, Hegel tries to integrate what Aristotle left unexplained with what he thinks would fit the Aristotelian context. On how matter and activity are opposed Aristotle remains silent, complains Hegel (*VGPh* 158, *HP* 143), so that only by making thought efficient in this way (which is implicit in Aristotle)\(^{10}\) can we understand activity as an external unification of form and matter. Further, if all sensible substances are vanishing and changing as \(\Lambda 3\) seems to argue, Hegel’s answer to the question how they can have any stable reality is probably what lies behind his insertion of the poietic efficient intellect at this point.\(^{11}\)

The third and highest substance is the union of *dunamis*, *energeia*, and *entelecheia*.\(^{12}\) For Hegel the pure actuality of the first substance is grounded in \(\Theta 8\), where Aristotle had shown the priority of actuality over potentiality. For Aristotle the unmoved mover is pure activity. “The scholastics rightly defined God” as *actus purus*; “there is no higher idealism than this” (*VGPh* 158, *HP* 143; *J/G* 71). According to Hegel, Aristotle had developed the principle first intimated mythically in the *Timaeus*; God has made the universe as similar to Himself as possible (*VGPh* 87, 147; cf. *ENZ.C* §564 A). God is “the unmoved which moves – this is a great determination; that which remains identical to itself, the Idea, moves and remains in relation to itself” (*VGPh* 161). Like Aristotle, Plato had already defined God as the identity of subject and object (*VGPh* 47–50); but even here Aristotle goes deeper than Plato. His progress can be expressed thus: God, pure intelligibility, must not be such (the Platonic Ideas) for the beings that tend toward it, but primarily for itself. Hegel understands the Aristotelian God as absolute self-conscious intellect. By translating *energeia* by *Tätigkeit*, he prepares the synthesis of identifications including final end, life, thought, and spirit.

In the next pages Hegel reads and comments on his almost integral translation of \(\Lambda 7\) and 9. As these are the most controversial passages,

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\(^{10}\) For the soul as efficient as well as final and formal cause, see *De an*. II 4, 415b 7–21.

\(^{11}\) Samonà advances an interesting suggestion: Hegel construes the intellect as the second substance because the intellect is the retention and subsistence of becoming (“Atto,” 1997: 226 ff.), the permanence of otherwise corruptible substances in and as their own *logoi*. But it seems to me that Hegel is here emphasizing the productive-poietic (“*wirk-sam*”) aspect of the intellect, and not its ideal side.

\(^{12}\) *VGPh* 158, *HP* 143, *J/G* 72. For the distinction between *energeia* and *entelecheia* see *Met*. \(\Theta 8, 1050a 21–3\).
where his errors and misunderstandings are the most numerous and important, we will have to follow with some patience Hegel’s translation in detail. Our purpose should only be to understand the reasons for Hegel’s translation before we denounce him for bad judgment and partiality. Hegel does not mistranslate the Greek text the way a dilettante would. Often his bias, and his translation of Aristotelian themes into his own language, are signs of his desire to comprehensively account for what he took to be the great new Aristotelian principle, even going beyond what Aristotle left unexplained, unsaid, or in principle ineffable. Often this takes on the form of Hegel’s “scientific” way of doing history of philosophy: the categories employed by the authors under investigation must be understood for what they are, but this is only possible if we examine such categories in their truth. And their truth is the Science of Logic.

For example, Hegel knows very well that Aristotelian kinésis is an incomplete motion characterized by potentiality (Phys. III 2, 201b 31 ff.; Met. Θ 6, 1048b 28 ff.; De an. II 5, 417a 15 ff; III 7, 431a 6–7). If he nevertheless persists in construing energeia as Bewegung, it is because in the Logic movement is the form of the self’s concretization, the absolute as self-determination. What matters is to see whether movement is a Heraclitean becoming, simple change from one determination to another, or if it is internal to an underlying universal that articulates itself in and through movement but remains identical to itself. Movement is the inner differentiation of something at rest.13 Accordingly, the absolute substance, which for Aristotle was pure actuality, an unmoved mover, is the inseparability of potency and entelechy (VGPh 158–9, HP 143–4). Something that is at the same time unmoved and moving cannot be conceived by Hegel otherwise than the activity of realizing itself.

The striking association that follows in the text of the immobility of the first mover with the Platonic Ideas clarifies this. To conceive of the true as unmoved means to conceive of the universal as quiescent and different from activity, like the Platonic Ideas. It is pointless to make substances eternal if they cannot actualize themselves. Likewise, to conceive God as pure actuality separate from potentiality would seem to suggest a negative theology in Aristotle. Aristotle’s God, to be sure, is

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13 About the concrete universal as a motion at rest, in which differences are as vanishing, see VGPh 1: 44, HP 1: 25. Hegel goes so far as to call even the Phenomenology of Spirit’s bacchic revelry of the true in which no member is not drunk a “simple rest” (“einfache Ruhe,” W 3: 46–7, PhS 27–8).
life and thought, but its life and thought seem to be the denial of sensible substance; motion is denied (it is unmoved), as are matter (it is pure form), time and space (it is eternal and immaterial), even the soul (which by definition animates a body). Thus for Hegel the difficulties of the Aristotelian God must be solved within the framework of the Hegelian Absolute. The extraordinary definition of God as thought thinking itself cannot be marred by understanding it as a pure actuality opposed to potentiality; for Hegel this would entail the surreptitious and unwanted consequence of its being an isolated and inert being, and thus a potency separate from and prior to realization. God is identical with being, it is the substance “which produces the content, its determinations, by itself” (VGPh 159). If the absolute substance is the identity of subject and object, opposite determinations must be understood as correlative. The absolute is precisely the sublation of their one-sidedness. It can be rest only insofar as it is activity, and it can be unmoved only insofar as it sublates oppositions in itself.

However arbitrary this may indeed seem, it follows naturally from Hegel’s translation of book Λ. In the course of this translation Hegel seems to commit several blunders. Speaking of the eternal motion of the first heaven, he translates what in Bekker’s and Jaeger’s edition appears at Λ 7, 1072a 24–5 as follows: for Aristotle “since the spherical is thus both moved and mover, there is a middle which causes movement but remains unmoved.”¹⁴ A whole host of commentators, beginning with Michelet himself, have stressed the absurdity of this translation.¹⁵

Hegel should have translated “since that which is moved and is a mover is thus a middle, there is something which causes motion without being moved” (Apostle, slightly modified). Jaeger’s edition reads “επει δε τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν καὶ μέσον . . . τοινυν εστί τι ὁ οὐ κινούμενον κίνει.” However, the fact – overlooked by his critics – is that Hegel correctly translates the Erasmus (or Casaubon)¹⁶ edition he used, which reads

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¹⁴ In German the passage reads, “Da das Kuglige ‘Bewegendes und Bewegtes ist, so ist eine Mitte, welche bewegt, das Unbewegte ist’” (VGPh 160–1; see HP 145).  
¹⁵ Michelet in HP 145 n.; Coreth, Sein (1952: 146–7); Aubenque, “Hegel” (1974: 105; curiously, later Aubenque goes so far as to call Michelet’s note “rather mean” in “Dialektik,” 1990: 219); Düsing, who elsewhere checks the Erasmus edition, ostensibly follows Aubenque here when he writes: “the reasons for these mistranslations obviously lie in Hegel’s philosophy” (Geschichte, 1983: 126).  
¹⁶ According to Bonsiepen and Lucas (GW19: 549–50), Hegel uses the Casaubon edition in the quotation from Λ 7 appended to the 1827 Encyclopædia, the reason being that book Λ (the twelfth, owing to the insertion of Alpha elatton) is cited as book XI by Hegel, just like in Casaubon’s edition (TA SÖZOMENA, vol. 2: 562c–d). However it may
“epei de to kinoumenon kai kinoun, meson esti ti, ho ou kinoumenon kinei.” As a result, Hegel identifies God with the first heaven, and the first heaven with reason moving itself circularly.

It is true that Aristotle does not explain how God moves the first heaven other than through the analogy of being loved (hôs erômenon). But what is most interesting and strange is the Spinozistic overtones of Hegel’s interpretation. He argues that, for Aristotle, God, as identical to itself, “moves itself circularly,” “exists realiter in visible nature” (VGPh 160, HP 145) and lives in the “two forms of presentation (Weisen der Darstellung) of the Absolute” (ibid.). The eternal heaven is this visible nature; thinking reason is the second of the two products (hypostases, may we say?) of the divine substance. This is the true nature of the Absolute in Hegel, a manifestation of its infinity in finite nature and spirit.

What Hegel does not say is how the analogy of the desirable as unmoved mover allows for a demonstration of God’s existence and the subsequent definition of thought thinking itself. Aristotle argues (1072a 28–31): If the good in itself is that to which apparent goods refer, and is the end of rational deliberation, then the first desirable and the first intelligible coincide and are the final good. Since thought is moved by the intelligible, and since in the series of intelligible opposites substance is first, and further since the first is the simple and actual substance, Aristotle can conclude that the simple substance moves as a final, not an efficient cause, as first object of desire. Hegel is only interested in what results from all this: the principle of motion is thought, and it moves in that it is thought. Hegel translates correctly up to 1072a 31, where he construes noêtê de hê etera sustoichia kath’hautên as the series thought qua posited objectively, as its own element (“Dies Gedachte aber ist die andere Reihe an und für sich selbst, ist sich selbst sein eigenes Element”; VGPh 161). Here “kata” does not stand for a reflexive relation but means “per se.” The noêton (intelligible)17 is the objective correlate of thinking. The content of thought is the unmoved, the intelligible moving the intellect; but inasmuch as the thought is nothing be, the Erasmus and the Casaubon edition have the same text and depart from the Bekker edition on identical counts. Michelet’s testimony that Hegel translated from the Erasmus edition in class (JA 17: 10) need not rule out that he might have used the Casaubon edition as well, which was in his private library.

17 For Hegel it is irrelevant whether noêton is translated by the passive form “thought,” das Gedachte, or by “the intelligible,” das Denkbare. At the margin of his translation of De anima Hegel writes: “ein Denkbares, oder Gedachtes (gleichgültig, hier Object)” (“intelligible or thought, it is indifferent, here object”); Kern, “Übersetzung” (1961: 53, line 85).
but a product of thinking, the thought or intelligible “is quite identical with the activity of thinking” (ibid.).

Thus Aristotle’s indivisible noësis noëseôs is turned into a dialectic activity of thinking that divides itself into an active and a passive side and at the same time remains at home with itself, in its own element. For Hegel the movement of thought is the perfectly self-enclosed and complete (teleia, in Aristotelian terminology) activity of thinking that, as a subject, relates itself to itself as to an object. Here subject and object are not meant in the sense of phenomenological shapes of consciousness (a finite subject opposed to a presupposed object), but rather as the opposites within – and of – their unity. Hegel knows that divine thinking is indivisible for Aristotle (VGPh 166); the apparent duality of subject and object introduced by Hegel within thinking is his understanding of the identity of intellect and intelligible that Aristotle affirms, and that for Hegel is a perfect example of Beisichselbstsein, thought’s being at home with itself.18 Again, the Spinozism of the interpretation is striking: “the Concept, principium cognoscendi, is also the mover, principium essendi” (VGPh 162, HP 147).

For Aristotle the intellect is qualified by the content it thinks. The nous is actualized by the noêton, it thinks itself only as it takes up the intelligible. As a consequence, the divine element in thought is not the potentiality of thinking, but the energeia of the divine intelligible content. Hegel instead interprets thinking as the most excellent. This is a subtle nuance, for intelligibility and intelligence are eventually the same; but it is a very important one, because it is the source of all the misguided consequences drawn by Hegel.

Hegel’s comments on 1072b 19–20 (“thought thinks itself by taking the place of the object of thought”)19 state that thinking is receptive;

18 We should recall in this connection Plotinus, for whom only the One is simple unity; thought, the second hypostasis, is both one and many. Plotinus writes that when the intellect thinks it duplicates itself, it makes itself two: “or, more precisely, it is two in that it thinks, it is one in that it thinks itself” (hoti noei, duo, kai hoti hauto, hen, Enn. V 6, 1: 21 ff.). Significantly, however, for Plotinus this runs in tandem with a criticism of Aristotle (V 1, 9: 7 ff.), who had made God a principle and at the same time, insofar as it is thought, something derived. Hegel never mentions this, for it is something he could not understand. For Hegel, pure actuality or unmoved mover make as little sense as the ineffability of the One (Enn. V 3, 13) or the gap between One and thought (V 1, 7), between an original principle and difference or negativity. Hegel actually interprets Plotinus exactly thus: as saying that the One negates itself and produces the intellect and the world (VGPh 443–4: 451; likewise with Proclus, in VGPh 487–8). Cf. Beierwaltes, Platonismus (1972: 177–82).

19 “Kata metalêpsin tou noêtou” (my transl.); Hegel has “durch Annahme (metalépsis, Aufnahme
but given the identity of thinking and thought “the object reverses into activity” (der Gegenstand schlägt um in Aktivität; VGPh 162). It seems natural to Hegel that if thought is receptive it is because it has reified, entäussert, its own content as being. If it is thinking that produces the intelligible, then the thought assumed as object is active thinking in the apparently inert side of its being in itself.

If this is what Hegel thinks, he can find even this in his Aristotle. His reading is guided by the Erasmus edition, which he translates correctly, but which again is no longer accepted. At 1072b 23 it reads: “hôste ekeino mallon toutou, ho dokei ho nous theion echein.” Jaeger’s edition reads: “hôste ekeinou mallon touto ho dokei ho nous theion echein.” While Hegel’s translation of the former reads: “[the activity] is more divine than the divine possession which thinking reason (nous) supposes itself to have” (VGPh 163, HP 148), on the basis of Jaeger’s edition we read instead: “the possession of the intelligible is more divine than the capacity of thinking.”

I said the Erasmus edition ad loc. is no longer accepted. The variant incorporated by Jaeger (and Ross), which implies that the first substance is the most excellent as thinking itself rather than as thinking in general, is more plausible in light of what Aristotle says about noësis noëseôs in Chapter 9. There (1074b 30–3) the first substance is thinking in actuality, where its thinking cannot be governed by another (allo kurion), otherwise it would be a potency. Since thinking is the potency of contraries (one can think even the basest things), the most excellent cannot be thinking. And since the object thought by God is immutable [reception]) des Gedachten” (VGPh 162). Ross and Apostle translate metalêpsis respectively by “sharing in” and “partaking in.” Liddell-Scott (2: 1119) is probably their source, emphasizing the originally Platonic meaning of the word. Metalêpsis in Aristotle’s texts (cf. Bonitz 460) sometimes means “participation” (De gen. et corr., 335b 14, speaking about the Phaedo; de gen. anim. 777b 25), but more often “substitution” or “exchange” (Rhet. I 10, 1369b 25, Top. II 5, 112a 21; An. Pr. I 29, 45b 17), which explain Hegel’s once again correct rendering of it as “reception.”

20 Natali (“Attività,” 1993: 343–4 n.) shows how most manuscripts had the same text as the Erasmus edition; he further writes that Bonitz first adopted Pseudo-Alexander’s text (the variant accepted by Jaeger); Natali discusses the interpretations of the line given by Averroes, Schwégler, Jaeger, Ross, and Reale.

Hegel diverges from Pseudo-Alexander’s commentary (In Met. 698–9). Although unlikely, it is not impossible that Hegel knew Alexander’s commentary on the Metaphysics. He quotes Alexander along with Averroes when lecturing on Pomponazzi (on the immortality of the soul, VGPh 3: 14) and as an Aristotle commentator at J/G 176. This commentary, which does not appear among the books of Hegel’s private library, was translated into Latin by Sepulveda in Rome in 1527 (Commentaria in duodecim Aristotelis libros de prima philosophia, interprete J. G. Sepulveda). Praechter in 1906 showed the inauthenticity of the part on E through N and ascribed the paternity of those books to Michael Ephesius.
and the most excellent, the first substance cannot think itself in actuality, save by receiving itself as the thought. This is pure *energeia*; it is thought thinking thought, because the thought is nothing but the first substance’s essence, and that is thinking in actuality.21

This conclusion impresses Hegel (“we hardly believe our eyes,” was his expression of wonder earlier at *VGPh* 161). “Aristotle busied himself in these deepest forms of speculation” and expressed the true as the becoming identity of subject and object (*VGPh* 163). This identity is not a dead identity but activity and movement.

Hegel’s conclusion is not surprising. The Aristotelian God is not just the most excellent, best, and most free being; the first substance becomes visible in the universe as heaven and thinking reason (*VGPh* 167) in which it appears and moves (ibid.). What is more surprising are two corollaries drawn by Hegel.

The first concerns the progressive move from the translation of *energeia* as *Wirklichkeit* to *Tätigkeit* and finally to *Wirksamkeit* (at *VGPh* 163 it is the standard translation). *Wirksamkeit* accentuates the efficient causality in activity (cf. Haldane-Simson’s translation as “efficient power” at *HP* 148). It is possible that Hegel was thinking of the poietic intellect of *De an.* III 5; after all, its kinship with the divine *noēsis noēseōs* is stressed by Aristotle in Α 9. There Aristotle asks whether the intellect thinks itself or an other. He writes that the identity of thinking and thought is understandable for us because in those sciences that do not have matter as their object, the science is both the subject and the object; specifically, in theoretical sciences the object is the concept itself (τὸν θεωρητικὸν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νοεσις, 1075a 2–3). Hegel reads this thus: “the science is the thing itself” (“die Wissenschaft [ist] die Sache selbst”; *VGPh* 166); in pure science the intellect thinks nothing but itself.

However, Aristotle had distinguished such pure thinking from science, sensation, opinion, and reasoning, which all *appear* to have an object outside themselves, where they themselves are objects only incidentally or indirectly (phainetai d’aei allou ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἰσθήσις καὶ ἡ δοξή καὶ ἡ διανοία, hautês en parergōi; 1074b 35–6). Hegel translates *phainetai* as a mere appearance, and rephrases this by saying that science, sensation, opinion, and reasoning “sind ein Scheinen” (*VGPh* 166), are an appearance of the thinking that manifests itself in them, just as in the passage on *metalēpsis* above the receptivity of thinking was indeed an activity. But that they appear to be “of another” is Aristotle’s cus-

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21 This point has been noted by Coreth, *Sein* (1952: 154) and Gadamer, “Dialektik” (1961:
tomy way of beginning with phenomena or *endoxa*, not his dismissal of what later turns out to be otherwise, as Hegel interprets him. Thus for Hegel self-relation is not at all exclusive to pure thinking and incidental to such lesser ways of knowing.

Just as there is a difference in such modes of self-relation for Aristotle, there is also a substantial difference – not very explicit in the text – between human and divine intellects. We are not always thinking, but are only intermittently what the first substance is in eternal actuality; even if in science there is an identity between the intellect and the intelligible, there is at the same time a separation in us between *nous* (intellect as the potency of thinking) and *noêsis* (actual thinking), which does not hold for the first substance. Hegel interprets divine thinking as being an eternal activity with the following phrase: “*Alles ist Denken, immer ein Nichtruhendes*” (“everything is thinking, never at rest”; VGPh 165). This sounds very much like *das Logische* pervading all reality in the *Science of Logic*. But this overlooks that the difference between human and divine thinking is sharper than appears from a simple reading of *Met*. A 9, as we see in Chapter 8.

The second, even more surprising consequence of Hegel’s interpretation is that this very principle, that “everything is thinking,” is understandable according to Hegel in light of Aristotle’s distinction between passive and active intellect. Passive *nous* “is nothing other than the in-itself, the absolute Idea as considered in itself, the Father [sic]; but only as active is it posited” (VGPh 164; J/G 73; HP 149 is very imprecise). This means no less than that Aristotle’s divine *nous* is “everything in itself” (ibid.), like the *topos eidôn* or ideal existence of all *eidê* (*De an.* III 4 429a 27–9). But it is only through activity, that is, through spirit, that it actualizes itself. Without spirit it remains the Absolute Idea, the inner soul of reality. Differently stated, Aristotle’s God needs man; man is the active and concrete side of *noêsis noêseôs*, the actualization of all essences that are ideally or in-themselves present in God’s *nous*. This seems a crucial qualification of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle’s God. Aristotle’s God remains activity and is visible in nature and spirit; but insofar as this absolute activity is a complete, self-enclosed totality prior to finitude (and not also posterior to a particular subjectivity certain of its infinity), it does not yet return to itself out of nature and spirit.

This complete reversal of Aristotle’s meaning, which now makes Hegel’s entire tripartition of substances clearer, is confirmed by a passage in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. There Hegel says about Aristotle’s God that “in order that it may actually appear as activity, it has to be posited in its moments,” and that “God thought of simply as the Father is not yet the true” (LPhR 3: 12). That Aristotle’s God appears in nature and in thinking or human reason (denkende Vernunft) means for Hegel that in itself, like the absolute Idea of the Logic, it is the logical form of all reality; but only absolute spirit is the full transparency of the concrete for itself, knowing both God and the finite world. Even though Aristotle’s God does not reveal Himself in free infinite individual spirit, for Hegel Aristotle’s human nous thinks itself and is thereby the actualization of divine nous. Thus there is no deep division between Aristotelian and Christian theology. The fundamental difference is that in Aristotle the substantiality of the speculative Idea is not known as identical with infinite subjectivity, which only emerges with Christianity. In Christian religion, in turn, God is the divine self-consciousness of the individuals belonging to a religious community (Gemeinde). But religion has to be translated from the language of representation (no self-subsisting God can be assumed as prior to ens creatum) to the language of the Concept (it is the logical idea that pervades all reality and thinks itself in and through individual spirit; see ENZ.C §552 A).

The importance of all this for Hegel can hardly be overestimated. He certainly points out that for Aristotle thinking is “some kind of state” (VGPh 164), one object among others. It is the most powerful and excellent being, but Aristotle does not express himself as does “the Concept” (VGPh 163): the true as the identity of thinking and the intelligible, of subject and object. “We say,” but Aristotle does not, “that thinking is all the truth” (VGPh 164). After the translation and commentary on Λ 9, Hegel says that Aristotle’s Metaphysics investigates further determinations (idea, principle, and so on) one after the other. And yet, for Hegel they are all finally “united in a totally speculative concept” (VGPh 167), namely thought thinking itself. In this respect Hegel stresses that his fundamental vision is the same insofar as Aristotle considers everything in thought (VGPh 164) and transforms everything into thoughts. Thus for Aristotle things “are in their truth; this is their ousia” (ibid.).

The quote concluding the second and third editions of the Encyclopædia shows the extent of Hegel’s enthusiasm. I must say that given what we have just seen I believe Hegel should rather have put it at the end of the Logic, not after the Absolute spirit and the whole Realphilosophie.
In the conclusion of this section we still have to consider one last question. We saw that Hegel does not invent his Aristotle, for he correctly translates the Erasmus edition, though he draws from it un-Aristotelian consequences. It would be interesting to study Erasmus’s presuppositions and cultural background in their own right. For even Erasmus does not invent his version of the *Metaphysics*: Renaissance philosophy, in particular with its Neoplatonic and Aristotelian streaks, has many points of contact with this understanding of Aristotelian divine and human intellects. 22

The first thing to say in this connection is that the relation between first mover and first heaven is marked by a tension internal to Aristotle’s very texts. If Α 7 and 9 underline the difference between first mover and first heaven, we must also recall that in the *Physics* the first mover is not separate from the first heaven but is its soul. More importantly, this makes it not a final but an efficient cause of motion. 23 Further, throughout Α the words God and divine are not restricted to one unique substance, but apply to both the heavenly bodies and thought thinking itself. 24 If these ambiguities are all found in Aristotle, it is little wonder not only that commentaries and interpretations differ so widely, but also that the relation between first mover and first heaven was subject to modifications right from Theophrastus and Strato, who “made all motion natural” and ascribed the primary cause of motion to

22 Erasmus quotes Themistius and Simplicius in his edition. Themistius’ and Simplicius’s commentaries, especially on the *De anima*, were taken as guides for the new Renaissance interpretation of Aristotle. They were known to Ficino, Nifo, Pico, and Pomponazzi among others, as were of course Alexander of Aphrodias and Averroes. Ermolao Barbaro published his Latin translation of Themistius in 1481; Girolamo Donato translated Alexander’s *De anima* in 1495; Simplicius’s Greek text, circulating in the late fifteenth century, was printed only in 1543 (cf. Nardi, “Simplicio,” in *Aristotelismo padovano*, 1958: 365–442; Mahoney, “Greek Commentators,” 1982: 169–77, 264–82; Park-Kessler, “Psychology,” 1988: 459 ff.). There is no evidence that Hegel knew Themistius; his knowledge of Simplicius, whom he calls one of the best Aristotle commentators (*VGPh* 1: 191; *VGPh* 486, J/G 176, 191) and whom he uses as commentary in his own lectures on Parmenides (*VGPh* 1: 290–1), is not necessarily indirect or dependent on Brucker, Buhle, and Tennemann (cf. J/G 440–1, 472). In Chapter 8, when we discuss Hegel’s interpretation of the *De anima*, we see the importance of Neoplatonic commentaries for Hegel’s picture of Aristotle; however, no direct influence can be proven. For a recent dispute on the extent to which Themistius was a Neoplatonist in his commentary on the *De anima*, see Mahoney (op. cit.), who argues pro Themistius’s Neoplatonism, and Blumenthal, *Aristotle and Neoplatonism* (1996: 23 ff.), who argues contra.


the celestial soul so as “to free God from work,” as Cicero had put it.25 While Proclus and Syrianus found the difference between Plato’s and Aristotle’s God in the fact that the latter was only responsible for the motion of the world, Ammonius harmonized Plato with Aristotle by making Aristotle’s God responsible for the existence of the heavens as well.26 In turn, perhaps following the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, for whom a unitary force was present in the entire universe, Avicenna and Averroes identified God with the corpus coeleste.

Further, the energeia of thinking in Λ 7 is sometimes understood as activity, sometimes as actuality. While it is fairly clear that God is the identity of the two and His intellect is the actual possession of its own intelligibility, and that it is thinking and not intellect that is its essence, it is not always so clear that Aristotle’s stress on the kinship between human and divine activity (1072b 17–18, 24) had to go hand in hand with what I above called their sharp difference.27 Even here, on the relation between divine nous and active nous in us, commentators varied deeply, as we will see below in Chapter Eight on the De anima.

Finally, a whole string of commentators concluded from the fact that God was the identity of intellect and intelligible that He had to know all that followed from Him as well. This seems to me to be flatly denied by the simple fact that for Aristotle’s God to know something other than itself would be a debasement. Yet Alexander, Themistius, Proclus, Avicenna, Maimonides, and Aquinas all shared the notion that God knew reality, whether in its principles only or in its entirety.28 In one sense, as we just saw, Aristotle’s God is for Hegel not omniscient, only absolute spirit is; in another sense, He thinks and possesses all thoughts.

In sum, Hegel’s interpretation of the Metaphysics, however misguided, is far from being a whimsical flight of fancy. Arguably, Hegel’s Aristotle is an arbitrary, if not “wrong,” Aristotle; but whether there is a “right” Aristotle, apart from the Pandora’s box of some of the most rich, influential, and problematic philosophical ambiguities, is much more difficult to establish.

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27 An interpretation strikingly similar to Hegel’s is offered by Norman (“Philosopher-God,” 1969): noêsis noêseôs is abstract thinking, which is common to human and divine thinking. For Norman only thus can the divinity of human theôria (Eth.nic X 7) be accounted for. Cf. Chapter 8, § 7 below.
THE ARISTOTELIAN HERITAGE IN THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Of all the phenomena which exist near by us to \textit{phainesthai} itself is the most admirable.

(T. Hobbes, \textit{De Corpore})

§1. Being and Essence

“Hegel’s interpretation of the theological passage in Aristotle seems characterized by the preoccupation of giving life and movement to the Absolute and of seeing in the self-position of the first substance a sort of exemplary act indefinitely repeatable at inferior levels.”

Even though it is easy for Aubenque, who does not check the Erasmus edition, to castigate Hegel for all his “mistakes,” it is hard not to concur with this judgment. On the other hand, Hegel would have agreed with Aubenque’s emphasis on the impossibility of deducing the categories from substance in Aristotle (\textit{VGPh 133}). What he would not have agreed with is the consequence drawn by Aubenque in his interpretation of the \textit{Metaphysics}, that is, that the ineffable transcendence and separation of Aristotle’s God from the sensible world is necessarily implied

2 Aubenque, \textit{Être} (1962: 193–6). The problem of the indeducibility of categories, which are original, underivable genera, was the object of debate among Prantl, Brentano, and Zeller soon after Hegel’s death. The successive reprints (II 2, 1844, 2nd ed. 1862, 3rd ed. 1879) of Zeller’s \textit{Philosophie der Griechen} bear witness to his progressive detachment from the Hegelian interpretation of Aristotle and his progressively more Kantian reading of the aporias of the \textit{Metaphysics}. Young Zeller’s review of Hegel’s \textit{Lectures}, which appeared in 1843, is remarkably favorable (as is Feuerbach, who writes, among other things, that Hegel is as at home with Plato and Aristotle as with himself: 1858: 4); see Santinello, \textit{Storia}, 1995: 497–500). Brentano (\textit{Bedeutung}, 1862: 94–123) gives a very interesting and
by the univocity of meaning in the demonstrative sciences and results in a “hyperplatonism.”3

What Hegel says in the Lectures, however, far from exhausts all he has to say about the Metaphysics. There are several passages in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia Logic which are both explicit and implicit comments on it, as well as on the Physics. This chapter, in which we consider Hegel’s confrontation with Aristotle within his own logics and the extent to which he would have considered himself an Aristotelian, thus supplements Chapter 3. I postpone a critical examination of the legitimacy and plausibility of Hegel’s assimilation of Aristotle in his logic until Chapters 5 and 6.

Hegel stresses the identity of scope and intention between his logic and the Metaphysics (VGPh 152). We have already seen in his correspondence with Niethammer and again in his “General Division of Logic” that the logic of being and of essence restore the categories of ancient metaphysics. Categories are not forms of the understanding but the logic of the forms in which being is spoken.

For Hegel, the meaning of Aristotle’s philosophy, as well as Greek philosophy from Anaxagoras’s intellect to the Platonic and Aristotelian Idea, is “objective thought,” or what he calls the soul of the world, or the Logical. Thinking in the Logic is free from the substrates of representation; that is, the Logic is not a thinking about something (WL 1: 44), a stable substrate whose existence is given and which forms the basis for our thinking, because here the Phenomenology of Spirit is presupposed, that is, the liberation from the oppositions of consciousness. The logic “contains thought insofar as this is just as much the thing (Sache) in its own self, or the thing in its own self insofar as it is equally pure thought” (WL 1: 43; SL 49, transl. modified). Thereby the content of pure science is “this objective thinking” (ibid.; ENZ.C §25). Objective thought means that “there is understanding or reason in the world” (ENZ.C §24 A, WL 1: 5, SL 51), that nous rules the world and that “the essence of the world is to be defined as thought” (WL 1: 44, SL 50). Anaxagoras is rightly cel-

plausible reconstruction of the relations obtaining among Aristotle’s categories against the charge of arbitrariness of the table of categories put forth by Prantl; but I think he is wrong in calling a deduction his own description of their definite order and finite meanings. A deduction is a deduction from a principle to its consequences, and Aristotle’s ousia is not a principle for the deduction of what is posterior to it. Aubenque goes further than Prantl when he writes that the incompleteness of the Aristotelian categories strengthens the open and indefinite character of the investigation of being (ibid.: 189, n.).

ebrated, Hegel argues, because he laid the foundation for thinking of the world in its pure form as the Logic. But both Aristotle and Hegel share Socrates’s frustration with Anaxagoras (Plato, *Phaedo*, 98b-9d; see *Met. A* 3, 984b 18, A 4, 985a 18; *VGPh* 1: 393–7, *HP* 1: 340–3).

For Hegel, Plato and Aristotle did not simply posit a rational principle and then fail to consider its actuality, as Anaxagoras did. They instead posited the True in the concept, and had a higher conception of thinking than does modernity. “This metaphysics believed that thinking and its determinations is not anything alien to the thing, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and the thought of them — our language too expresses their kinship — coincide in and for themselves, and that thinking in its immanent determinations and the true nature of things form one and the same content.”\(^4\)

Logic assumes as its starting point precisely that remarkable progress made by Plato and especially by Aristotle, thanks to which the forms of thinking have been freed from the matter into which they are submerged in intuitoring, willing, and representing, and “have been brought into prominence in their own right” (WL 1: 22, SL 33). Plato and Aristotle do not know the opposition between subject and object, between thought and reality; for them the universal is the essence of the thing. For Plato and Aristotle “only in its concept does something possess actuality and to the extent that it is distinct from its concept it ceases to be actual and is a non-entity” (WL 1: 44, SL 50, transl. modified). In the world one comes across only individual dogs; but if we were to do away with the universal essence, we would not even be able to recognize individual dogs (the example is at *ENZ.C* §24 Z 1). This is why “logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to be taken to express the essentialities of the things” (ENZ.C §24).

It is surprising how these decisive passages in the logic correspond to the words of Hegel’s lectures on the *Metaphysics*, which I here transcribe at length:

This is the speculative philosophy of Aristotle, that everything is considered in thought, everything transformed into thoughts. Aristotle thinks objects, and in that these are thought, they are in their truth; this is their *ousia*. That does not mean that objects in nature are thus themselves thinking. The objects are thought subjectively by me; then my thought is also the concept of the thing, and this is the substance of the thing. In

\(^4\) *WL* 1: 38, *SL* 45, transl. modified. The kinship to which Hegel refers is that between *Ding* and *Denken*. 
nature the Concept does not exist as thought in this freedom but has flesh and blood; but it has also a soul, and this is its concept. Aristotle knows what things are in and for themselves; and this is their ousia (VGPh 164–5, HP 149–50).

What Hegel thus reads in Aristotle is that the form and actuality are the truth of finite things: the conformity of a substance to its concept, to its energeia, is the decisive truth of its being. Concept and actuality are prior to potency and matter, as we have seen; and for Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle this is the only possible criterion for the truth of things. This is Hegel’s understanding of the meaning of Aristotle’s first philosophy as the science of being qua thought: the concept is the true. This is how Hegel unifies the kath’hauto meanings of being: being qua actuality, qua true, to some extent being in the first category – but obviously not being kata sumbebêkos, accidental being (Met. Δ 7, E 2).

This identification of thing-form-truth does not only hold for the finite; as we saw in the first section, the absolute Idea is nothing other than the noêsis noëseôs, so that the logic is, in Hegel’s well-known metaphor, “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of finite spirit” (WL 1: 44, SL 50, transl. modified).

We have also seen how for Hegel the freedom to think is the only assumption required by philosophy for the beginning of abstract thought, and that he quotes Met. A in this connection. Hegel overlooks the crucial differences we saw in Chapter 2 between his position and Aristotle’s; as a result, he thinks that his understanding of philosophy is very similar to that of Aristotle. For Hegel philosophy does what the sciences cannot do, because they assume the existence of their object and an external method; likewise, Aristotle wrote that first philosophy investigates being in general (katholou, Met. E 1, 1025b 6–18) while other sciences are confined to their domain and assume the existence of their object. The very distinction we see in Chapter 2 between sciences as aggregates of positive cognitions, particular sciences, and philosophy which seems to correspond roughly to Met. A and to the distinction experience-art-science of principles.6

5 The only qualification relevant in this context is that this is what Hegel calls thinking in and for itself. But Aristotle is not always speculative. As we see in Chapter 6, according to Hegel, in the Organon Aristotle treats thought as the union of presupposed given contents; this thought is subjective or formal (VGPh 238–41).

6 When Hegel comments on this definition of philosophy as science of principles, he says this is “the Rational” (VGPh 149). For Aristotle science is developed from preexisting
If philosophy is a circle returning to itself (ENZ.C §17), similar, according to Hegel, to Aristotle’s God, it incorporates a notion of becoming and development which is explicitly inspired by Aristotle. The notion of development we considered in Chapter 1 (VGPh 1: 39–42) is summed up by Hegel with the following words: “In order to comprehend what development is, what may be called two different states must be distinguished. The first is what is known as capacity, power, what I call being-in-itself (potentia, dunamis); the second principle is that of being-for-itself, actuality (actus, energeia)” (transl. HP 1: 20–1). The for-itself does not differ from the in-itself owing to the addition of new contents; the in-itself retains itself in the developed form, yet the difference is quite enormous (ungeheuer, VGPh 1: 40). The task and end of all of spirit’s efforts is that spirit become for itself.

That which is in-itself must become an object to man, must arrive at consciousness, thus becoming for man. What has become an object to him is the same as what he is in himself; thereby man first becomes for himself, is made double, is retained and not become an other. Man is thinking, and then thinks thoughts; in thinking only thinking is the object, rationality produces rationality, reason is its own object (VGPh 1: 40, HP 21).

The distinction between having reason and exercising reason comes from the De anima (II 2, 417a 21 ff.; III 4, 429b 1–9). But what is even more striking, and is not usually noticed, is that the two illustrations of development mentioned by Hegel in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit are also taken from Aristotle. The evolution seed-plant-fruit is an example of development, but it is defective insofar as it ensues in the apparent result that the evolution takes place in different individuals—in Hegel’s infamous expression (W 3: 12, PhS 2), the blossom refutes the bud. A more concrete universal, a more comprehensive subjectivity, is spirit, whose development begins, continues, and ends within the

knowledge (An.Post. I 1, 71a 1–2; Eth. nic. I 4, 1095b 2–4) and is a theôria which investigates the “why” (Met. A 1, 981a 29–30) for its own sake. For Hegel philosophy must presuppose a certain familiarity with its objects; it transforms the well-known into the known, in order to demonstrate the necessity of its content (ENZ.C §1). Echoing the opening line of the Metaphysics (we naturally desire to know), Hegel writes that the Idea of the true first appears as a drive (WL 2: 498, SL 783).

We have also seen that Aristotle calls free science cultivated for its own sake the science of truth (Met. α 1, 993b 19–31); God is both the subject and the object of first philosophy (A 1, 983a 5–7), and theôria is divine. Superficially, Hegel reiterates the same line: the absolute Idea is Aristotle’s noêsis noêseôs (ENZ.C §552 A; §236 Z); the Concept is first in itself (ENZ.C §163, Z 2) and the only truth.
same subject. The illustration of this second form is common to the Phenomenology and the Lectures: “the embryo is indeed in itself a human being, it is not so for itself; this it only is as cultivated reason, which has made itself into what it is in itself. And that is when it for the first time is actual” (W3: 25, PhS 12; VGPh 1: 40).

These two examples, which Hegel scrupulously records when commenting on Aristotle’s natural teleology and philosophy of spirit in the Lectures, are taken respectively from De generatione animalium (I 19, 726b 15–19; compare Metaphysics Z.9, 1034a 34–b 1) and De anima (II 2, 417a 21–b 2). What is interesting to notice in this regard is that for Aristotle potency and actuality were the two notions which made it possible to speak of becoming – of change, predication and plurality – and made it possible to understand it as neither opposed to nor identical with being. This argument played a polemical role contra the univocity of meaning of being in the Eleatics, which had made all predicates impossible and change illusory, and the sheer plurivocity of being in Protagoras and the sophists, which does away with substrates and according to which there is nothing but change.

This is not sufficient to label Hegel an Aristotelian in any facile manner or to assume any passive assimilation of Aristotle on Hegel’s part. But if even the determinations of in- and for-itself are rooted in Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle, the question of the importance and extent of the Aristotelian heritage in Hegel’s own philosophy does deserve being pursued. To be sure, Hegel often acknowledges in the Science of Logic or in the Encyclopædia the Aristotelian origin of some of his own determinations. For example, in the Logic of Being he writes that the Eleatic antinomies are deeper than the Kantian, especially with regard to motion. The solution of the problem of the continuum is contained in Aristotle’s “truly speculative concepts of space, time, and motion” (WL 1: 225–6, SL 198). Hegel adds that Bayle completely missed the potential infinite divisibility explained by Aristotle; and Hegel’s discussion is more than vaguely reminiscent of the Physics. Strikingly, and despite Hegel’s (however mixed) praise of Kant’s Dialectic, Aristotle is the true dialectician when it comes to the problem of the continuum and motion.

Hegel will not always be so explicit in the Logic. For example, the Logic of quantity and of measure are rich with implicit references to Aristotle. To be sure, it is not because Hegel goes back to Aristotle

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7 This was first noted by Kern (“Aristotelesdetung,” 1957: 332–3 and “Antinomie,” 1971: 240–1).
against Kant that he proceeds from being to quality, thus making quality the second category. Aristotelian qualities are qualities of substances, and as such they are not treated in the Logic of Being but in the Logic of Essence, as properties of, in necessary relation to, a substrate. For Kant, quantity is the first group of categories because it is a pure synthesis of the manifold of space and time, while quality is the real in sensation, that is, the degree to which an appearance affects our senses. Quality is therefore more complex and also more empirical than quantity, which is in turn more universal and fundamental for appearances (everything is a quantity, but not everything is a quality – for example, geometrical figures constructed in intuition are not, in any relevant sense at least).\(^8\) Hegel has a different principle for the deduction or order of categories than Kant: it proceeds not from what is first for us but from what is first in the thing or *Sache*. Thus quality is the immediate determination of something, while quantity is indifferent to the thing, being only the quantity of a quality.

When quantity is posited as limited it is a *quantum*, and the *quantum* is expressed in number. Hegel’s notion of number is peculiarly Greek in its definition: it is the union of amount or annumeration\(^9\) and unit (*WL* 1: 232, *SL* 203; *ENZ.C* §102), and is the resolution of the contradiction between continuity and discreteness. As in this tradition, number is defined as the how-many-times the unit is repeated; but the unity of units, the thought of the many as one, is a break of continuity or the discontinuity of determinate pluralities, and is thus a limit of the many. Erdmann recalls the Pythagorean *apeiron* and *perainonta* (indefinite and limit, *Logik*, §64 n.4); but the notion is in general Greek. In Aristotle in particular, *arithmos* was never understandable in separation from what it numbered; number is relative to a definite collection of items which it measures (*Met.* I 6, 1057a 2–7; *Phys.* IV 14, 224a 2 ff.).\(^10\) To *poson*, Aristotle’s word for quantity, means “the quantitive” (*Cat.* 6, 4b 20–6a 35; *Met.* Z 1, 1028a 37–b 2); in other words, it is a predicate – that is, of substances in intelligible matter. Further, number is negation and delimitation of the *continuum* (*De an.* III 1, 425a 19).

We see in Chapter 7, §5, how Hegel interprets Aristotle’s “now” in

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8 See *KöV* A 715/B 743 for an “inessential” application of quality to quantity. I have discussed the question of quantity and number in Kant in a few essays; see, for example, “Construction” (1995) and “Intuition” (forthcoming).

9 *Anzahl* is the nightmare of translators into French, Italian, and English.

his theory of the *continuum* of time and motion. But before we go on, an important consequence of all this must be mentioned. Hegel, whose knowledge of mathematics is rather impressive, shares with Aristotle not only this concept of number, but also the resistance to treating mathematics as a separate formalism. Mathematics is fundamentally a theory of ratios; as such, it is not an independent construction with its own requirements and language. The reason for the superiority of Kepler over Newton, which we discuss in closer detail in Chapter 7, is that Kepler formulates mathematically the laws of phenomena, “the reason of the thing” (*ENZ.C* §270 A). Newton’s translation of physics into the language of geometry and algebra, and the “substitution” of empirical observation by a pure independent and autonomous formalism, is for Hegel the idle detour of the understanding from appearances. Such procedure is unaware of its nature; it draws its demonstrations neither from experience nor from the concept (*WL 1: 407, SL 343*), and it does not realize what it presupposes from experience.

When quantity and quality determine each other, as in the category of measure, Hegel mentions the “Greek awareness that everything has a measure” (*WL 1: 394, SL 329*) and often uses examples from Aristotle. Bodily limbs have fixed ratios, which depend on organic functions (*WL 1: 393, SL 331*); city-states must retain certain proportions, such that the type of constitution varies according to variations in dimension (*WL 1: 394, SL 332*). In the *Politics* (VII 4) Aristotle writes that the best city has to be able to be overseen in a single glance to guarantee the economic autarchy and the mutual acquaintance of citizens; a change in the dimensions of the state disturbs the balance of this ratio and consequently of the constitution. Paradoxes such as that of the heap or the bold man (when does the repeated removal of a grain from a heap stop being simply quantitative and equal to the disappearance of the heap?), which show how a quantitative change results in a qualitative one, are taken from Aristotle’s *Sophistic Refutations* (which Hegel quotes at *WL 1: 397, SL 335*). The passage from quantitative to qualitative in morality is reminiscent of the *mesotēs*, the choice of the mean in virtue from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*WL 1: 441, SL 370–1*).

When Hegel opens the Logic of Essence with the inwardization of thought into itself (*Erinnerung*) out of being, he writes: “The German language has preserved essence in the past participle [gewesen] of the verb to be; for essence is past – but timeless past – being” (*WL 2: 13, SL 136*).

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11 See Chapter 9 for a discussion of this point.
389). Hegel picks up the definition of essence expressed by the Aristotelian *ti ἐν εἶναι*, which we can roughly understand as “what being was before its existence” (where the imperfect is not a past tense but is exempt from time).12 The intelligible determinations of substance resolve the thing in its intelligibility; yet essence exists only in relation to the composite, as its explanation. In Hegel, the Concept at the level of essence is the negative relation to the immediacy of being. In reflection the essence is posited in relation to its unity, and designates the sublated being as an intemporal having-been (*WL* 2: 15, *SL* 391).13 The intelligible determinations of the thing are that negative totality of forms which a given thing can have or not have in its existence and becoming, but which taken singularly cannot be identified with its essence. As an indivisible whole, they are logically prior to their empirical manifestation as moments in the thing’s becoming.

In several categories of essence we can discern an Aristotelian inspiration. Kern has shown how the chapter “Form and Matter” seems to overlap point by point with the text of the *Lectures* on substance (*VGPh* 154–6).14 Aristotle, we have seen, sets the Platonic Idea in motion and inserts into it the negative moment of determination. Form is the specification of matter, the activity of distinction in the passive substrate. For Hegel the union of form and matter, in the self-determining ground and self-relating negativity, has resulted from the “sundering into” an “essential identity determined as the indifferent basis, and into essential difference or negativity as the determining form” (*WL* 2: 90, *SL* 452). The relation form–matter is the mutual presupposition of both. Indeterminate matter is the “passive [side] over against form as the active [side]” (*WL* 2: 89, *SL* 451). Matter is “the absolute receptivity [Empfänglichkeit]” for form (*WL* 2: 90, *SL* 451, my transl.); it is the basis or substrate of form (*WL* 2: 88, *SL* 450).

With respect to the composite, Aristotle took form and matter to im-

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13 Erdmann, (Logik, 1841: § 88 n. 2); Marcuse (Ontologie, 1932: 69–70) point out the relation between the *ti ἐν εἰναι* and *Wesen*. For a more minute contrast between *Met. Z* and the Logic of Essence, see Chapters 5 and 6.
plicate each other; for Hegel, it is form that makes matter a “this,” a tode-
ti. For this reason he writes that if we abstract from all determinations and
all form we are left with an indeterminate matter; but matter here is abstract, for “what is seen, felt, is a determinate matter, that is, a unity
of form and matter” (WL 2: 88, SL 450). The consequence, faithful to
the concept of composite but running against Aristotle’s thesis of the
ungeneratedness of matter and form, is that “neither matter nor form
is self-originated, or, in another terminology, eternal” (WL 2: 89, SL
451). Form acts on matter and brings it into existence; but what “ap-
pears as activity of form, is also no less a movement belonging to matter itself” (WL 2: 92, SL 453), the negativity and ought (Sollen) of matter.

In the Logic of Essence, all categories are the unity of existence and
its condition posited reflectively. But the duality into which the Concept
duplicates itself – relations of form and matter, ground and grounded,
thing-in-itself and existence, appearances and laws, inner and outer –
contains in itself the two opposite sides as different, therefore as defec-
tive. Instead what is must sustain itself, produce itself into existence
(ENZ.C §122 A), it must not have its reason to be or ground in another. When the Concept reaches this stage, essence is no longer what must
appear but is manifestation itself in which the absolute has its expres-
sion and the form and guise of its self-manifestation as its content (WL
2: 195, SL 452). This is “actuality,” a self-grounded reality (Wirklichkeit).
This is what is fully rational for Hegel. When he complains that the prin-
ciple of identity of actuality and rationality announced in the Philosophy
of Right (Preface; PhR 24, Knox 10) has been misunderstood by com-
mon sense (ENZ.C §6 A) for lack of distinction between existence, which is contingent, and actuality, which is a manifestation of the Con-
cept, this can be made sharper if we remember the identification be-
tween actuality and energieia. The Aristotelian energieia is for Hegel the
concept attaining to itself in existence, the prefiguration of the Spin-
zozistic causa sui.¹⁵

¹⁵ This understanding of actuality as energieia has been brought to attention by Erdmann
(Logik, 1841: § 125–§127 n.); N.Hartmann (“Aristoteles,” 1923: 236); Marcuse (Ontolo-
gie, 1932: 93–4); Mure (Logic, 1950: 138). For Düsing, Hegel misconstrues here as well
the modal difference from his assumption, the “logical-speculative theory of pure sub-
jectivity” (Geschichte, 1983: 125); he thinks that N. Hartmann and Kern anticipated his
criticism, that “potency as in-itself does not retain any independent ontological signifi-
cance” (ibid.). Actually they did not. I cannot understand if Düsing’s criticism is based
on the fear that Hegel confuses Aristotle with the Megarians (about which see the next
paragraph in the main body of the text) or if it is supported by Trendelenburg’s inter-
pretation of the concepts of potency and actuality. According to Trendelenburg (Kate-
Aristotle criticised the Megarians, for whom there is no potency unless in actuality; a potency is insofar as it is actualized. For Aristotle the difference between potency and actuality must be safeguarded, simply because change is real as a transition from potency to actuality; a disposition is not necessarily exercised, otherwise I would be blind and deaf whenever I do not actually exercise sight and hearing (Met. Θ 3, 1047a 8–10).16

The evidence of Hegel’s use of these Aristotelian concepts is implicit but quite abundant. In the *Encyclopædia* Hegel writes that the actual is the positedness of the unity of being and existence: “hence, it is exempted from passing-over, and its externality is its energy” (§142 A, EL 214, *energy* in my italics). In the oral addition only do we find an explicit mention of Aristotle: actuality

form[s] the principle of Aristotle’s philosophy, but his actuality is that of the Idea itself, and not the ordinary actuality of what is immediately present. More precisely, therefore, Aristotle’s polemic against Plato consists in his designation of the Platonic Idea as mere *dunamis*, and in urging, on the contrary, that the Idea, which is recognized by both of them equally to be what is alone true, should be regarded essentially as *energeia*, i.e., as the inwardness that is totally to the fore, so that it is the unity of inward and outward. In other words, the Idea should be regarded as actuality in the emphatic sense that we have given to it here (§142 Z, EL 214).

Possibility, actuality, and necessity are not subjective modal categories but forms of being. For Hegel, logical possibility is vacuous: Kant’s logical possibility as the absence of contradiction (*KrV A* 75–6/B 101) is what Hegel calls the empty abstraction of self-identity, that is, it can be

16 Whether Aristotle misunderstood the Megarian critique, as suggested by Heidegger (*Metaphysik Theta*, 1981: 141 ff.), or could not escape it, as argued by Rosen (“Nothing,” 1988), cannot be discussed here. Certainly in the case of “irrational potentialities” (such as for fire to burn, *Met. Θ* 2) potentiality is indistinguishable from actuality.
predicated of everything no less than its opposite. Real possibility, in
turn, is a *dunamis* or in-itself which denotes what is essential for actual-
ity (§143, A). Further, necessity is nothing but the developed concept
in the Aristotelian sense elucidated above, of being-for-itself (§147).
“This self-movement of the form is activity, activation of the matter, as
the real ground, which sublates itself into actuality” (ibid., *EL* 220).

§2. The Subjective Logic

After the Logic of Essence we do not have to wait until the absolute Idea
as *noësis noëseôs* for another appearance of Aristotelian themes. The sub-
jective logic must show how the principle of subjectivity present in na-
ture and spirit is constitutive of the Idea. Only thus can the concept be
a true *archê kai telos*, principle and end.

Aristotle is not systematic and does not deduce finite determinations
from the Idea. But Hegel appropriates and deduces within the Subjec-
tive Logic the principles sketched by Aristotle with speculative depth in *Physics* and *De anima*.

It is a long shot to state without argumentation, as Marcuse did, that
Hegel did not invent any new categories but only used those available
from the *Metaphysics*. However, the massive presence of Aristotelian
themes in the Subjective Logic is quite remarkable. If the Logic is the sci-
ence of determinations grasped in thought, and if the truth of all that
is the Concept, then Hegel must now show how *energeia* is at work in or-
ganic nature and in spirit.

For Aristotle the soul of organic beings is the formal, efficient, and
final cause of their being and becoming. In the *Lectures* on the *Physics*
Hegel says that Aristotle understood nature as life, “as a unity which has
its end within itself, is unity with itself, it does not pass into another, but,
through this principle of activity, determines changes in conformity
with its own content, and in this way maintains itself therein” (*VGPh*
174, *HP* 157). For Aristotle, beings by nature have in themselves the
principle of motion and rest thanks to which they reach their end (*Phys.*
II 1, 192b 13–15; 8, 199b 15–16; *De part. anim.* I 1, 641b 23–6); for
Hegel this is the true concept of the living as an end in itself, “a uni-
versal identical with itself which repels itself from itself and actualizes

17 For the identity between the formal and final causes and actuality cf., e.g., *De an.* II 4,
415b 7, *Phys.* II 1, 193b 6, 8, 199b 16–32. This point will be spelled out in Chapters 7
and 8.
(reproduces) itself” (VGPh 176, HP 159). The Idea effectuates (bewirkt) itself; in natural reproduction there is an identity (obviously specific, not numerical) between producer and produced. This is the notion of entelechy or immanent finality; and it is superior to the contemporary view of nature, says Hegel, because it finds in the end “the inner determinacy of the natural thing itself” (VGPh 173).

In nature the opposite moments of substance, form and matter, acquire the more evolved shape of finality and necessity. But Aristotle solves the traditional antinomy between determinism and external finality (causae efficientes and causae finales) by showing how matter, external necessity, is subverted in the teleological rationality in which nature lives and maintains itself.

The end cannot do without the necessary, “yet it keeps it in its power” (VGPh 180–1); for Hegel, this means that the free concept that subordinates external necessity under itself is the truth of the antinomy. In this connection Hegel contrasts Aristotle against mechanism and fatalism, which do not recognize freedom in objectivity, which for Hegel is the self-determination of immanent causality. Only Kant has revitalized the finality in the organism and considered life as an end in itself, even though in the Critique of Judgment the concept of teleology is merely a subjective form of reflective judgment and is therefore inferior to Aristotle’s (VGPh 177, HP 160).

The correspondence between the Lectures and Hegel’s own logic is blatant. The truth of objectivity in the Logic is teleology understood as the Concept’s self-determination, rationality made world. In these parts of the Science of Logic Aristotle is not mentioned until the Idea of cognition, where Hegel contrasts Kant’s “thoughtless representation” of “the soul or of thinking” with “the truly speculative ideas of Aristotle” (sic: WL 2: 492, SL 778). As we see in Chapter 8, the philosophy of subjective spirit is no less pervaded by Hegel’s discussion and assimilation of the De anima than the Idea of cognition. But the impression one gets is that every time Hegel criticizes or discusses Kant in the Subjective Logic, he is at the same time relying on his understanding of Aristotle.

Hegel opens the chapter on Teleology by recalling how teleology is usually wrongly contrasted with mechanism. As in the Lectures on Aristotle, he writes that “the opposition between causae efficientes and causae finales” (WL 2: 436–7, SL 734) is sublated in the freedom of true finality, which is “the Concept in its existence” (WL 2: 437, SL 734). There is a verbatim correlation with the Lectures running throughout these pages. Hegel recalls how Kant deserves the credit for distinguishing in-
ternal and external finality and for opening up “the concept of life, the Idea” (WL 2: 440, SL 737); thereby the notion of teleology distances itself from the postulate of an extramundane intellect and is closer to “the true investigation of nature, which aims at cognizing the properties of nature not as extraneous, but as immanent determinatenesses” (WL 2: 438, SL 735).

In Aristotle, finality subordinates under its activity external necessity; so here the syllogism of finality or purposiveness, called “the rational in its existence,” is the Concept that attains to itself in and through mechanical and chemical objectivity. In the words of the parallel sections of the Encyclopedia, the Concept as purpose “does not pass over, but preserves itself, in its operation; that is, it brings only itself about and is at the end what it was in the beginning, or in its originality: what is truly original comes to be only through this self-preservation” (§204 A, EL 280).

The movement of the actualization of the purpose is one of the removal of its subjectivity (by which Hegel means the presupposition that it refer to the objective world “as to something already there”), and of “posit[ing] the object as determined by the Concept” (WL 2: 447, SL 742 transl. modified). Thus there is no longer an otherness outside the Concept; objectivity ceases to be external to the Concept, becoming instead the concrete inwardly mediated totality of subject and object: the Idea.

Only in the remark to §204 of the Encyclopedia does Hegel mention Aristotle. But that he has nothing else in mind than the Aristotelian natural beings is shown by the oral addition to the introductory section of the Philosophy of Nature: “This notion of end was already recognized by Aristotle, too, and he called this activity the nature of a thing; the true teleological method – and this is the highest – consists, therefore, in the method of regarding nature as free in her own peculiar vital activity” (ENZ.C §245 Z).

In the remark to §360, which has to do with the animal organism, we find once again the already mentioned judgment on Aristotle and Kant. Hegel is talking about the difficulty of understanding the animal instinct; the only correct way to characterize it is to see in it the concept of end in its immediate and unreflected or unconscious form. Hegel’s comment in the Addition is: “Because the urge is not a known end, the animal still does not know its ends as ends; and that which unconsciously acts in accordance with ends Aristotle calls phusis.”

18 WL 2: 446; SL 741 inserts “concrete” before “existence,” which is absent from the German text.
In teleology, the activity of the Concept has as its content only itself (ENZ.C §212); the principle of objectivity is now subjectivity itself. In the Idea, the Concept is actualized in the object; in the immediate Idea, life, it exists as the soul animating a living body. At first life is a universal particularizing itself in living individuals which assimilate the existing world by making it the means through which the living determines itself. The truth of objectivity is its sublation by the soul, which mediates itself with the world, appropriating it and negating its otherness thanks to its corporeity. “This is in the first place life as soul, as the Concept of itself that is perfectly determined within itself, the initiating, self-moving \textit{principle}” (WL 2: 475, SL 765 transl. modified).

If we turn the living being into a mechanical or chemical product, as does the understanding, for which life is an insoluble riddle, then the Concept is taken to be external to the organism which, in turn, is grasped as something dead. Instead the organism is defined as the Concept teleologically immanent in its realization. This means that its limbs are not parts but members. For the understanding, the relation of parts to whole is analyzed into a simple aggregate. The limbs of a body are, on the contrary, necessarily in relation to their overarching unity. Life, the soul, is the absolute unity of the end that posits the many as means, as ideal moments of its self-realization (WL 2: 476, SL 766; ENZ.C §216 Z). In the Idea of life the opposition is the merely formal one between \textit{dunamis} and \textit{energeia}: in the life process “the active impelling substance and the product are the same” (VGPh 1: 399, transl. at HP 1: 345). In the life process, in which the living individual shapes itself out of its state of need and opposition to the existing world, the object loses its specific indifferent and alien nature and becomes a means for subjectivity.

But the individual is finite and mediated through its relation to its genus; only through reproduction does the finitude of natural life affirm itself as the self-perpetuating universal. The peculiar cunning of reason in life is that while individuals tend to their own satisfaction and preservation, they at the same time produce their inner essence, which preexists to them, the genus. “In copulation (\textit{Begattung}) the immediacy of the living individuality perishes; the death of this life is the procession (\textit{Hervorgehen}) of spirit” (WL 2: 486, SL 774). For philosophy \textit{Begattung} is no accident; it is the fundamental category of the Idea of life as \textit{Gattung}, genus; the genus is not a “this” but, even though only real as individual, it is exempt from the finitude of passing-over.

As is clear from the \textit{Lectures} on Aristotle’s psychology (VGPh 200–2), all this has to do with Hegel’s reading of the \textit{De anima}, and in particu-
lar with the first four chapters of book II. For Aristotle, given that natural bodies are substances in that they have life (II 1, 412a 13–16), and that life qua generation, nutrition, and corruption are what discriminate animate from inanimate beings (II 2, 413a 21), then in the case of animate beings it is idle to look for the unity of body and soul, matter and form (II 1, 412b 6–8). In the living individual we distinguish matter from form as two moments immanent in one another. The soul is the form qua actuality of the body; likewise, the function is the form of the organ, so that an organ severed from the living unity would only retain its name by homonymy (II 1, 412b 21). Here too the essence is the activity. It is the function or activity of the organ that defines it, and the soul is the entelechy of the organic body which has life potentially (II 1, 412a 27–8; 2, 414a 17–19).

That the death of the individual is the condition for the emergence of spirit, that the end of the living being is the infinity of its genus, is something that Hegel could find in Diotima’s speech, before Aristotle (Sympos. 206e: reproduction “is what mortals have in place of immortality”). Aristotle writes in the De anima: “for any living being . . . the most natural act (ergôn) is the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine” (II 4, 415a 26-b 1 Smith transl. modified). The soul is the final, formal, and efficient cause of the body (efficient cause of movement). But it is the final cause in two senses: it uses the body to maintain itself in life and develop its activities, and it preserves the species. In this second sense, what is identical to itself and numerically one suppresses itself to perpetuate what is specifically one (II 4, 415b 7–15). For example, in eating, contra Empedocles and Democritus, the body does not assimilate the like, but the unlike as an other, which it makes like itself. Thus, the active eating animal does not change or increase itself because it is not an aggregate; rather, it retains its form by making the external thing like itself (II 4, 416a 29–b 31).

In the Aristotelian soul Hegel had good reason to find a model for his idea of substance as that which is at the same time the subject of its moments, an archê kai telos. Even the transition from the immediate Idea to the absolute Idea, from the issues of De an. II 1–4 to those of Met. Α 7–9, draws on the third book of the De anima. In the remaining sections of the Subjective Logic spirit as cognition is the truth of the Idea of life, or the Idea freed from immediacy. Here the object is the movement of comprehending itself within the unity of self-consciousness, but in such
a way as to remain finite in its givenness for the subject. In practical
spirit the world is the subject’s object of consideration in that it is per-
vaded by its activity; but only in the perfect energeia of the true and the
good does the absolute know itself in its activity (Tun) and “in its works”
(WL 2: 404, SL 706). This “science of the divine Concept” (WL 2: 572,
SL 846 transl. modified) is the noësis noëseôs, the pure form of the free
and absolute thought in itself which is not yet identical with the con-
crete reality of spirit (ENZ.C § 552 A).

For an examination of Hegel’s treatment of the De anima I must refer
the reader to Chapter 8. What needs to be emphasized here is that, in
Hegel’s judgment, the concept of subjectivity as the actuation of its own
end and self puts Aristotle above the modern philosophies of reflection.
True, Aristotle did not know the infinite value of particular subjectivity
affirmed by modern philosophy, from Descartes to Kant and Fichte, in
religion by Christianity (Lutheranism in particular), and in history by
the French revolution. However, the structure of a teleological subjec-
tivity, which is an end to itself, is Aristotle’s greatest merit in Hegel’s eyes.

In the Lectures on the Metaphysics Hegel curiously argues polemically
against Schelling by showing the superiority of the energeia of the Aris-
totelian God (the unity with itself that realizes itself in its self-objectifi-
cation) over the abstract system of identity (VGPh 163–4).19 The true
philosophy is not a dry and dead identity lacking development but
God’s “energy” (ibid.; recall what we saw above regarding the formal-
ism of a system that repeats its principle in all aspects of its philosophy
and does not account for difference).

According to Haym (Hegel 1857: 226), in the Preface to the Phenom-
enology of Spirit Hegel distances himself from Schelling by arguing in
Aristotelian fashion. In the Preface, the substance as subject is “the
process of its own becoming”; the true is not identity, but “self-restor-
ing sameness,” “the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its
end also as its beginning.” This is also called “God’s life” (W 3: 23, PhS
10). These words are the same as those used to describe the absolute
horror for mediation and for the development from dunamis to energeia
is a peculiar ignorance of the nature of “reason,” which is “purposive ac-

19 This is all the more curious since, as we have seen in the Introduction, energeia is used
in the same period by Hegel against Schelling and by Schelling against Hegel, in the
Münchener Vorlesungen and elsewhere. Undoubtedly Aristotle would have found
Schelling’s specific point on divine energeia closer to his understanding of God than
Hegel’s notion of absolute subjectivity.
tivity (das Zweckmässige Tun)” (W 3: 26, PhS 12). This is one of the earliest and yet decisive occurrences of internal finality as integral to the Absolute in Hegel. It will come as no surprise that at this point Hegel writes: “in the sense in which Aristotle, too, defines nature as purposive activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved that is also self-moving and as such is subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is being-for-self or pure negativity. The result is the same as the beginning, only because the beginning is the purpose” (ibid.).

We have seen how the Concept is first because it is the object of its own development. It does not seem far-fetched at this point to say that Aristotelian immanent teleology is of decisive importance for Hegel’s own definition of reason and the Absolute, and for the shift from the position of his 1804/5 Logic to his mature conception.\(^{20}\) To be sure, Hegel applies development to history and to the phenomenology of consciousness in a way alien to Aristotle. But the concept of subjectivity was not simply implicit in Aristotle; it formed the core of his speculative philosophy for Hegel.

Among other things, the Preface to the Phenomenology focuses on the relation between subjectivity and truth. Given the thesis of the immanence of thought discussed in Chapter 2, the true cannot be but its development, the dialectic of self-mediation. If so, empirical predicates cannot be attached to it as to a subsisting and fixed substrate. The absolute is the activity of developing itself; thus it takes on definitions of itself which progressively approximate its result and truth, that it is thought thinking itself. If the absolute is the becoming of its self-consciousness through thought-determinations, proceeding from the more abstract to the more concrete, then it is impossible for the normal predicative form, the judgment, to express the speculative as the whole. The judgment cannot render the identity within difference of subject and predicate: the copula is the external connection of two independent and different terms. Further, it is in the nature of the sentence to be a finite, positional proposition whose determinate negation can only be expressed in another proposition opposed to it.

The speculative language should be able to express the two senses in which the subject is end to itself: its being substrate and its being activity, the self-determining concept. But this cannot be expressed in the predicate in the sense of the traditional grammatical logical relation. There the subject is taken as given, an inert and fixed presupposition

\(^{20}\) Compare Chapter 11 below.
whose determination is conceived as an aggregate of different predicates attached to it. The problem of the speculative sentence is that of conceiving the true as a movement between subject and predicate where one of the opposites must not be absolutized. But as sentence “the speculative is only the internal inhibition” (W 3: 61, PhS 40), that is, the form of the sentence is intrinsically finite and cannot exhibit the speculative content, the Concept’s return to itself. The form of the sentence must be dissolved from within, set into motion. Only dialectical thinking can start this movement articulating itself in a syllogism containing affirmation, negation, and the unity of both, and expressing the true as the identity of identity and non-identity.

This question, which arises here in the form of a problematic corollary of Aristotle’s subjectivity, seems actually to be turned against the traditional predicative model of the Categories, where the hupokeimenon is only the passive substrate of attribution which does not include also the subject as energeia. One may conjecture that Hegel would have turned the thesis of Met. Z 6 against the discursive model of the Categories. In Z 6 Aristotle identifies the “this” and the essence for all things which are said per se. To avoid all infinite regress and multiplication of essences, the identity of thing and intelligibility is expressed in the indivisible unity of a definition, where the predicate is not attached to a subject but constitutes it and is identical with it.21

What is less conjectural in this regard is the importance of the issue of the syllogism in Hegel, and his criticism of the formal understanding of it. It is clear that for Hegel the syllogisms as organa, instruments, of scientific demonstration are only interesting to the extent that they express the unconscious syllogisms operating in nature.22 In Aristotle the cause of production and generation is the essence; natural relations are so centered around essence that Aristotle compares generation to a syllogism (Met. Z 9, 1034a 30–1). Hamelin writes that “the relations on which logic hinges are natural relations, nature syllogizes like spirit” (Système, 1920: 191). In the same sense Hegel speaks of the teleological process as a syllogism.

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21 Düsing (“Ontologie,” 1997: 77) is the only one in the literature who mentions, but does not pursue, the possibility of Aristotle’s positive influence on Hegel’s notion of speculative sentence.

22 See N. Hartmann, “Aristoteles” (1923: 229–30). On the syllogism in Aristotle and Hegel compare the works by Van der Meulen (Gebrochene Mitte, 1958); von Diersburg (“Hegels Methode,” 1960); Krohn (Formale Logik, 1972); Guillamaud (“Médiation,” 1987); Doz (Logique de Hegel, 1987).
For Hegel, the syllogism is the “posited . . . real Concept” (ENZ.C §181 A); it makes explicit the development of the Concept and expounds the circular mediation of the moments of reality as an inwardly determined unity. “The definition of the Absolute from now on is that it is the syllogism . . . ‘Everything is a syllogism’” (ENZ.C §181 A, EL 257). This means that everything is a concept which as “the subject concludes itself with itself” (ENZ.C §182, EL 258).

The syllogism, a connection of premises and conclusions through a middle, is, as a proof-structure, the form that necessity has for the subjective understanding, which can only grasp things in their finitude (ENZ.C §182 A). “It is no wonder that these figures later have come to be treated as an empty formalism” (ENZ.C §187 A, EL 263). But contrary to what many are used to thinking, in the Metaphysics, the Physics, and the De anima “the speculative concept is always what is dominant” (ibid.). “In his metaphysical concepts, just as in the concepts of the natural and the spiritual, he [Aristotle] was so far from seeking to make the form of the syllogism of the understanding the basis and the criterion, that one might say that not a single one of the metaphysical concepts could have arisen or stood its ground, if it had had to be subjected to the laws of the understanding” (ibid.).

To conclude, Hegel appears to be convinced that he can supersede the substrate-property schema of the Aristotelian tradition inspired by the discursive model of the true found in the De Interpretatione and the Categories by recourse to a principle he deems more genuinely Aristotelian: the theory of the self’s mediation with itself, of energeia as subjectivity. How the dissociation of finitude and self-referentiality in Aristotle is more problematic than Hegel thought is the object of Chapters 5 and 6.
Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or “mystical” secrets than does perception.

(E. Husserl, *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*)

§1. Substance and Activity

Is Hegel justified in this characterization of form as subjectivity in Aristotle? Is this interpretation of the identity of form, end, and cause of motion (Zweck, Bewegungsvorsache) legitimate? Certainly at first glance the order and content of the central books of the *Metaphysics* would seem to support such an interpretation. It would require some qualifications; but it is clear that Aristotle progressively moves from the investigation of substance to that of form or essence (Z 4), then shows how essence is cause (Z 17) and energeia, the actuality of matter (H 2). There are, however, many objections to such a reconstruction; without going into details, the general objection is that this seems to make sense mostly on the basis of a restriction of substance to natural substance, and that it becomes problematic when we speak of mathematical or artificial forms, and also of separate forms (the nous, the unmoved movers). If so, then the problem of the nature of the central books becomes pressing: are they the object of a physical investigation, that is, do they deal with the principles of sensible substances subject to movement? If they do, does any difference remain between first and second philosophy on the treatment of substance? If they do, how can anything universal about substance, not to mention about being, be argued on the basis of their conclusions? How can they prepare the way to Λ, and to the investigation of first substance, as most interpreters argue, if first
substance is precisely not the form and actuality of any matter but exists separately? If causes and principles are not the same for sensible and separate substances, is substance simply a homonymous term? If it were, no \textit{pros hen} or \textit{tôi ephexês} unity could hold the \textit{Metaphysics} together.

These are only some of the innumerable difficulties that beset these books. They are full of tensions, sometimes flat out contradictions, or at best riddles and apparently insoluble difficulties. I know of no single comprehensive solution to all of them. It seems to me that all exegeses of these books emphasize one aspect at the expense of others. Even the best commentaries cannot help downplaying the importance of passages that conflict with their interpretations.

The understandable appeal of a genetic reconstruction of Aristotle’s position draws its lure from such basic ambiguities. Were it possible to date different conflicting passages, we would have a plausible interpretation of Aristotle’s evolution on the problems of form, essence, and substance. Unfortunately, many such genetic studies beg the question they were meant to solve. The transformation of a tension into historical stages of a development leaves untouched the unity of its content or conflicting moments, and the unity of the \textit{Metaphysics} as a whole is forsaken as a matter of fact from the beginning. Further, reconstructions such as Jaeger’s present as fact, which is then read into the text, what is only a presupposition that cannot be grounded and which has, in fact, been largely disputed – Aristotle’s move from an initial allegiance to Platonism to an independent realist metaphysics.

I believe the main obstacle to a unitary interpretation of substance is Aristotle’s ambiguity in his treatment of it. Like all Aristotelian ambiguities, it has proven immensely fruitful for posterity, and it is no wonder that opposing schools have found passages supporting their interpretations of Aristotle over the centuries. In the case at hand, the main source of difficulty lies in Aristotle’s oscillation between the definition of substance as essence and as substrate (\textit{to ti ên einai} and \textit{hupokeimenon}, \textit{Z} 3, 1028b 34–6). This is also rephrasable as the problem of the essence of Socrates (\textit{Z} 6, 1032a 6–8). The essence of Socrates’s soul and of his soul are the same (\textit{Z} 10, 1036a 1), but it is not clear, writes Aristotle, if Socrates denotes the composite substance or its essence (\textit{H} 3, 1043a 29–31). Unlike soul, man and the essence of man are different (\textit{H} 3, 1043b 2–3; compare \textit{De an.} III 4, 429b 10–14, on the difference between essence of flesh and flesh). Clearly the essence of a composite substance is not the same as all of its material components.
Yet the whole purpose of Z 6 was to show, against the Platonic Ideas, that singularity and essence coincide (hekaston and to ti ên einai, 1031a 15–16); this excludes substances with accidental properties (white man), but it is certainly not meant to be a trivial identification of essence and singular essence: it is the man, the composite substance, who is identical with his essence. If the essence were altogether other than the thing, we would have the infinite regress that pops up whenever Aristotle criticizes the Ideas.

Problems only get more acute when we proceed to identify form, essence, and universal. Not only individuals, but even corruptible substances, if we follow the translation of ta phtheiromena as referring to a genus of things, become unknowable, for there is no science of them (tòn phthartòn, An. Post. I 8, 75b 24). Aristotle writes that we cannot have definition or demonstration of ousión tôn aisthêtôn tôn kath’hekasta, singular sensible substances (Z 15, 1039b 28); but he also writes that a composite is known in its universal concept (tôi katholou logôi, Z 10, 1036a 8). But how is the universal concept related to the thing? Isn’t the universal a genus, that is, matter or potency to be differentiated into essence as ultimate species? And what is the relation between the definition of essence and predication, on the one hand, and pre-discursive intellection of essences, if any (whether pre-discursive means given intuitively, or reachable dialectically or epagogically)? What is the connection between essence and properties, essence and matter, essence and contingent singular traits? If essence is the principle of scientific syllogisms but does not ground accidents, exactly what follows from our knowledge of essence in science? Such are some of the questions I will try to address in this chapter.

The worst trouble comes when interpreters of the Metaphysics read form, essence, and substance interchangeably. This is to some extent justifiable, for nowhere does Aristotle sharply distinguish his usage of terms; he always begins with the common understanding of ordinary language from which he then occasionally and significantly departs. But it seems to me that while some difficulties are intrinsic to Aristotle’s text, some are based on misconceptions of various kinds. For example, it is necessary to differentiate Aristotle’s essence according to the relative context. Sometimes essence is contrasted with the other categories in predication, sometimes with the composite substance it defines; sometimes it is equated with form and distinguished from matter, sometimes it is contrasted with the universal on the one hand and the singular or particular on the other. Thus while contradictions are some-
times real and the aporias as genuine as can be, other times the difficulties are introduced by interpreters.

Concerning form, matter, essence, and actuality, it is clear in the *Science of Logic* that Hegel could not be more hylemorphist. For his interpretation of the *Metaphysics*, being is delimited to substance, and substance to the intelligibility of matter. Hegel appreciates the Aristotelian priority of form and actuality over matter and potency, as well as the anteriority of the definition with respect to its parts. For him this is tantamount to affirming the freedom of the Concept, the self-determination of the infinite in the finite. We may read this interpretation with a charitable eye and preserve its fundamental line, despite its arbitrariness; we may pass over its conflation of subject, one, substrate, form, and activity versus predicate, many, matter, and potentiality, all unified in the notion of a self-determining concept or a self-particularizing universal. But we must admit that it is not the most common interpretation. The very core of it, the identification of substance and essence, is used by many interpreters to show the self-defeating nature of Aristotle’s claims. From Schwegler to Zeller, from Robin to Jaeger, from Hartmann to Cherniss and Düring, the objection is basically the same: for Aristotle only forms are knowable, and forms preexist composites. Aristotle’s protests to the contrary, he remains a Platonist and simply moves form into the composite; his insistance that only individual substances exist drives an even sharper wedge between his idealist side (in a Platonic, not Hegelian sense) and his realist side; as a result, the gap is insoluble. This may well be the final verdict on Aristotle’s metaphysics. I do not think this is an “unwitting caricature”\(^1\) of Aristotle, because its reasons are not weak. It is Aristotle who insists that forms are ungenerated (Z 8, 1033b 5–8; Z 15, 1039b 23–5), and that matter in itself is unknowable (Z 10, 1036a 8). Yet everything turns on the question of how matter and form are conceived. And in this respect I think it necessary to distinguish respects and different senses in Aristotle’s argument.

The following sections will be devoted to a close reading of some of the senses in which being and intelligibility overlap.

§2. Mathematical, Artificial and Natural Forms

If the composite substance as such is not definable apart from its *eidos*, and matter, preliminarily understood as an irrational or alogical un-

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knowable principle, is excluded from knowledge, then Aristotle would
be reintroducing the Platonic separation within the composite sub-
stance. The form would then be separate from the thing, itself a part of
substance instead of its unifying principle, which is against the thesis of
Z 6. All natural beings would then have to be divided into their form,
on which science depends, and their existence, which is necessarily re-
lated to movement and sensible multiplicity; paradoxically, what is not
their essence is pushed back into the realm of the indeterminate and
accidental, so that the knowledge of natural beings would not differ
from the knowledge of abstract, independent forms.

How are beings in which form has a necessary relation to matter de-
finable for Aristotle? If definition has parts, and in the case of natural
beings we integrate material aspects in the form, how can the parts con-
stitute an indivisible necessary whole and not an aggregate? In turn, if
matter is determined by form, when can we say that it is sufficiently
formed so as to be ousia, independent substance?

Substance for Aristotle is the inextricable unity of the following two
determinations: the ultimate substrate which is not predicated of any-
things else (to th’hupokeimenon eschaton, Met. Δ 8, 1017b 21–6), and
something determinate and separable (tode ti kai chôriston), that is, es-
sentially different from otherness and intelligible as prior to its prop-
erties. Thus substance is what underlies change and predication
and can exist per se (kath’hautên). Substance is a naturally indivisible
whole (holon), not an aggregate of parts (pan, Δ 26, 1024a 1–10). In
this way substance is primary in all senses (Z 1, 1028a 30: kai logôi kai
gnôsei kai chronôi). Only substance can exist separately; we understand
categories and predicates with reference to substance but not vice
versa, such that we know something when we know its essence; parts
cannot preexist the whole to which they belong. However, essence is
not an abstract universal, but immanent in substance as a real essence,
expressing what a singular thing is per se (to ti ên einai hekastôi ho legetai
kath’hauto, Z 4, 1029b 14).

Aristotle at first equates the essence of a sensible substance with the
essence of a bronze sphere (Z 10, 1035a 25–34); what Aristotle seems
to mean by sphere is a circular shape which externally applies to all mat-
ter. Such is the case of a mathematical essence whose form is pressed
upon an inert matter but where the essence itself remains separable
from it. But the circle only exists in matter, and more importantly not
just in any matter but only in that matter which can assume its shape.
Mathematical abstraction deals with its object as if it were separate from
matter; but actually it is not (it is separate in thought, τέι νοῆσει, reads Phys. II 2, 193b 31–5).

On the other hand, if substance is the form and actuality of a house, then to list its matter (stones, wood) is to express its potentiality, while stating its end (protection of things and persons) expresses its essence (H 2, 1043a 14–21). In another passage (Phys. II 9, 200a 34-b 9), where Aristotle argues that, for natural beings, even though the definition indicates the end, this is possible only if we consider what kind of matter underlies form as its means, he writes that if we want to define the “saw” as a certain division, then the saw must have as its matter iron with teeth of a certain kind. In the case of the snub nose (Met. E 1, 1025b 31), and in the case of anger (De an. I 1, 403a 29-b 16), the principles of matter and form are not simply complementary or correlative but overlap. Here form is exclusively the form of a certain matter. If in anger the materialist sees the boiling of the blood (the material cause), and the dialectician the desire for revenge (the final cause), we must instead give a definition of anger that expresses the indissolubility of the corporeal movement and its determinate motive, of the material and functional aspects.

This is ambiguous, however. Putting on the same par the living being and a bronze sphere, though serving the purpose of showing that, like natural or artificial forms, mathematical forms also exist in matter and not separately, at the same time groups together composite substance with essential unity and external application of shape and matter, or the whole that preexists its parts and the whole that results from the correct arrangement of its parts. Concluding from this that the composite is not definable (Z 10, 1035b 24–1036a 5) is quite misleading. However, Aristotle then gives his own solution of the ambiguity2 when he writes:

the comparison which Socrates the younger used to make in the case of animal is not good; for it leads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement [ανευ κινήσεως] – nor, therefore, without reference to the parts and to their being in a certain state. For it is not a hand in any state that is a part of man, but the hand that can fulfill its function, which therefore must be alive; if it is not alive it is not a part (Z 11, 1036b 26–32, transl. Ross modified).

2 Aristotle’s arguments are less pénible than S. Mansion supposes (“Universel,” 1981: 341).
Neither is matter dependent on form nor form on matter, for neither is apart from the other; only the composite substance exists separately (haplōs, H 1, 1042a 31). The composite substance’s separation is in being, not in abstraction as with the mathematical forms or in concept – τοὶ λογοὶ – as with the forms of sensible composites (1042a 29). If there is then a difference between mathematical and natural forms, then in the case of the soul of an animal as the actuality of a certain body we cannot define the soul independently of the activities and functions of a body (Z 10, 1035b 14–18), or independently of sensibility and movement, or even of the relation between parts and whole (i.e., regardless of if the organs can exercise their functions: Z 11, 1036b 21–32).

“Snubness” and “living being” are examples of the necessary relation of form to matter. They are analogous, but also different insofar as snubness cannot be defined; it is a predicate which cannot be without the subject and the definition of which must repeat the subject in itself (snub nose is concave nose), therefore giving rise to infinite regress (Z 5). If, as it just turned out, all composite substances must be defined as forms relative to matter, this should not be understood as if Aristotle denies his previous claim that we only define forms. The definition of composites does not contain material parts, which are posterior to the composite (Z 10, 1035b 20–1), but is only meant to show the necessary relation of form to a certain kind of matter. For example, the soul is the soul of a body that has life potentially: thus it is not of any body in general, but nor is it of a body that we must then proceed to enumerate in its various parts and organs and functions.

Looking closer, it appears that all definitions of forms in matter – mathematical, natural, artificial – are of this sort. A lintel, or ice, are only understandable as the position or disposition of matter to which they refer (H 2, 1042b 26 ff.). Matter is the matter of a form, the potentiality of a whole actualized by a form. This compels us to conceive of form as a principle of the organization of matter, as its cause. Saying that matter is potentiality and form is actuality is not sufficient: the latter is the form of the former. Form and matter are not two elements we arrive at once we logically analyze substances into their constituents; forms are real causes, the physical organization of matter. If so, then it is clear that forms are not paradigms of intelligibility but principles that explain change, the causes of the actualization of matter. Aristotle does not ask how we come to have plurality from an original one, as did Parmenides and Plato, but how the many can be a one. The answer is: through its form qua cause.
This “hyletic correction”\(^3\) of essence, which integrates the reference
to matter in definition, lets us qualify the role of form as a principle of
the organization of material parts. If the definition of a mathematical
form is “this form (in this matter),” the definition of natural as well as
of artificial forms will have to be “these materials, these parts, united
and subordinated as means to this form, which is their final cause.”
Essence, as I said, is no longer the simple intelligibility of the thing, but
the cause itself of the unitary constitution of the thing.

However, natural substances are a variegated and stratified multiplicity. This important consequence runs parallel to the necessity of dis-
tinguishing realms of being. If the “actuality or the logos is different
when the matter is different,” as is the definition (H 2, 1043a 12–13),
the conclusion follows that the kind of definition varies according to
the definienda (Z 10, 1035a 22–5), that is, to the different relation form-
matter that is proper to them. This problem concerns the scientificity
of the knowledge of nature and the different degrees of intelligibility
of matter as always already shaped. This emerges with full force in the
last years of Aristotle’s natural investigation.

His biological writings (De gen. et corr. II 7, De part. anim. I 1, II 1–2,
De gen. anim. I 1) sketch a hierarchy of beings corresponding to the ra-
tios or principles of combination of the matter which gives rise to
them.\(^4\) There are (De part. anim. II 1, 646a 12–24) (1) inorganic uni-
form homeomeries composed by the four simple primary elements,
that is, which result in the properties subsequently active in the move-
ment of bodies such as fluidity, solidity, temperature, weight, and den-
sity. These give rise to (2) homeomeries whose essence results from a
chemical synthesis of elements in accordance with different formulas,
such as bones, metals, and flesh, in which the unity remains an undif-
ferentiated continuum. (3) Finally, there are anhomeomeries, hetero-
genous parts such as organs. In the latter, matter is differentiated into
discontinuous, mutually distinct organs; these are distinct, but not in-
dependent. The continuation of the passage is very significant: the
statement “the order of the formation process is reverse to that of the
essence of the thing itself” means precisely that the parts of the animal

\(^3\) This expression is Kessler’s (in Einheit, 1972: 29 ff.). See also Aubenque, “Colère” (1957);
Tugendhat, Ti kata tinos (1958: 110–14); S. Mansion, “Definition physique” (1969:
124–32); Leszl, Logic (1970: 486–538); Happ, Hyle (1971: 570–9); Gill, Substance (1989:

\(^4\) Compare Tugendhat, Ti kata tinos (1958: 94–101), Happ, Hyle (1971: 296 ff.), Gill, Sub-
– the hand, the eye, which retain their name inasmuch as they can excercize their proper activity, otherwise are only said by homonymy – they do not have independent existence. They are the particular functions of the animal in its totality which is alone separate substance, prior logically and ontologically, and the subject of becoming.\textsuperscript{5}

It would seem that the case of the living being more clearly highlights the role of entelechy, totality, and individuality; it is mostly here that the form is the principle of finalistic organization of a multiplicity in a one. Here the definition is accordingly the teleological adequation of a potency to its telos. It is tempting to draw the Hegelian conclusion that the identity of substance and form is not a simple givenness, the result of an indifferent matter and a form determining it, but is a becoming, the essential unity of the activities which constitute it as the means through which the living being realizes its telos and attains to its form.

This suggestion appears to be only strengthened when we pass from book Z to book H and to the reformulation of the problem of the unity of form and matter in sensible substance in the terms of matter and potency. Now the question no longer concerns how the unity of two supposedly mutually external and pre-poseded elements is to be established, but how a material potentiality is its own actuality. Now the definition is no longer articulated in response to the question “What is it?” (\textit{ti esti}), but to the question “Why?” (\textit{dia ti}: Met. Z 17, H 6; An post. II 2, 90a 1–23; 10, 93b 38–94a 10; De an. II 2, 413a 11–20). Definition does not simply identify substance with its essence in the way it would a logical atomic subject independent of its predicates. Essence is rather the cause of substance as that which brings potentiality to actuality, or that which determines matter. It would seem that to define animal as an animate body that is generated, grows, dies, is endowed with locomotion and sensibility, hence with organs, would be tantamount to integrating movement in its definition. Its logos is determined as the relation of means to ends which constitutes it. In this sense essence is no longer simple; it is the ground of the unity of the living being, or the middle of its actualization.

\textsuperscript{5} Aristotle assimilates point (2) and Empedocles’s logos tês mixeôs (De gen. et corr. II 7, 334a 25-b 2; De part. anim. I 1, 642a 18–25), which he considers legitimate but insufficient for the study of life (De an. I 5, 409b 32-410a 3). Let me underline this in light of what we discuss in Chapter 7, Hegel’s gradation mechanism-chemism-teleology. Hegel says that the truth of chemism is teleology; he does not imply that chemism thereby becomes “false,” unless one pretends to use it as a model of explanation for a superior, more complex level of being such as the organic. Compare Giacchê, “Teleologia” (1988).
Aristotle’s concern is with essence as a principle for demonstration; apodictic science will be a syllogistic proof-structure starting from essence. In §4 we will see that only once the definition of essence is qualified as the definition of the \textit{dioti}, of the “why” something is what it is, does it form the premise of causal demonstrative knowledge. This seems to set essence in motion, as it were; if essence is a principle, then it is also an “active” principle for the demonstration of per se predicates. This makes the simplicity of essence the potentiality of a multiplicity of consequences.

In this context it is important to notice that the activities defining the composite substances are not only organic forms. For all substances, essences are the causes that make potentiality actual; the “proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, the other actually” (H 6, 1045b 18–19). If matter and form, potentiality and actuality are two names for the same thing, then this characterization is common to all substances over and above their differences.

Aristotle had already introduced the example of a house in this text. In the house, it is the form that explains why matter, stones, and wood, are a unity. In the \textit{De anima} (II 1, 412b 9–17) the examples are those of the axe and of the soul. In the axe the activity of cutting defines the wedgelike form of the matter, the iron bar; the \textit{energeia} of the axe is the overarching principle of the four causes and is obviously not organic finality. In the soul, which has in itself the principle of motion, the form is the very actuality of the body. The only difference is that in the former case essence can be said to preexist the composite substance, in that matter must be of a certain kind but indifferent to the activity, undergoing whatever change is imposed on it. I can also use iron to make, say, nails, not just an axe. In the latter case, \textit{energeia} is instead the actualization of a potentiality as \textit{internal} finality; essence, matter, end, and efficient cause form a tighter kind of unity. Matter is not formless passivity but resembles more the impulse of a \textit{dunamis} to its end.

In sum, if all forms are in matter (\textit{tod’en tôide}, “this form in this matter:” Z 11, 1036b 23; \textit{De an.} III 4, 429b 14), then for all \textit{logoi enuloi} (\textit{De an.} I 4, 403a 25) “to bring all things thus to forms and to do away with matter is useless effort” (\textit{Met.} Z 11, 1036b 21–4).

It would be a serious misunderstanding of Aristotle to argue that this qualification of essence should not mislead us because definition is only definition of form and first philosophy is about separate forms anyway.\footnote{This position is argued for by Reale in his commentary on the \textit{Metaphysics} (2: 607, 614).}
Aristotle does say that it is physical investigation that is concerned with the soul, while first philosophy is concerned with separate beings, *ta kechórismena* (*De an.* I.1, 403b 15–6). But by separate beings he means the intellect and first substance, not forms supposedly independent of matter. The form of a composite is separable by the intellect (*De an.* III 4, 430a 6–7), hence only potentially. But if this is so, again, the problem is the homonymy of substance and form. We must conclude that the central books of the *Metaphysics* appear to be about the subject of physics, in the Aristotelian sense: the investigation of the principles of composite substances. What they can do for first philosophy is make available their conclusions about actuality and form to the metaphysical study of the different meanings and causes of being. They cannot ground the study of separate forms because they were never meant to carry out a reduction of composites to forms alone.

Though this is fairly clear, what is less clear is what concerns us most directly here, namely what Aristotle would have thought of Hegel’s reading. This is a difficult but crucial point. My impression is that, in part, Aristotle would have disagreed, and in part be willing to agree but unable. Let me explain myself on the basis of the example of a living being.

Aristotle would have disagreed in that strictly speaking the definition of essences with reference to movement in the passage from Z 11 quoted above *cannot* include movement and the multiplicity of material parts, organs, and functions of an animal, despite Aristotle’s formulation, for two reasons: (1) What undergoes (or initiates) movement is the composite, not the essence (the animate body, not the soul); even if the soul is the principle of the per se accidents of the composite, the animal’s various activities and organic functions cannot follow syllogistically from essence. Definitions are not definitions of becoming but of being; they identify the essence of a composite as its cause and actuality, but are not meant to incorporate the composite’s life and multiplicity of predicates. (2) Consequently, the essence must be expressed in a definition of the ultimate difference, and this has to be simple and incomposite. Even if essence is described as a ratio of material parts, a ratio is simple, unlike the material parts it defines.

But unfortunately on this decisive point Aristotle seems to waver substantially. And not just because his explicit statement seems to claim the contrary (recall that “an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement . . . and to parts”). More importantly, even if Aristotle’s polemical aim is to identify being
with the intelligibility of the singular thing, he nevertheless finds it necessary to differentiate between parts of form and parts of the composite (Z 10, 1035b 18–22; 1035b 31–3; Θ 7, 1049a 29–30). Attributes, accidents (whether kath’ hautoa or contingent), properties, and all becoming are said of the composite, not of the essence; and the essence is not a cause of becoming but of something’s being so and so.

However, if this is what I believe Aristotle should have said on this fundamental point, he is again far from ambiguous. He writes that “to say that it is the soul that is angry is as if we were to say that it is the soul that weaves or builds . . . it is better to say that it is the man that does this with his soul. What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul, but that it sometimes terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it” (I 4, 408b 12–18). In the following chapter he writes that knowing, perceiving, desiring, local motion, and even growth, maturity, and decay belong to and are brought about by the soul (I 5, 411a 26–30).

A glance at Posterior Analytics II 3 confirms the thesis that essence is not the cause of becoming but of being, and at the same time complicates it. It confirms it in that Aristotle here distinguishes between definition and demonstration: essences are defined, what belongs necessarily or for the most part to something can be demonstrated syllogistically (91a 1–2; II 4, 91a 14–16). It also complicates it, and this is why I wrote that Aristotle would want to agree with Hegel but could not, because an essence must be presupposed in apodictic science as the principle out of which the per se properties are demonstrated or deduced.

After painstaking efforts at distinguishing substance and essence in order to avoid confusion, or conclusions about the self-defeating nature of Aristotle’s claims, it seems that we are brought back once again to their conflation. An examination of how this is supposed to work in the case of the animal shows that Aristotle fails to deduce per se properties from the definition of the soul, which in turn cannot function as cause of demonstration and as syllogistic middle.7

Actually, the definition of the soul is a good showcase to test Aristotle’s procedure. It seems to me that in the De anima Aristotle found it tempting to adopt the model of the Posterior Analytics (I 13, II 10). He begins by saying that a definition of the soul that does not enable us to discover its properties is futile, and that his predecessors failed precisely

7 Compare Owens, “Definition” (Papers, 1981); Movia’s commentary on the De anima (61, 285–91).
on this point (I 1, 402b 25-403a 2). At first he gives an epagogical definition of the soul, a definition of the “that” (II 1, 412a 11–12), which he then grounds as a causal definition to serve as a principle (archê) for the demonstration of its per se properties (De an. II 2, 414a 27–8). If the final definition is “the first actuality of an organic body possessing a potentiality of being such,” not only are the different senses in which life is meant and the presupposition of the organs necessary for the vegetative functions not demonstrated, but even the additional activities of perception and thinking are arrived at surreptitiously from experience, not from the definition of soul itself.

It is as if Aristotle were simultaneously giving us a phenomenology of the soul, which Hegel thinks was unsurpassed, and trying to ground it scientifically and logically on a pre-given method that includes systematic requirements alien to such a phenomenology.

In §4 we will see how essence as principle is conceived by Aristotle in syllogistic demonstration. But before that we must investigate how essence is expressed and known.

§3. Essence and Predication: Definition and Truth

In book Z, after the physical investigation of substance in Chapters 7 through 9, Aristotle resumes the “epistemological” discussion of substance.

Not everything that has a name subsists independently. The Iliad is a unity by composition only, it is not a hen, a unitary whole (Z 4, 1030b 9). Essences are only essences of that which is definable as a whole (1030a 6). Definition renders the determinate essence of the thing, what is first in it. A genus (animal) does not exist unless specified in one of its differences (for example, two-footed: Z 12); the universal is not concrete apart from its specification into its ultimate differences. Substance and definition are of the ultimate difference (Z 12, 1038a 19–20: hé teleutaia diaphora); and definitions are not aggregates of words or concepts, because they refer to the oneness of their definiendum (H 6, 1045a 7).

Form is the immanent form of what can be by itself, kath’ hauto. Forms or essences are the object of definition. Definitions are not logical definitions, but logoi which reveal or show what the thing is per se. Forms are not separate from substrates but rather constitute the determinateness of things. Aristotle is not interested in what makes a “this” identical to itself through time, but in what makes it a “this;” the unity, not the identity of substance is the subject of these chapters.
But if a unity is the unity of a plurality, if actuality is the actuality of matter and potentiality, is not the unity itself a multiplicity? How can a definition, which is a plurality of terms, be intrinsically a unity? How is the simplicity of substance related to the other categories? Is essence separate from the categories or is the ultimate difference determined as such by essential predicates?

The troubled genesis of the notion of difference is indicative of Aristotle’s difficulty in distinguishing between accidental and essential predication vis-à-vis the fundamental aspects of their different occurrences. It is also indicative of Aristotle’s struggle to meet the demand that the relation between predicate and subject be taken into account.8

As is well known, accidents (sumbebêkota) are defined in two opposite ways (Met. Α 30, 1025a 4–6, 30–4): they can be accidental properties of a substrate, referring to it neither necessarily nor for the most part, or they can be each thing’s per se determinations, such as, for example, a triangle that has the property whereby the sum of its internal angles is equivalent to two right angles. How can we reconcile these two senses? How can we reconcile Categories 2 and Metaphysics E 2 with Posterior Analytics I 7, in which, respectively, we read that there is no science of accidents, and that the science of per se accidents is demonstrative?

The problem that even a definition such as “two-footed rational animal” contains predicates of quantity and quality seems to become even sharper when Aristotle writes that essence and ultimate difference are qualities. Obviously, they are not just any poion (quality), but the quality of a substance as division of the genus (peri ousian to poion, Cat. 5, 3b 20; compare Top. I 15, 107a 20–1; Δ 6, 128a 20–9; Cat. 5, 3b 10–23).

This does not suffice to claim, as many modern interpreters have since Trendelenburg, that Aristotle confused quality and specific difference.9 This undermines not only Aristotle’s continuous efforts, but also the content of his distinctions, in particular between quality qua the accidental modification of particular substances undergoing change, which cannot be in separation from that “in which” it is (Cat. 2, 1a 20–5), from quality as the division of the genus which only exists as ultimate difference and species (Top. V 6, 143b 5–9). Aristotle compares the genus to the voice: only insofar as it articulates or limits itself in specific sounds is voice significant.

To clarify this, Porphyry opposed the difference which qualifies the

9 Kategorienlehre (1846: 56, 217).
substrate (that is, moving–at rest) to this heterotês tou genous, the ultimate difference which makes the genus other in its species (animal is not externally qualified, but restricted to one essence when I add “rational”).

Met. Δ 14 is very clear in this regard. The distinction appears to be closely connected with the duality discussed in the Categories between “being said of” and “being in” a substrate (Socrates is a man; Socrates is white).

Even here I cannot agree with Trendelenburg (ibid.: 17–18), who finds in the “being said of” the expression of a logical-grammatical relation, and in “being in” the ascription of a property to a real substrate. This interpretation presupposes a thesis about being which is not Greek; einai is the purely discursive connection among representations of a substrate that is in turn understood as absolutely separate from being. It is no wonder that such formalism is embarrassed before one of the four fundamental meanings of being, that of truth, and that it cannot breach the gap it has created between logic and metaphysics.

It seems necessary to interpret “being in” and “being said of” as two logical–ontological relations which differ modally. The former case is that of an accidental qualification, a relation of inherence that is stated in a contingent predicative connection; while the latter is a relation of identity or subsumption expressed in a necessary predication.

Aristotle eschews the aporias of the sophists who transform everything into accidents and construe predication and change as contradictory: for example, Socrates in the Pyraeus is different from Socrates in the agora; brown hair, once it becomes white, is no longer the same hair. If the substrate accounts for change and predication in that it cannot be reduced to properties, then accidents will not replace the substrate, nor be sheer nonbeing, but will instead have a being different from the being of the substrate.

But how can we distinguish between subsumption or identity and inherence, between necessary and contingent predication, between def-

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10 Porphyry, Isagoge (IV, 9, 1–5). This is to be found, however, in the context of the exhaustive division of the genus, and only indirectly helps clarify the independent logical status of substance as the ultimate difference in definition.

11 Met. Δ 7, 1017a 31–5; α 1, 993b 30; Θ 10, 1051a 34.

12 Sainati (Organon, 1968: 166 ff.) distinguishes in this regard intercategorial predication, in which predicates are said of substance in other categories, and which therefore gives rise to contingent inherence (for example, Socrates is sitting), from infracategorial predication. Here we have a relation within the same category; predicates are ascribed to a substrate in a hierarchy of species and genera culminating in the highest genus, the category itself (Socrates is man; living being; substance – my examples).
inition and inessential attribution, if the logical structure \( S \text{ is } P \) is common to both (An. Post. I 22)? And what happens to the unity of definition if, as it appears at first, “every definition is a logos [is discursive] and every logos has parts” (Met. Z 10, 1034b 20)? If accidents and categories are not deducible from essence but refer to their independent substrate, substance enjoys an eccentricity and privileged status even though it is still called a category.\(^{13}\)

It seems that the only trait common to all categories is that they are different ways of speaking about being. But the fact is that, as Posterior Analytics reads, if demonstration predicates something necessary of something, definition does not predicate something of something different (ouden heteron heterou, II 3, 90b 35). Rather, it reveals (dêloi) the “what is” (\( ti \text{ esti}, 91a \ 1 \)), as an indivisible thing (atomon, II 5, 91b 32). The logos of essence identifies a thing with its intelligible determinacy, while the discursive synthesis combines a substrate with a predicate that may or may not belong to it.

Aristotle’s solution to the problem of the unity of the definition implies the nonexistence of the genus outside the differences, and the identification of the ultimate difference with the final result of the successive divisions of the genus – the essence of the thing. Insofar as it differs from the complex expression that determines the properties of a thing and which, by qualifying a given thing already identified independently and otherwise, contains more than one concept, the ultimate difference does not entail a plurality of terms. It is an \( eidopoios \ diaphora, \) the specification of a genus, a difference constituting the thing as an essence. By identifying a unity, an indivisible essence and not a synthesis, definition is by its nature a whole (holon), not a combination in which something is affirmed or denied of an underlying subject.\(^{14}\)

This is why Aristotle can say that definition is not a \( sumplokê \) (combination) but expresses something primary, the indivisible essence (Met. Z 4, 1030a 11), and is simple. In definition what is expressed in place of the predicate is neither a predicate nor an alterity. Definition renders the substantial unity of the substrate in an identity statement which brings the \( ti \text{ esti}, \) the essence, to the \( tode \ ti, \) the this. Thus the logos of essence determines that which is being addressed by the discourse; it does not qualify it via contingent attributes in a synthesis through a copula. In this

\(^{13}\) See also Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen (II 2: 184 ff.); N. Hartmann, “Eidos” (1941: 134); Aubenque, Être (1962: 187–8).

sense definition, understood intensionally, regardless of its extension to the members of a class, is true, because it reveals the essence.

This should raise some eyebrows. How can a definition be true if it does not state facts but reveals an essence? Aristotle has two conceptions of truth which he often has great difficulty reconciling (which does not at all imply that he should dispense or reject the concept of truth which departs from the common conception). On the one hand, at the level of accidental predication, truth and falsity consist of the combination and separation of a predicate and a subject, and state the belonging or not belonging of a property to a substrate, which is something we must verify (De interpr. 1, 16a 12–13); they are in discursive thought (en dianoiai, Met. E 4, 1027b 27), where thought is regarded as the mirroring of given matters of fact of which we do not investigate *ti esti* and cause. On the other hand, at the level of the intellection of indivisible essences, other texts show another, more unusual and radical understanding of truth, which consists in the revelation to *nous* of a unitary determinacy the opposite of which is not falsity.

It is fruitless to try to solve the contradiction between E 4 (truth is only of discursive thinking) and Θ 10 before first trying to understand what the meaning of the second passage amounts to.

Met. Θ 10 distinguishes the truth and falsity of what can be otherwise from the truth of what is incomposite and indivisible. In the latter case, the mode of being of truth is the contact with a thing that says it in its simplicity. *Thigein kai phanai* (1051b 24–5), touching and saying, are also mentioned at Α 7, 1072b 21; as the pure contact with the intelli-

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15 *Phanai* or *phasis* (saying) is prior to *kataphasis* and *apophasis*, affirming or denying, as the simple is prior to the compound. Likewise, *thigein* (or *thigganein*) are not synonymous with *haptein*. *Haphê* is the sense of touch exposed in the De anima, and it emphasizes the hand’s material grasp or grip over sheer contact, which can be incorporeal and metaphorical. When Aristotle expresses an idea of simple contact he uses *thigganein* (II 2, 423a 2) or *thigein* (I 3, 407a 16–19), not *haphê*. To make contact is a simple act, opposed to the complex grasp of a multiplicity (essences are touched, composites are grasped, we could say). Although there is no direct relation to the Greek, it is remarkable how the Latin and German words for grasping (*caepere* and *greifen*) are both respective sources for the words for “concept” in these languages. *Conceptus* and *Begriff*, the grasping together of a multiplicity in one, is the modern “concept,” which thus differs from this simple act of touching-saying essences advocated by Aristotle.

As Cicero reports, in order to distinguish the three degrees of appearance or representation (*fantasia*, representation assented to, and comprehension, Zeno first introduced the word *katalêpsis*: he compared the outstretched hand to representation; a hand with fingers slightly closed was like assent; comprehension and science were like a tight fist (*SVF* 1: 66). This is the first substantial transformation of Aristotle’s connection between thought and touch; it is informed by an idea of progress in certainty and
ble character of a thing, they are opposed to affirmative and negative predication or attribution (kataphasis, apophasis: Θ 10, 1051b 25; De an. III 6, 430b 26–7), to the belonging of an attribute to a substrate. Whereas such belonging is temporally qualified, and whereas in predication properties may change over time, thus where different properties may be predicated with truth at different times (Θ 10, 1051b 13–17; De an. III 6, 430b 4–5), “the triangle does not change” over time (Θ 10, 1052a 6). Again, the stress is on the contrast between contingency and necessity or identity.

The contrary of a noetic truth is not falsity but ignorance (agnoia, 1052a 2). If we must not predicate something of something (τι κατατίνως; De an. III 6, 430b 26–9) but identify something with its essence, it is not possible to say what is false. We may miss the essence and thus not “touch” it, and in this sense we remain ignorant.

It seems to me unduly reductive to limit intellection to mathematical sciences or to identify simple, indivisible, and in composite substances with God or the unmoved movers.16 The peculiar infallibility of intellection (νοέσις; De an. III 6, 430a 26) touches the thing in its essence (τι ἐν εἶναι, 430b 28–9); its object is, in other words, the indivisible essence of substance, the universal as form isolated from the composite. With regard to the asuntheta kai adiaireta, the in composite and indivisible, their truth simply consists in their being thought (το de alethes to noein tauta; Met. Θ 10, 1052a 1).17

I have talked indifferently about Met. Θ 10 and De an. III 6, and have had recourse to nous, not only because the two texts are closely related, but also because I believe this theory of truth is not understandable apart from the identity of intellect and intelligible.18

possession of science which goes quite beyond Aristotle. (I wish to thank Rémi Brague for reminding me of this fragment.)

16 The first position is defended by Calogero (Fondamenti, 1927: 119–21), the second by a host of commentators from antiquity (for example Themistius, in De an. 111, but also Philoponus and Aquinas) to our times. See, among others, Schwegler (in Met. 4: 187 ff.); Ross (in Met. 2: 275 ff.); Owens (Being, 1951: 413–14); Merlan (Platonism, 1953: 186–7); Aubenque (Être, 1962: 374–5); and “Pensée du simple,” 1979: 79 ff.).

17 For the difference between mê suntheta and asuntheta in Θ 10 (1051b 27), see Oehler, Lehre (1962: 183 ff.). For Oehler the former are the essences taken in isolation from composite substances, while the latter are contents of concepts in judgments (ibid.: 190) or noëmata. As such they are coextensive with the different kinds of indivisibles and incomposites of which De an. III 6 speaks. The former are a particular case of the latter.

18 This is stressed by Aristotle himself in the brief recapitulation of the previous chapter at the beginning of De an. III 7 (431a 1). Besides the De Interpretatione, the De anima, and
In the *De anima* Aristotle distinguishes between two operations of the intellect: judgment and intellection of indivisibles.\(^1\) If *Met. Θ* 10 is less explicit about the meaning of indivisibles and incomposites, in this text Aristotle explains what the candidates are: indivisibles according to quantity (length is the example); indivisibles according to form (*toi eidei*, 430b 14–15: universals such as “man” or “triangle”); actual indivisibles (such as the point); causes without contraries (first substance, separate and in actuality). I call the third candidate “actual indivisible” because Aristotle immediately distinguishes potential from actual indivisible (430b 6–7),\(^2\) but adds that the intellect views them both “qua indivisible” (*hêi adiaireta*, 430b 17). Strictly speaking, the first two types of indivisibles are both divisible (quantity in parts, *eido* in its logical constituents – for example, “rational animal” for “man”), but only accidentally (430b 16).

This intellection is instantaneous and does not involve succession or take any time. The unity and indivisibility of time is itself “produced” or made possible by the indivisibility of the intelligible at hand (430b 17–19); the time of apprehension is indivisible because its object is indivisible.

The doctrine is perfectly consistent with the idea we have explored in the *Metaphysics* that the intellection is an indivisible act which has no separation “in time or place or logos” (Δ 6, 1016b 1–3). At I 1, which discusses the meanings of “one,” we read that intellection is indivisible, both when directed at an individual and at the universal (1052a 29–34).

With regard to the latter, Aristotle needs to answer the question “*ti esti* according to the *ti en einai*” (what is X according to its essence, *De an. III* 6, 430b 28–9). Aristotle writes that the essence is considered without matter (*aneu tês hulês*, 43oa 31); this refers to essences as isolated from the composites they define. All the attributes mentioned in connection with incomposites in *Met. Θ* 10 (1051b 26–31: they are ac-

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\(^1\) An excellent essay on intellection in the *De anima* is by Berti (“Intellection,” 1978).

\(^2\) For this reason *adiaireta* is best rendered as “undivided,” as in Hicks’ translation (*in De an. 142*).
tuality, ungenerated, incorruptible, per se) are typical for Aristotle of essences isolated from composites, and need not be taken to refer to immaterial substances.²¹

What is not as clear is how we should interpret the timeless apprehension of such essences. Almost all commentators stress the mediated nature of this intellection despite its initial appearance as an absolute immediate act of apprehension.²² There would be nothing mystical or occultish about an antepredicative intuition for Aristotle; that essences do not arise by predication but are rather presupposed by it is precisely the theory he defends as the way toward essences as first principles. However, this antepredicative intellection is not a simple act that posits the starting point of investigation, an intellectual intuition preceding perception, but is the result of ἐπαγωγή.

This comes to the fore in the clearest manner in Posterior Analytics II 19. Here the intellection of the universal is the result of experience, which is obviously a temporal process. It is thus from sensible intuition that we rise to intellection of the essences, from the sensible to the principles, and thereby from what is first for us to what is first in itself.

There are four additional reasons why we cannot postulate an intellectual intuition in Aristotle prior to and directive for experience. (1) Induction (ἐπαγωγή) is described as a kind of dialectic search (Top. I 12, I 2, 101a 34–b 4). In this sense it does not exclude discourse and questions that test opposite views, but it does remain at the antepredicative level of experience; dialectic does not constitute its result but helps us reach it, which is another way to say that induction is an intelligent process and not a blind or random series of sensations. (2) Induction is the sharpening and strengthening of an immediate, at first indeterminate perception (recall the passage from Phys. I 1 quoted in Chapter 3). (3) Cognition is described in the De anima as arising from sensation to thought through images, so that we do have intellectual intuition, but in and through images left over from sensation. (4) Finally, Aristotle writes, when commenting on the Meno, that if we possessed an in-

²² Lesher (“Meaning of Nous,” 1973); Berti (“Intellecction,” 1978: 142); Aubenque (“Pensée du simple,” 1979: 79); Burnyeat (“Understanding Knowledge,” 1981: 130–1); Kahn (“Role of Nous,” 1981: 393), as well as countless others, seem preoccupied with avoiding finding in Aristotle any mystical or solipsistic notion of intuition. Hence most of them draw a sharp differentiation between Plato’s “intuitionism” and Aristotle. I believe this is a contemporary preoccupation not shared by Aristotle. Yet I also believe they are right in stressing that intellection is no simple and first act but the result of intellectual habituation, ἐπαγωγή.
nate science of essences it would be very strange if we were not aware of it, and that we are at first familiar with something indeterminately and proceed to make our cognition more and more determinate (An. Post. I 1, 71b 4–8; also see An. Pr. II 21, 67a 21 ff.; An. Post. II 19, 99b 26 ff.).

In sum, the indivisible unity of intellection is not a timeless instant independent of experience, but is rather the precipitate of a search, the result of a process of empirical investigation. In this “appeasing of the universal in the soul” (hêremêsantos tou katholou en têi psuchêi, An.Post. II 19, 100a 6–7), taken in itself, there is no more process: we have an indivisible intellection of the thing all at once.

The question of the two senses of truth has divided interpreters in the two opposite camps. Trendelenburg and Brentano remain convinced that only the apophantic judgment can express truth. Schwegler, in this case strangely blind to the identity of being and intelligibility, goes as far as expunging Θ 10 from the Metaphysics; Jaeger also considered it a later insertion.

Martin Heidegger has devoted some very incisive pages to the dissolution of the prejudices according to which (1) the locus of truth is the


24 Met. Z 17 (1041b 9–11) also speaks of a search (zêtêsis) for the nondiscursive intellection of “simples” (hapla) alternative to teaching and predication generally. What are “simples”? Are they the same as the indivisibles? In the Physics (I 7, 189b 32–190a 5) “simple” is what is with reference to a single category (man, musical) as opposed to “compound” (things or assertions: the “musical man”). In Met. E 4 (1027b 27–8) Aristotle contrasts dianoia with knowledge about simples and “whats” (peri de ta hapla kai ti esti). But the case of “simples” could be understood to differ from the indivisibles only if one were to adopt Apostle’s mistaken translation (Apostle renders toinun by “however,” setting up a contrast between simples and essences of composites, which is in fact absent in the text; he is probably under the impression that the form of matter about which Aristotle has been talking up to this point is meant as that of a composite, and not as essence qua the principle or cause of the thing). But the fact is that the indivisible and incomposite essences, which, as we have just seen, include forms as isolated from composites, thus both potential and actual indivisibles, are incomposites which only exist in (as causes of) composites. Strikingly, such simples pluralize and divide themselves once the question turns from “what is it?” to “why is it so?” I will return to this point in §4. For Aubenque, who starts from the pluralization of essence, and who understands essences as innerly divided, the search for the simples is the intuitive attestation of their existence (“Pensée du simple,” 1979: 79). I agree with the criticisms advanced by the symposiasts in the colloquium at which Aubenque presented his thesis, in particular with Leszl, Verdenius, and Berti (compare ibid.: 81–5).

assertion; (2) truth is the accord between thinking and being; and (3) Aristotle is the founder of (1) and (2). The meaning of logos is not judgment but déloun, apophainesthai, indication of what the discourse addresses; only in a second, derivative sense is it predication, sunthesis, bringing something out of concealment insofar as it is together with something else.26

Logos is not the primary locus of truth. Truth is originally defined with relation to vision, not to assertion, which can only give expression to aisthēsis, perception (which, if referred to the proper or idion, is always true) and to noein, thinking. Truth is, differently stated, defined in relation to the two modes of grasping or gathering (legein, Vernehmen) something present (Anwesenheit), the letting themselves be seen out of themselves of beings. Seeing is the pure uncovering, which has nothing to do with adequation; all adequation happens not between representations and things but within beings that manifest themselves as what they are.

For Heidegger in Met. Θ 10 we find the essential link between truth and being. Touching-knowing is not directed to something determinate (subject-predicate), but toward the pure something, that which cannot be otherwise. Essence is an aei on, an incomposite, which cannot be understood on the basis of truth understood as combination-separation. We cannot be mistaken with respect to essence because its being cannot be reached from something else. If, however, we do not allow things to be encountered purely (the chalk as innerwordly ready-to-hand), but instead begin by making assertions and predicating properties, distinguishing them from one another, then we conceal: we grasp (legein) things in contrast to other things. This contrast is the Greek dia; as a consequence, legein becomes dialegesthai, enunciation of combination and separation. But if we take assertion to be based on synthesis, that is, on a derived and leveling structure (in Heidegger’s words, the apophathic qua) and not on the original and primary structure of seeing-touching (the hermeneutic qua), we lose sight of that to which the discourse addresses itself. A-lêtheia (Un-vorbergenheit, truth as unconcealedness) hides, escapes from us.

However philosophically suggestive, close to the text, and polemically to the point, these considerations should be taken as a beginning and not as a conclusion. Further, they have serious limitations, and not

26 I summarize in the next two paragraphs SuZ (32 ff., §44) and the seminar Logik (1976b: §10–§14).
over points of mere detail. With respect to the theme of *Anwesenheit* or presence, which for Heidegger is common between Plato and Aristotle, any trace of their fundamental differences disappears; in particular, what is lost is the contrast between Platonic participation and dialectic and the indivisibility of substance that allows Aristotle both to distinguish between accidental and essential predication and to advance his conception of identity and otherness as immanent to substance. Further, the unity of grasping, of having before oneself, is faithful to Aristotle only in part: *aisthēsis* and *noēsis*, perception and thinking, are similar but also quite different; what Heidegger passes over is the reason and context in which Aristotle draws the distinction between the two “modes of grasping,” that is, the relevance of the problem of the universal for science; sensation does not have as its object logos in the same sense as does intellection (e.g., *An. Post.* I 31, 88a 2; *De an.* II 5, 417b 22–3). In his reading of *agnoia*, ignorance, in *Met.* Θ 10, Heidegger misconstrues the word as though it were intended to mean not the absence of *nous*, but its self-reduction to inauthentic *dianoia* (1976b: §13c).

If all Heidegger can say is that the whole domain of science and discursivity is rooted in the flexion from *legein* to *dialegesthai*, it seems that the scientific status of predication and demonstration has for Heidegger even less significance, if possible, than it does for Hegel. Also, the relation between intuited truth and predicated truth is marked by a hiatus in which we can only point to a primary and a derived sense. As a consequence, the compatibility of noetic and dianoetic aspects of truth remains even more obscure than it was in Aristotle. If the intuition of essences is the grasp of identities, it appears that seeing essences is a wholly analytical enterprise. But if that were so, otherness would be confined to a contingent ontology and extensional predication which fixes essences as unrelated and mutually indifferent atoms of intelligibility. As long as the contrast between noetic truth and dianoetic leveling is an ultimate datum, it is incomprehensible how a new cognition arises from preexisting cognitions and how science of causes can make progress.

Before declaring the failure of Aristotle’s efforts to connect the identity of definition with the difference of demonstration, thus linking essences to per se properties, we must first see if Aristotle manages to solve his problem through the idea of substance as the “unity of a multiplicity.”27 The next section is devoted to such an examination.

§4. Definition and Demonstration: Unity and Plurality

If the intellection of indivisibles is an identity of thinking and the thing, in that the thing is identical with its essence, while in the constitution of substance, thing and essence or form are not strictly identical, then we must conclude that in the central books of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle did not distinguish sharply enough between the logical or noetic order and the real order. If the intellect has as its object forms isolated from composites (whether potential or actual indivisibles), and if forms never exist apart from composites, then there is at the same time both a difference and an identity between embodied forms and forms taken in themselves. The identity lies in the fact that the forms which are the object of intellection, definition, and then of demonstration are the same as the forms and causes of composites; otherwise I could not know anything. The difference is made possible by the intellect that isolates forms in the order of cognition alone, thus immediately denying such difference, by treating equally all forms as forms without matter.28

One of the reasons why so many interpreters (if not all but Hegel) resist the identity of thinking and thing by rejecting it or misinterpreting it is that the dilemma between a realism that privileges discursivity and a theory of *esse est intelligi* (being means to be thought), which clearly cannot be ascribed to Aristotle, seems inescapable. But there is a third possibility, it seems to me; noetic identity is limited to intellection and does not produce its determinations. Determinations are brought to actuality by the intellect *in thought*; but in terms of being they are already actual as the causes of the thing.

This lack of distinction is bound to give rise to many confusions and tensions. As I have said, most of such confusions are rooted in the lack of clarity in the Aristotelian texts themselves; but to exploit them unduly and without the patience of studying all different senses and contexts of Aristotle’s usage of terms is only the fault of the interpreter.

Another striking example of such lack of distinction is that which leads Aristotle to understand substance and form as ground. The reason why I have insisted on the question of definition in the preceding section is precisely that the issue of definition is in Aristotle’s eyes what links noetic and dianoetic conceptions. To Aristotle, the duality of say-

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28 Brinkmann (*Metaphysik*, 1979: 121–46) aptly distinguishes the three respects of determinacy, constitution, and predicative-logical mode in the relation between essence and composite.
ing and predicing is not an insoluble opposition between noetic intellection, from which all predication is alien, and definition, understood as the diairetic division of a genus into its species which reaches its result by having in view the stability of the noetically apprehended essence. In the terminology of the *Topics*, even the definition is a *katêgoroumenon*, a particular way of union of the subject and the predicate – that of their mutual convertibility (I 4, 5).

Predication presupposes essences, as we saw, and essences are neither obtained through predication nor through the division of the genus. What Aristotle never says is that this operation can only follow the isolation of the essence to be kept in view. In fact, he treats definition and intellection as two perfectly complementary moments of the same cognition of essence. Further, he speaks indifferently of definition and essence: they are both apparently complex, but are actually a simple and primary unitary whole, such that the definition is formulated in accordance with its object. But obviously to isolate an essence as the object about which the discourse will speak is not the same as actually proceeding to the diairetic division of the genus that will result in the ultimate difference which alone has reality and which must correspond to the essence in view. It seems puzzling to me that for Aristotle this is no more problematic than the transition from experience to language in the third book of the *De anima* and in the *De interpretatione*.

However, it is clear that for Aristotle definitions represent the translatability of intellection into logical, diairetic terms, thus allowing us to apprehend and describe the real as a net of logical determinations. If in a definition genus and species do not fall asunder, but instead the genus subsists only potentially, and in actuality only in the simplicity and unity of its ultimate species, then the essence thus defined will be a simplicity, which at the same time will be the possible element of a demonstrative combination. If essences were simple, unrelated monads, the highest intellection would be a dispersed, pointlike contact with no implication for our everyday or scientific knowledge.

Essences have to be simple, incomposite, and undivided; the fact that they exist only in (as causes of) composites cannot make them composite. Yet in Z 17 Aristotle writes that the “what is” question must be turned into a “why” question; he goes on to say that even the question about simples has to be rearticulated into a causal question, so that we do not ask “what is a house?” but “why are these stones and wood a house?” As soon as we ask a “why” question, whether about simples or composites, we introduce a plurality. Does this mean that we thereby
dissociate essence, that we reduplicate essence into a subject and attributes? Or is it that essence projects itself toward its attributes, so that essence is the cause of its attributes, as Aubenque argues?\footnote{Être (1962: 136 ff., 430, 475–80); “Pensée du simple” (1979: 72 ff.).}

It seems that support for such an interpretation can be found in Aristotle. Chapter Z 17 (1041a 23–6) argues that once the question is a “why” question there is no difference between questions about simples and questions about composites. For all the reasons shown above, and in particular in order to make sense of the plurality of the senses of essence in intellection and predication, it would seem that we cannot conflate essence and substance after we have distinguished them. It is Socrates who is white, not Socrates’s essence. But can we likewise say that it is the triangle and not its essence whose internal angles are equivalent to two right angles?

We must turn to the \textit{Posterior Analytics} and to the theory of syllogism in order to shed some light on the problem. The syllogism is what makes a conclusion necessary and universal. A syllogism has as its principles both those axioms that are common to more than one science and genus, and those principles proper and specific to each discipline; these can be hypotheses, the positing of an existence, or definitions.\footnote{Here in the sense (to be elucidated below) of nominal definitions, such as in arithmetic the positing of unity as indivisibility of quantity (\textit{An. Post} I 2, 72a 14–24). On the difference between hypotheses and nominal definitions see I 10, 76b 35–9.}
The principles of the sciences are anterior propositions, which are primary, indemonstrable, immediate, and better known than the conclusion; and the principle of science in general is the intellect that apprehends essences (I 3, 72b 18–25; II 3, 90b 24–7; 19, 99b 17–19, 100b 5–14). In each investigation we distinguish between questions that have simple answers (“if it is” and “what it is”) from questions that have compound answers (“that it is so and so” and “why it is so and so”). This fourth question asks the \textit{dioti}, the “why,” that is, why the moon undergoes eclipses; the answer it wants to know is the cause (II 1).

When Aristotle states that demonstrative science is of per se properties (I 6, 74b 5–12)\footnote{About such \textit{kath’hauta huparchonta} (or \textit{sumbebêkota}) compare \textit{Met.} Δ 30, 1025a 30–4; Γ 1, 1003a 20–1; 1004b 1–8, 1005a 11–18.} he has taken the decisive step. Demonstration investigates the relation between essence and those properties that something has in itself but that do not belong to its essence, namely the \textit{sumbebêkota kath’hauta} (I 7, 75b 1) the definition of which contains the substrates of which these properties are said (I 4, 73a 34–b 24).
“White” is not per se a property of Socrates’s essence, but that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle equals two right angles is (per se properties can be eternal, reads Met. Δ 30, 1025a 30–4). All properties predicated of a singular substrate are accidental (I 22, 83a 24–8; 27, 87a 33–5). We cannot have any science of what is corruptible and contingent (I 8, 75b 24–6). Aristotle says that arithmetic, geometry, and optics are more clearly scientific than other sciences, in that they unfold through the first figure of the syllogism (I 14, 79a 17–21), but he is not implying that we can have only sciences of mathematical objects. What we know universally is exempt from both time and contingency regardless of the factual nature of the object; and from universal premises a demonstration will show the necessary belonging of a property to something once a middle premise has been added. In order to develop a science, the essence must be the principle or archê of its per se properties (I 22, 83a 18–23).

The thing’s essence is the cause of its being (II 2, 90a 14–15). The investigation of the cause is the search for a middle term which concludes from the fact that S is P to the cause of the necessity of S is P, from the property to its belonging to the subject. The answer to the question “why the moon undergoes eclipses” cannot simply be a nominal definition of eclipse; it must include the cause and be the conclusive definition of an inference. This is done when we start from the nominal definition (“eclipse is the privation of light”) and construct the following syllogism:

That which undergoes the interposition of a body between itself and its source of light is deprived of light;
The moon undergoes the earth’s interposition;
Therefore the moon is deprived of light.32

The middle, the interposition of the earth, is the cause thanks to which we can reexpress the nominal definition and make it causal. In this sense eclipses are a factual necessity, not contingent facts; a conclusion about them, however particular (kata meros), is eternal (aei, I 8, 75b 33–6). And in this sense we can see in the essence the ground of its per se properties.

This is the way in which Aristotle fills the gap between intellection and discursivity and understands definition and demonstration as a unitary knowledge.

32 Compare Tugendhat, Ti kata tinos (1958: 122 ff.)
The problem is that this seems to make good sense in the case of mathematical; but as the previous discussion in §2 of the soul as the form of what is alive should have shown, this model cannot hold when applied to nature. For demonstration in nature, not only are the causes known universally needed, but also you need to know a plurality of functions that cannot be demonstrated in the same way as the properties of a triangle. Even though it is precisely in nature that an *energeia* is most clearly the unity of something, here I find it much more difficult to see how the essence can be the ground of its per se properties and at the same time be the subject of attributes to be demonstrated in apodictic science.

§5. Matter: Contingency and Individuation

The numerous references to the problem of singularity in scientific knowledge scattered throughout Aristotle’s corpus can be summed up in the well-known motto “science is of the universal, the singular is only perceived” (e.g., *An.Post.* I 18, 81a 38–b 9; 31, 87b 37–40). Any conclusion with regard to objects of sensation has momentary validity (I 8, 75b 30), which is also uncertain (*Top.* V 3, 131b 21–4). Properly speaking, sensation is always directed to the proper object of each sense; but, accidentally or indirectly, sensation can also be of common sensibles and universals (*Met.* M 10, 1087a 19–20). In the *Posterior Analytics*, even though sensation has as its object something here and now, it is nevertheless “of such and such, not of individuals” (I 31, 87b 28–30; compare II 19, 100b 4–5); likewise, in the *De anima* sensation retains the form of the thing once it is out of sight, for the *tode*, this, is always perceived as a *toionde*, a such (II 12, 424a 24). Of sensation we can say that it is the certainty of its object when it is actual, but when sensation is no longer present, the thing is retained in its form.

But if the composite is known only in its form or essence, and not through the determination of its difference from other individuals by matter, understood as accidental variations within a species (*Met.* Z 15, 1039b 27–1040a 8), and if the singular (qua generated and corruptible in that it has matter) is not the same as its form, then the problem is apparently insoluble. If science is knowledge of necessity, and matter is itself unknowable (*Z* 10, 1036a 8–9), but is the principle of numerical multiplicity and of individuation, how can physical investigation ever come to know its object? Isn’t it impossible, as *An.Post.* I 8 and *Met.* Z 15 (1040a 1–5) seem to argue, to build science or a demonstration
on account of what is corruptible and materially singular? Are universal, essence, and form identical?

Zeller’s aporia, which was actually formulated by Aristotle himself (Met. B 4, 999a 24–9), is well known: properly speaking, only individuals exist, but only universals can be known. Ideal and real stand as unreconciled, and we can never know the form as the form of the singular. N. Hartmann’s aporia is along the same lines: if knowledge of the singular is only possible insofar as it coincides with its essence, there is an insurmountable gap between ultimate difference and concrete reality. The singular is inessential for science, according to Aristotle; while in Hegel it is only rational to the extent that it realizes the rational in history, otherwise it is labeled as irrelevant. Thus Aristotle and Hegel share the same axiological judgment on the inessentiality of the singular.

In Aristotle, matter has to be assessed according to the teleological hierarchy of beings in the sublunar world as the cause of contingency and imperfection, which increases as we take up less and less independent forms of existence. In inorganic nature, where matter is least permeable and least teleologically subordinated to form, matter is external necessity, indifferent to the end. In organic nature, matter is the essential condition for finality, as a dynamical impulse to form. Matter nowhere seems to be an irrational absolute passivity. It is relation to form and is always already shaped (Phys. II 2, 194b 9). Even in the living being, with regard to which the question of individuation as the cause of individual and sexual variations seems most pressing, matter, as menses opposing its own warmth to form (sperm), actively favors or hinders the transmission of the father’s or mother’s hereditary traits to the child (De gen. anim. IV 3, 767a 36–768a 34).

The problem of matter as the principle of individuation is relevant

33 Philosophie der Griechen, II 2 (2nd edition 1862: 231 ff.).
34 See “Aristoteles” (1923: 233–36), slightly modified in “Eidos” (1941: 136–40). Expressions such as “to the extent that” are hardly applicable to Hegel, who has shown that breaking up the object into a plurality of points of view is the understanding’s approach. If the singular could be either in conformity with its concept or exist as inessential, the judgment on the adequacy of the singular to its concept seems dangerously close to a question of legitimacy and value to be solved on the basis of political considerations (in Hartmann’s example, the historiographical assessment of cosmic-historic individuals), that is, a posteriori in any case. If this were the case, Hartmann’s thesis, which distinguishes Hegel, that champion of absolute apriorism in which the real is reduced to the logical without residue (restlos), from Aristotle, whose ontology sees the real in the composite and in which matter divides the logical from the formal, would undermine itself.
foremost at the biological level of the variations within a selfsame species, including the hereditary transmission of ancestral traits, but not at the metaphysical level of substance. Thing and essence are not mutually isolated; form is the very determinacy of the thing. If the thing is its essence, then the \textit{tode ti}, the “this,” is already logically determined as an essence. And an essence can be the object of universal knowledge.

If, ontologically speaking, the form is “this” thing, it is prior both to singularity and to universality. The distinction between singularity and universality is a problem for cognition, not for substance; the form is neither singular, since it is definable universally, nor universal, since it is actual as the cause of a “this.” The aporia is based on three unnecessary conflations: first, form is equated with species; species is then understood to be over and above singulars, where it is equated with universal as opposed to the particular; and, finally, form is turned into an element of the composite instead of its principle, a part instead of an essence. Certainly Aristotle often calls an \textit{eidos} universal; but he invariably does so only once he has shifted from the constitution of substance to our scientific knowledge of it.

Owens writes that the problem of the principle of individuation is not genuinely Aristotelian, since it arises only if we conceive of form as universal; then we need another principle to reduce it to singularity, whereas by knowing the form I know both the singular and the universal. Leszl argues that Zeller hypostatizes the universal as an entity over and above the beings belonging to a class as if these could be identified independently of their possessing the universal; if we fail to follow Aristotle in showing the identity of thing and essence there would be nothing intelligible in things.\footnote{Owens, \textit{Being} (1951: 390–4); Leszl, \textit{Logic} (1970: 468 ff., 498–500). See also Witt, \textit{Substance} (1989: 150–75), who follows Owens.}

How different “thises” can happen to share the same essence does not seem to be a problem for Aristotle; the medieval debate about universals stems in good part from this silence, as does the non-Aristotelian problem of the instantiation of universals in different individuals. But it seems clear that, for example, in the case of Socrates, I do know the essence, that is, his soul. What I cannot give of Socrates is a definition of his individual traits (\textit{Met.} Z 15, 1039b 20–1040b 4). This is not a problem about Socrates or about contingent individuals, but about the nature of language. Corruptible beings are definable through their form (\textit{Met.} Z 10, 1036a 8), but if I want to state something singular
about them, I must have recourse to common terms that can be predicated of something else as well. Singularity cannot be distinguished as an absolute *unicum* from other singularities in the same species because there are no predicates capable of defining something unique without at the same time being open to being said of other things as well.

Again, this does not mean that corruptible substances cannot be defined; otherwise, we would have the absurd consequence that there are no natural beings that can be defined, the result being that one wonders what to do with a good half of Aristotle’s corpus. It means rather that we cannot know what pertains to something only accidentally or uniquely – in other words, that we cannot know chance (*An. Post.* I 30, 87b 19 ff.). I can distinguish Socrates from Callias by way of his snub nose, hair, age, smell, bare feet, etc.; but in doing so I have not defined “Socrates.” All I have done is enumerated a number of inessential properties which I can never be sure identify Socrates as opposed to other individuals (and this is the reason why for Aristotle I cannot define eternal individuals such as the sun either). I can of course perceive the accidental or the singular, and I can describe it in language: but only in the way of accidental predication. Either the predicate identifies the subject, where it is then no predicate but the essence that I declare to be identical with it, or the predicate is in, attributed to, the subject, but in a purely contingent way.

If all this interpretation of universality, definability, and absolute relativity of matter to form is not free from difficulties, it seems positively doomed to failure when faced by *Met.* Z 10, 1036a 8: “in itself matter is unknowable” (*hê d’hulê agn tôstos kath’ hautên*). Exactly what this matter, and prime matter, is is far from being clear, and it is no wonder interpreters are divided.37

Denying or downplaying the fact that Aristotle speaks of prime matter would be of little help. Matter, in the passage from *Met.* Z 10 above, is not the material function of a composite. Per se matter is unconceivable; it is an abstraction. If we abstract it from its relation not only to

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37 For both Simplicius and Philoponus, prime matter is indefinite extension (Sorabji, *Matter*, 1988: 7–30); for Wieland, matter is a limiting concept (*Physik*, 1962: 209); for Happ it is determinability in itself, but always relative to form (*Hyle*, 1971: 561–2, 774–98); for Leszl, in this passage Aristotle occasionally absolutizes a concept (as he did with the One in *Met.* I 2), when his standard theory is that only the composite exists for itself (*Logic*, 1970: 517–20; 1973–4: 169); for Owens, matter is necessary to explain change, but itself has no property, even negative, of its own (“Matter,” in *Papers*, 1981: 40 ff.); for Gill, prime matter is the set of the simple elements (*Substance*, 1989: passim).
form but also to the elements, there is nothing to know, for matter in itself has no determinations whatever on which to hold fast.

Substance is itself said of matter, as we saw à propos Z 3; matter persists through change and is the subject of the changing properties of elements (*Phys.* I 9, 192a 13–34). But in itself matter eludes all qualitative, quantitative, or other determinations, just as it eludes perceptual and conceptual characterization while still being indispensable in the explanation of change. This pure empty potentiality reads like a logical requisite, something which must be assumed as a substrate for contraries and elements but which has no existence in itself (*De gen. et corr.* II 1, 329a 24–b 5).

Aristotle criticizes materialists who suppose that all things are generated out of one something for not distinguishing between generation and alteration (*De gen. et corr.* I 1, 314a 6–12), and in turn he criticizes those who suppose that all things are generated and corrupted out of elements for not distinguishing aggregation and separation from generation and corruption (*De gen. et corr.* I 2, 317a 17–27). Thus it would be very strange if he finally resorted to the existence of a separately existing matter. Yet it is this notion of matter as an eternal separate passivity, determined only by a form conceived as opposed and no less independent, which underlies the reading of essence as a Platonic form in disguise.

To recapitulate, the ultimate difference can be the subject of science and definition, while we only have opinion (*doxa*) of that which can be otherwise. This implies the undefinability of the contingent properties of a substrate, but not of corruptible beings.

We must at this point go back to Hegel and see what he thinks of Aristotle’s notions of definition, essence, and matter. This is the object of Chapter 6.
ESSENCE AND CONCEPT

§1. Singularity and Opinion

At the end of Chapter 5 we saw that, for Aristotle, what happens to belong to a substrate can only be said in the mode of accidental predication. We have knowledge and definition of the ultimate difference; what may or may not belong to a substrate escapes determinacy and is instead the object of sensation and opinion (doxa). This does not imply the unknowability of the corruptible in general, but rather the undefinability of what is accidental about this or that substance. The definition of “man” is definitely incorruptible even if the man it is predicated of is not.

A science of man is possible insofar as we talk about universalities, re-

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1 This is an attempt at translating Gadda’s difficult passage (I wish to thank Paul Tucker for his help):

The recent events had come to fruition and had dropped into the reality of common cognition, that cognition or consciousness which certain philosophers precisely call “the real,” in order to distinguish it more clearly from the train of their own private fantasies, almost conferring on it some faint right of citizenship dans le domaine de l’esprit. Those events, like hard fruit, had dropped off the Christmas tree of a previous suspension, termed “the possible.”
membering that the individual is indefinite and need not coincide with the universal in many respects. For example, medicine will tell me that once I apply a certain treatment to my chest my body will be healed of its cold. This is knowledge about myself only incidentally, since per se it is about the treatment of colds; and it does not guarantee success, in that the particular circumstances of my body and of my cold may make the treatment ineffective, compelling the physician to take other causes into account and possibly qualify the diagnosis. 

Turning to Hegel, we notice how similar this is to his own conception. Chance is necessary, indefinite, and ineliminable. That accidentality is necessary is not some cloudy confusion of modal categories. Hegel means, like Aristotle, that what is always accidental is indefinite and unknowable, yet the concept of accidental is itself indispensable as a logical category. Henrich writes that absolute chance is an ineliminable moment of subjectivity.2 Hegel does not pretend that he can deduce Krug’s pen or find anything interesting in the enumeration of over sixty varieties of parrots. In nature chance is the accidentality of singular variations, while in spirit particularity is a necessary moment that cannot be eliminated, but that is indispensable for the universal to be individual. Thus Hegel’s theory is no different from Aristotle’s; the individual is indefinite, but it is not an irrational residue separate from form.

The parallel continues in the recourse to language as further evidence of the indefinability of the singular. Aristotle writes that “the definition must consist of words, but the established words are common to each of a number of things; these then must apply to something besides the thing defined. For example if one were defining you, one would say a living being which is lean or white or something else which will apply also to some one other than you” (Met. Z 15, 1040a 9–14, transl. Ross modified). Likewise, Hegel’s sense-certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit is meant as the grasp of the object without neglecting any of its richness; but as soon as the object is expressed in its truth, such certainty reveals that the immediate is contradicted by its very preservation. By saying “this,” “now,” consciousness experiences the universality of language. The singular is only opined or meant [gemeint] because all singulars can be indicated as a “this” or a “now.” The “this” is “neither this nor that, a not-this” (W 3: 85, PhS 60). In other words, the “this” cannot be identified positively with a singular spatiotemporal given; it abides as a constant in the vanishing of its being referred to. In sum, it is not

2 “Zufall” (Hegel im Kontext, 1971: 168.)
an immediacy but a negation; the this is the negative proxy (demonstrative pronoun) for each singular given.

The identification of singular contents that recurs to proper names is even more external. Proper names are accidental signs of “active memory” \((VGPh 1: 537)\). They are “remedies” which help identify something that is perfectly singular. But when we use them “we admit we have not thereby expressed the thing itself. The name as name is not an expression containing what I am” \(\text{(ibid.)}\); it is “purely posited, arbitrary” \((WL 1: 126, SL 117)\).

Hegel is not saying that protocols or indexicals fail to do their job. I can say: “Now it is A.D. 1805; I am 35, I am in Jena” \((VGPh 1: 537)\). However, what is thus expressed is not a truth, but only a given whose essence and truth vanish. What Hegel is denying is that indexicals identify and refer to something exclusively singular. When I say “I,” I express at the same time a singular and a universal, for everybody says “I.” And this shows that the chapter on sense-certainty is not based on a thesis about language or on the impossibility for the universality of language to come down to the singular.\(^3\) Hegel’s argument about sense-certainty is that a singular has no truth in itself. A “this” is at the same time an other; as long as I want to hold fast to the singular, irrespective of its being also a universal, thus a reality without ideality, I fail to realize that I am always already operating within a linguistic web that is the space of universality. As in a Socratic dialogue, I do not know what I am saying.

Language can certainly express singulars, as we have seen; but only in propositions that have nothing to teach, that have no truth, and at best are simply correct. This is in accord with Hegel’s distinction between proposition and judgment in the \emph{Science of Logic} \((WL 2: 305–6, L 626)\). The grammatical form \(S \text{ is } P\) is not sufficient for a proposition to be a judgment. A judgment “requires that the predicate be related to the subject as one conceptual determination to another, and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual. If a statement about a particular subject only enunciates something individual, then this is a mere proposition. For example, Aristotle died at the age of 73.”\(^4\)

\(^3\) As argued, among others, by Simon \(\text{(Sprache, 1957: 19–20)}\) and Debrock, “Language” \(\text{(1973: 294)}\).

\(^4\) I find this example to be a further indication that Hegel is thinking of Aristotle here (which is hardly surprising, as the triad concept-judgment-syllogism comes from the Aristotelian tradition, and Hegel has just talked about \emph{hupokeimenon} in the previous page). I also find it ironical. Hegel does not seem to doubt the correctness of this proposition.
qualitative judgment “subject and predicate do not stand to one another in the relationship of reality and concept” (*ENZ.C* §172 Z). When in judgment I predicate something of something, the copula is the expression of an identification between reality and concept, between a thing and its truth. In other words, predication is an apparent predication, just as in Aristotle, for whom there is no real *ti kata tinos* predication in definitions of essences. A proposition, in turn, expresses the copula as this external connection.

And interpreters have in fact noted this similarity between Hegel and Aristotle.5 We must now examine whether behind this basic agreement there may be lurking a different conception. For Aristotle, *doxa* is that opinion which is addressed to what can be otherwise (*An. Post. I* 33, 89a 3; *Met. Z* 15, 1040a 1); it can be true or false, and can become false when the object changes without our realizing it (*De an. III* 3, 428b 8–9). For this reason the object of opinion differs from the object of nous and of science, which is always true and provides necessary knowledge (*An. Post. I* 33, 88b 30–1), where it is not possible to have at the same time opinion and science of the same object (89a 38–9). This is another occurrence of the distinction between essential and accidental predication: opinion expresses a conclusion that holds momentarily, the inherence of accidental attributes in a subject at a certain time and place (*I* 8, 75b 24–30). Also, accidental attributes are very close to nonbeing (*Met. E* 2, 1026b 21).

Compared to this, it seems to me that the dialectic of sense-certainty has a different meaning. Sense-certainty believes in the truth of the singular object which is meant. The meant object, on which the dialectic of truth and certainty is exercised, is *the same* which then turns out to be universal. Language for Hegel is the power of ideality in which the singular turns out to be identical with the universal, that is, with its logical determination, while for Aristotle the language of definition cannot express accidents, since it would have to treat them as essential and universal attributes, which they are not.

Aristotle criticizes Plato for not distinguishing sensation from opinion (*De an. III* 3, 428a 16–b 10). Actually, in Plato, for whom the sensible is understood in reference to the intelligible, contingency is an at-

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tribute of a defective, inadequate, and provisional way of knowing: it is a necessity that we ignore as such. Now, the chapter on sense-certainty was not the place for Hegel to fully develop the forms of knowing that we find later in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit; but we can still say that Hegel is more Platonic than Aristotelian when he presents opinion as the belief in the truth of the changing singular as attested by immediate sensation, prior to any discussion of the necessity or accidentality of the properties of an object. Whether or not Hegel had a Platonic or an Aristotelian conception in mind, what is important is to show that the dialectic of sense-certainty has the sceptical, negatively rational sense of pointing out to the opinion of the moderns (especially modern presumed sceptics such as Schulze) the nonbeing of the finite. For Hegel, the master of this negative dialectic, thus of the dissolution of the finite, was Plato, not Aristotle. Not only the Parmenides, but more especially the reductio ad absurdum of all claims to truth posed by the vanishing sensible – think of Socrates’s criticism of Protagoras in the Theaetetus (171a-c), which is much more powerful than Aristotle’s dialectical refutation of Protagoras in Met. Γ – are, it seems to me, Hegel’s model from the 1802 Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie on.

§2. Essence and Matter: The Lectures on the Organon

In Chapter 5, I question the plausibility of the equation of substance, essence, and universality. It is now time to examine Hegel’s position on these issues. But if we turn to Hegel himself for help, we find remarkably little. In all the Lectures on Aristotle there is virtually no trace of any of the subject matter of Chapter 5. One could advance the suggestion that if Hegel had asked himself such questions and looked for answers, he would have taken the Organon more seriously. Moreover, one can surmise that by considering the Metaphysics to be a speculative work and the Organon a natural history of finite thought that examines the correctness of formal connections in propositions or judgments about what is given (think of the Prior Analytics and the Topics), Hegel subordinates issues of judgment, predication, and categories to the question of affirming the full intelligibility of being within becoming. Differently stated, Hegel seems to consider Metaphysics E, Z, H, Θ, and Λ to make up a speculative ontology, in which subject and predicate, like essence in the Topics (II 1, 109–10 ff.), are mutually convertible, and in which reality is not an object for a subject but is in opposition to the Organon its superior intelligible truth. With respect to the Organon, Hegel does
not question the prejudice of most historiography according to which its subject matter is formal subjective logic.

If so, then we should know what to do with the priority of act to potency and matter in the different substances; we should know what to do with their essences, which thus appear as windowless monads. We would not know how to relate essences to one another if we dissociated the Organon from speculation. The affinities in subject and mode of exposition among Metaphysics $E$, $Z$, $H$, $\Theta$, the Categories, and the Posterior Analytics (the sensible substances and their relation in language and demonstrative science) would be entirely missed; and the identification of the Metaphysics with the Concept and the Organon with the logic of finite predication that lies behind this dissociation seems more than clumsy; it seems false.

This criticism is partly true. The fact of the matter is that Hegel never discusses in the Lectures the logos of essence, definition, and intellection. There is not one word about such topics in his comments on the Metaphysics or on the Organon. Yet Hegel’s lectures on the Organon are of particular – presumptive or symptomatic – interest, as it were, over and above his judgment on the philosophical value of the Aristotelian logic. They are valuable for an understanding of what he means by the finitude of thought he finds at work in the Aristotelian logic, and for an understanding of the reason why the Metaphysics is a speculative work in which reason unfolds itself precisely insofar as it does not follow the intellectual formal relations of judgment and syllogism expounded in the Organon.

Hegel begins by saying that Aristotle is rightly considered the father of logic which, as was already pointed out by Kant, has made no substantial progress since then (VGPh 229). Aristotle’s logic is an immortal masterpiece of empirical investigation (VGPh 237): Aristotle considers the various finite applications of discourses, abstracts them from the external material in which they were submerged, fixates and finally gathers and describes them with infinite patience and precision. Thus he expresses the activity of the understanding as a consciousness of the pure forms of thinking isolated from their contents. For this reason his logic is an introduction to correct thinking.

However, in this way the content remains a given content (VGPh 238). As long as the understanding’s identity and its abstract laws are held fast in their isolation, as long as nothing must contradict itself, thinking remains a subjective thinking opposed to the thing. This does not mean, as “the logicians” think (VGPh 239), that judgments and syl-
logisms do not reach truth because they are simply forms. The cause of their nontruth is for Hegel the opposition between form and content which they presuppose and which obscures the question of truth in and for itself. Thought which has no empirical content becomes itself its own content; however, in Aristotle the laws of thought fall asunder, each demanding validity for itself. Hegel’s conclusion is that their defect lies not in that “they are only forms, but that they lack form” (VGPh 239). Just as a syllogism can be correct but its conclusion qua mere subjective form lacking truth in itself, as long as they are considered in separation the forms are only the material for thought. Only their unity and totality has truth in and for itself because the content of such a totality, developed into a system, is the same as its form. But if we had such a totality, we would already have the speculative idea, the science of subjective and objective thinking; in other words, we would have the complete and conclusive demonstration of the system of thought-determinations we read in the Science of Logic.

It is difficult to give a comprehensive evaluation of the Organon; Aristotle does not even have a term which covers all the logical treatises, let alone a unitary theory of logic. The Organon is the result of a later editorial arrangement, as is well known; Andronicus’s systematization is based on his particular conception of logic, which reflects post-Stoic preoccupations (from terms to propositions to inference, syllogistic or dialectic: Categories/ De Interpretatione/ Analytics/ Topics).6 That Aristotle considers his “logic” an instrument of science (the meaning of the word Organon), or as a propædeutic to philosophy, is far from obvious. At Met. Γ 3, 1005b 2–5 Aristotle writes that he presupposes that his listeners are familiar with the Analytics and the theory of truth expounded there.

However that may be, Hegel never seems troubled in his interpretation of the finitude of thought, or even concerning the role of matter in knowledge. His exposition of Met. Θ does not meet with any major difficulties in the identification of potentiality and matter; Hegel never raises questions about the composition of essence and matter or about the status of composite substances for definition and intellection.

The only time he speaks of definition and substance is with regard to the definition of the soul in the De anima (for a fuller discussion of this, see Chapter 8, §3 below). Hegel focuses on this definition because for him the soul is the “substance only according to the concept” (VGPh 201: in Aristotle the word “only” is missing, “ousia gar hê kata ton logon.”

De an. II 1, 412b 10). For him this means that “the form, the concept is here the being itself, this substance itself” (VGPh 201); and this concept is the dominant principle that teleologically sublates its parts into itself, reducing them to its means of actualization, and is their truth or totality. In this sense Hegel can say that “matter does not exist as matter here, it is only in itself” (VGPh 200).

For Aristotle, all that is under investigation is the composite of soul and body. On the one hand, matter is referred to in the definition of the living being as that which is enlivened by the soul; on the other hand, matter is the source of contingency, of accidental multiplicity, and of the difference between essence and singularity, thus is relatively other from essences. For Hegel matter is instead simply a concept, the concept of passivity (VGPh 159), of the in-itself, of multiplicity, the correlate of the form. For Hegel, matter can be the substrate, indifferent to the imposition of a form on the part of human activity (Wirksamkeit), or it can be the external means, sublated in its independence and otherness, for the subjectivity of energeia in a teleological relation.7

This is in keeping with Hegel’s characterization of sensible substance in his analysis of the Metaphysics. Substance, regardless of its kinds and differentiations, is explained as actualization, as the movement of realization. It is (1) matter, the substrate of opposites; (2) the abstract essence opposed to matter; (3) “das Bewegende” (“that which moves,” VGPh 157, missing in HP), which is also called the end or the motor of its realization. By thinking of sensible substance as energeia, and of energeia as nature, Hegel thinks the concept as subjectivity. But subjectivity cannot leave anything outside itself, an external world which would limit it. Matter for subjectivity must be the intelligible in itself, an ideal moment. It cannot be a residue, opaque to knowing and to spirit’s activity. It must be posited as a finite form in order to be sublated in the self-actualization of absolute self-consciousness. Matter is what ought to become (“was werden soll,” VGPh 157). Philosophy can only be knowledge of the whole if it has resolved the real in itself, and if the sensible world is not other than its concept. That matter is validated as ideal, as

7 It can also be the external accidentality or whimsy of nature (ENZ.C §248), so that nature is the unsolved contradiction between its concept (forces, laws, and so on) and its existence. But if the task of the philosophy of nature is that of expounding its content as an ordered organism (§246), in that nature is a living whole aiming at the production of spirit and the true actuality of the Idea (§251), then material accidentality is precisely what must be neglected and considered inessential in a thinking consideration of nature. About this see Chapter 7.
the concept of multiplicity, is a point that returns, as if it went without saying, when Hegel comments on the *Categories*, where he translates the *poson* as “Quantität: *hulê*” (quantity and matter are the same, VGPh 233).

Hegel seems to think that reality is for Aristotle eminently nature, or *phusis*. For this reason he only concentrates on substance when taking up the teleological relation, in which the concept turns otherness into an in-itself. The concept is thus more than a ground, it is the organization and subordination of external multiplicity under itself. The consequences drawn from this are important. First, the consideration of essence as the simple intelligibility of the thing is insufficient. Substance is essence only insofar as it is understood as final cause or coincidence of final and formal cause. Second, Plato and Aristotle, according to Hegel, share the notion of *Wesen*, or abstract essence (the Platonic Idea, the Aristotelian formal cause). Third and most important, substance as actuality is not a given and fixed identity, but a self-producing unity. Living entelechy is the unity of a multiplicity, not a unity over multiplicity. Entelechy is what the essence is as the subject of motion and of becoming.

If the definition of essence, regardless of the final cause, renders an abstract and unmoved identity (formal cause) between thing and concept, and if for Hegel the definition of an entelechy includes the process of realization and the relation with otherness, then we must conclude that being is the Concept only provided that we understand by form or essence an actuality and a final/efficient cause, and thus the whole of nature as logically articulated in its forms. We must conclude that for Hegel Aristotle’s advance over Plato consists in the attempt to explain the sensible world as in itself the intelligible world. If Plato begins with the truth of ideas and is unable to reach the unlimited realm of the sensible, Aristotle wants to make essences useful for the knowledge of the sensible, and to understand motion in the principles of its logic. If all of this is what Hegel finds in Aristotle, this marks the difference between Hegel and interpreters who would have essence understood as a form opposed to matter.

§3. Aristotle and the Logic of Essence

Why is it that we find no extensive reference to, let alone a discussion of, Aristotle in the Logic of Essence? The inner split within the thing
between essence and appearance, ground, the principle of noncontra-
diction, laws and appearances, and especially the modal categories, are
all treated here with reference to Leibniz, Spinoza, Newton, and above
all Kant’s Amphiboly. Why are Plato and Aristotle absent?

Is there not, according to Aristotle, a difference between essence and
composite in the thing, a difference which is none in the case of what
is said “kath’hauto”? Whenever we speak of kath’hauto or per se, are we
not already implying a split, and thereby a relation, between the essen-
tial and the inessential, between the truth and the concrete composite,
between the cause and that which the cause is a cause of? Is this rela-
tion not a relation, to put it in Hegelian terms, of identity and differ-
ence? Does not the discussion of essence in Aristotle address the ex-
planation of what is visible by what is invisible, without at the same time
posing the truth of appearance beyond appearance? Is not Aristotle
writing, in his conception of the embodied form and in his criticism of
the separation of a world of intelligibility from the sensible world, his
own parable about “how the true world became a fable” (Nietzsche)?
Again in Hegelian terms, isn’t essence the ground of its own appear-
ance in the composite? Finally, could not Hegel have said that, in his in-
ability to account for the indefinite multiplicity of appearance, Socrates
sailed to the ideas; while Aristotle instead took appearance to be the ap-
pearance of forms and essences?

In order to answer these questions we must briefly go over some of
the key tenets of the Logic of Essence.

Quality, quantity, and measure in the Logic of Being are not fixed de-
terminations; they pass over into one another. Since they have proven
inadequate for a stable self-grounding standpoint at the level of imme-
diacy, they result in a logically complex, internally differentiated deter-
mination: essence. Thus essence is other than being; being was imme-
diate, essence is its negation and mediation. In being, determinations
undergo their transition, and their relation is our reflection, such that
when a determination becomes a different determination the original
determination has vanished; whereas in essence, difference and rela-
tion have become internal. In essence we do not have an other which
replaces the original thought-determination, because here the relation

9 As recognized by N. Hartmann, Deutscher Idealismus (1929, 2: 233); Fleischmann, Science
universelle (1968: ch. 6); Belaval, “Doctrine de l’essence” (in Études leibniziennes, 1976:
277); Longuenesse, Critique (1981: 57 ff.).

10 For an intriguing interpretation of Aristotelian substance and essence as determinations
of reflection in a Hegelian sense, compare Brinkmann, Metaphysik (1979: 63 ff.).
is between the one and its other. If being was the logical stage of immediacy, essence is the stage of internal relation. Determinations in being simply were; essence has its determinations in itself. Being’s determinations are extinguished in their simple being; when we pass from being to having we get a relation between that which has and that which has been had. But this means that essence is already inwardly split. Therefore in essence passing over (Übergehen) is not a transition to another but a staying within the same which doubles itself into two sides.

This is called the reflection of essence in itself. Even though when we confront being’s determinations with their pretense to be valid it seems as though we look for the truth of being behind it, the reflection is not to be taken as our reflection but as a reflection (shining: Scheinen ins Entgegengesetzte) of being, which duplicates itself in an essential permanence and an inessential side. But even the inessential is understood by reference to the essence: in other words, it is not a nothing, but the appearance, shining or manifestation of something permanent.

Determinations are necessarily linked to their opposites because the identity of thought-determinations is now defined negatively as inner difference. Essence is a negation of being, of the self-subsistence of the immediacy with which we began; thus it inwardizes itself as a simple in-itself and opposes itself to its outer appearance. It is relation to itself insofar as it is relation to its other. Being splits itself into two opposite determinations; the Logic of Essence plunges into this opposition until the final conciliation in the category of actuality, wherein essence and appearance are one.

In that it is a result, essence is a product: the product of the reflection of being. But essence is not beyond being or appearance; it is rather that appearance is the product of essence. But if appearance is not given, but constituted by essence, then we must consider things as the result of essence’s thought-determinations. And this means that things appear insofar as they essentially are products of absolute thinking. The sensible world appears to me in sensation as a given whose stable essence I think over against, or alternatively in accord with, what I see. Thus while it seems that thinking is my particular activity and that things are there as the veil, mask, or manifestation of a hidden essence, in truth the same laws and relations which obtain in my thinking about or perception of appearance are the finite products of the unity of absolute thinking.

Different forms are not given identities because form is itself an activity; as such, it is negative, and is a ground of unity insofar as it negates
and produces its own otherness. Nor are unity and plurality, identity and difference given; they are thinking, producing its thoughts.

But if this is the core of the Logic of Essence, then we must conclude that essences are the reflection-determinations of thinking. And thought-determinations are defined by the movement of thinking, which fixates essentialities as self-same unities in opposition to other essentialities. What matters for Hegel in essence is the logical relation between the opposites of inner and outer, identity and difference, permanence and appearance, etc. If one freezes the movement that gave rise to particular essences in its abstract or reified products, starting from them as primary data, one loses sight of the origin of essences in thought. Thoughts lose their link with thinking.

If we bring these considerations to bear on Hegel’s treatment of Aristotle, we would have to draw several conclusions of which Hegel never seems to be aware. We would have to say that Aristotelian essences are fixed and stable causes of being and intelligibility for each of the beings they define. The dialectical self-motion of thought-determinations; the negativity that Hegel finds in the nous; and the relation to otherness that in the Phenomenology of Spirit (W3: 54, PhS 34) he finds in essences, seem almost entirely absent. In fact, a dialectical critique of the positivity of Aristotelian substance and essence based on the Logic of Essence would compel us to question precisely the fixity and isolation of essences we found in Aristotle in Chapter 5, over and beyond what could be interpreted from a Hegelian perspective as his efforts to set them in motion.

Though each substance is unity of essence and accidents, this very unity is a fact that Aristotle does not explain. Substance, which should be identity and otherness, is only touchable qua the object of noetic intellection as a simple identity. Identity and otherness are not equally immanent in substance. Negation is only an apophantic predication that says nothing of the essence; it is not a conceptual or internal negation immanent in essence. It is only an attestation of a fact, the fact of a non-inherence of a predicate in a substrate. And this fact is attested by sensation, which shows that a predicate does not happen to belong to a substrate.

In discursive terms, this is translated into the distinction of aspects within a thing, Aristotle’s qua (ἡεὶ). This distinction is crucial to rebuke the assertion, made by Eleats and sophists alike, that plurality is impossible. But this very distinction is never grounded metaphysically; we do
not know how unity and difference are themselves unified. Not only does Aristotle not do this, he is not even willing to explain how the accidental belongs to the necessary. This belonging is presupposed as a factual union; accidentality has no per se logical status, simply because Aristotle is not examining the logical categories of the composite substance in their mutual relation, as Hegel does in the Logic of Essence, but rather its “ontological” composition. What is postulated in the idea that substance is both an essence and an accidental contingent singularity is that the singular is in itself informed by an essence and that this is acknowledged as common to many singularities, within the same species. We thus isolate the universal of which we make use in scientific considerations; but how and why different singularities share the same form is never discussed by Aristotle.

A consequence of this assumption that is difficult to resist, and even more difficult to explain, is that singularities which have no species but exist as unique items in nature, do not have an essence; they are not definable and are not objects of science. Aristotle’s example is that of the sun, but God could be one as well – but if he were, this theory would have disruptive theological consequences, including for the very definition of God as noësis noëseôs in Met. Λ.

Moreover, not only is the relation between intellected essence and the discursive diairesis of a genus which ends in the coincidence with the ultimate difference left unexplained, such that there seems to be a jump between antepredicative intellection and language. There is also the consequence that, if essence cannot be negated but only overlooked, then science and all investigation must be founded on premises that cannot be put in question. Thought must assume essences as an immediate certainty with regard to which the possibility of a false touching/saying is not even contemplated, for it does not make sense to begin with. This means that the relation between nous and dianoia is not biunivocal; I cannot discursively negate the essence I have thought, just as I cannot demonstrate essences (if I could, they would no longer be primary, and we would have an infinite regress; the only demonstration allowed with regard to principles is the elenctic-dialectical demonstration of common principles). And the relation is not biunivocal just because essences are only thought of as mere identities. The touching and saying of them is their simple identity with the intellect,

11 This is argued by Rosen in his beautiful essay “Much Ado” (1988: 161 ff.).
not the principle of their further (subsequent or concomitant) dialectic (in a Hegelian sense). Differently stated, from the Hegelian perspective, Aristotle, who starts from the identity of thinking and thought and from the principle that the *nous* is potentially all essences, never takes the further step of considering *nous* as the pure origin of essences, nor does he consider the content of thought as its own product, let alone the thinking of such content as thought’s self-knowledge and self-determination.

If negation is not in things or intellection but in discourse only, then Aristotle seems guilty precisely of a version of that dissociation of thinking from thoughts which Hegel criticizes in the philosophies of reflection.

For Hegel, it is crucial to think of determinations as negations. Not only are all finite things contradictory, but determinations of essence hinge upon the constitutivity of negation. Internal difference is the opposition constitutive of essence — and for Aristotle relation is not constitutive or internal to substance, but is one of the *ousia*’s accidents.

“At the same time” (*hama*) and “in the same respect” (*kata to auto*) were for Aristotle the basic adverbs on which depended the *bebaidatì ton archon*, the most stable principle (*Met. Γ 3*, 1005b 19–23). Aristotle’s so-called principle of non-contradiction is not the logical principle that is typically read into *Met. Γ*. It is, and is dialectically explained as, a principle of the determinacy of being, not of logic. (It is not the *nihil negativum irrepraesentabile* of German scholastic logic; neither Aristotle nor Hegel take their bearings from logic in their considerations of the principle of noncontradiction.) It is the acknowledgment of the presupposition that things have a given stable and determinate nature. The distinction of respects, or of time, which preserve things from the impossibility of predication or change, is an ultimate datum. And it is developed and criticized by Hegel precisely as an ultimate datum about the determinacy of being, and not simply about language or logic.

Hegel introduces relation within determinacy. Thus identity *is* difference; what something is in itself it is at the same time in relation to its opposite. The Logic of Essence shows that determinations are identical insofar as they are opposed to *their* determinate otherness (“Socrates is a trireme,” or “anything goes,” do not follow from Hegel’s discussion of noncontradiction, and it should even be pointless to repeat this). If no such negativity can be found in Aristotle’s account of essence, then reason’s negation of negation is even less present. The *nous* is not understood as a return to itself or as the truth of appearance.
All the considerations I have developed in this section lend themselves to contradictory reactions.

From an Aristotelian point of view, one could reply that all of these criticisms make sense only provided we take Hegel as having completed these theses we have surreptitiously considered as having been only halfway thought by Aristotle, and that they thus miss the central point: Aristotle had no intention of understanding essences as products of thought, because the *Metaphysics* is not intended to be a logic of thought’s determinations.

From a Hegelian perspective, the charge against the presumption of these considerations would seem to be even weightier. Not only did Hegel himself not take up such criticisms; in fact, there is evidence that on, say, the separation between the identity *nous*/intelligibles and the self-knowledge of *nous* he would have totally disagreed. Besides, if what I have argued is what I think Hegel should have said, then why didn’t he consider Aristotle as part and parcel of classical metaphysics, holding fast to fixed essences and finding in intellection a unity of thinking and being just because these are assumed as separate to begin with?

§4. Conclusion to Part II and Introduction to Part III

The answer to this question is complicated. Part of the answer is already in §2. Let me spell it out here.

For Hegel, Aristotle’s idea of essence is that it is always a final cause, hence a concrete universal. Hegel’s conclusion is that Aristotle must be treated at the level of the Concept, not of Essence. In other words, substance is not a reflexive abstraction but a concrete universal containing in itself the principle of its development and actualization. *Energeia* is already the stage at which essence and appearance are reconciled. But they can be that only insofar as they are a self-relating negativity, a self-motion, and thereby a totality. Hegelian essence is not a developing totality, because its other is opposed to it; and this relation (inner/outer, essence/existence, etc.) is not yet a whole, for it lacks a basis or “substrate” (*Grundlage*). Once essence is understood as the end of itself, it is a universal, self-particularizing concept (*WL* 2: 182, *SL* 526).

The Concept is what essence was in itself; but it is first, for like actuality it comes before potentiality. This priority distances Hegel from all of modernity, from Suarez to Leibniz to Wolff to Heidegger (“*Höher als Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit,*” SuZ 38). We can still have doubts that Hegel is an Aristotelian, this priority of actuality over potentiality
notwithstanding: his interpretation of the Concept as *energeia* means the process of thought’s self-actualization in finite reality. But for Hegel it is clear that Aristotle was at the level of the Concept, not of essence.

As he puts it, the Logic of Essence contains “the categories of metaphysics and of the sciences generally; – it contains them as products of the reflecting understanding, which both assumes the distinctions as *independent* and at the same time posits their relationality *as well*” (*ENZ.C §114 A*). Aristotle is never a thinker of the understanding for Hegel simply because his concept is vitality, entelechy. As I show in Chapter 1, Aristotle is alien to reflection and the understanding for Hegel.

We can now understand why Hegel dissociates the *Organon* from the *Metaphysics*. He can do so to the extent that he in turn associates the *Metaphysics* with the *Physics* and the *De anima*, and construes the thematic unity of such works in the following order: (1) a theory of pure determinations underlying the theory of nature as a living whole; and (2) the theory of *nous* as absolute self-consciousness in the finite subjects of intellection. This whole interpretation is made possible by his interpretation of *nous* as a self-motion, a being in identity and difference with otherness, the principle of a dialectic of intelligibles.

Thus Hegel reads Aristotle once again through the eyes of a certain Neoplatonism: dialectic, the relation between being and negation, the relation between the One and the many, is read into a complex theory of *nous*. Hegel interprets the *nous* as objective thought operative in nature and in finite spirit. Nature and spirit are for Hegel the result of a *nous* that makes itself passive.

We turn to an examination of this in Part III. We analyze Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle in the philosophy of nature and of spirit; but we must remind ourselves that, for Hegel, the Realphilosophie is the self-concretization of the Idea.

The absolute Idea, which at the end of the Logic shows itself as having dictated its very structure and progression from the outset, is the highest logical determination. As such, however, it is only the concept of the Idea, in the form of a now completely developed subject that stands opposed to a reality which at first appears as other than the Idea. The Idea must fall into nature, as in Hegel’s mystifying expression,12

12 For a plausible defense of this *Sich-entlassen* see Wandschneider/Hösle, “Entäusserrung” (1984). If this theological figure of speech and image is to be taken seriously, I believe it takes more than a plausible reconstruction of the meaning ascribed to it by Hegel. No direct proof for it can be given, only, as with the principle of noncontradiction in Aristotle, a dialectical-elenctic reductio ad absurdum of its negation. Hegel’s own explana-
because the Idea, an empty or formal absolute, must recapture itself at the end of the real-empirical process as spirit conscious of itself. Because the Idea is complete in itself, it must go out of itself to gather itself through nature and spirit. That is to say, it is spirit that must realize the dialectic of the Idea and expose its moments from the universal absolute Idea through its particularization in nature to its individuality in spirit.

Nature is an essential moment in this realization, as are all finite stages of spirit. Were it not so, nature and finitude would remain external to the infinite, which would then be finite, a finite being opposed to another finite being. We cannot even say that nature and spirit are the manifestations of the Idea, for that would be to fall back on categories of essence; we would have a relation, not a whole. Nature and spirit are rather the moments of the Idea’s self-actualization as free and self-determining spirit. Thus the development of the Idea comes to an end when spirit has grasped it as the totality of its moments. In this sense the release of the Idea into nature is not a logical transition comparable to the logical dialectic; it is its freedom that makes the Idea assume a finite form. This is not, argues Hegel, an incomprehensible leap, but part and parcel of the self-knowing nature of the Idea.

Nature and spirit are the process of the actualization of the Idea. Logic is the realm of abstract thinking, the skeleton of reality and thinking, a soul without a body. Spatial and material otherness, temporal development in empirical cognition and action, institutions, art and religion, are all the calvary through which spirit must go to finally reflect and recapitulate itself in nature and in its own second nature. In all of this the Idea is externalized and presupposed. Only in itself, in its purity, is the Idea pure thinking; in its finite realization the Idea is embodied in finite forms, from the motion of the planets to linguistic rules to political customs. Differently stated, the Idea is grasped in the form of representations and concepts hidden in, or underlying, objects, until we realize its primacy.

tions are unsatisfactory and circular (this claim does not pretend any particular originality). If, on the other hand, the considerations developed in Chapter 2 about the three syllogisms and the structure of the system hold, and if this transition is an image for the sake of representation, then the question as to why Hegel has extensive recourse to it remains unanswered.
ARISTOTLE AND THE REALPHILOSOPHIE
§1. The Philosophy of Nature: Introduction

The Philosophy of Nature has always been considered one of the most controversial and obscure parts of what is usually referred to as Hegel’s system. Very often the reader is struck by the awkwardness of certain passages, or of the overall intentions of Hegel, which sometimes are quite hard to make out. And yet Hegel seems to have devoted many of his efforts to this part of the system. The Additions to the Philosophy of Nature are among the longest, most intricate, and exhaustive in the whole of the Encyclopædia. Hegel’s knowledge of the contemporary accomplishments in most scientific disciplines was thorough and his discussion is quite detailed.

In the thirty years since the publication of Petry’s translation of and commentary on the Philosophy of Nature, innumerable contributions to this topic have been published. The whole picture of the Philosophy of Nature has undergone a substantial change, so that it would be difficult to say today, following Croce for example, that the second part of the Encyclopædia should be entirely dismissed as misguided. Hegel cannot be approached as a late 19th-century-historicist who takes his bearings by something like the division between natural sciences and Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences) and devotes himself to the latter. For Hegel we do not simply have before us two different models of explanation and approaches that belong to two radically different and mutually exclusive realms. For Hegel, nature has a life that cannot be op-
posed to the life of the mind. It is the Idea in its externality. Thus it is neither alien to reason, nor does it belong to a realm of objectivity forever separated from man. It is rather instead that such a position is the view of nature that Hegel sets out to put into question. Hegel holds that his epoch has separated nature from man, and that the main task of the Philosophy of Nature is to retrieve the substantial unity between the two. He wants to overcome, in other words, the modern conception of nature as the inert and dead opposite to subjectivity.

There is no radical gap between nature and man; nature belongs in us as much as we belong in it. Trying to deny this is an abstract and one-sided approach to both man and nature. Hegel criticizes all ways of understanding nature that would view it as something dead and thereby external to man – whether as instrumental, as in some theological conceptions, or as a generalized material mechanism governed by a few fundamental laws.

The question Hegel wants to ask in the Philosophy of Nature is the question of its being. He does not construct nature a priori, independently of experience. As we know from the Introduction to the Encyclopædia, philosophy must be in accord with experience. This does not mean that it must look for its foundation outside of itself, as though experience gave it any proof or evidence for its method; that would be to rely on the accidentality and contingency of a given, not on the necessity of the concept (ENZ.C§246 A). If the question is of the being of nature, then we cannot hypostatize a method, nor can we treat nature in all its manifestations as reducible to mechanism. Nature has qualitative differences; it cannot be approached quantitatively as if it were a homogeneous body subject to mathematical treatment. Yet it must be investigated as a whole. As we know from Chapter 2, this means that a systematic idea of the whole must precede the parts, as in Kant.

Nature is not wholly transparent; it contains a logical element, but also an alogical element. In fact, it is defined as the inner split between intelligibility and accidentality. In this sense, nature in all its facets is not deduced from the Idea; accidentality is intrinsic to nature. Nature is the Idea in its otherness; in other words, it is the Idea in the element of the aconceptual. For this reason it takes considerable exertions on the part of the sciences of nature to detect laws and conceptual elements hidden in it.

In order to have a clearer grasp of the sense of Hegel’s intentions, it is both important and fruitful to understand the Philosophy of Nature against the background of alternative models. In particular I believe
that the basic traits of, on the one hand, the modern conception of nature as we find them in Newton’s *Principia* and, on the other, of the Aristotelian conception of *phusis*, help us gauge Hegel’s standpoint with regard to such issues as the understanding of motion, the notion of organic being and of life.

The purpose of this chapter is, first, to elucidate the rationale of Hegel’s criticism of Newton and of the mechanical worldview (§2). After an explanation of some of the basic tenets of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, I examine the notion of organism or living whole. I show that Hegel understands his Philosophy of Nature, at least in its main inspiration, to be a revitalization of Aristotelian motives (§3). The interpretation of nature as a living totality and a concept in-itself striving to actualize itself will be the leading thread of Hegel’s interpretation and appropriation of Aristotle. After having established this, however, I then try to spell out the reasons why Hegel misconstrues a few essential aspects of Aristotle’s natural philosophy (§4). In particular, I want to stress some of the fundamental assumptions that Hegel shares with modern physical science, which are responsible for his transformation of Aristotelian themes. Finally, I turn to the subject of time and the different types of temporality in natural and spiritual subjectivity (§5).

§2. Hegel’s Criticism of Newton

Let me begin with Hegel’s understanding of Newton. From the time of his 1801 *Dissertatio de orbitis planetarum* until the appearance of the last edition of his *Encyclopædia* the year before his death, Hegel repeats his criticism of Newton’s conception of nature and of the essence of physical laws.

For Hegel, Newton confuses physical and mathematical laws. Newton was unanimously praised for something that Hegel found both unpalatable and philosophically crude, namely the mechanical world-picture based, as Hegel says, on a Lockean (*Lectures, VGPh* 3: 233) or Baconian (*Logic, WL* 1: 406, *SL* 343) empiricism. Further, Newton received all the credit that should have been ascribed to Kepler. In fact, Newton’s laws are simply the formal mathematical derivation of Kepler’s laws. But Hegel goes even further to say that Newton’s own contribution is only a superfluous addition to and a misguided interpretation of what Hegel found to be so speculative in Kepler’s laws. So let me have a closer look at the detail of Hegel’s criticism. I do not insist on what have been called the ridiculous blunders of Hegel’s reading of
Newton, nor do I try to correct or denounce them. Also the plausible suggestion, advanced by Neuser, according to which Hegel criticizes Martin, de La Caille, and D’Alembert, and not Newton directly, is a suggestion important for the sources of Hegel’s critique, but does not modify its content with its supposed Aristotelian inspiration. What I am interested in showing in this section are the different underlying notions of motion and nature in Hegel and in Newton, which I believe are worth spelling out.

In both the *Dissertatio* and the *Encyclopædia* (§269), Hegel distinguishes, in the wake of the Aristotelian tradition that we can still find in Kepler, between heavenly and terrestrial bodies and their respective motions. He thereby overlooks or downplays what we consider to be the greatest achievement – and the most significant and influential innovation in terms of worldview – of Newton’s philosophy. I refer to the reduction of the different – astronomical and mechanical – motions to the fundamental principle of inertia (First Law), and thus to the substitution of the old rank-ordered, oriented cosmos with the identity of the new uniform laws governing any motion whatsoever of any body.

As is well known, with Newton all differences in rank between circular and rectilinear motion disappear, and circular motion is no longer the perfect and explicative principle it is for the Greeks. Circular motion must itself be accounted for as constantly accelerated motion that maintains an attraction to the center, once inertial motion is understood as the natural state of a body and is decomposed into infinitely many rectilinear segments in calculus. The transition is from motion as determined by the inner nature of a body to a conception of motion with respect to masses moving according to mathematical laws in space and time under the influence of forces. “Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to


3 See the superiority of circular over rectilinear motion in *ENZ.C*§261 Z.; compare Wand-schneider, “Mass in Hegel” (1993).

4 In the addition to *ENZ.C*§270 (Petry 1: 272) he does mention the generalization of the law of gravity as a merit of Newton’s work. By contrast, in the addition to §264 (Petry 1: 246) he expresses scorn for it. In the light of Hegel’s systematic distinction between finite and absolute or free mechanics, I believe the force of the former passage should be relativized.
change that state by forces impressed thereon.”⁵ Thereby, motion is not, as for Aristotle, intrinsic to a body’s *dunamis*, nature, and place, but is determined with respect to time, measurable distances, and mass. Accordingly, nature is no longer the inner principle (the *archê dunameôs kai staseôs*) from which derive the motion of bodies and all change, but the spatiotemporal homogeneous realm relative to which bodies in motion occupy determinate positions. Rest, in turn, is not that to which motion naturally tends to but the limiting case of motion.

What Hegel takes from all this is, according to some authoritative interpreters,⁶ rather odd. He criticizes Newton’s parallelogram of forces in the decomposition of motion as though Newton had meant to account for the velocity and orbit of a planet by combining two different forces, that is, centripetal and centrifugal force. As we know, Newton had only had recourse to the centripetal force (*Principia*, Book I, Section 2 ff.). For Newton, a centripetal force must be applied to a body in order to constrain it in a circular motion; according to Hegel, Newton needs centrifugal force as well. Although he was definitely not alone in this misunderstanding,⁷ he does seem to disregard or misunderstand the principle of inertia, in that he construes motion as if it were a process that would come to a stop unless a force acted on the moving body. For Newton, we do not need to explain motion, only the departure of a body from its uniform rectilinear motion; for Hegel, on the contrary, as for Aristotelian and pre-Galilean science, all motion must be comprehended as a change.⁸

I would add that for Newton mathematics is not simply or even foremost a theory of ratios and a logic of measure. We saw in Chapter 4 that for Hegel Newton used mathematics as a formalism with which he took a detour from experience, while Kepler had expressed mathematically what he experienced (*WL* 1: 321, *SL* 273). This is true, but Hegel does not seem to realize the sweeping consequences of this formalization. Mathematics becomes with Newton the autonomous language that

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⁵ I agree with Koyré in preferring Motte’s translation over Cajori’s. In Latin the sentence reads: “*Corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus a viribus impressis cogitur statum ille mutare*”. Compare *Principia*, Motte-Cajori: 13.
⁶ Compare the considerations by De Gandt and Shea in the works quoted above.
⁸ Shea (ibid.) argues for a strong Aristotelianism in Hegel’s theory of motion which I believe calls for careful qualification. For the main differences between Aristotelian and Hegelian motion, compare §4 below.
makes possible the reduction of all phenomena to quantity regardless of their nature. Newton’s novelty is precisely that he does not look for a Neoplatonic harmony in the cosmos and in the motion of the planets; instead he makes the modern algebraic symbolism an instrument in the generalized and universal objectification of nature. Mathematics is not a notation expressing the rationality of nature; it replaces all given order, becoming the new paradigm of self-sufficient rationality.

There is something important in Hegel’s criticism, however, which has to be addressed. Hegel thinks that Newton portrayed matter and force as two fixed, dead abstractions external to one another (ENZ.C §261). Since Newton refuses to ascribe any active force, including attraction and gravity, to matter (Scholium generale added to the second edition of the Principia (1713); Motte-Cajori 3: 546), which has only passive resistance to motion, the active principle requisite to start motion is found in God’s activity. Newton actually confesses his ignorance of the nature and origin of active forces. He claims, just as Galileo did before him, that we cannot aspire to explain motion and forces but must limit ourselves to a mathematical description of their action. All we can legitimately say about matter is that it is impenetrable, extended, and hard; and in particular, we can also say that it is endowed with an indifference to motion, a vis inertiae, which we can translate (freely but, I believe, meaningfully enough) by “the force of a lack of active force.”

Since Leibniz’s Specimen dynamicum and since Wolff, this absence of force in matter had been widely criticized. For Leibniz, the activity of a force, far from being an external action changing the motion of a body, as it is for Newton, is inherent in substances and proportional to the magnitude of the body to be moved.

For similar reasons, Hegel claims in the Science of Logic that Kant’s Dynamics in the Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature has renewed the philosophy of nature. Instead of beginning by positing an indifferent matter, then introducing various external forces into something alien and dead, Kant conceives of matter as the very power of attraction and repulsion. Matter is no longer taken as the abstraction of sensible givenness in perception. It is now an articulate concept.

What is decisive in all this for Hegel is that inertia is an abstraction, which considers matter to be an indifferent and dead entity. At the same
time, Newton does not realize that the matter he treats as dead is not a primary given but itself the result of a universalization from perception (and a bad, intellectualistic universalization at that).\textsuperscript{11} Here Hegel thinks he can show why Newton was unclear about the unity of the principles of his philosophy and had confused mathematical formalization and physical laws, or, better, physics and philosophy of nature.\textsuperscript{12} According to Hegel, Newton never gives a philosophical justification of the principles he uses nor an account of his choices. He claims that the center is a mathematical point and that his forces are of a mathematical nature, but then he treats them as physical and mutually independent (\textit{ENZ.C} §266 A, Petry I 249–50). He takes inertia to be an empty and quite abstract postulate of perpetual motion which has no empirical basis. He thereby thinks gravity to be away from matter (ibid.).

For Newton, gravity and attraction are inexplicable because the notion of an \textit{actio in distans} is an unjustified hypothesis the causality of which cannot be inferred from phenomena.\textsuperscript{13} While for Newton gravity represents a problem of methodical accessibility, for Hegel it is a phenomenon whose meaning and causality has to be accounted for philosophically, just like extension and impenetrability. For Hegel, gravity is a unity, a balance of attraction and repulsion.

Thus when I say that Hegel finds Newton philosophically crude what I meant is that he believes that all that Newton does is to presuppose the validity of the inductive method, set arbitrary definitions as uncritically accepted starting points, abstract formal notions from what is given as constant in experience, and then proceed to impose in a completely external and arbitrary way a mathematical format to the laws he thinks he has established (compare \textit{WL} 2: 99–101). Just as for Kant the possibility of the application of mathematics to motion has to be shown by transcendental philosophy and by the principles of the construction of magnitudes, so for Hegel the task of philosophy is that of articulat-

\textsuperscript{11} The third of the \textit{Regulae philosophandi} (\textit{Principia}, Motte-Cajori: 398 ff.) can be cited as a very good example of what Hegel means by this universalization of the absolute passivity of matter in perception. Newton writes that extension, impenetrability, hardness, mobility, and inertia of bodies are known by our senses. From the parts we conclude to the whole, that is, we ascribe these properties universally to all bodies whatever, “and this is the foundation of all philosophy” (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{12} Hegel finds Newton’s use of the word “philosophy” quite unjustified but naturally consistent with the British empiricist understanding of philosophy as the knowledge of what is constant and lawful in experience, in all disciplines (compare \textit{ENZ.C} §7, Remark).

\textsuperscript{13} For Newton’s understanding of hypothesis, see the second of Koyré’s \textit{Newtonian Studies} (1965).
ing a logic of measure which must precede, and in fact theoretically comprehend, what the empirical sciences do. And while Newton notoriously claims that he feigned no hypotheses, Hegel not only objects to the quality of the metaphysical assumptions he in fact made, but also to the complete obliviousness on Newton’s part of a tacit and unacknowledged metaphysics.

It would be easy to show that what Newton means by metaphysics or hypotheses are the Cartesian vorteces and full space, while Hegel means the diamond net of presuppositions implicit in everything we say or think. But Hegel’s point is that the thoughtless assumption of metaphysical categories results in an uncritical practice of a necessarily bad— that is, intellectualistic— metaphysics (ENZ.C §38 A). It is a bad metaphysics because it cannot take the concrete Idea as its basis but instead takes its bearings by one-sided and separate forms of thought that are rigidly fixed by the understanding.

Coming back to our theme, Hegel thinks that forces have not been brought into matter by God. Instead, they are inherent in matter. By excluding any physical theology or “bad metaphysics” from his considerations and by supposedly understanding matter iuxta propria principia, Hegel thinks he is bringing back to life the old Aristotelian teleological notion of matter and of nature as an inner principle of change. In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature (ENZ, Addition before §245, Petry 1: 193) Hegel says that in contradistinction to Wolff we must retrieve the ancient, that is Aristotelian, philosophy of nature prior to its historical sundering from physics (see also VGPh 169, 171). In doing so, we cannot limit ourselves to the questions of motion, matter, or forces, as modern physics has done, but must move forward to the philosophical question of the essence and meaning of nature as a whole. Echoing what Aristotle writes about being (Met. Z 1, 1028b 2–4), Hegel says that the question of being will “always be asked and never completely answered” (ENZ, Addition before §245, Petry I: 194). For Hegel, the highest view of nature is that in which it is regarded in its proper animation as an end in itself, or, differently stated, as that which does not impose any category external to nature. Hegel ascribes this approach to Aristotle (ENZ.C §245 Z; Petry 1: 196). He then contrasts it with the mechanical frame of modern science, which by remaining ex-

14 From the existence of ether to that of atoms and the void, not to mention absolute space, time, God as abstract and fixed entities. Cf. Newton’s Opticks: 369, 402–3; Hegel’s letter to Goethe of February 1821 (Briefe 381, Letters 700).
ternal to nature and life begins by applying its most primitive notion—
that of death, or inertia—to matter. Mechanical science is incapable
of seeing exactly what Aristotle had taught us to look for in nature: a
vision of a living cosmos developing out of itself as an organism.

§3. The Idea of a Philosophy of Nature
and the Aristotelian Heritage

According to Hegel, a philosophical understanding of nature requires
that we attempt to comprehend what is intelligible and meaningful in
it as a whole. In itself nature is the Idea in its negated form. In Hegel’s
language, this means that nature represents an existing split between
concept and objectivity, or an “unsolved contradiction” (ENZ.C §248 A). In nature, intelligibility and appearance are not reconciled: nature
is not in conformity with its intelligibility. It is the realm of external ne-
cessity and chance in opposition to its implicit lawful, thus conceptlike,
being-in-itself.

As such nature is not free, which again in Hegel’s language means
that it cannot find itself in its other. But the concept is present in a hid-
ren and interior way in nature. For Hegel, the merit of the empirical
sciences, and of physics in particular, is their attempt to know the uni-
versality of nature in the form of laws, forces, and genera (ENZ.C §246),
and thus to overcome the indifference, externality, and split
within nature—that is, its externality to us as investigators, and the split
within nature between external accidental manifestation and internal
intelligibility.

As we see in Chapter 2, empirical sciences and philosophy do not dif-
fer because of any greater or less faithfulness to experience. Rather,
they differ with respect to their different categories or underlying meta-
physical assumptions. In fact, philosophy must acknowledge the results
of science. But it immediately transforms such results critically bringing
to light their theoretical principles and laws as moments of the concept
thanks to its higher awareness and vision of the whole. It clarifies those
moments and shows their interrelation. As long as mechanics is the only
guide for our understanding, nature will always remain an unsolved
contradiction because mechanics estranges it from the idea and views
it as the corpse of the understanding (ENZ.C §247 Z, W 9: 25, Petry 1:
206). Philosophy must then view nature in the light of a different prin-
ciple: it must regard it as a living or self-articulating whole, that is, as the
implicit Idea. Thus the laws, forces, and genera isolated and objectified
by the natural sciences must become for a thinking consideration of nature a self-determining concept, a self-differentiating universality. But a self-differentiating universality, once again, cannot be found as such in nature. The concept is only hidden in nature, or embodied in its most elementary form in an existing living individual (\textit{ENZ.C \S}249).

If the task of the Philosophy of Nature is that of regarding nature as a whole in its being, then, as we saw in Chapter 2, it must regard all the various forms assumed by nature in terms of levels ascending from what is most elementary toward what is most concrete, independent, and capable of sustaining itself. For Hegel, the latter is the life of an organism. All of this amounts to saying that the Philosophy of Nature is constructed on the basis of its end, the account of the emergence of subjectivity. There is here a conceptual or dialectical teleology, which orders sciences, laws, and natural domains in order to show in them the progress of the Idea. But the progress of the idea cannot be taken as concrete, as it were lying in the natural transition from one species to another as in a great chain of being or \textit{scala naturae}.

To use Hegel’s image, “every drop of water yields an image of the sun” (\textit{ENZ} \S252 \textit{Z}, Petry 1: 220); though this remains just that, an inert image that stands in need of interpretation. Or also, in another metaphor, “in Christ the contradiction is posited and overcome, as life, passion, and resurrection. Nature is the son of God, not as the son however, but as hardening in otherness – the divine Idea as for a moment held fast outside of love.”\textsuperscript{15} One of the implications of this is that a dialectic of the formal moments of the concept is needed to make this hardness fluid and to break the limitation and mutual externality of the different spheres of nature. Nature is not thereby itself a process, but is conceptually reconstructed as a progression in concreteness and independence. In this idea there is an element that is both inspired by and yet contrary to Aristotle. As in the principle which Hegel found to be so speculative in Aristotle’s \textit{De anima}, according to which all forms become matter – or, as Hegel says, inorganic nature – for the subsequent consideration, here we read: “all subsequent stages contain those prior to it, so that the last is the concrete unity of all that have preceded it,

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{ENZ.C \S}247 \textit{Z}. (my transl.). The passage, which is more striking in German than in Petry’s translation, reads: “In Christus ist der Widerspruch gesetzt und aufgehoben, als Leben, Leiden und Auferstehen; die Natur ist der Sohn Gottes, aber nicht als der Sohn, sondern als das Verharren im Anderssein, - die göttliche Idee als außerhalb der Liebe für einen Augenblick festgehalten.” Along the same lines see \S140 \textit{Z}.
and presupposes them as constituting its inorganic nature” (ENZ.C §252 Z, Petry 1: 219). On the other hand, Hegel criticizes the image of a chain of being and all natural metamorphoses and transitions which were traditionally inspired by Aristotle’s Historia animalium.

As a consequence, it is the dialectical concept that guides the hierarchical structure of the whole of the Philosophy of Nature. And the progression will go from the abstract to the concrete, from what is most external – space, time, motion – to what is most internal, which for Hegel is the self-relating negativity of an individual organism. Thereby, the parts dealt with in the Philosophy of Nature are mechanics, physics, and organics. In mechanics, matter is indifferent to essential or qualitative determinations; everything is external to itself. In physics, passivity is introduced in matter and we first have particular bodies with an immanent determinate form. In organics, all determinations are not just specific properties but are finally themselves totalities determined qualitatively with regard to one another. Here all elements are posited as finite elements of an ideal nature, that is, subordinated to an overarching and independent whole.

What this entails with regard to the problem with which we started, Hegel’s confrontation with the scientific revolution as exemplified by Newtonian mechanics, is the reduction of the modern scientific approach to nature to one view of which Hegel must show the one-sidedness and, at the same time, pervasive holistic ambitions. I believe that Hegel is very conscious of the problem posed by the modern scientific world-picture. The positive side of what is so perplexing and awry about the grandiosity of his Philosophy of Nature is his conviction that, unless we thematize the categories used by natural science, we would not only have to disregard fundamental questions as to the nature of space, time, motion, substantiability, matter, causality and so on. But we would also, more importantly, be in danger of falling prey to a tacit acceptance of the basic underlying assumptions of mathematical physics. The risk is that the form of scientific consciousness actually shapes our very life and the way we ask all fundamental questions, including our understanding of the world and our place in it. In Hegel’s reaction to this danger we are bound to recognize a recurrent temptation that we normally try to eschew due to our bad conscience, as Jacob Klein once put

16 In this connection I find it particularly meaningful that, to name an example, Hegel links a discussion of Hobbes’s political atomism with the scientific world-picture in natural philosophy.
We believe we cannot follow in detail the discussion in mathematics or physics; therefore we should forsake all attempt to take a position on what has long since stopped concerning us as philosophers. This profession of humility is also less dangerous for our narcissism.

For Hegel all this is a typical consequence of modern philosophies of reflection. Science has separated itself from philosophy so that the sciences, by becoming more and more institutionalized and sectorial, care less and less about their principles and presuppositions, and thus tend to become increasingly empirical and positive, while philosophy becomes more and more abstract and nonscientific. Hegel’s precise intention is to overcome this pathology. For him philosophy is the paramount case of science and the only comprehensive account of the whole. Therefore the objective is to articulate the relationship between different levels of scientificity and to bring back empirical sciences into the scope of the Idea.

On this score Hegel is in agreement with Kant,18 who had shown that nothing whatsoever can be thought without the pure principles of the understanding, and that the universality and necessity of physical sciences cannot be found in reality but are a product of pure concepts. If sciences can no longer be merely empirical, and if the science of nature itself requires a metaphysics of nature elucidating its principles, then according to Hegel the task of philosophy is to transform what is familiar and well known (bekannt) from the sciences to a known articulate concept (erkannt). The difference between science and philosophy lies all in the degree of necessity, that is, in encompassing comprehension, and in the assumption or interrogation of a given conditional presupposition.

Understanding nature as a living and inwardly articulated whole, thus as an organism, comes down to viewing it as a form of subjectivity. While defining nature as immediate subjectivity, Hegel refers back to Aristotle’s notion of nature as the arché kinéseōs kai staseōs, the principle of change and rest immanent in all natural beings. He often praises Kant for revitalizing the notion of organism; but, as we know from Chapter 4, whenever he does so he always rushes to add that Kant’s notion is limited in that it is not a cognition of the thing itself, but a re-

17 In Lectures (1985: 2 ff.)
18 See the Introduction to the Encyclopædia, and Illetterati (Natura, 1995, 304 ff.). Hegel’s affinity with Kant on this point has been widely recognized. For recent examples in the literature see the essays by Buchdahl, Ihmig, and Garrison in Petry, ed., Hegel and Newtonianism (1993).
reflective judgment, while Aristotle had already determined nature more philosophically as internal finality.

The notion of internal finality could not be grasped by modern science. Given nature’s internal split, there is always a necessary discrepancy between a law and the objects governed by it. But these objects, according to the section on objectivity in the *Science of Logic*, are themselves conceived by modern science, by and large, as analyzable into distinct parts subject to external forces, devoid of any internal consistency and independence. Or, alternatively, they are conceived as interacting according to their inherent affinity or repulsion. A mechanical sort of explanation cannot make sense as a description of a totality. We would then have a totality of mutually indifferent substances, always in need of a mover external to the totality so that no totality as such could exist. Further, no individual, stable unity capable of subordinating plurality to itself could exist. This can be exemplified by Newtonian mechanics in which relations are all external: matter is external to forces, the world to its mover (God), and all of the above to the external observer.

In a chemical explanation, in turn, we first have particular bodies; but, in a process of combination giving rise to a new product, once the initial properties are lost so is the initial body, which is therefore not independent and capable of reproducing itself. In these terms, we cannot give an account of totality as the differentiation and combination of independent things. The consequence in the *Science of Logic* was the necessity to think of reality as a self-differentiating totality; and, in the Philosophy of Nature, as an organism. In other words, the approach is holistic, attempting to define the totality we are dealing with. Whereas a mechanical and a chemical totality are impossible, since neither can account for phenomena such as life, a teleological totality can account for both itself and other, inferior forms of totality by subordinating them under itself, that is, by taking them as special cases or moments of the teleological process.

Thus the forms of mechanism or chemism are not merely false. There are more concrete and independent levels in nature, however, for which these explanatory principles are not sufficient. For example, if we study anything that has to do with life – and we can very well say that the philosophical comprehension of life had always been of crucial importance for Hegel since the time of his early theological writings – we need a conception of an object as an independent thing, which is not merely subject to external constraint but derives its form and con-
stitution from its inner principles. We need a conception of an object as a *Selbstzweck*, an end in itself.

In the *Critique of Judgment*, as we see in Chapter 4, Kant made it possible for us to approach life and organisms again in the correct manner. Organisms are ends of nature. They are both cause and effect of themselves, both in terms of their species through generation and in terms of themselves through their existence as individuals, insofar as they shape the matter of which they are composed. They are organized totalities in which the parts are only possible through other parts and for the whole. This is the proper mode of the being of nature; it is not instrumental to something higher, but a regulative form of internal finality.

According to Hegel, Kant has overcome the old antinomy between necessity and external teleology, between a mechanical view of the totality of nature and a final theological teleology, which projects an end outside of nature itself. In this way Kant has paved the way to a renewed consideration of nature as self-determination. However, in the *Logic*, as well as in the *Lectures* and in the Philosophy of Nature Hegel invariably contrasts Kant’s approach with the Aristotelian conception of an internal finality that finds an immanent self-determination in nature. Teleology is not a requirement that our judgment of the intelligibility of living nature leave the knowledge of life in itself behind. Nor is it an external principle imposed from without. We do not need to postulate a connection of objectivity with an extramundane principle of activity to save phenomena.

In the *Lectures*, Hegel comments on this at length. He says that Aristotle has solved the antinomy between efficient and final causes in the conception of *Selbstzweck*. The concept as free, immanent finality subsuming external necessity is the truth of the antinomy. Mechanism and external theological finality share the same assumption, in that they cannot find the end in nature but deny freedom in objectivity and/or project the end outside of nature (*VGPh* 173). Both are responsible for the oblivion of the only rational view of nature, Aristotle’s (*VGPh* 179).

Aristotle had explained the teleological relation with the example of the corn. The essence of corn is to tend to its form; the stages of the corn. The essence of corn is to tend to its form; the stages of the corn.

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20 *WL* 2: 436–40; *ENZ.C* §204 A; *VGPh* 173–81; *ENZ.C* §245 Z and §360 Z.
generation and growth are complete in the actual form (Phys. II 1, 193b 6, 13–18; 8, 199b 16–32). Hegel says that leaves, blossoms, and roots produce the plant and return to it; essence preexists what grows out of it (VGPh 180). In chemistry, says Hegel, the essence does not preexist in this way (VGPh 176), and even less, we should add, in mechanism. Here things do not move or generate themselves but are always a product external to them; all becoming is understood as mere heterodetermined change.

Hegel says that in Aristotle “the end needs the necessary but retains it in its power” (VGPh 180–1). The living organism is the active transformation of externality; but the causation of external potencies on the organism is “only possible insofar as it conforms to the animal’s soul” (VGPh 178). Aristotle views nature as the final cause and then shows how the necessary operates in nature (VGPh 173). The organism is a Selbstzweck, an end to itself (VGPh 177). This is the right understanding of nature because it is true to “the inner determination of the natural thing itself” (VGPh 173). The fact that this rational view has recently been brought back to attention is “nothing other than a revitalization and justification of the Aristotelian idea” (ibid.).

In Physics II 5 and 9 Aristotle has equated external necessity and chance with matter’s resistance to the action of form. External necessity is inherent in matter, but, far from being sufficient to explain change, it is defined as the accidental cause which finality uses or, alternatively, finds in its way, while striving to actualize itself. Form uses matter but never actually masters it.

Incidentally, this accounts for Aristotle’s notion that nature should not be divinized, that it occasionally gives birth to monsters.21 There is actually an impotence endemic to the actualization of the telos due to the resistance of matter to form, or what Hegel calls external necessity. Against Empedocles’s teratology theory, Aristotle admits that nature may generate monsters, but it is more akin to the way a physician errs in the preparation of a drug or in the way a grammarian errs in writing (II 8, 199a 34–5).

Nature is an end to itself; and here the end is immanent in its development. But nature does not have ends, nor does it deliberate the

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21 Compare the following phrase, referring to divination in dreams: “phusis daimonia all’ou theia” (“nature is demonic, but not divine,” De divin. 2, 463b 15). Likewise for Hegel contingency and accidentality are ineliminable. They constitute nature’s “impotence” (ENZ.C §250). Therefore nature “should not be divinized” (ENZ.C §248 A).
best course to follow in the way a technê would (II 8, 199a 15–16). Besides, not all natural processes are finalistic; the growth of hair, for example, is a spontaneous generation of matter without an end. In fact, Aristotle is criticized by Galen and the Stoics for not equating his teleology with divine providence. But if this is the case, then the charge of anthropomorphism and providentialism leveled by Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza against Aristotle is misguided. Natural finality is prior both logically and ontologically to the finality of art. For Aristotle, art imitates nature; what operates according to an end imitates, or helps complete, what is an end to itself (De part. anim. II 1, 639b 15–20).

One last thing to notice is the differing temporality of art and nature. The outcome, the end of production and of art, lies both outside of it and in the future; a telos of nature need not be thought of as temporally subsequent in this manner (when I eat I nourish my metabolism now).

For Hegel this shows that Aristotle understands nature as an in-itself concept, a self-maintaining subjectivity. The concept is defined by Hegel as a purpose which “does not pass over but preserves itself, in its operation; that is, it brings only itself about and is at the end what it was in the beginning, or in its originality: what is truly original comes to be only through this self-preservation” (ENZ.C §204 A).

According to this view, the organism is a self-sustaining and self-renewing activity of subordinating or subsuming externality under itself. This amounts to the definition of the organism as a negative self-referential unity, which constantly transforms external inorganic nature and assimilates it into its own metabolism or, as Hegel says, into its ideality. Differently stated, its identity is not that of a given form, but that of a rudimentary self, an active shaping of itself and maintaining of its form in relation with externality. Thus the organism is a concrete universal, or the unity of a multiplicity – the process of maintaining its individuality as a realization of its concept or in-itself in objectivity. In this connection we can understand Hegel’s treatment of sensation, pain, hunger, or desire as forms of contradiction. The contradiction is that between the identity of an organism and its otherness. Here we do not have an external relation. The organism can live only insofar as it is a relentless active confrontation with otherness. That is, negativity is constitutive of the organism and does not come to it from without.

In all this Hegel consciously adopts the key-points of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, from the fundamental distinction between all and whole (pan and holon) to the notion of entelechy, that is, of substance as a holon and as an aitia (cause) of itself. Hegel translates these
two terms, whole and cause, by Ganzes and Ursache, and interprets the organism as a Selbtszweck, an end in itself. In doing so he rightly understands Aristotelian natural causality as constitutive of the thing. Unlike in modern science, here a natural cause is not external to its effect, but is the actuality of an energeia, or the identity of eidos and telos, of formal and final causes. More a ground than a cause, so to speak, it is the ground of the sublation of the many under the one.

For Hegel, Aristotle’s nature is what actualizes and maintains itself (VGPh 174); it is “entelechy, that which produces itself” (VGPh 175); it is what has in itself the principle of fulfilling its end and which, in its self-identity, while infecting itself with externality, uses the latter to conform to its concept, that is, to its end (VGPh 176). As such it is “the Idea [which] effectuates itself” (ibid.). Aristotle had distinguished nature from art in Physics II 1 as that which has the principle of change within itself as opposed to that which needs an external agent, and as that which can reproduce and perpetuate itself as opposed to that which cannot. For Hegel, the truth of the organic process in contradistinction to mechanical or physical processes is that it can reproduce itself and contribute to the continuation of the species, while this is impossible for all nonorganic processes – that is, in that they are not independent and self-sustaining. And this is only possible because organic beings are not aggregates of parts but overarching totalities whose particular functions are oriented for the sake of the whole.

Hegel does not mean that everything is to be understood as teleologically structured. For example, when he talks about the earth and refers to contemporary earth sciences, in particular to neptunism, plutoism, and vulcanism, he treats the earth as the static and petrified foundation for life, so to speak its skeleton. The earth is a dead or always already past processuality, in which time has acquired the solid state of reified space (ENZ.C §339, Z).22 Once again, internal finality is the principle of a holistic view of nature as a totality of self-determining processes, and it is the only category which can account for both life and what is instrumental to it.

Organics itself shows this inner progression from the least articulate forms of life to the individual living being. For Hegel, plants do not have an internal articulation in discontinuous organs, and in their assimilation and reproduction lack a self. This means that, although plants do develop from themselves to themselves, they do not subordinate their

ramifications to their internal unity but repeat themselves indefinitely in their parts.\textsuperscript{23} Here there is no difference between parts and whole. In plants, neither reproduction nor assimilation mediate with otherness (ENZ.C §344). In the animal organism, instead, we have three phases or moments: the Gestalt or anatomic shape, the relation with the external environment, and the generic process, the relation to an other like itself, that is, sexual reproduction.

For Hegel, the animal organism is more free than plants. Mammals have a feeling of themselves, body warmth, locomotion, and periodical nutrition (ENZ.C §351 ff.). Thus they maintain their identity in their relation to the environment: they are free to move and are not dependent on seasonal change. Such self-sustaining identity through a relation to its difference is absent from the mechanical, chemical, and even vegetative realms. In organic life we have the Idea in its immediate form, a self-referential negativity. The organism determines its own relation to place on the basis of its needs and desires; its sensibility as unity of receptivity and activity is the first form of appropriation of the environment. Its desire or lack is its inner split or felt contradiction which pushes the animal to overcome it.

But this is only possible insofar as lack or negativity is internal to the organism. In this connection Hegel says that even pain or disease are the privilege of the animal organism; they represent its internal negativity constitutive of its finitude, as opposed to the negativity coming from without in the case of inorganic beings. A stone is limited externally by what surrounds it; organisms, which have self-feeling and the inner/outer distinction, perceive their limits as barriers or limitations (\textit{Schranke}) which they strive to overcome (WL 1: 146, SL 135, and ENZ.C §371 Z, Petry 3: 194, where the example of the stone is mentioned).

This hierarchy mirrors the hierarchy we find in Aristotle’s \textit{De anima}, stretching from plants, which have \textit{auxêsis} (growth) and continuous food-intake (\textit{threptikon}), to the animals, which in addition have locomotion (\textit{hê kata topon kinêsis}), periodic assimilation of food, sensation (\textit{aisthêtikon}), and appetites (\textit{horexis}) (see, for example, \textit{De an.} II 2, 413a 21 ff.). Aristotle speaks of a correlation between matter and form in natural beings. As we see in Chapter 5, in Aristotle’s biological writings we have a hierarchy of beings corresponding to the combination of mat-

\textsuperscript{23} See Aristotle’s \textit{De anima} II 2, 413b 16 ff., where Aristotle speaks of the “potential multiplicity” constitutive of the soul of plants, whose parts can live on even if they are severed from the original plant.
ter that defines them. We pass from properties of the four elements (fluidity, solidity, weight, and density) to a synthesis of these properties in bodies according to different proportions (De gen. et corr. II 7; De part. anim. I 1 and II 1–2; De Gen. anim. I 1). At this stage, unity remains an undifferentiated continuum – flesh, bones, metals, and so forth. Then we have heterogeneous parts such as organs. These, in turn, are defined by their lack of independence with regard to the functions they perform and to the organism. The organism alone has separate status as living ousia capable of initiating and supporting a change and of actualizing its end (De part. anim. II 1, 646a 12–24). In a very striking passage Aristotle adds that nature adjusts organs to their erga or functions, not functions to organs (De part. anim. IV 12, 694b 13–14).

All organs are nothing independent of the ergon they perform, so that in the case of a dead or impaired organism they are only called organs by homonymy. An eye which can no longer see is an eye only by homonymy (De an. II 1, 412b 17 ff.). Aristotle reverses Anaxagoras’s argument that man is the most intelligent animal because he has hands; man has hands, says Aristotle, because he is the most intelligent animal (De part. anim. IV 10; see also below, pp. 282–3). The organ once again depends on the function, not vice versa.

For Hegel also, organs are defined by their subordination to the whole, to the living body. The body is, in turn, with respect to its functions the object of the soul’s activity. When Hegel comments on Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, which for him represented the conception of organisms as systems in opposition to Linnaeus’s intellectualistic isolation of characteristics for the investigator, or when he mentions Lamarck’s classification of animals as vertebrates and invertebrates, which belong to water, air, and earth, he stresses that Aristotle has already delineated the same hierarchy and understood the organism as a unity in which the parts are moments of a whole.24

In sum, the case for the Aristotelianism of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature appears strong. It is with reference to Aristotle’s philosophy of nature that Hegel gives his famous description of Aristotle’s speculative principle within the empirical. “Aristotle is completely empirical inasmuch as he is at the same time thinking . . . The empirical conceived in its synthesis is the speculative concept.”25

25 VGPh 172. In the second edition this passage is broken up; bits and pieces of it resurface in the Philosophy of Nature, in the Philosophy of Spirit, and in the Introduction.
Like Aristotle, Hegel is antireductionist in the following sense: each sector of natural investigation has specific principles; for neither Aristotle nor Hegel can the mathematical treatment of the cosmos, as it was found, respectively, for both in Plato’s *Timaeus* and in modern physics, be generalized as it had been for many of their respective contemporaries or predecessors. For both, the study of life and biology is more appealing than the apparent sublimity of a mathematics applied to astronomy because such an approach goes hand in hand with, to quote Aristotle, “a childish disgust towards the most humble living beings.” Not chance but finality – and with it beauty – rules the most humble recesses of living nature (*De part. an.* I 5). Likewise, Hegel ranks the study of life as not only higher but also more philosophical than the mathematical study of motion, for he ranks immanence over external relations, the ideality of organic life over the dead inorganic realm.

This should not be taken to mean that Aristotle and Hegel deny the importance of applied mathematics. What it does mean is that the role of mathematics is restricted to realms capable of quantitative treatment.

For Aristotle, physical astronomy must acknowledge the results of mathematical astronomy. Physical sciences, in turn, cannot pretend to the degree of precision of mathematics, since they are directed at what happens for the most part (*hós epi to polu*, *An. Post.* I 14, 78 b 17–24; 30, 87b 19–27). Again, this does not mean that physics is deprived of scientific status; eclipses recur occasionally, yet they are hypothetically necessary in the sense that once a cause is given an effect will necessarily follow.

For Hegel, in turn, when only external relations are at stake, laws are and must be predicated of phenomena. But for him the universality and necessity ordinarily ascribed to physical laws only apply to the Concept, to a philosophy that does not rely on anything given, and not to mechanism and its laws.

The reduction of causality to external causality is countered by both Aristotle and Hegel with the privileging of the investigation of natural processes in light of the subjects in which they originate. Hence, reference to particular bodies is not dropped or replaced by symbolic formulas and general laws that equally subsume all objects under them.  

§4. Hegel’s Modernity

Hegel interprets all stages of organic life as guided by an internal finality that subordinates inorganic nature to the fulfillment of its purpose. Digestion, and here Hegel also draws on *De anima* II 4 and on the theory of the self-maintenance of the vegetative soul addressed to itself, is no exception to this self-referentiality. But it is more than just a simple variation on a given theme, it is the very model that Hegel uses for both thought (*ENZ.C* §12 A) and work. Eating is the assimilation of food that shows the self’s power over externality, as well as the acknowledgment that externality has no for-itself, no independent subsistence. As such it is the self’s negation of immediacy and of givenness. In this respect, Hegel speaks of the self’s sovereign ingratitude towards what gives it sustenance (*ENZ.C* §381 Z). He also calls food-intake or intussusception an infection or a syllogism whereby we mediate ourselves with externality. Thus we transform givenness and idealize it, that is, give it the higher meaning of our possession (*ENZ.C* §363–§366).

All organic processes are such mediations. But what this shows is not only that externality lacks a for-itself but also the unconscious and ever-active work of idealization on the part of subjectivity. While the formation process only deals with the conditions for self-preservation internal to the organism, the assimilation process is the stage of the self’s openness to the environment, as well as its unity with otherness, or the unification of subject and object.

In this process activity is no less important than receptivity. The idealistic principle that Hegel finds in Aristotle – that external causes affect us only insofar as we are predisposed to let them act on us, that in eating and sensation the “unlike” otherness becomes a like element (for example, *Met.* Θ 7, 1049a 3–5; *De an.* II 4–5) – is the thrust behind Hegel’s understanding of receptivity. The organism’s receptivity is a capacity immanent in it. As Hegel writes:

Only the living feels a lack; for in nature it alone is the concept, the unity of itself and its specific opposite . . . A being which is capable of containing and enduring its own contradiction is a subject; this constitutes its infinity . . . An important step towards a true representation of the organism is the substitution of the concept of stimulation by external potencies for that of the action of external causes. This is where idealism begins, in that *nothing whatever can have a positive relation to the living being if this latter is not in its own self the possibility of that relation* [italics mine], i.e., if the
relation is not determined by the concept and hence not directly immanent in the subject (ENZ.C §359 A, Miller transl. modified).

With respect to digestion in particular, Hegel draws on Spallanzani’s research to show that assimilation would not be possible without the stomach’s gastric juices. Digestion would not be thinkable without a reference to the subject’s inner constitution and chemical activity, which is able to work over externality insofar as it produces its own receptivity out of itself.27

According to Hegel, Aristotle sees quite clearly that in assimilation the identification between subject and object, or (as in sensation) between perceiver and perceived, points to the same activity-within-passivity. The object is assimilated by an active subject predisposed to mediate it (VGPh: 204–7).

The final truth of organic life for Hegel is that the individual living being is inadequate to its genus; in other words, it is dominated by it insofar as it lives and dies, its processes instrumental to the perpetuation of the species (Gattung). This is what Hegel means when he says that the existing organism is external to its concept and that its only immortality is that of reproduction (WL 2: 486, SL 774).

Here, I think, we can begin to appreciate, after the similarities and affinities between Aristotle and Hegel, also their fundamental differences. For Hegel, man is not simply his natural life but can rise above it. By thought and action the individual human being can consciously carry out and actualize a spiritual content. Thus here the concept is no more an in-itself but becomes for him. This has the more precise consequence that man can objectify himself in the universal medium of reality and make his individuality universal, part and parcel of the spirit’s history. By thus taking nature’s independence as an appearance, he can assimilate nature and treat it as a moment of his own ideal life.

In this process spirit appropriates externality and gives it a meaning which, as I have said, is implicit only in nature. Thereby the spontaneous or instinctual unconscious teleology active in organisms is made explicit and transformed. It acquires two forms, the theoretical and the practical, in which spirit sublates externality. Reason, reflection, and the possibility of inhibiting desire and denying natural death are all manifestations of man’s consciousness of reality and nature as ideal,

27 About Spallanzani and Hegel, see Bodei, Sistema (1975: 102 ff.); Illetterati, Natura (1995, appendix 2).
that is as negated in its immediacy. But more meaningfully they are an expression of man’s superiority over animals and organic life. His control over his instincts, his discipline over his drives, and his satisfaction depend on his ability to act according to purposes and to temporarily silence his needs. While animals cannot rise to this sovereignty over their naturality, spirit can disregard it and follow its will. Through work it can transform nature and – this time, literally – make it its own. This is where Marx later got his famous contrast between bees and architects. Man can only build a house through rational design, by the mediation of a thought-out project. It is not his immediate nature that pushes him to do so.\(^{28}\)

While Aristotle distinguishes bees from men on account of gregarious as opposed to political nature, for Hegel this distinction is rooted in the respective relation toward nature and self. Being an integral part of nature, bees do not rise above it. Man, instead, has both a theoretical and a practical relation to nature. This twofold attitude toward nature is dictated by nature’s unsolved contradiction, by its split between intelligibility and accidentality; at the same time, it is only because man is similarly twofold (being nature and spirit) that he can appropriate nature. In the theoretical attitude spirit at first finds nature as something alien and subsistent before it into which it tries to gain an insight, unveiling its mysteries. The practical attitude is instead the violent domination of nature, now regarded as a non ens or nonbeing. If the former looks for its intelligibility, the latter treats it as mere accidentality.

The contradiction will remain unsolved until we overcome the opposition and regard the two opposites as complementary. As usual in Hegel, the separation between theory and practice is overcome at a (however superior) theoretical level. Man’s violence and exploitation can only excercise itself on nature’s externality; man’s theoretical investigation will always differentiate between an essence to be grasped and an appearance to be discarded.

The philosophical question about the being of nature purports to bring about precisely an awareness that if the two levels, in themselves one-sided, are taken as complementary, we will stop treating nature as an enemy to colonize or as an externality to unveil. Rather, once nature is understood as a living whole and as a concept in-itself, spirit will comprehend nature as its own inner foundation and at the same time put a limit to the bad infinity of its exploitation of nature through work.

\(^{28}\) Compare Bodei, Sistema (1975: 145 ff.)
This implies that it is spirit itself that has to overcome the opposition between theory and practice. As such, *it is spirit that has to reconcile nature with itself.*

The difference between Aristotle’s search for a meaning in nature and Hegel’s analogous approach here begins to become sharper. In both Hegelian theory and practice, nature’s externality is overcome by spirit, and likewise its appearance of givenness is overcome. All this is a consequence of the peculiar switch advanced by Hegel in the initial question about the being of nature that he inherits from Aristotle, that is, his definition of nature as the Idea in its externality. This question, let us recall, distinguishes Hegel from modern science, which has ceased to ask for the meaning of the being of nature and limited itself to a description of its behavior. For Hegel, theory and practice are different moments of spirit’s sublation of externality, while for Aristotle they are independent activities directed to separate genera. Aristotle’s assimilation (for nutrition, compare *De an.* II 4, 416a 30 ff.) occurs all within the realm of nature, whose givenness is never put in question. Thus what I find irreconcilable with Aristotle is the understanding of assimilation, and of teleology in general, as a *sublation of externality.*

Hegel has tacitly taken a further step: he has reduced all nature, from the nature outside us to our bodily nature, to one unitary realm of externality; he has set up an opposition between nature and spirit that we cannot find in Aristotle, and he has ascribed to externality the role of a moment in spirit’s return to itself.

This is quite consistent with his treatment of the *De anima* in the *Encyclopædia* and in the Lectures, as we know from Chapter 2. While “psychology” for Aristotle was all internal to natural philosophy, with the exception of the pages on *nous*, Hegel treats it as Aristotle’s alleged philosophy of spirit to which he felt so close. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit, in turn, is subsequent to the Philosophy of Nature but also opposed to it as to its basis (*ENZ.C* §381). It must be pointed out that the reason why Hegel could make such massive use of the *De anima* was the fact that he found it much more speculative than any ancient or modern work on the subject – whereby speculative means, among other things, timeless. Likewise, at the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature (*ENZ.C* §245 Z), he quotes the verses from the *Antigone* where Sophocles writes that “Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man; nothing destined to befall him finds him without resources” (lines 332–3, 360). In the same sense he could also have quoted the myth of Prometheus as told by Protagoras in the Platonic dialogue of that
For Hegel, in sum, the practical attitude toward nature is not typical of modernity but, as an eternal trait of spirit, was already known to the Greeks, who made use of need and ingenuity to control nature.

What I find disputable in this is an antihistorical lack of due emphasis on the consideration that only because modern science stopped asking about the being of nature could it objectify it into the realm of externality and begin to subjugate it. Besides, this returns us to the problem internal to Hegel’s system, which we discuss in Chapter 1. For us, the main differences between antiquity and modernity are rooted in the respective understandings of nature and of man’s place in it. Hegel is free to refuse external history in favor of speculation, to privilege affinities over differences and to isolate what is speculative and a permanent acquisition in philosophy, beyond or possibly against its historical genesis. But, regardless of all other considerations, this seems to me to run against Hegel’s own repeated statement that progress in the concreteness of the Idea’s thought determinations corresponds to the historical progress in mankind’s liberation from externality and to the rise to the absolute level of thought.

Aristotle does not spiritualize man’s natural life. The soul is the animation of the body, not its master. The difference between man and other living beings articulated at De part. anim. II 10, 656a 5 ff. – that man not only lives but also values life – is based on what falls outside man’s body, nous, not on a spirituality permeating all forms of man’s physical nature, as in Hegel’s Anthropology. Accordingly, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and his “psychology” in particular can be understood prior to its separation from the human world. There is an undeniable difference between this and Hegel’s attempt at establishing a continuity or an identity-within-difference between nature and spirit; at overcoming the modern division between nature and culture in a renewed understanding of nature’s internal finality as the foundation of spirit.

For Aristotle, philosophy of nature is a théoria, a contemplation, of what is given to man and on which man has no influence. As such it contrasts with art or technê. Hegel does not seem to realize that he comes after the fusion of technê and nature performed by modern science and

What for Hegel is an unqualified hymn to human resourcefulness was much more ambiguous for Sophocles (as well as for Protagoras). See my article “Homo Sapiens, Homo Faber” (forthcoming).
that his interpretation of Aristotle is dependent on, and vitiated by, his
disregard of this transition. What he disregards is that modern science
does not conceive of the investigation of nature as an investigation into
the principles of what is given to us in sensation, but instead begins in
open opposition to the concepts and methods of ancient science, in-
cluding the difference in genus between Aristotelian *theôria* (contem-
plation), and *poiēsis* (production). As such modern science institutes a
contrast between a natural prescientific world and the world of object-
vity, which has lost all immediate touch with what we see, to put it in
the terms of Husserl in the *Krisis*. But it is this latter world that will from
now on define what nature is. From Descartes on, mechanics replaces
Aristotelian physics because of its objectivity and universality. This is
how *technê* and science, for Aristotle “virtues” of two distinct parts of
man’s rational soul (*Eth.nic.* VI 2), become two complementary aspects
within the practice of natural science itself. Science is in principle ap-
licable technically, and conversely *technê* stops being banausic work to
acquire scientific status.

Thus instead of viewing nature as the realm of sensible things in mo-
tion, modern natural science treats it as a mechanic and quantitative
uniform structure measurable in spatiotemporal terms. Thereby, from
Galileo to Newton, it interprets motion and its laws as the motion of
estric geometric bodies in an indifferent space, as the pure abstract structure
underlying the motions we perceive. A preliminary split between ob-
jectivity and subjectivity in our experience of nature is essential to and
presupposed by the new method. As a consequence, the prescientific
experience of nature itself is already a product of science, an abstrac-
tion affected by the split between subjectivity and objectivity.

Hegel never mentions the distinction between primary and second-
ary qualities or even experimental method (other than in the *Phenome-
nology of Spirit*). But this general background is implicitly operative
throughout his theory of nature. The way he expounds Aristotle’s
*Physics* in his *Lectures* bears witness to his own dependence on it. Before
passing on to his commentary on internal finality, he begins with the
same categories we find at the beginning of his philosophy of nature:
space, time, and motion (*VGPh* 169, 197–8). He says that Aristotelian
motion is the first appearance of absolute substance (God’s Spinozistic
self-manifestation in motion we see in Chapter 3) and that time and
space are its moments (*VGPh* 169).

Even if we disregard theological questions and stick to motion, this
beginning can hardly correspond to anything Aristotelian. It is not a
Newtonian beginning because space and time are not an absolute framework of motion for Hegel. However, Hegel definitely does assume a modern standpoint, in which sensible experience has already been turned into thought determinations or categories, if only to transform it dialectically, that is, to show the inner excitation of its categories. Thus we can begin to realize that Hegel’s very idea of nature as an unsolved contradiction is rooted in the very split between intelligibility and appearance that modern physical science has taken so much pain to delineate. Obviously, the concept in-itself is not the same as the spatiotemporal lawfulness of mechanics. The concept is not a dead selfsame abstraction but nature’s inner soul and life. This very concept, which is only for us and can never be for nature, allows reason’s recognition of itself in nature. Only thus can nature be a moment of the Idea. For Aristotle nature is not the in-itself of the concept opposed to its being-for-itself. Aristotle begins with the givenness of the sensible world, not with a contrast between intelligibility and appearance.

In his analyses of space, time, and motion Hegel draws on a number of Aristotelian notions. We will see in the next section that he takes space as a continuity differentiated only by a proper limit, like the Aristotelian point or stigmê (ENZ.C §254 Z, Petry 1: 224–5), just as time is a continuum separated by the now (Phys. IV 10–12). However, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature time and space are the necessary presuppositions for an investigation of mechanics, that is, for the intelligibility of motion. However immortal are Aristotle’s pages on time, in his exposition of them in the Lectures Hegel does not realize that the relation between motion, time, and space in Aristotelian physics and modern science substantially differs and that he treats the two on a par.

Time is the number of motion for Aristotle, who thereby allows for a divisibility of space and, in principle, for a quantitative and measurable treatment of motion. But motion is first defined without reference to time; in fact, the notion of time is itself articulated in terms of motion. Modern natural science, on the contrary, understands motion in terms of its relation to time as a pure frame of reference; and this model is so successful and pervasive that it guides all modern understanding of motion and time, culminating in Kant’s analysis of the relation between causality and the pure form of inner sense. Thus the reason why the divisibility of time advocated by Aristotle does not give rise to anything like mechanics or uniform mathematical laws of motion is that, for Aristotle, all physical processes depend on the nature of the substances we are investigating and are not understandable in terms of homogeneous
relations binding all bodies equally. And this is the reason why even Aris-
totelian *phora* or locomotion (one of the three senses of movement or
change, *kinēsis*, in the *Physics*, V 1–2, 225a 1-b 9) differs from the mod-
ern understanding of motion.

Hegel also takes motion and matter as correlative notions. Space, as
I said, is not an absolute framework but the determinate space of bod-
ies. It is not a Leibnizian relation of order either (*ENZ.C* §254 Z). In its
posited form, it is a spatiotemporal selfsame place in which matter is lo-
cated. As such it has many properties in common with the Aristotelian
topos, place. But it is striking that when Hegel comments on this theme
in his *Lectures* he interprets, quite Spinozistically, place as the inner neg-
avity of a thing, whereby its limit is at the same time its negation (*VGPh*
184). He does recognize that Aristotle distinguishes high from low. But
he goes on to oppose to such natural places the superior dialectical
truth of the three dimensions of space.

I believe this is quite meaningful. It shows that when Hegel refuses
to treat space and time as a Newtonian ready-made framework prior to
the insertion of bodies and matter in motion, but then interprets them
as a sort of disposition of matter developing out of itself, he does not go
back to an oriented cosmos in which everything tends to its proper
place. Nothing falls outside movement or *Bewegung* for Hegel, not even
the prime mover. Hegelian *Bewegung* is not Aristotelian movement,
which is qualified by the rest a particular process naturally tends toward.
For Aristotle, motion is an imperfect process which ends in a clearly
identifiable state. When Hegel talks about Aristotelian rest or *stasis*, he
translates it as “the possibility of being moved” (*VGPh* 182). Thus he
does not see that rest is superior to imperfect motion for Aristotle, be-
cause he privileges inner excitation or negativity (which for Aristotle
would be potentiality) over rest.

On this score Hegel is more Leibnizian than Aristotelian. This is
often true throughout his interpretation of Aristotle. Matter and
motion are for Hegel understandable as a result of the dialectic of
space and time; matter is intrinsically motion. In the *Specimen dynam-
icum* Leibniz had written that not extension but action is the essence
of substances. *Actio* is *nisus*, *conatus* (tendency, drive). By this charac-
terization Leibniz thought he was giving Aristotle’s couple *dunamis-ener-
ergeia* its badly needed clarification as well as new legitimacy.30 What it

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354 ff.) on the importance of Leibniz for Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature.
actually does is efface all notion of rest and coming to a stand from Aristotelian *energeia*.

Leibniz’s dynamization of matter is itself no less rooted in his criticism of Cartesianism than in the transformations of Aristotelian prime matter at the hands of Aristotle commentators. From Strato to Alexander, from Avicenna to Averroes, matter became endowed with active causality. However, for Aristotle matter always needs an agent to attain its determinate form. As such, it cannot be put on the same level as nature, which contains a principle of change within itself. Hegel, instead, universally interprets the inner dynamic negativity of things, substances, spirit itself, as a transition from an Aristotelian *dunamis* to its actuality. This is how he can interpret Aristotelian matter as an inner dynamical and quantitative principle (recall his translation of matter as quantity at *VGPh* 233). And when Hegel writes in the *Science of Logic* about space and time being pure quantities and about the equation of matter and quantity in Leibniz’s *Disputatio Metaphysica*, he argues that matter is an outer existence, which in its pure thought-determination means exactly the same as quantity (*WL* 1: 215, *SL* 189–90). In the *Philosophy of Nature* he calls matter a *nisus* (*ENZ.C* §262 A) in the context of a discussion of Kant’s “construction” of matter as attraction and repulsion. Significantly, once he comments on the four Aristotelian elements in the *Lectures* he calls the principles of heavy and light “attraction and centrifugal force” (*VGPh* 195).

To conclude, in the *Philosophy of Nature* and in the *organics* in particular, Hegel adopts the Aristotelian notion of nature as a model of internal finality, of a process in which beginning and end fall within the same subject. Hegel is right to find this incompatible with the mechanical view of nature advanced by modern physical science. But his interpretation of Aristotle’s natural philosophy is largely conditioned by the unacknowledged modernity of his presuppositions.

§5. Natural Time and Eternity: From Life to Spirit

Aristotle does not deduce reality from ideality, that is, matter and motion from the dialectic of space and time (*ENZ.C* §261 A). He does not proceed from the abstract self-externality of space and time to its individualization in matter and motion. Yet for Hegel his grasp of time is another example of the speculative peaks he had reached. In the *Lectures*, Hegel translates *Physics* IV 10–13 (*VGPh* 188–91, *HP* 170–2); his comments are reduced to a minimum. He says that time is a potential
divisibility and that the “now” is both a limit and the union of anterior and posterior. Point, instant, and limit are at the same time one and many; in the “now” (nun) division and unification are one even though they differ in essence.

Just as the soul discriminates by using the limit and is thus one and two (De an. III 2, 427a 11–16) in the perception of common and incidental sensibles, which Hegel interprets in the Lectures on the De anima (VGPh 211–12), here in the Physics Aristotle uses the limit as both separation and union. For Hegel this shows that Aristotle goes beyond understanding’s principle of identity and understands motion as contradiction (VGPh 190). This way of talking about contradiction is present throughout Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle. Hegel takes what Aristotle describes as an identity in actuality between two opposites, where the two terms also differ tóí einai or tóí logóí, as a real contradiction, while Aristotle stresses the difference of respects in which things are predicated. (As we see in Chapter 6, §3, this is because for him negativity is constitutive of identity.) This is no less clear here than in Hegel’s comment on Aristotle’s conception of sensation.

In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel treats time along the same lines.31 Space and time are continua; this continuity is interrupted or broken by the point and the “now,” which introduce discreteness into continuity. For Hegel space and time are as little composed of points and “nows” as they are for Aristotle; taking them as continua means that they are potentially infinitely divisible, and that points and “nows” are not parts of wholes but limits of continua. Further, in Hegel’s terms, they are idealities: they are identical to themselves while referring to something that is each time different.

Like Aristotle, Hegel treats time in the Philosophy of Nature, not of spirit. I believe this departs from Kant less than it may appear; Hegel’s treatment is a constant confrontation with the Transcendental Aesthetic, as especially the remarks to §258 and §259 show. Kant’s very distinction between forms of intuition and formal intuitions adopts the same conception of continuity and discreteness, even though an elaborate conception of schematic construction is operative in Kant, something we do not find in Hegel.32

But this fact, the treatment of time within the Philosophy of Nature,

31 Before the Phenomenology and the three editions of the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel’s most important treatment of time is to be found in the Jenenser Logik (GW 7: 193 ff.)

32 See my article “Intuition” (forthcoming).
is the most significant starting point for Heidegger, who first drew attention to Hegel’s “direct connection” to Aristotle in his theory of time. According to Heidegger, Hegel paraphrases Aristotle in his *Jenenser Logik* (*SuZ* A32–3). “Aristotle sees the essence of time in the *nun*, Hegel in the ‘now.’ Aristotle takes the *nun* as *horos*; Hegel takes the ‘now’ as a ‘limit.’ Aristotle understands the *nun* as *stigmê*; Hegel interprets the ‘now’ as a point. Aristotle describes the *nun* as *tode ti*; Hegel calls the ‘now’ the ‘absolute this.’ Aristotle follows tradition in connecting *chronos* with the *sphaira*; Hegel stresses the ‘circular course’ of time” (ibid.). This is called by Heidegger a “rough suggestion,” and is inserted at the end of *Being and Time* in a footnote.33

This “direct connection” is in part true. The understanding of the “now” and of the point as limits which negate or make discrete a continuity is a deep affinity between Hegel and Aristotle. However, as I argued in the preceding section, time is understandable for Aristotle in relation to motion; only because we distinguish and at the same time relate anterior and posterior in motion can we number “nows” (IV 11, 219b 26–8). The “now” unifies two discrete segments that have been previously discriminated by the soul. For Hegel, instead, motion is understandable only as the reality of time and space; time is not in the soul, it is rather the way of being of nature and of finitude in general; the quantitative categories of the continuous and the discrete are the presupposition and ideal genesis of finite mechanics, while Aristotle formulates the question of time within a phenomenology of motion, not a logic of its dialectical genesis.

Besides, the consequence Heidegger draws from this is unwarranted. This conception of time, he argues, is based on the privilege of the “now,” on the connection between now and point, between time and space, and this is the inauthentic or vulgar conception of time. In the second part of §82, Heidegger interprets spirit’s time as the fall into temporality and opposes this fall to his own conception of an original temporalization of temporality.

Heidegger ignores that for Hegel time is not only the self-externality of nows in intuited becoming but also the totality of its dimensions in duration, in eternity (*ENZ.C* §258 A). Heidegger does recognize that time is the existing concept (der Daseiende Begriff, W 3: 584, PhS 487)

33 In his essay on this footnote (“Ousia”, in *Marges*, 1972: 47 ff.), Derrida writes that this thesis concentrates on the evaded question of metaphysics, the domination of presence. However, he does not dispute the basic lines of Heidegger’s interpretation.
and that “time is the same principle as the I=I of self-consciousness” (ENZ.C §258 A). But he does not draw the necessary consequences from this, and so his criticism remains one-sided. Hegel simply does not privilege the now, nor does spirit fall into time. If time is the existence of the Concept, its externality, then it follows that the Concept is the inner essence of time. When spirit comprehends its development and returns to itself (Werden zu sich), it sublates its external existence and the temporal succession itself. In other words, spirit does not undergo time but on the contrary masters it (ENZ.C §258 A).

The finite is temporal; spirit, instead, is eternal. However, this eternity is not timelessness, abstraction from time, but duration. Duration is not the presence of a “now,” that is, one of the three temporal dimensions, but an absolute present (“die wahrhafte Gegenwart,” ENZ.C §259 Z). This absolute present is the totality of time which as such is a concept, not an external succession, and which has raised temporal differences to moments of a spiritual development; thereby, it transforms a bad infinity into a true one.34

I believe that if we must critically assess this notion of temporality, it is wrong to dismiss it as a vulgarization based on the privilege of the “now.” Rather, as I point out in Chapter 1, the problem is that I think it is hard to see what is left in this Aufhebung of time as open-ended succession.

If spirit does not undergo time, it is because it is infinite, that is, development out of itself. This subjectivity differs from natural subjectivity in one crucial respect: spirit is free inasmuch as it is consciousness of its freedom. Animal life, in which the singular is dominated by its genus, is the highest stage reached in nature; but here the Idea is only a singularity, not a self-conscious individual. The species survives, but the singulars perish; beginning and end of life fall within the same specific, but not individual, subject. Its temporality is a repetition of the same (VPhG Lasson 48; VGPh 1: 51, HP 1: 32). If the death of nature is the birth of spirit (ENZ.C §376), it is because spirit, unlike life, duplicates itself and is for itself. As a consequence, spirit comprehends time.

34 The bibliography on time in Hegel is vast and includes many important essays, from Kojève, Koyré, and Marcuse on; the literature on time in Aristotle is even more comprehensive. Let me refer the reader to Stevens, “Maintenant” (1993) for a discussion of the Aristotelianism of Hegel’s concept of time; for a critical assessment of Heidegger’s interpretation of Hegel on time, compare Souche-Dagues, “Exégèse Heideggerienne,” 1979 (in Recherches Hégéliennes, 1994: 111–35), and Lugarini, Prospettive hegeliane (1986: 213–46).
as its outward element in the inner element of thought. Time is here the frame of spirit’s development; time assumes the shape of progress. Spirit can become what it is in itself; its discovery of itself is the activity of producing, objectifying, and recollecting (thereby knowing) itself.

Spirit is the result of its own development. But this takes place in individuals, not in a generic process. In natural organisms a singularity stands distinguished from and opposed to another singularity, and both are subject to their genus. In spirit, individuals distinguish themselves from one another; we do not have a given multiplicity, but a distinctive plurality in which individuals are not tokens but unique.

Individuals become what they are through their education. Man makes himself what he ought to be ("soll"). And this is only possible through will, which animals lack. Will is one step above the principle of motion which natural beings have in themselves; it is the freedom to inhibit motion and desire. This freedom makes it possible for us to silence our nature and act according to ends, to produce rationality in actuality (VPhG Lasson 31–5).

If I duplicate myself and am object to myself, I am a division between what is mine and myself; I know myself in and as this opposition. Hence I am not tied to my biological life; I have a life, which means I am free from it (for example, I can risk it for the sake of something higher). While in nature everything comes to be and passes away in repetitive cycles, my life becomes a value in itself just because it is not simply biological life. It is self-consciousness and is thus divine. Its mortality is the mirror of its possibility of being immortal.

This idea absorbs Christian eschatological and universalistic elements at the same time as it fuses them with Greek elements. Aristotle in particular distinguished bios from zôê and followed the Greek tradition when he called this mortal immortalization athanatizein in the Nicomachean Ethics (X 7, 1177b 33).

We must now turn to the relation between mortal and immortal in spirit in its theoretical and practical forms and to Hegel’s discussion of Aristotle’s theory of man.
ARISTOTLE’S *DE ANIMA*  
AND HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY  
OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

*Es kommt bei all diesem nur darauf an, es in unsere allerdings gebildete Denkweise zu übersetzen.*

(Hegel on the *De anima*, 1820)

*was freilich schwer ist.*

(VGPh 221)

A. ARISTOTELIAN SOUL AND HEGELIAN SPIRIT

§1. The Systematic Place of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the *Encyclopædia*

In the *Philosophy of Right*, after defining spirit as intelligence and saying that the moments of its development from feeling to representation to thought are the path along which spirit “produces itself as will,” Hegel announces his intention to carry out a “science of spirit, usually called ‘psychology’” (*PhR* §4 A, my transl.). Hegel never had a chance to fulfill this wish, however, save in the revision of the 1817 *Encyclopædia* in its second and third editions and in the notes for a Philosophy of Spirit, which he wrote between 1822 and 1825 (Fragment, *BS* 517–50). This is so much greater a pity if we recall that Hegel’s interest in psychology spans his entire lifetime as one of his fundamental and constant concerns. In a letter to Niethammer, after lamenting Fries’s shallow deduction of logic from anthropological presuppositions based on experience, Hegel announces the publication of his Logic and adds: “My psychology will follow later” (*Briefe* 196, *Letters* 257–8). The combined reformation of logic and psychology, which do not show any traces of
the accelerated time of the “new spirit” (WL 1: 15, SL 26), appears to be one of Hegel’s primary goals, especially in the Nürnberg years.

In the first edition of his Encyclopædia Hegel expresses his disappointment over the contemporary understanding of psychology in these words: “Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which have profited least from the more general cultivation of spirit and the profounder notion of reason distinguishing more recent times, and it is [still] in a highly deplorable condition” (ENZ.A §367 A; ENZ.C §444 A, transl. Petry). Significantly, Hegel leaves this sentence unmodified in the subsequent editions, save for the insertion of the adverb “still.” An avid reader of works in anthropology and psychology, especially in the 1820s, Hegel, who incorporates many of the scientific findings and empirical evidence discussed by his contemporaries on such diverse issues as madness, language, and animal magnetism, clearly believes that even the most important research led by modern anthropologists and psychologists contributes virtually nothing to the philosophical knowledge of spirit.

Until recently, Hegel scholarship has paid surprisingly little attention to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in this century. This is largely due to a prejudice, more often than not grounded on a misunderstanding of Hegel’s criticism of Kant. To many interpreters it looks as though Hegel were not interested in epistemological or moral questions, in the forms of knowing and acting, because in this domain we have an opposition between a form and a content. Therefore we should rather focus on thought, understood as the movement of logical thought-determinations or on action within legal and state institutions. As a result we have at our disposal a very large bibliography on the Logic or the Philosophy of Right, and precious little on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. The examination of the forms and modes in which spirit knows and wills itself as its content has been largely neglected. The suggestions for further research put forth by Nicolin (“Hegels Arbeiten,” 1961) have found little response, so that the reader of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has no other help apart from Petry’s instructive notes in his commentary (PSS, 1978).1

1 For recent exceptions, see De Vries, Mental Activity (1988); the two collections of essays Theorie des subjektiven Geistes (Eley, ed., 1990) and Psychologie und Anthropologie (Hespe/ Tuschling, eds., 1991); and Wolff’s Körper-Seele (1992). In my mind, by far the best book on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is Peperzak’s Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten (1986); but Peperzak concentrates mostly on practical spirit. Unless otherwise noted, translations from the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in this chapter will be Petry’s.
This is all the more puzzling if we consider the richness of Hegel’s material, from the 1794 notes to the Jena system projects, from the texts of the lectures at the Nürnberg Gymnasium to the three versions of the *Encyclopaedia*, as well as the lively disputes with regard to anthropology and psychology in Hegel’s school. Among the most recurrent efforts of Hegel’s pupils was the development of that part of the system that had received the least complete and autonomous treatment by Hegel. The issues discussed by Hegel in this part are indicative of his position on such traditional themes as the soul, consciousness, and sensation, up to the various psychological forms of representation, thinking, and the will.

Before I comment on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, I should remind the reader of the external framework and of its general conceptual background so as to clarify its meaning and purpose. In the *Encyclopaedia* more than anywhere else, the principle of contextualization is crucial. Just as it would be misleading to treat the different understandings of the concept of “life” in the *Logic*, Philosophy of Nature and of Spirit as one identical concept, so in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, sensation has a different meaning and explanatory value for the soul than for consciousness or intelligence. What a plurivocal concept presupposes with respect to its theoretical genesis in the system is an indispensable part of its meaning – and no concept *legetai pollachôs* (is said in many ways) more than spirit. According to Hegel, confusions arise precisely when we disregard contexts, levels, and assumptions on which the concepts at hand are predicated. That a concept resurfaces at different levels reflects Hegel’s preoccupation to situate it theoretically at its different degrees of concreteness. I take this to constitute no less Hegel’s effort at clarification than the richness of his analyses.

The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit follows the Philosophy of Nature and comes before the Philosophy of Objective Spirit, which in turn is followed by Absolute Spirit. In both its subjective and objective modes spirit remains finite; the Idea’s concept and actuality are not thoroughly reconciled, and the split between form and content makes it impossible for the spirit to conceive of itself as the truth of the whole. Finite spirit considers itself and its nature – from external nature to its spiri-

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2 See Hinrichs, *Genesis des Wissens* (1835); Rosenkranz, *Psychologie* (1837, 3rd ed. 1863); Erdmann, *Psychologie* (1840, 5th ed. 1873); Michelet, *Anthropologie und Psychologie* (1840); Exner’s criticisms in *Psychologische der hegelischen Schule* (1842); and Rosenkranz’s reply in his *Vertheidigung der hegelischen Psychologie* (1843).
tual world or second nature – as a given to be presupposed; it does not know itself as the unity and principle of all oppositions.

Concept and actuality are not thoroughly reconciled, as I just said; but, unlike in nature, which is an unsolved contradiction, in spirit they can be in principle. Spirit emerges out of nature and tries to return to itself from it. This means that understanding spirit as disembodied is no less abstract than understanding nature as a dead otherness devoid of rationality. However, in nature the Idea is external to itself. The progression of its moments finds finite expression in particular existences and formations external to one another. In spirit, instead, concept and actuality do not fall asunder. While inner and outer, essence and manifestation can never be identical in nature, in spirit (for spirit) they can. Spirit can comprehend the Idea’s actuality in its concept; conversely, it can actualize spiritual contents in objectivity. Spirit is not merely beyond nature’s juxtaposition and externality; what nature lacks is the dialectic of inner and outer. Spirit is the inwardization of externality and of all otherness and the externalization of interiority.

At first spirit presupposes (“voraussetzt”) nature. As it progressively appropriates it, it posits (“setzt”) it as its own, as its own world (ENZ.C §384). In this movement, spirit does emerge out of nature; yet at the same time it discovers that the nature out of which it comes is the mediation through which it attains its essence. Nature seemed to be an absolute origin; it turns out to be a means and a middle. Even though it seems that spirit is supervenient on nature, it is actually prior to it.

“For us, spirit has nature as its presupposition. It is the truth of nature, and, therefore, its absolute prius” (ENZ.C §381). This sentence, with which Hegel opens the “Concept of Spirit,” encloses in its enigmatic brevity the whole essence, beginning and end of the Philosophy of Spirit. This presupposition must be taken very seriously. But just what must be presupposed, if spirit is prior? In what sense is spirit the truth of nature?

In spirit the Idea returns to itself from the externality of nature. The Idea is experienced and known by spirit; so is nature. But spirit’s relation to nature is negative. Nature must die to give rise to spirit, as we saw in the preceding chapter; death is the conclusion of the Philosophy of Nature. Spirit negates precisely its own nature; it rises above natural life and death. Its essence is not simply interiority, but freedom and negativity. Spirit is on its way to understand its ties with nature and liberate itself from them, thereby positing this naturalness as its inferior mo-
ment and sublating it as its means. Thus appropriated by spirit, which is the activity of negating externality as a moment in its self-actualization, as a second nature or spiritual world, nature stops being an external given and becomes spirit’s in-itself or ideal possession.

That spirit is this activity of idealizing nature should not be understood as Novalis’s Romantisierung, where spirit would be the transfiguration of nature. Spirit idealizes nature in that it posits it as a negated form and relates itself to itself in its inferior determinations. Subjective spirit in particular is spirit’s activity of negating the sensible givenness and transforming it into the forms in which givenness is for spirit. Further, it is the activity of knowing these forms as the truth of the object and, finally, of knowing itself as thought by knowing the object. Thereby subjective spirit objectivizes and knows its moments and understands them as the self-finitization of the absolute Idea which knows itself and is for itself in concrete spirit – as in the noēsis noēseōs of ENZ.C §552 A.

In and through this process of idealization, the other turns out to be spirit’s own other; the empirical is spirit’s finite expression, from the shaping of spirit’s immediate naturalness (our senses and bodily habits) to spirit’s most mediated second nature, the concept of right made concrete in institutions. Thus the Philosophy of Spirit has as its essence and purpose the becoming, for spirit, of the Idea, which in the Logic is only in-itself. In other words, the Philosophy of Spirit is the spirit’s self-knowledge as the absolute and original foundation of the whole process, or spirit’s revelation to itself.3

“Know thyself,” which, as Plato reminds us, was the inscription in the temple of Apollo at Delphi (Charm. 164(d)), is for Hegel the “absolute commandment” (ENZ.C §377). In the idea of a commandment we do not simply have a description of a given essence; we have the expression of an ought. Spirit is as an ought; spirit is the movement of adequating its essence to its existence, its concept to its reality. Spirit’s life is this movement. This in turn means that finitude is part and parcel of spirit, and that absolute spirit alone is this self-knowledge. But no less important than the result is the path that takes us there. The philosophy of finite spirit is this path.

3 This marks the difference between the Idea of cognition in the Logic and reason as the end of the Psychology. In the Logic the concept is free, that is, it has itself as its object and does not need to deal with its genesis out of nature; at the same time, it is an in-itself, tantamount to a pure possibility. The reason of the Psychology, instead, is the concrete reality (the becoming for-itself) of spirit’s essence (of its in-itself, the concept).
This commandment does not have the meaning of an investigation of the peculiarities of human nature, the foibles and recesses of the human heart. Spirit must come to know the substantial being of its universality. Intelligence must elevate its knowledge of its activity to the determinate knowledge of itself as reason.

The specific object of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is the realization for spirit of the freedom from any conditioning. The goal is that spirit, which initially is considered immersed in naturality, discovers itself at the end of the process as the truth of the process itself, and as the activity which produces it. Each stage of spirit’s relation with reality and of its process of liberation from an apparent heteronomy becomes the object of the next, higher stage. Since each stage discussed is a phase through which spirit has previously undergone as a global stance toward itself and the world, spirit in this process has—in an increasingly clear fashion—itself and the sublated moments of its development as its object. The various forms of knowing and acting are all moments of a single process, the entelechy of the living spirit.

In the chapter on the animal organism, Hegel read nature as an entelechy in which the universal concept actualized itself as a particular individual by assimilating the world through corporeality; the Idea existed at that stage as genus. The first section of the Philosophy of Spirit, the Anthropology, begins with that result: the soul is the life of the genus and substance of knowledge (“die allgemeine Immaterialität der Natur, deren einfaches ideelles Leben . . . die Substanz, so die absolute Grundlage der Besonderung . . . der Schlaf des Geistes”). However, while for the organism death is its conclusion, its absolute negation, for spirit universality and individuality are not in conflict. The individual is a universal: the simplicity for which all finitude and externality, all difference, is an ideal existence. Therefore spirit can abstract from anything given, including its life. Not only can it, it does. And this is how a higher, spiritual life takes over natural life.

This progression takes place in a series of stages that correspond to spirit’s liberation from nature. Spirit awakes from its immersion in nature, from its sleep in the Anthropology. The Anthropology studies the different psychophysical states linked to corporeality, the qualitative determinations representing the first immediate conditions that fetter

4 “The universal immateriality of nature, its simple ideal life . . . the substance, the absolute basis of all particularization . . . spirit’s sleep” (ENZ.C §389, my transl.; see also ENZA §311).
spirit, from our relation to the environment to sexual relations, from sleep and waking to bodily expressions. Its end is the production of the I, in which corporeality is reduced to a sign of the soul. Thereby, spirit brings diremption in its substantial identity with nature. It particularizes itself and becomes consciousness opposed to a world. At this stage, the Phenomenology, spirit is its simple identity with itself, it is consciousness or I; but the I is opposed to a world which it considers absolutely separate from itself. It must still discover itself as reason, the ideality in which there is no more separation between subject and object, between subjective thoughts and the objective determinations of the things. In the Psychology it grasps its in-itself, all its inferior determinations – the realm of objectivity which for consciousness was at first the in-itself, appearing as a given – as its own representations. In the Psychology, the object exists for spirit as intuition, recollection, name, and concept. Actuality is idealized as the product and possession of spirit. Spirit is the subject; but what is here the object for spirit is nothing but itself, its own inferior determinations, sublated and reduced to moments of its process of coming to itself. Finally, in Practical Spirit and Objective Spirit spirit wills its freedom, moves itself to act, and gives its interiority an external outcome.

The relation to otherness is progressively reduced to the spirit’s relation to its forms of thematization of actuality. If the I perceives the object, the object has existence and meaning for the I as perceived; the object of intelligence is perception, itself qua perceiving no less than the perceived object. If the I intuits the perceived, represents the intuited, recollects the representation, transforms this into a linguistic sign, thinks this discursively, and finally wills the rational and universal end produced by thought, then wherever spirit looks it will find itself as the truth of reality. If spirit is thus in relation to itself, every relation with otherness will be a different mediation of spirit with its particular moments and a development or actualization of what spirit is in itself, in its potentiality. Conversely, the reality of spirit will be the expression of what spirit knows, of the consciousness it has gained of its freedom. Spirit is free or infinite because the beginning and end of its development, as well as its actualization, fall within the same subject, which can abstract from, and thus does not depend on, anything external.

This coming to itself is spirit’s discovery of its essence qua identity of subject and object, reason as the truth of the entire process. This is only possible because spirit is defined neither as finite nor as infinite but as the very progression from its finitude to its infinity, or the movement of
sublating the otherness and immediacy it had begun by presupposing—differently stated, this is the movement from its naturalness to its divinity. Clearly, spirit can only run through this progression, and be finite, because it is in its essence infinity, self-relation; it must realize and produce its concept, actualizing its freedom in objectivity and history. In this sense the task of knowing itself is the discovery of its infinity and the rise above finitude and above nature.

Spirit is this movement of appropriating reality because it is potentially all things. It is a self-relating totality, a universality whose particular differences do not have independent subsistence, but which assume a spiritual existence as moments of an all-subordinating whole, interrelated moments of a throughgoing unity. Otherness is ideal, a possession of spirit, from which spirit is free to abstract. In this process the content at first appears to derive from without and conform to spirit’s rational form; but spirit’s progression in these sections is the filling of this gap, or the adequation between its form and its content. When Hegel writes that spirit is its own determinate manifestation and that spirit’s possibility is the same as its actuality (ENZ.C §383), he means that the content of spirit is ultimately itself.

However, spirit must discover this identity of itself as the identity between content and form. At first content and form appear as separate, and this is precisely what constitutes spirit’s finitude. But spirit’s entire activity is the production of its freedom through its activity. The meaning of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is therefore that spirit realizes its infinity while infecting itself with externality, while appropriating and shaping it.

StrIKINGLY, a great deal, if not most of all this Hegel sees somehow prefigured in Aristotle. In the addition to ENZ.C §379 the same statement is made as in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy and on the Philosophy of History about development as the actualization of a potency (VGPh 1: 39–42; VPhG 78). Formally speaking, Hegel’s definition of freedom is reminiscent of Aristotle’s in the Metaphysics (A 2, 982b 25). What Hegel finds in the De anima is no small achievement (VGPh 199–221): the soul as life, Idea, an activity, and self-development in and through its relation to otherness; the negativity of spirit, for which every finite form becomes matter for the superior form of the consideration

5 This was remarked by Ritter (Metaphysik und Politik, 1969: 197); see also Brague’s considerations about Rousseau and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Monde, 1988: 163 n.). We obviously have to return to the question of beginning one’s actions in §8 below.
of reality; spirit emerging out of nature as its truth; sensation as identity of perceiver and perceived, an activity within passivity; the conception of the subject as a potency or *hexis* preserving and idealizing experience in memory; the intellect thematizing reality as it was inwardized in the inferior theoretical forms, thereby coming to know itself; the unity of will and reason; and in general the unity of the forms of life, knowing, and acting qua all moments of the entelechy of spirit.

Otherness can be understood as posited by the subject only if we conceive from the outset spirit’s passivity as a mere appearance, an immediacy devoid of truth. For example, in the Anthropology the soul depends on given content, which it finds and does not freely produce. Yet spirit is active in its passivity; sensation activates a possibility originally proper to the subject. While we find ourselves at first determined, we at the same time actively transform what is given into our possession; we are engaged in a modification of our disposition to be determined. This internalization of givenness is what Hegel calls spirit’s ideality. And for this reason Hegel takes Aristotle as a pivotal thinker in his conception of sensation. Aristotle understands sensation as *alteratio perfectiva*, development of a subjective potentiality; and this is how Hegel reads sensation and experience. This is so central that the transition from the Anthropology to the Psychology depends on the conversion of an immediately apparent passivity into a one-sided moment of spirit’s overarching and pervasive activity.

A philosophy that pretends to investigate the forms of knowing abstractly, that is, which begins by separating its sources, understanding, and sensibility, lacks precisely the fundamental trait of Hegel’s retrieval of Aristotle: the unitary consideration of the various forms of living, sensing, knowing, and willing as the stages in and through which the teleological process of living subjectivity articulates itself. From this point of view there is no difference for Hegel between Kant, empiricism, and rational metaphysics. The development of the concept of experience is not seen by Hegel in light of the scission between empirical and a priori but as the spirit’s self-actualization and emergence out of nature in return to itself.

This awakening of the soul to consciousness and to self-conscious reason accounts for its recognition in all that is of the Idea, of the logical, the identity of subject and object. This is the ground for Hegel’s argument that, as long as it does not know itself as this self-determining free activity, spirit is still finite, in itself, or affected by presuppositions. But it is no less the basis for Hegel’s distortion of Aristotle’s theory of
nous in his theory of spirit, and for the assertion that as long as it is passive (leidend), spirit is in all its manifestations nous pathêtikos, or reason that is potentially everything (ENZ.C §389).

For Hegel, Aristotle’s divine and active nous is the autonomy of reason which is its own pure object; it is the absolute and infinite self-consciousness. It is of little surprise, then, that the expression with which Hegel translates the nous apathês (impassible intellect) of De an. III 4, 429b 23, “von aussen nicht bestimmt,”6 is analogous to the description of the logical movement of the Science of Logic (“[ein] von aussen nichts hereinnehmende[r] Gang”, WL 1: 49), and that thought must remain faithful to itself “so that it may overcome” (ENZ.C §11), just like the nous of Anaxagoras and Aristotle (“ina kratêi,” De an. III 4, 429a 19).7

A clear difference in meaning is present here: for Aristotle the intellect dominates or overcomes unmixed in the sense that, if it had a form of its own, then this would hamper the reception of intelligible forms – it would not be able to know. Hegel also knows of “man’s practical relation to nature” (ENZ.C §245), the slogan of modernity from Bacon and Descartes on, as we see in Chapter 7, and something that is not alien to his notion of thought as exertion and domination.

In this chapter I critically discuss Hegel’s interpretation of the De anima (and in §8 of the Nicomachean Ethics), which is often irreconcilable with Aristotle’s original intentions, as well as the impressive extent of Hegel’s use of Aristotelian elements in his philosophy (especially in the Anthropology and the Psychology). I examine in detail Hegel’s texts on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, taking the third edition of the Encyclopædia as our lead; other related works and sources are also used. I make references to the “Fragment,” the newly published edition of the 1827/8 lecture course on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, the reports of Hegel’s evaluations of dissertations or Habilitationsschriften during his Berlin years, and obviously to Hegel’s interpretation of the De anima.8

We will see how Hegel revitalizes the fundamental tenets of Aristotle’s De anima within an implicit framework which never comes to the

7 Compare ENZNicolin-Pöggeler, p. 471.
8 The lectures based on Erdmann’s notes have been published by Hespe and Tuschling in 1994 (H/T). The reports that interest us concern Hegel’s judgments on such works as those by Mussmann, by Fichtians such as Stiedenroth, Schellingians such as Eschenmayer, positivist physiologists ante litteram such as Beneke. They are recorded by Hoffmeister in his edition of Hegel’s Berliner Schriften (BSH).
fore as unequivocally as his praise of the *De anima*: his preliminary transformation of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception, which is now understood as absolute self-consciousness or absolute reason present in the even most apparently heterodetermined stages of spirit’s life.

§2. Hegel’s Appraisal of the *De anima*

What Hegel finds unsatisfactory in the treatment of subjective spirit or knowing subjectivity advanced by his contemporaries is the presupposition, common to both empirical psychology and rational psychology, of a “ready-made” (*fertiges*) subject abstractly isolated from its actualization. Pneumatology, that branch of special metaphysics (the first position of thought with regard to objectivity in *ENZ.C*§26–§36), which reduced the soul to a thing (*ENZ.C*§34, §30), turns spirit into “an ossified and mechanical agglomeration” (*ENZ.C*§445 A; compare *ENZ.A* 368 A) of forces and faculties, which it then fixates into unrelated and independent determinations. The question of the soul’s immortality cannot even be asked, argues Hegel, as long as abstract reflexive determinations are hypostatized in isolated contents. By making the soul separate from the body, spirit is taken to be an aggregate of forces lacking unity, not a whole (*BS* 520): a *pan*, not a *holon*.

Empirical psychology does not fare any better. It breaks apart spirit’s living unity by describing its forces as particularities standing to each other in an external (*BS* 519–20) and contingent (*ENZ.A* §367 A) relation (compare *ENZ.C*§445 A). Empirical psychology takes particular faculties as given from ordinary representation, without any sense of the necessity and unity of the concept. “The psychological approach – which is the ordinary – renders, in the form of a narration, what spirit or the soul is, what happens to it, what it does, so that the soul is presupposed as a ready-made subject” (*ENZ.C*§387 A, my transl.).

Since Kant, who had freed metaphysics from the consideration of spirit as a thing (*ENZ.A* §321 A), a greater importance has been attached to psychology. Yet even though Kant is not responsible for the distortions of his successors, who have raised empirical psychology and its analysis of the facts of consciousness to the foundation of metaphysics, Kant is still prey to “the psychological consideration” in his

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9 *ENZ.A*§367 A.; *ENZ.C*§444 A. It is more than likely that here Hegel is referring to Fries. The first volume of his *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft* appeared in 1807 and was followed by two more volumes (Heidelberg, 1828–31).
great idea of synthetic a priori judgments (VGPh 3: 337; “psychological” here means ostensibly “empirical psychology,” not the discipline Hegel is trying to reform). The reference to Kant recurs also in the Science of Logic, in the Idea of cognition. There Hegel says that the Kantian representation of the I is no less one-sided than the reflexive categories adopted by pre-Kantian metaphysics. Hegel goes on to oppose to the conception of an I over against objectivity “the genuinely speculative ideas of older philosophers” (WL 2: 489, SL 777). In the next paragraph he simply repeats the phrase but qualifies the reference: Kant “appears all the more meagre and empty when compared with the profounder ideas of ancient philosophy on the conception of the soul or of thinking, as for example the genuinely speculative ideas of Aristotle” (WL 2: 492, SL 778).

Hegel’s praise of Aristotle’s psychological works is repeated the following year in the Heidelberg Encyclopædia. Hegel writes that the couple dunameis-energeia, central for the notion of spirit as self-actualization and development, has nothing to do with the modern representation of the forces and faculties of the soul (ENZ.A §368 A). In the theory of sensation that immediately follows, Aristotle is mentioned as the only possible authority on the subject (ENZ.A §370 A). The praise rises to a panegyric in the Fragment, a few years later: “by and large it is only what Aristotle has written on this part of philosophy that contains a truly speculative development of the being and activity of spirit” (BS 523–4). In the second and third editions of the Encyclopædia (1827, 1830), a sentence identical in content is followed by this programmatic announcement:

Aristotle’s books on the soul, as well as his treatises on its particular sides and conditions,10 are still by far the best or even the sole work of speculative interest on this subject-matter. The essential purpose of a philosophy of spirit can be none other than re-introducing the concept into the cognition of spirit, and so re-interpreting the meaning of these Aristotelian books (ENZ.C §378, my transl.).

The praise could not be more unconditional and explicit. More importantly, it is now explicit in its relevant context, at the opening of Hegel’s own treatment of those themes which he thought had been given unsurpassed philosophical status by Aristotle, from the soul to sensation to thinking. Among the many questions that can be asked

10 Hegel clearly refers to the Parva Naturalia.
about this unusual endorsement, and which this chapter tries to answer, the most important seems to me to be this: how deep is Hegel’s debt to Aristotle in his theory of spirit? Differently stated: on what counts, and why, does Hegel find inspiration in Aristotle? or does he simply recognize the affinity of a like mind about theses he had established independently?

Hegel gave nine lecture courses on the history of philosophy: in Jena (1805/6), in Heidelberg (1816/17 and 1817/18), and in Berlin (1819, 1820/1, 1823/4, 1825/6, 1827/8, and 1829/30). In each of these courses Hegel examined the *De anima* at great length, reading and commenting on his own translation of the Greek text. Hegel read, as we know, the Erasmus edition without taking recourse to the first translation into German, published by M. W. Voigt in Leipzig in 1792. Voigt and Buhle shared the tendency to interpret Aristotle as a precursor to Kant, and the *De anima* as a propaedeutic to the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

Hegel invariably focused in class (compare *VGPh* 199–221 and *J/G* 78–95) on the definition of the soul and its relation to the body (*De an.* I 1, II 1), on the three “faculties” (II 2, 3), on sensation (II 5, 12, III 2), on thinking (III 4–8), and finally on the appetites and the practical intellect (III 9–11). After the appearance of Michelet’s huge epitomizing work, fourteen notebooks of students from the Berlin courses have resurfaced little by little. Today we can say, with Kern, that there are three translations of Chapters 4 and 5 of book III: the first, from the Nürnberg years, is very precise, though in some details it already shows the originality of Hegel’s interpretation. The second translation dates back to the Heidelberg years and is the one read in the *Lectures.* The third translation, that of III 5, was written in Berlin, and it is also incorporated in the *Lectures.* The two latter translations are far less accurate than the first, and in their interpretation of the re-

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13 For example, the *nous chôristheis* of III 5, 430a 22 (“separate”) is translated, just like the *nous chôristos* (430a 17), by “abstract”; *apathês* (III 4, 429b 23) is translated by “von außen nicht bestimmt” (“not determined from without”).
14 Here the translation of *chôristheis* is “in and for itself.” As we see in §7, Heintel (“Der Spekulative Satz,” 1961: 218 n.) is wrong when he writes that Hegel thus rightly interprets the true dialectic of the Aristotelian *nous*.
15 *Dunamei* and *energeiai* are here rendered as respectively “nur an sich” and “an und für sich” (“only in itself,” and “in and for itself”); in Nürnberg the translation was respectively “potentia” or “der Möglichkeit nach,” and “actu”; in Heidelberg “der Möglichkeit nach” and “wirklich.” Compare Kern, “Eine Übersetzung,” 1961: 81.
lation between potential and active intellect reflect more the necessity of the Hegelian system than the letter and spirit of the text.

It is very rare to find such identifications with an author on Hegel’s part, and it is difficult to find another philosophical work for which Hegel showed such deep and constant admiration over the years. Plato’s *Parmenides*, the *Enneads*, Spinoza’s *Ethics*, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*, and Schelling’s early works enjoy either discontinuous or temporary fortune in Hegel’s judgment, if not an ambivalent evaluation in which their depth is countered by serious limitations, reservations, and flaws.

According to Stenzel, the lectures on Aristotle are Hegel’s masterpiece in philosophical historiography. If we look at the secondary literature on Hegel, this seems hardly a shared assessment. Even if analyses of Hegel’s commentary on the *De anima*, though not numerous, are not lacking, it is much more problematic to find in-depth investigations of the real influence exercised by Aristotle on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Until recently, the very few commentators would occasionally recall Aristotle in footnotes without ever showing any interest in or concern for what Hegel finds so speculative and unsurpassed in the *De anima*.

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16 “Hegels Auffassung,” 1931.
17 Kern’s studies (“ Aristoteles,” 1957; “ Eine Übersetzung,” 1961; “ Aristotelesdeutung Hegels,” 1971) are still the necessary starting-point. Weiss’s book (*Hegel’s Critique*) shows a remarkably shallow understanding of both Hegel and Aristotle. Drüe’s critique of Hegel (*Psychologie, 1974*) concludes that Hegel was a “prattophile” (335) who could not accept the duality of life and thought (343).
18 For examples of this tendency see Van der Meulen (“Leib, Seele, Geist,” 1963); Fetscher (*Lehre vom Menschen, 1970: 17 ff.*); Findlay (“Conception of Subjectivity,” 1973), as well as virtually all the papers in *Philosophische Psychologie* (Henrich, ed. 1979); Güssbacher, *Psychologie der Intelligenz* (1988: 15–17, 50–1). Greene’s remarks are approximate and generic (*Soul, 1972*); Sallis’s are more attentive but not very comprehensive, given their restricted scope (“Imagination,” 1987). Allmayer tries to do the opposite of what this chapter tries to argue: in his commentary on the *De anima* he finds Hegelian arguments everywhere, so that it comes as no surprise that *De anima* and *Metaphysics* are basically the same as Hegelian psychology and logic (in *De an.*, 77–8; 82–6). Mure’s book (*Introduction to Hegel, 1940*), unjustly forgotten in my view, often collapses Aristotle and Hegel; his references to the texts are so scarce that when one reads the dialectic of spirit it is hard to tell if he is expounding the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *De anima*, or the *Encyclopædia*. Kozu (*Bedürfnis, 1988: 216–25*) limits himself to mentioning Aristotle along Leibniz with regard to the notion of entelechy.

The situation is recently changing, especially after the two conferences on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit held in Cologne in 1988 and in Marburg in 1989 (see footnote 1 above). Important insights can also be found in the essays by Wiehl (“Wahrnehmungslehre,” 1988) and Chiereghin (“L’eredità greca,” 1989, in German
What Hegel finds in the *De anima* and in the *Parva Naturalia* is the opposite of a metaphysics of the soul which dissociates essence and manifestation. In Hegel’s words, Aristotle has in view “the nature [of the soul] in itself; not its being, but the determinate modes and possibility of its activity” (*VGPh* 198; compare *VGPh* 199). The word here is *Wirksamkeit*, but Hegel uses it interchangeably in the Philosophy of Spirit and in the interpretation of the *De anima* along with *Tätigkeit* (activity) and *Aktuosität* (actuosity). In spirit or the soul, the essence is not apart from its manifestation because it is activity. Activity, let us recall, is the translation of *energeia*; *Wirksamkeit* of *entelecheia*. Hegel has in mind the definition of the soul as the first actuality or entelechy of a natural body potentially possessing life (*De an. II 1, 412a 27–8*).

Aristotle distinguished between a first and a second entelechy; he compared them to science and its exercise (*412a 22–3*), as well as to the living being’s sleeping and waking (*412a 24*), and illustrated this generic definition with the examples of the axe (*412b 12*) and the eye (*412b 20*). Sight, a function and an activity, is the specific form or substance of the eye. Actual seeing is a second actuality, whereas the eye

“Griechische Erbe,” 1991). Wolff’s book (*Körper-Seele*, 1992) finally takes seriously both Hegel’s relation to Aristotle and Hegel’s Anthropology in a thorough way, and should therefore be welcomed as an important addition to the literature. The reasons for my disagreement with Wolff are the following: (1.) According to Wolff, for Hegel nature cannot be an end in itself, thus the teleology of organisms is not actual (“*wirklich*”, 46) but only thought (70–1, 133–4). It seems to me that Wolff fails to distinguish between natural and spiritual subjectivity; he employs the concept “*Selbstzweck*” univocally and is therefore forced to ascribe it genuinely to spirit only. (2.) The consequence is that, notwithstanding Hegel’s protestations to the contrary, (a) subjectivity is not a concept that Aristotle entertained (67), and (b) Aristotle’s finality of organisms is for Hegel a half-truth (133), so that Hegel’s distinction between natural and actual soul is turned against Aristotle’s definition of soul as the “inner end of the natural organism” (142). (3.) Wolff’s translation of the *logos* of sensation in Aristotle (*De an. II 12, 424a 25–8*, where *logos* means a middle, a ratio) as “concept” (*Begriff*, 54, 68) seems to me no less mistaken and Hegelianizing than his understanding of Aristotle’s “common sense” as an activity (173) of centralization or contextualization, analogous to Hegel’s *Erinnerung* (183). (4.) It seems to me that Hegel’s statement that the soul is substance or passive *nous* (*ENZ.C* §389) is neither a “(slightly transformed) quote” from the *De anima* (for it is a massively misguided departure from the theory of passive intellect), nor need it be referred to Aristotle’s theory of *ousia* in the way Wolff does (127). (5.) I would subscribe to the view that Hegel is, like Aristotle, antireductionist, antidualist, and hylemorphic (154); but I would immediately qualify this assertion by adding that this holds in the Anthropology only, up to the particularization of the soul in the I or what Hegel terms, “the victory of the soul over corporeality” (*ENZ.C* §387 Z). Having said that, I would still hold, with Wolff, Feuerbach’s criticism of Hegel to be mistaken; but not because it simply ignores the text (69), but because the dualism is itself a moment that is overcome at the next level, the Psychology. Differently stated, Wolff interprets spirit and the entire Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as natural spirit throughout (ibid.).
taken in itself is matter, such that if the eye were considered apart from its function it would not differ from a painted eye and would not be called such but by homonymy.

Several consequences must be drawn from this. For one thing, this is a *koinotatos logos*, the most comprehensive definition (412a 5–6) which, as Aristotle argues, has two drawbacks: it only gives the “that” and not the “why,” and it neglects what is specific and definitive of each of the kinds of soul. Second, in doing so, Aristotle does admit the possibility of a general definition of the soul. The point of such a definition is that the form must be understood as the form of a body appropriate to it, and that form and matter cannot be conceived as independent of or preexisting one another. Form and matter are mutually relative, in that only together do they constitute an indivisible being, the living individual of which the soul is called the *ousia kata ton logon* (the substance according to the form, 412b 12). For this reason “one need no more ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the impression it receives are one” (412b 6–7, transl. Hett). But, third, not only does Aristotle rephrase the definition of the soul as a causal definition. He also arranges a consecution (*ephexês*, 415a 1) of the three kinds of soul (vegetative, sensitive, and intellective), and writes that “it would be ridiculous to look for the common definition” of soul that would have no reference to each proper and indivisible species (414b 25–8). No soul exists unless specified as a particular kind, just like there is no definition of a rectilinear figure apart from triangle, rectangle, and those that follow (414b 20–3).

The point of this hierarchy, as well as of this general consideration, is that the higher kind contains in itself the lower, and that the lower exists potentially in that which follows. The triangle is the paradigmatic figure; but it is *not a* universal that exists per se and which potentially includes its species; it is rather a species that is absorbed and incorporated in the higher ones. Each soul will have to be investigated in its own terms, for each soul exists as the actuality of its particular potentialities. But each soul, each kind of living being, is related to the others. For example, animals have both the vegetative soul (nutrition and reproduction), which existing in isolation would be characteristic of plants only, and the sensitive soul (sensation, desire, and locomotion). In turn, man is both a plant and an animal, as it were.

Hegel, who expresses himself in these terms (“daß der Mensch auch Tier und Pflanze ist,” VGPh 203), finds it “profound” on Aristotle’s part not to look for the common definition (“das Gemeinschaftliche,” ibid.). He adds that the meaning of the consecution of the three souls, or the
shapes, is that the first is the “truly universal” (ibid.) in that the vegetative soul is potentially or ideally contained in the sensitive soul the way a predicate inheres in a subject (VGPh 204). In this fashion, each form becomes matter for the superior form. Aristotle has rightly considered spirit as “a series of successive determinations” (VGPh 199); his great insight is that the different souls are not to be conceived as independent but as ideal moments, as forms of a functional unity. In light of this principle, the inferior forms of a subject inhere in the activity as sublated moments, predicates of a unique subject. Only thus can the individual be considered a concrete universality.¹⁹

This judgment again appears in Kehler’s and Griesheim’s manuscripts of Hegel’s lectures on the introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit. Hegel dictates to the students a sort of essential glossary of the De anima in Greek (recall that he is not lecturing on ancient philosophy but on his own Philosophy of Spirit), and concludes that in man the three different souls inhere in a unique and identical subject (ENZ.C §378 Z; in PSS 1:10). The soul is the unity of its different functions, an essence whose activity is that of manifesting itself – or, as the “Preliminary conception” put it, an actuosity and not an “ens lacking all process, the way it was regarded in the older metaphysics, which separated a spirit’s inwardness that lacked process from its outwardness” (ENZ.C §34 Z). Actuosity, a rare term found in Suarez and in 16th and 17th-century scholasticism,²⁰ is used by Hegel to imply that spirit is its own manifestation. But this means more precisely that all of spirit’s stages are inherent in, and must be understood as moments of, the core essence of spirit, a nous which is potentially all things. This manifestation is the dialectic of the complementary moments of actualizing the concept in objectivity and of recognizing the concept in all objectivity. This progressive adequation between being and thinking, or, in Hegelian terms, between concept and actuality, is what spirit’s actuosity brings about. It is made possible by the implicit essence of spirit as reason and of reason as identity of subject and object, as well as by the understanding in actuality of the identity of perceiver and perceived, of thinking and thought, which Hegel finds in the De anima.

Every time Hegel mentions Aristotelian sensation he comments on

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¹⁹ See Rosenkranz, Erläuterungen (1870: 85). Hamelin (Système, 1920: 371) and Mure (Introduction to Hegel, 1940: ch. 4) share the view that the idea of natural hierarchy comes most to the fore in the De anima.

²⁰ Compare pp. 405–6 below.
the slovenliness of Tennemann, who sees in Aristotle a Lockean empiricism, an assessment based on the metaphor of the wax and the signet ring (De an. II 12, 424a 19–20). Hegel objects that Aristotle does not mean that thought comes from without. He means that the soul is receptive of forms, and that its activity is that of becoming all forms. Differently stated, the soul determines itself to what it is, and this involves a passive and an active side. This is for him a deep understanding of subjectivity. In the “Fragment” he writes that the soul is at first abstract; this ideal space is therefore still indeterminate and empty – it is the tabula rasa which first has to be filled, and which as abstract ideality may at the same time be said to be absolutely receptive. However, this filling certainly does not take place through so-called impressions from without in the way that a signet impresses images on wax. That which can come into existence in spirit can only do so in that spirit self-determiningly posits it within itself (BS 544–5, my transl.).

The soul is ideality inasmuch as it is the encompassing and thoroughgoing unity of its moments. “The self-feeling of the living unity of spirit is itself opposed to its being split up into what are presented as different and mutually independent faculties,” writes Hegel in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit (ENZ.C §379). In spirit, unlike nature, the particular stages of development do not remain behind as concrete existences; rather, they are as moments, “so that what is higher already shows itself to be empirically present in a lower and more abstract determination, all higher spirituality, for example, being already in evidence as content or determinateness within sensation” (ENZ.C §380).

This unity of subjectivity, from its most immediate to its more mediate forms, is what Hegel reads in the De anima and which he opposes to modern views of subjectivity. This opposition to Lockean empiricism must be precisely understood. Hegel is in many details of his treatment of subjective spirit deeply influenced by the 18th-century empirical psychology, especially by the French sensualism and the Wolffian school. What he protests is the fragmentation of the subject into various faculties or forces and the juxtaposition of different stages lacking the negative activity of transformation. For example, Condillac deserves credit for his attempt at understanding “the unity of spirit’s multifarious modes of activity” (ENZ.C §442 A). Hegel agrees that the sensible must be taken as the initial foundation. His reservation is that Condillac treats the further determinations as proceeding forth “from this starting
point in a merely affirmative manner, that which is negative in the activity of spirit, that whereby this material is spiritualized and its sensuousness sublated, being misconstrued and overlooked” (ibid.). What Condillac overlooks is that spirit is not simply receptive but active in its receptivity, and that “in the feeling, volition, and thought of man there is only one reason” (ENZ.C §471 A).

For Hegel “everything is in sensation; one might also say that it is in sensation that everything emerging into spiritual consciousness and reason has its source and origin” (ENZ.C §400 A). I believe Hegel would have agreed with Kant’s principle that all our knowledge begins with experience, but not all knowledge arises out of experience (KrV A 1/B 1), or with Leibniz’s corrected motto “nihil in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse” (nothing is in the intellect which has not been in the senses). But when he comments on this motto in the Introduction to the Encyclopædia (ENZ.C §8 A), where he writes that “nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu” (nothing is in the senses which has not been in the intellect) is the complementary truth of the old dictum, he means that what is experienced even at the most elementary level is actually ultimately the nous itself as the principle of the world. This shows that Aristotle is praised because he understood the soul as an indivisible unity that lives, feels, remembers, thinks, and wills, and in which the superior is implicitly present in the inferior, the nous in the lowest functions. Hegel understands this as the negativity of subjectivity which idealizes its inferior moments in its progression, so that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit appropriates the structure of the De anima, which progresses from the soul’s immediate unity with nature to sensation, from the inwardization of experience to thinking and practical will.

What it admittedly cannot correspond to is the phenomenological level, spirit’s awakening into a particular consciousness (ENZ.C §413–§439). This level is identified by Hegel as that of modern philosophy from Descartes to Fichte, which conceives of spirit as the relation to something subsistent (ENZ.A §332 A, ENZ.C §415 A). This is a position of thought toward objectivity which the Greeks would not find familiar, since for them the opposition of thinking and being had not yet reached this fixed reality. For them “the soul still had the more indeterminate meaning of spirituality” (ENZ.A §321 A). Obviously, the translation of the De anima as mentioned in the motto at the opening of this chapter is not just a passive rendering of something true once and for all, for what it involves is no less than the judgment Hegel found lacking in his contemporaries, and a systematization of what Aristotle saw
with “exactness and profundity” (VGPh 199). We must now examine how original this systematization purports to be.

§3. A Critical Evaluation of Hegel’s Endorsement

When Hegel writes that one determination is the truth of another, he means that even though the former may be the first for us and a starting point, the latter turns out to be the first in itself, that which has been active all along in the determination of the former. By reducing the former to its moment, by subordinating it to its activity, the latter emerges not just as one relatum of a relationship, but as the whole of it. That spirit is the truth of nature means that spirit must rise from its tie with nature to realize that the nature it knows is nothing but the Idea in its otherness. In such pairs of opposites, the superior form severs its ties with the inferior, eventually mastering it.

A similar result holds in the case of the soul and the body. For Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body; but Aristotle never draws the conclusion that it is the whole or the truth of the body. As we see in Chapter 2, the “psychology” is not the first part of the Philosophy of Spirit, as Hegel interprets it, but the culmination of natural philosophy. It is the task of the natural philosopher to investigate the soul (tou phusikou to theóresai peri psuchês, De an. I 1, 403a 28), because the affections of the soul are inseparable from the body or forms-in-matter (logoi enuloi, 403a 25–6). If in nature forms only exist in matter, then when the pre-Socratic materialist and the dialectician give their respective definitions of the soul and its affections, that is, by accounting for the matter or for the end (403a 1–7), they err because they cannot account for the unity of both, as does the natural philosopher envisaged by Aristotle (403a 8–9).

The only exception to this natural investigation has to do with that which is separable, and which falls within the territory of the first philosopher (hêi de kechôrismena, ho prôtos philosophos, 403 b 15–16). By this Aristotle means the nous, which is not necessarily the form of an organic body but can exist separately. The very important consequence of this is that the investigation of man is part and parcel of the philosophy of nature, thus man is not something apart from it but lives in it as its element. In other words, only thinking is above natural life for Aristotle and distinguishes man from brutes.

Hegel appears to be saying the same – reason is man’s prerogative and excellence. But this is because for Hegel thinking pervades the lower forms of spirituality (recall the meaning of thinking for Hegel elucidated
in Chapter 2, §2.3). What spirituality means in this context is the progressive overcoming and self-affirmation of form over matter. As we will see in the next section, this overcoming begins already in the Anthropology. This principle guides Hegel’s reading of the Aristotelian soul. Teleology begins losing its hylemorphic character when Hegel interprets the living being’s activity as a reduction of otherness to a means for its actualization. He translates 412b 10–11 with the following phrase: “the soul is substance, but substance only according to the concept (kata ton logon); or the form, the concept is here the being itself, this substance itself” (VGPh 201). The Greek text, significantly, lacks the adverb “only.” Hegel had just argued that “matter does not exist here as matter, it is only in itself” (VGPh 200). The inseparability of soul and body is an “identity [which] can only be grasped as such entelechy – our Idea” (VGPh 201). What this means is that this inseparability of soul and body is the Concept’s activity of maintaining itself by reducing reality to its means. The concept is both principle and end, that which returns to itself from nature. The soul, which for Aristotle was the principle of motion, the end and form of the body (II 4, 415b 10–12), is the “existing concept of what is potentially,” or the “active form; hulê is only potentially, not truly a substance. This is a truly speculative concept” (VGPh 202).

Here is Hegel’s first important departure from Aristotle. In the De anima the form is always the function of an organic being; it cannot be understood as a concept idealizing matter. For Hegel “spirit is the existent truth of matter, the truth that matter itself has no truth” (ENZ C 254: 8).

21 “Unity is a totally indeterminate expression; the identity is a totally abstract, hence superficial and empty determination. The essential being is the actuality, activity [Wirk- samkeit], and this is the entelechy” (J/G 80).

22 See also Kern, “Aristotelesdeutung” (1971: 256) and Dubarle, “La nature” (1975: 30).

23 However one understands the fact that the body has the soul as its end (for example, De part. anim. I 5, 645b 20), matter cannot be understood as the pre-existing substrate of a form which can also exist independently. If taken in these terms, matter and form cannot clearly help in the definition of the living being; the objections raised by Dörrie (“Gedanken”, 1961), Ackrill (“Aristotle’s Definitions,” 1972), and especially Cherniss (Aristotle’s Criticism, 1944: 326–40) would be fatal. To speak of the transition from an instrumental to a hylemorphic conception (as does Nuyens, L’évolution, 1948), or of two different and potentially conflicting versions, the former more biological, the latter more attentive to the problems of tradition (as does Düring, Aristoteles, 1966), while being an interesting suggestion in itself, does not greatly help in resolving the peculiar relation between form and matter in Aristotle’s definition of the soul.

Aristotle’s famous hesitation (“it is not clear whether the soul is the entelechy of a body as the sailor is the entelechy of a ship,” De an. II 1, 413a 8–9), though embedded in a hylemorphic discussion, will be exploited by Neoplatonic commentators centuries later to show Aristotle’s “Platonism.” Simplicius will be quite explicit in taking it to mean that the soul uses the body as an instrument (in De an., 96).
§389 A). The soul is the only truth of nature. This is tantamount to moving the demarcating line between man and nature from the *nous* to the Anthropology. In other words, the life of spirit still immersed in naturality is understood already in all its manifestations as the effort towards an awakening as consciousness and returning to itself. Already the Anthropology shows how spirit progressively affirms itself over corporeality and reveals itself to itself even in its most natural modes. The Anthropology is pervaded by the same inseparability of soul and body that Hegel finds in Aristotle; but the soul that eventually reduces corporeality to its means is itself an instrumental stage in spirit’s separation from nature, its rise above it, and the superior profundity of its life.

For neither Aristotle nor Hegel does an isolated consideration of the forms of sensing, knowing, and desiring make sense. But while for Aristotle such forms must be expounded as proper to the nature of the living being, within an investigation itself closer to the medical-naturalistic than to the religious (Orphic or otherwise) tradition, for Hegel these forms cannot be understood apart from the metaphysics of free spirit and thought thinking itself. As a result, the *De anima*, which for Aristotle is the culmination of the philosophy of nature from which the chapters on *nous* alone are excluded, is integrated by Hegel into a Philosophy of Spirit understood in light of the superiority of spirit over nature. As we have seen in Chapter 2, this allows him to treat unitarily, both in the *Lectures* and in the discussion of the Aristotelian points in the Philosophy of Spirit, themes and works which for Aristotle could not be considered homogeneous: *De anima*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, and *Politics* (not to mention *De anima* with *Metaphysics*).

Obviously Hegel does not mean that Aristotle knows the phenomenological scission into which consciousness must wade in order to vanquish its essence objectified in history, and thus attain to the absoluteness of spirit in art, religion, and philosophy; nor does he say that for Aristotle the soul must win over corporeality to make itself I. But he thinks he can reconcile Aristotle’s notion of entelechy with his own concept of spirit as self-finitization of *nous*. As a consequence, he sets himself the task of expounding spirit as entelechy and actuosity (*BS* 528) and of considering “the concept of spirit in its immanent, necessary development from out of itself into a system of its activity” (*BS* 524, my transl.). This is coupled with the revitalization of Aristotelian *dunamis* and *energeia* (*ENZ.A* §361; §368 A, *ENZ.C* §383).24

24 Hegel’s interpretation of spirit and of the Aristotelian soul as actuosity also determines his attitude toward the works of his contemporaries. In Hegel’s comments, one is often
If spirit is its own manifestation and ascent to its own essence, then obviously its essence is implicitly present in all of its manifestations. Positing an “I-think” as the condition of all knowledge and activity would be one-sided; but if we can show that something similar, such as a subject’s self-relating activity, is a foundation operative in all moments of spirit, including its apparently most heterodetermined stages, then subjectivity’s self-relation is a result and at the same time the truth of the process – that which gave rise to it in the first place. Nous’s identity with the object of thought is precisely this truth that communicates itself to all lower stages.

Lest this be misunderstood, let me be as precise as I can be on three points: (a) the notion that a form is matter for a superior form, (b) spirit’s self-knowledge, (c) Hegel’s relation to Kant.

§ 3.1. The Hierarchy of Souls. It was Themistius who first emphasized in his paraphrasis of the De anima (in De an., 100) that in man the three Aristotelian souls are hierarchically arranged, and that each is matter to the soul superior to it.

The disposition of the kinds of soul in a hierarchy of comprehensive globalization is a principle whose traces could be found in Aristotle. However, it is only later turned into the principle that the higher determines the lower by Plotinus. For Plotinus, each term of the series is generated by its higher source, which in turn does not disperse itself in

reminded of the dialectic-refutational part of the De anima (book I). We must be clear about the meaning of actuosity, Hegel argues. In this respect, it makes no difference if Stiedenroth also calls “activity” what he otherwise persists in treating as a bunch of isolated faculties and forces (BSH 569–70). Fichte, on the other hand, also used this terminology, but without profiting from its fundamental truth, for he considered spirit only as relation to alterity without achieving the notion of an entelechy of spirit in and for itself (ENZ.A §332 A. and ENZ.C §415 A; see also §445 A). As Aristotle showed the vacuity of the definition of the soul as harmony advanced by the Pythagorean Philolaos (De an. I 1, 408a 1), Hegel thinks that Beneke, who chats of a “harmonic context” of psychical attitudes without grounding its possibility, simply expresses a Sollen and recurs to “empty figures of speech” (BS 520; compare ENZ.C §378 Z). When Hegel laments that the union of body and soul (that is, life) has always been an incomprehensible fact, because the opposites were conceived at the outset as independent, he criticizes modern philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz for not considering matter as an externality which is an ideal moment of the soul, devoid of truth in itself (ENZ.C §389, A). Erdmann, in his Leib und Seele (Halle 1837, 2nd ed. 1849), repeats the opening paragraphs of the Philosophy of Spirit almost verbatim, save in his conclusion about theism, and in the explicit references to Aristotle. In Erdmann’s view, Aristotle understood the soul as the very activity of uniting the body, the principle responsible for turning a multiplicity of limbs into an organism. Cf. Guzzo-Barone, Anima (1954: 224–8).
what comes after (Enn. V 2, 2; V 1, 6; II 4, 5). In Plotinus’s example, science does not cease to exist, nor is it in any way affected because of the bare fact of being known by a learned man: the intelligible, as it were, is not an intelligible which alters when it alteration finds (IV 9, 5; VI, 5, 10). The soul receives light from the intellect as the intellect receives light from the One (II 9, 3; IV 3, 17; V 3, 9).25

This procession or emanation is deprived of any supernatural-mystical slant by Hegel, and of course of any transcendence, and turned into the principle for the interpretation of Aristotle and for the theory of spirit. Spirit raises its lower nature to a moment in its knowledge of itself.

§3.2. Know Thyself. But this self-knowledge, the absolute commandment, is not just the motto of the Delphic oracle. Hegel is adamant on the limitations of the Greek spirit. The Greeks knew spirit in its freedom within nature (BS 527), but not yet as relation to the infinite spirit. Only Christianity and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit present in the community of believers make it possible for spirit to know itself as absolute and infinite, and, hence, of making itself thus in history (ENZ.C §377: §552 A). This is the superiority of the modern principle, that freedom is universal and inwardized as an absolute core in each individual, which we see in Chapter 1 – and for this reason Hegel takes spirit as a deeper principle than either Aristotle’s soul or intellect. At the same time, Hegel takes the Delphic Apollo’s motto as being induced by spirit’s own law; that “spirit recognizes itself in all that is” (ENZ.C §377 Z) is the meaning of the Greek commandment.

Hegel is certainly right that “know thyself” means neither romantic introspection of the recesses of the heart nor a reference to an interiority detached from and opposed to an external world.26 But he passes over what is most crucial about the Delphic motto, the Apollinean invitation to moderation and to remain within the limits of humanity. “Know thyself” means “know your measure.” The shunning of hubris implicit in the motto is just the opposite of what Hegel claims about the divinity of spirit. Further, in the Platonic dialogues Socrates is not look-

25 Compare §7 below.
26 Thus he distances himself from the contemporary understanding of it as suggesting private self-observation, something which we can find in Fichte’s First Introduction to the Doctrine of Science (W 1: 422) or in Moritz’s journal, to which both Maimon and Mendelssohn contributed, Magazin für Erfahrungseeelenkunde (1783-93), and which adopted it as its own motto. If anything, he is rather closer to Rousseau’s opening remark in the Preface to the second Discourse, according to which the Delphic motto is the most important precept, though man’s self-knowledge is the least advanced.
ing for the universality of the soul, for there is nothing like an idea, or universal structure, of the soul to begin with. What Socrates strives to know is himself as a particular person.27

In Aristotle’s case the knowledge of the soul is not the knowledge of spirituality either. And when Hegel simply seems to repeat Aristotle’s point when he says that the knowledge that spirit has of itself is of the highest and most difficult kind (ENZ.C §377; compare tôn chalepótatón, De an. I 1, 402a 11), he is actually taking an entirely different turn. The reason for the difficulty in the knowledge of the soul in Aristotle is not the reflexivity of spirit and its acquaintance with the “sublimest” (as Petry translates höchste) things in the soul’s knowledge of itself, but rather the intricate problem of the relation between affections and the soul, between form and matter. Aristotle’s naturalistic approach implies the same absence of opposition between physical and psychical (hence the opposite of what modernity from Descartes on has emphasized), which we find in Hegel. But this is rooted for Aristotle in the soul being a natural thing, which is known like any other natural thing, as a form-in-matter.

Hegel seems to share with Aristotle, if I am allowed the anachronism, a resolute anti-Cartesianism. Neither looks for an indubitable Archimedean point in which to find mental contents and out of which to derive all knowledge. The soul or spirit is not a mind or a solipsistic consciousness in which everything thematic, from sensations to God, becomes a homogeneous realm of all mental contents whatever.28 Ontology, metaphysics, or logic are not grounded in a generalized method treating all things equally as concepts: for neither Hegel nor Aristotle are they relative to epistemology.

However, while for Hegel metaphysics is a logic or theory of thought, for Aristotle thought simply expresses (or fails to express) the way things are. Hegel is actually unaware of the immense divide between his starting point and Aristotle’s. His interpretation of the self-knowledge or reflexivity of the soul and the intellect knowing itself bears witness to this negligence, as we see in §7, the section on the nous.


I would be the last to deny the importance of reflexivity in Aristotle. But I find it very telling that it arises as a problem at different stages – perception of perception, thought thinking itself, one’s practical relation to oneself in friendship – and not at the fundamental core of the definition of the soul as a self-grounding phenomenon. Unlike in Kant, for whom reason is both the appointed judge and the judged in a tribunal, in Aristotle the knowledge of the soul contains no reference to the judge. Aristotle does not begin with a consciousness of something; cognition is always directed to things, and only indirectly to itself. And even when we do have knowledge of ourselves or of our cognition, the knowledge is a cognition in and through the thing, such that – as we see in the section on the *nous* – it is very hard to tell just what we are knowing when we know ourselves. Knowledge is subordinate to, and silent before, the revelation of things, which are never mediated by us and our modes of cognition. Our access to them is unmediated and direct. “We let the things speak for themselves,” as Owens puts it. For Hegel, on the contrary, things speak insofar as they are our possession, insofar as we have idealized them; even so, they are dumb and do not speak, for we name them.

§ 3.3. *Theoretical Spirit and Kant.* It seems to me that the reason why Hegel is insensitive to this problem is that he takes for granted Kant’s so-called Copernican revolution even as he reads Aristotle. For Hegel the transformation of the original synthetic unity of apperception (or I-think) at the hands of Fichte and Schelling is the irreversible turning point and new foundation of his age. Hegel, whose task is that of accelerating this transformation by eschewing the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte, is the first to obscure this fact: his criticisms often seem to equate Kant with those of Kant’s followers who take his philosophy as a cushion for the indolence of thought. The I-think must be understood as spirit or absolute self-consciousness, not as a finite presupposition. As it accompanied (or was capable of accompanying) all representations in Kant, so in Hegel *it must pervade all of spirit’s life as a thoroughgoing all-subordinating unity.* But this is only possible if we develop the I from its concept.

While for Hegel Aristotle showed (in *De an.* III 4, 8) the interconnection of all of the soul’s *dunameis* (powers), Kant’s trouble is that he

29 *Doctrine of Being* (1951: 131).
fails precisely on this point. He does not proceed from sensibility to un-
derstanding to reason (let alone to will) in any unitary and develop-
mental way. Instead, he takes faculties as immediately given from rep-
resentation and proceeds psychologically (again in the sense of em-
pirical psychology: VGPh 3: 339). He presupposes, in other words, a
scission of the sources of knowledge and separates abstractly the pure
understanding, the empty I, from the manifold of intuition. Kant
thinks the I as consciousness, as the relation to a transcendental object.
The I-think is always an I-think something; consciousness is always con-
sciousness of an object. But the relation between an object and con-
sciousness is an original, irreducible, and unproven assumption. But if
so, then the foundation is formal, in that the in itself is only synthesized
as appearance and not known in its truth. And it is empirical, in that the
transcendental subject is a postulate and the intellectual categories uni-
fying the manifold of intuition are assumed lemmatically from formal
logic, rather than being deduced from the unity of self-consciousness.

For Hegel categories are not originally given in a table but must be
exhibited in the movement of their self-constitution. Thus in the Logic,
being and essence must be presupposed as preceding the concept; in
the Psychology, the rise out of nature must be presupposed as prece-
ding reason if the Kantian problem of a priori judgments is to be trans-
formed into that of spirit’s production of its self-knowledge. The guar-
antee of our a priori concepts that refer to objects of possible
experience is not acquired through a transcendental deduction, but
through the identity of subject and object in the Logic, and in the Psy-
chology through the identity of reason with its natural subjectivity. In
other words, for Hegel subjectivity must not be ascribed from the out-
set to an I-think but must be shown as spirit’s self-constituting process,
as the self-determination that first begins to dawn in organic life. This
is the natural substance and the psychophysical presupposition for con-
sciousness, which can be identity with the object because the object is
a moment of subjectivity.

In the Introduction to the Psychology, in an only slightly less conde-
scending tone than his reminder that we learn to swim only by swim-

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30 We should protest that actually Kant does not presuppose the scission but proves it
against Leibniz, based on the thesis of the irreducible difference between intuition and
concepts. Whether the essay on the regions of space is a successful proof and whether
Kant has managed to separate the two sources adequately in the first Critique goes defi-
nitely beyond our task here, as does a detailed discussion of Hegel’s critique of Kant.
ming, Hegel writes that if we ask the question of the possibility of knowing we imply that

it is possible to will the exercise or cessation of knowing. The concept of knowledge has yielded itself as intelligence itself, as the certainty of reason; the actuality of intelligence is now knowledge itself. It follows from this that it would be absurd (ungereimt) to speak about intelligence and at the same time of the possibility or arbitrariness of knowledge. However, knowledge is truly knowledge precisely insofar as intelligence actualizes it, i.e., posits for itself the concept of knowledge (ENZ.C§445 A, my transl.).

For Kant this would be to confuse condition and conditioned. The I-think is the ratio cognoscendi of all appearances, including my own. But Hegel’s point is not simply epistemological even in the Psychology. The subject is being, and we can know being because it is subject. Therefore we cannot begin by positing a pure I and separating empirical and a priori.31

Kant writes that I cannot know the I-think the way I know objects because that would be circular. He distinguishes the active from the passive I and argues that the subject of categories cannot be at the same time the object of categories (KrV B 131–5, 406–26). For Hegel, Kant is following ordinary representation, conceiving the I as a sensible existence (WL 2: 491, SL 778). It is very blind on his part, argues Hegel, to call the circle of the I an inconvenience: this circle is the concrete existence of absolute self-reference, the unity of itself and its other. “The I thinks something, itself or something else. This inseparability of the two forms in which it opposes itself to itself belongs to the innermost nature of its notion and of the notion itself” (ibid.).

Hegel thinks that Kant has not developed a theory of speculative knowledge that would account for the relation between the consciousness of objectivity and the nature of subjectivity on the one hand, and thought thinking itself on the other. Kant’s I is doomed to remain abstract, finite and one-sided. The I must be understood as a process of self-actualization, not as a fixed subjective pole. Then, however, the consciousness of objectivity must be understood as one moment in the self-determination of living subjectivity, not as the truth of all thinking.

§4. The Anthropology and Hegel’s Treatment of Aristotelian Sleep, Sensation, and Habit

§4.1. Introduction. If spirit must not be presupposed as a fixed substrate of its properties or representations but must be conceived as the subject of its own development, then the most important issue to face in this theory is the relation between givenness and production, between passivity and activity, or the passivity and naturality of spirit. The thrust behind the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is spirit’s turning its passivity into its activity; this is what liberation means for Hegel, the passage from contingency and external necessity to freedom, from finding oneself determined to determining oneself. This liberation is not a liberation from nature but from our dependence on its immediacy and externality.

But if spirit must first arise from nature, how can it become master of itself? How can the body become a “sign” of the soul (ENZ.C §411)?

The Anthropology is the crucial link between and transition from spirit’s dependence on nature and its freedom from it. Here spirit learns to subordinate nature to its will. It particularizes its natural endowments into instruments it uses for rational purposes; it educates itself in and through its body.

We are subject to our natural qualitative determinations. We live in sympathy with nature; we have feelings, we are immersed in the cycles of seasons, in our geographical regions and climates; we experience sleeping and waking and the alternation of day and night; we are determined by the stages of life, our race, etc. But this dependence decreases as we become adults and gain command over our bodies. Goethe’s dictum that, after 30, one is responsible for one’s face, or Orwell’s similar remark that at 50 we have the face we deserve, expresses this thought well. Clearly, we never entirely master nature; but according to Hegel we do shape nature in view to our ends, and thereby can abstract from it. We train our senses, our gestures, and upright posture; we develop a feeling of ourselves in and through our bodies. This process is pre-reflexive and habitual, and it ensues in an inadvertent possession which is actually the result of a long appropriation become unwitting through habituation.

The soul educates the body into a second nature. Body and soul are not in conflict; reason does not curb or suppress natural qualities, in-
stincts, and passions. Rather, the soul spiritualizes the body and shapes it into psychophysical capacities instrumental to a proper integration and adjustment to the natural and social environment. The formation of a human being, from its perceptive and motor abilities to its social interactive skills, is the starting point for the subsequent individualization of spirit and its objectification in history (for the rest of subjective spirit and for objective spirit). The Anthropology is crucial for the subsequent sections just because it shows that all of man’s natural determinations are coherently pervaded, to varying degrees of success,\textsuperscript{32} by spirit’s pre-reflexive will.

The body progressively becomes the object of the will. There is no cleavage between nature and civilization, between corporeality and spirit, because man’s nature has always already been subjected to man’s habituation towards integration, adaptation, and self-control. There is no Nietzschean “reason of the body” without an appropriation of the body on the part of the soul. Through this appropriation, the psychophysical life becomes an object of consciousness; and this is a negation of or break with nature as well as a shaping of it. The telos of the Anthropology is the production of consciousness in which psychophysical states are transformed into a deliberate pattern of behavior towards self and otherness. But in order to turn passivity into activity and to become conscious of its nature, spirit must first be able to influence its nature spontaneously and pre-reflexively. Differently stated, preintentional and preconscious psychophysical states are to be understood as expressions of spirituality, not just as natural states. Accordingly, the I, explicit consciousness, is not a starting point, but a further stage of subjectivity supervenient upon a well-functioning, teleologically shaped body.

The soul is the middle and tie between corporeality and spirit, be-

\textsuperscript{32} Madness, like disease in the philosophy of the organism, is the reification (\textit{Beharren, ENZ.C} §408) of one part of the whole in opposition to it, the lack of integration of a part or contradiction between the harmonious whole and the estranged part which the subject cannot subsume or work up into ideality, and which thus disrupts internal order. Based on Pinel’s research, Hegel understands madness not as the destruction and irretrievability of reason, but as the wound which the psychiatrist must thematize, in cooperation with the patient’s will, in order to heal. Obviously modern psychiatry’s novelty is that it appropriates this conception of spirit – of the patient as a partially or temporarily incapacitated subject (\textit{ENZ.C} §408, A).

This is, incidentally, quite different from Aristotle’s description of lunacy as the inability to distinguish between \textit{eikôn} and \textit{phantasma}, copy and image, in the \textit{De memoria} (451a 8–11). Even though Hegel does not say this, to him the treatment of the patient as a subject should be another occurrence of the modern principle of subjectivity as proper to all individuals.
tween the substantiality of nature and a full-blown subjectivity. In the animal, the soul is not for the soul, that is, the animal cannot distinguish in itself the genus from singularity. Man, instead, can differentiate himself qua singular from himself qua universal (BS 544). For man, stimuli, sensation, or excitation are particulars or idealities that can be subordinated and overcome in the whole of psychic life; they do not occupy the entire soul as they do in animals (ENZ. C §381 Z). The most relevant consequence of this is that there is a difference between the physiological and the psychophysical aspects of natural life, between sensation and feeling, and that “soul” strictly speaking is human only. While the animal organism has sensation as a physiological expression of a life-process through which the genus perpetuates itself, man, who shares in animal life, also experiences the next level of an embodiment of spirituality.

To what degree has the Anthropology a broadly Aristotelian inspiration? To be sure, in the Anthropology Hegel discusses most of the developments of contemporary research in medicine, physiology, and anthropology, not to mention the empirical psychology of the Schulphilosophie and of post-Kantian philosophy (especially the Schellingian school); he elaborates on the subject matter of his time and reflects most of the preoccupations and interests of his contemporaries. And when he writes that the soul is the potential locus of the whole world or a featureless “mine” (ENZ. C §403 A), he may well have more in mind the Leibnizian monad than the Aristotelian soul. Besides, what he means by soul is not coextensive with the Aristotelian psuchê, which was the principle of life and animation of plants and animals, no less than of man. Hegelian soul has the narrower scope of psychic functions indissolubly intertwined with human bodily manifestations. Yet it seems to me that the general inspiration of these paragraphs owes a great deal to Aristotle. In order to show the relevance of the Parva Naturalia and De anima on these sections, I will concentrate on Hegel’s notions of (a) sleep, (b) sensation, and (c) habit.

33 Compare the extensive notes collected by Petry in the second volume of PSS. I wholly disagree with Petry when he writes that the Aristotelian soul means simply physical animation and therefore has little to do with the Anthropology (PSS 1: lli; 2: 431).

34 For a connection between the monadology and Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, compare ENZ. C §403 A; Tuschling, “Die Idee” (1991: 557 ff.) See also Baum, “Seele und Geist” (1991: 61). Given what Hegel says about the monad’s lack of passivity and interaction with the world (for example, J/G 84), I doubt this notion is strictly Leibnizian.
§4.2. Sleep. Many details in Hegel’s Anthropology should strike the reader as more or less direct references to Aristotle. \footnote{For example, when Hegel calls for a discipline to study the embodiment of spiritual determinations (ENZ.C §401 A), he mentions the examples of rage, courage, and affections. The Hegelian anthropologist, who shuns both empirical and metaphysical approaches, should revitalize the procedure adopted by Aristotle, who wrote that rage could be seen in two opposite, equally defective ways, that is, by the dialectician unconcerned with matter and by the pre-Socratic physicist unconcerned with intentions. Rather, he should see passions in light of corporeization (Verleiblichung) or embodiment of spirituality. These passions are mostly the same as those discussed by Aristotle (De an. I 1, 403a 16–19, 29–403b 2 on rage). Another example is Hegel’s treatment of the five senses (ENZ.C §401, Z, De an. II 7–11).} Hegel quotes Aristotle only once in the Anthropology, when he writes that the soul is the \textit{substance,} i.e., the absolute foundation of all particularization and singularization of spirit, so that spirit has within it all the material of its determination, and it remains the pervading identical ideality of this determination. In this still abstract determination it is however only the \textit{sleep} of spirit; – the \textit{passive nous} of Aristotle, which is all things according to \textit{possibility}. (ENZ.C §389, transl. Petry, modified)

This passage is important in several respects. First, this reference to Aristotle, more explicit and circumscribed than in the Heidelberg Encyclopædia which only speaks of “the \textit{nous} of the ancients” (ENZ.A §311), reflects Hegel’s renewed reading and confrontation with Aristotle in the early 1820s, which the focus and preoccupations of the Fragment makes clearly visible. \footnote{As we see in the following pages, in the Heidelberg Encyclopædia Hegel explicitly refers to Aristotle in his discussion of sensation. It seems to me that the Fragment and the second and third editions of the Encyclopædia pursue in greater depth themes that Hegel has already begun spelling out in his Nürnberg and Heidelberg years. About the evolution of Hegel’s thought on the part which he entitles Anthropology as of 1827, see Chiereghin, “Griechische Erbe” (1991).} Yet the reference is merely instrumental and elucidatory: its purpose is not a direct discussion of the \textit{De anima} but the use of its third book and the potential intellect for exemplification. Second, I think the reference is intended to remind us that the soul is not \textit{sic et simpliciter} sleep, but \textit{spirit’s sleep} – that is, the soul is the material and disposition for spirit as the passive \textit{nous} is the potentiality or matter for thinking proper. Third, the words in the first half of the quote should suffice to counter the critique later leveled by Feuerbach against Hegel: we never can suppress our anthropological nature, our finitude. Thought can abstract from it; not because the concept is the end result
of a process of abstraction, but rather because thought lowers itself to the point of being present and active everywhere – even in sleep.\footnote{Thinking in general is so inherent in the nature of man, that he is always thinking, even in sleep. Thinking remains the basis of spirit in all its forms, in feeling and intuition as well as in representation” (\textit{ENZ.C}§398 Z). Hegel inverts Aristotle’s priority of sensation as the basis for all of the soul’s activities, as we see more clearly below.}

Fourth, since everything, including the highest contents, is sensed and felt and shapes our body’s relation to the environment and external world, the soul contains potentially in itself all that is later developed in a complete and objective form. The complete and objective form of finite activities and products stands to the potentiality of the soul as the state of being awake stands to sleep. What is insensitively or implicitly present in the soul is isolated and brought to light by the specific intentionality of consciousness.

The crucial difference is that between possession and exercise; or, in Aristotelian terms, between first and second actuality. When Aristotle establishes this difference, he writes that first actuality is “analogous to the possession of knowledge; for both sleep and waking depend upon the presence of the soul, and waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep to its possession but not its exercise” (\textit{De an.} II 1, 412a 23–6). The end is the exercise of a potentiality, not the possession of it; unlike in incomplete movements, rest is not the end and final meaning of a process merely instrumental to its attainment. For the soul is the beginning and end of its processes, and its activities, complete at every moment of their temporal duration, are not directed at outcomes external to them.

For Hegel, rest is instrumental to wakefulness, that is, to the exercise of self-conscious, rational, intentional activities. The relation of sleep and being awake obtains both in the relation between soul and spirit (spirit possesses itself in and as the soul) and within the soul itself (spirit in its naturalness). In the latter relation the soul considers its state of sleep as one state confronting another, that of being awake. But the two alternating states are not on a par: sleep serves actually to strengthen spirit’s activity (\textit{Bekräftigung, ENZ.C}§398), which is its end. Hegel calls this waking of the soul the differentiation of individuality, which is now for-itself (ibid.). Sleep, in turn, is the “withdrawal from the world of determinateness, from the diversion of becoming fixed in singularities, into the universal essence of subjectivity”. In this withdrawal from determinateness, representations live a life of their own and are unconnected.
with reality. In sleep, spirit stops being directed outside of itself; the soul differentiates itself neither from the world nor in itself (ENZ.C §398 Z). Besides, in dreams we have presentations or re-presentations that we do not differentiate from reality, so that the faint or small perception, if I may use a Leibnizian term here, of a door slamming may initiate a dream involving a robbery (ibid.).

One is struck by the virtually literal adoption of Aristotelian vocabulary in this section and in its Addition.

Rest is necessary and beneficial for waking life, which is the end of animal life, writes Aristotle (De insomn. 455b 20–5). Sleep is a “natural recession inwards” (ibid., 457b 2–3). It is also a suspension or immobilization not of sensation altogether (454b 26–7), but of the sense of touch, which guarantees contact with the world to all animals. (Touch is the most fundamental sense for Aristotle because no animal can live without it; 455a 4–b 13.) In other words, all senses are directed inward and there is no longer a distinction between inner and outer. In sleep we thus have images or phantoms appearing before the sleeper, where the sleeper is under the impression that they are copies of real things (De insomn. 461b 29); in sleep, imagination, which is a movement resulting from sensation, runs unfettered and without check, so that when one hears a faint echo in one’s ear one dreams of thundering (De divinat. 463a 13–16).38

Hegel is not only interested in the physiological conditions for sleep and dreams. He also shares with Aristotle a teleological interpretation of sleep that he incorporates in his theory of the soul at large: sleep is a passive moment instrumental to activity and, in general, the understanding first thematizes with explicit determinateness inert possessions or states lying below the threshold of our consciousness.39

38 For Hegel, in the passage from sleep to wakefulness, all that spirit suffers or undergoes is its becoming for-itself (“erleidet der Geist nur sein Fürsichwerden,” ibid.). This is another occurrence of something we will consider in a moment, Hegel’s appropriation of the Aristotelian epidosis eis tèn entelecheian. On sleep in Hegel and Aristotle, see Petry’s notes at PSS II: 479–82; Kent Sprague, “Metaphysics of Sleep,” (1977); Chiereghin, “Griechische Erbe” (1991); and Gallop’s Introduction to his edition of De Somno.

39 This notion can of course be found in authors other than Aristotle. Leibniz is an obvious example, but it can also be found in Plotinus. For Plotinus, nature produces forms and has an intelligence which, compared to man’s waking intelligence, is immersed in sleep (Enn. III 8, 4, 15–28; 8, 33–5). As such, it is a weakening of the original contemplation. When the soul descends into a body it forgets its origin; its life is a diminishment of the nous, which alone is always thinking, while the soul only thinks occasionally (Enn. V 1, 10, 10–8). Again, the individual soul is a descending succession of reflections or images of the higher hypostasis (I 1, 11). The task is that of waking our intelligence and becoming one with the divine intelligence, according to Plotinus’s reelaboration
§4.3. Sensation. The theme of passivity and activity rises to central prominence in Hegel’s treatment of sensation. Activity and passivity are not two separate sides as in Kant’s division between sensibility and understanding. There is no steadfast separation between form and content, as we saw; likewise, there is no separation between a priori and a posteriori. Hegel’s pair of alternatives are external givenness and spirit’s production out of itself.

What is given must be inwardized; it must become spirit’s object in order to have meaning. This means that I retain of sensation what I assimilate within the preformed system of my sensibility. The given is determined by spirit in this sense: the passivity inherent at first in sensation is progressively transformed into a possession for spirit that uses it in its psychic life. All connections, relations, and order among objects we thematize are those we have set up, not those we have found.

Spirit is active even in that which most of our tradition has considered the pure passivity of sensation. For Hegel, as we saw in Chapter 7, nothing can have a positive relation to us unless we are the disposition or possibility of that relation in our selves. According to Hegel, Aristotle recognized that, in sensation, though we find ourselves at first determined, we are at the same time engaged in a modification of our disposition to be determined.

Certainly passivity must be a necessary part of sensation for both Hegel and Aristotle. The soul is not a monad, it has all windows open to the world. But in Hegel’s Anthropology passivity is progressively turned into activity. The soul finds itself determined in sensations and feelings throughout the Anthropology, not just in the explicit treatment of sensation (ENZ.C §399 ff.). At first, the soul in sensation has the form of a “subdued stirring” (die Form des dumpfen Webens) of “limited and transient” contents (ENZ.C §400). But this immediacy loses its contingency when inwardized and appropriated as felt corporeality (§401); bodily sensations acquire meaning or are idealized as ours, and our senses embody our interiority. Sensations become feelings; compared to sensation, feeling stresses more the internal derivation of a content than the passivity of the found immediacy (§402 A), that is, greater inwardness and lesser dependence on otherness. By turning of the Aristotelian theory of nous. But about this, compare §7 below. (I wish to thank Walter Leszl for suggesting that I explore this possibility. While there is no reference in Hegel to Plotinus in the concept of spirit’s sleep, this influence cannot be ruled out, even though I believe that the hylemorphism of the Anthropology takes the bodily expression of spirituality more seriously than does Plotinus.)
sensations into feelings, something that happens to us into our dispositions towards it, the soul becomes (or wakes to) an internal individual relating itself to itself in all its particular feelings. But this is the dawn of its subjectivity and individuality, distinguishing itself from its moments as the universal from its particulars. The soul has a feeling of itself in and through its feelings; but when the soul realizes that it pervades its bodily aspects as an abiding and universal subjectivity, it distances itself and its simplicity from its corporeality and its plurality of impulses, passions, sensations, etc. Thereby, the immediacy and corporeality of the soul is overcome and becomes a tool and sign of the soul. Through habit, as we see in a moment, I move about effortlessly and insensitively in dispositions which are all mine.

All this cursory summary of the unusually obscure central sections of the Anthropology purports to show is that in sense experience we are not a blank slate or tabula rasa, but that we inwardize givenness, thereby transforming what is passively given into our possession. The possession is at first corporeal; later it is felt, and finally it is ideal, a completely subordinate moment in the mind’s life that no longer needs to be spurred by external things, but is free to establish its own connections and to activate itself at will.

Nothing external acts as a simple cause of alteration of our senses. Whatever I assimilate is transformed within the preexisting framework of my sensibility. The sensitive faculty is common to every human being; but different people’s sensibilities differ because at the very same time that we suffer the action of something on us we are shaping our disposition to be affected by that sensible. We are not causally determined by the object; rather, we shape, educate, and bring to actuality our individual potentiality to be affected by sensible things. This is what Aristotle’s identification in actuality between perceiver and perceived means for Hegel: in the actuality of sensation there is no difference between subject and object; contents are as sensed by us, and, in Hegelian jargon, we assimilate or posit being as ours.

How can Hegel interpret Aristotle in this way? What does he do with the famous simile of the wax tablet? After all, is it not an historiographical commonplace, since at least Locke and Leibniz, to regard Aristotle as an empiricist?

In this case I think that Hegel perceived and treasured more insightfully than anyone a fundamental quality of sensation: that it is not merely receptivity but also a making actual and determinate of our senses’ openness to the world. Aristotelian sensation does not presup-
pose a passive subject affected causally and serially by manifold data, as does modern empiricism. The subject of sensation actively uses his passivity and educates its ability to sense.

For Aristotle, sensibility is potential; it needs the sensible to be activated. Sensation is a movement; but, unlike incomplete movements, here a quality does not replace an opposite one. The movement is from potentiality to actuality, and amounts to the actualization of the senses (De an. II 5, 417b 16–18). Being passive or suffering, writes Aristotle, may mean a destruction of the sense organ by too strong a stimulus, or it may mean the preservation of what is potential by an actual being. The latter is not a simple alteration, but a progress into self and into one’s entelechy (epidosis eis entelecheian, De an. II 5, 417b 2–7).

Aristotle thus distinguishes between a process directed outside of itself, where one quality or state is replaced by another at the completion of a motion, and a self-perfection or development, which actualizes and brings to light a potentiality. This is the education and refinement of our senses’ disposition to discriminate, recognize, and identify their objects. The emphasis on the cognitive import of this actualization leads Aristotle to use a misleading analogy. He distinguishes the respective stages of potentiality, first actuality, and second actuality in both sensing and in learning grammar. In the latter case, I learn grammar and can exercise my knowledge of grammar whenever I want to. Grammar is a first actuality or a possession, which I bring to existence whenever I do grammar. The analogy between grammar and the senses, however, is loose because we don’t acquire sensibility as we do grammar; and more importantly, we cannot activate our senses at will (the transition from first to second actuality needs a sensible from without).

Anyway, both actualizations are what Aristotle calls “a change to a positive disposition and to the realization of the [subject’s] nature” (metabolên kai tên epi tas hexeis kai tên phusin, De an. II 5, 417b 16). Neither the transition from potentiality to first actuality nor that from first to second actuality is an alteration in the sense of incomplete movements: they are actualizations of potentialities. Thus they are not material movements or processes aiming at ends external to them, but are self-directed and complete from the moment of inception. From a temporal point of view, there is no difference between perfect tense and present tense, between seeing and having seen. The end or terminus ad quem is nothing but the senses’ awareness of their object, and that does not increase in time.

Sensation, then, involves passivity for its activation but is at the same
time an active and determinate modification of our capacities. The active side breaks down into two components: senses actively discriminate (krinei, III 2, 426b 10–11) and recognize their objects; and we can actively decide to expose ourselves to perceptions in order to educate our sensibility (say, listening to music in order to develop an aesthetic taste). Whereas obviously the former sense of “active” bears no relation to “voluntary,” the latter certainly does, even though it need not be the result of an explicit act of will. From the point of view of knowledge, sensation is thus not an isolated episode but acquaints us with sensible forms that become sedimented in us as first actualities and dispositions (hexeis), enabling us to learn cumulatively. If this is what is involved in sensation and perception (aisthēsis is the Greek word for both), then obviously material alteration in the organ is insufficient to explain it. We need to be aware of the sensible and be able to discern it from other sensibles to call the alteration a perception.

Sensation is of particulars, but sense retains or receives (labein, De an. II 12, 424a 16) sensible forms without matter (De an. II 12, 424a 24; compare An. Post. I 31, 87b 28–30; II 19, 10oa 17, 100b 4–5). In the words of the first section of the Metaphysics (A 1, 980b 25–9), experience (empeiria) needs memory (mnêmê). Only because we retain many sensations of the same thing in memory can we have a meaningful experience. For the subject is potentially the contraries it can sense and a disposition which becomes determinate when actualized (De an. III 2, 427a 6–7). Aristotle compares the perceiver’s awareness, numerically one but divided in its functions, to a geometric point which is both indivisible (the point unites two segments: the subject simultaneously perceives different sensibles) and divisible (the point separates two segments which originate from it: here the subject operates as a limit discriminating two sensible things; De an. III 2, 427a 10 ff.).

For Aristotle, the senses have as broad an application and range of meaning as thinking does for Hegel: they are the basis for all activities, from animal movement and desire to human knowledge, including imagination, and memory, and action. They are not directed simply at their proper objects, but give us a much broader content than many

40 Hegel refers to this notion and to the related theory of time and space from the Physics in the chapter on Perception in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The example of salt as a common sensible shows that the determinate perception of the thing and its properties is both one and many, or, as Hegel says in the Lectures on perception, “a unity in difference” (VGPh 211–12). Here, Hegel concludes that “the logos is the logos of the soul itself” (212).
would be willing to ascribe to them today: they discriminate common sensibles (such as shape, size, number) in and through movement, and they even give us a sensible awareness of relations, pluralities, and connections in incidental perception (the white we perceive and recognize as the *white of* Diapers’s son; we simultaneously perceive the yellow *and* the bitter in the bile). In other words, sensible qualities are only one class of the objects of sense for Aristotle (proper sensibles); they form the basis for more complex forms of perception involving discriminative awareness and the ability to identify and recognize not just qualities but complex objects as well as states of affairs.

The senses are not fallible and deceptive as they are for modernity (mistakes arising in the composition of proper sensibles in incidental or common perception, and in inferences); they are not the recalcitrant, passive material and instrument of a mistrustful reason setting up experiments and testing sensible instances in light of them. They give us an active and intelligent perception, not supposedly raw sense-data or the material blind manifold for intellectual unification; and they are self-conscious, in that we are aware of our sensation through the sensible things we discriminate (*De an. III* 2, 426b 10–11, 1, 425b 12 ff.).41 In light of this, translating *epagôgê* in the *Posterior Analytics* by “induction” makes very little sense, and cannot account for activities that obviously have nothing to do with induction in our sense, such as *epagôgê*’s ability to know principles (*An. Post. II* 19, 100b 4) or its recognition or realization that the figure before our eyes is a triangle (*I* 1, 71a 22).42

In the concept of *epagôgê* Aristotle is not thinking of a generalization

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41 The manipulation of Aristotle’s notion of a central organ allowing us to perceive common sensibles and incidental sensibles simultaneously in the unity of a thing (*De sensu* 7, 449a 5–20; compare *De somno*, 455a 16–18; *De an. III* 2, 425b 12–426b 29) into a supposed theory of a common sense begins as early as Alexander of Aphrodias (*De an.* 63, 6–28) and runs through the medieval *sensus communis* up to the 18th century “common sense” and Kant’s “inner sense.” This long and intriguing story cannot be told here. On Aristotelian common sensibles, cf. Rodier (*De an.*, 1900: 365–7); Kahn, “Sensation and Consciousness” (1966); Hamlyn, “Koinê aisthêsis” (1968). For incidental perception, see Cashdollar, “Incidental Perception” (1973).

42 Even though I am not convinced of the foundational usefulness of etymologies in philosophy, I would like to point out that *epi-agein* means to “lead toward,” as does the Latin *in-ducere*. It is not the translation of *epagôgê* by induction which is faulty; it is the inevitable association of empiricist notions that goes with it that is seriously misleading when we are called to interpret Aristotle. Hartmann reminds us that Aristotelian *epagôgê* has the literally introductory task of moving from the first for us to the first in itself (“Aristoteles und Hegel,” 1923: 217). Compare these also: Heidegger, “*Phusis*” (1958: 242/314); Lugarini, *Aristotele* (1961: 82); Hamlyn, “*Epagôgê*” (1976); Kal, *Intuition* (1988: 52 ff.); Samonà, *Dialettica* (1988: 105).
from cases but of bridging the gap between intelligible and sensible. This concept is his restatement of the problem of Plato’s *Meno* on the beginning of knowledge. For Aristotle, we do not get acquainted with what we already know: on the contrary, it is possible to be familiar with something without knowing it *determinately*. Knowledge of the universal and of the particular are complementary (I 18, 81b 2), and taken separately they are not a concrete cognition. *Epagôgê* concretizes the knowledge of universals in that it is the recognition (*anagnôrizein*, An. Pr. II 21, 67a 23–4) of the universal in the singular. It reveals or makes the one manifest or visible (*dêlon*) in the other. Instead of generalizing cases, it makes us realize an initially confused generality as a determinate form. The sensible form is apprehended as embodied in matter, and thought in its image; the thing we sense possesses a form we thematize in thinking. Sensation, which for animals is an indeterminate realm of singularities and a stimulus for movement, becomes for man the perception of a singular as constituted by a form which can be represented for its own sake as a universal by thought.

Experience is obviously indispensable to acquire familiarity with sensible things. While it is not yet a science of universals, it is its necessary presupposition. We are constituted as the abiding continuity of a disposition making possible the formation of habits, attitudes, and customs. The potency is acquired and shaped by repeated actualizations as a second nature, so that after being formed, after – in the words of the *Posterior Analytics* – the universal has come to rest in our souls, we are free to exercise our potency out of ourselves. Only because we are a formed *hexis* can we recognize a thing as the token of a type, as a form in matter. And that is, I submit, what Aristotle meant in the *De anima* with his distinction between purely passive alteration and the actualization of the senses as a progress into one’s entelechy and change to a positive disposition realizing the subject’s nature (II 5, 417b 16).

I believe that Hegel is aware of all this. This progression into self, this refinement and stabilization of a disposition to be affected, is what he reads in Aristotelian “subjectivity:” not a *cogito*, but an abiding subjec-

43 *An. Post* I 1, 71a 8–9; a 19–21; I 10, 77a 1–4; I 31, 88a 4–6; II 5, 91b 34–5. In the *Rhetoric*, the example is one form of induction (I 2, 1356b 1–2).

44 Since passions belong in the soul intermediately between the vegetative and the rational, the formation of character in the *Nicomachean Ethics* seems to me to be included in this activity as a subspecies of sensibility; Aristotle’s distinction between appetitive (*orektikon*) and sensitive soul at *De an*. III 9–10 is crucial for the determination of the motives for locomotion, but is here secondary – as confirmed by *Eth. nic*. I 13.
tivity, something Aristotle would call memory, which is the meaningful retention of forms and establishment of habits, patterns of perceiving, acting, and relating oneself to the world. More particularly, Hegel thinks he has made it possible to reinterpret Aristotelian sensation in its own right without superimposing on it any un-Aristotelian frames of thought. He goes so pertinaciously against a clear-cut separation of sensation from thought, of a posteriori external manifold from the mind’s universals or a priori, of passive receptivity from the understanding’s synthesizing activity, that in the 1817 *Encyclopædia* (§370 A) he treats Aristotelian sensation as a rational intuition and the starting point of the philosophy of theoretical spirit (which he later calls Psychology).

In the Berlin *Encyclopædia*, Hegel is more careful to distinguish within the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit the different levels at which sensation operates in the Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology. More explicitly than in Aristotle, we find in Hegel the emphasis on the difference between animal and human sensation. In the additions to §400, §401 and in the Fragment, Hegel claims that man is not tied to singularities in sensation but embraces a cycle of singularities. When we talk of a distinction between perceiver and perceived, we do not realize that we are inserting into the simplicity of sensation both a difference and a relation; however, these are forms of consciousness which do not belong in sensation itself, but only in the “later reflection of the soul in that it has determined itself into an I” (*BS* 542). If I say that I see red, this is a “pleonastic expression” (ibid.), which separates me from my sensation. A sensation is the identity of perceiver and perceived; but this is not a simple identity, because it is, as we saw, the turning of passivity into activity, the inwardization or idealization of a given in my psychic and mental life (*BS* 544). Hegel continues: the soul is an ideal space still empty and indeterminate, the absolutely receptive “tabula rasa” which “first has to be filled.” But “this filling does not take place through so-called impressions from without in the way that a signet impresses images upon wax. That which can come into existence in spirit can do so only in that spirit self-determiningly posits it within itself” (*BS* 544–5).

This obvious reference to Aristotle is peculiar: Hegel wants so badly to guard off any Lockean interpretation of Aristotle’s simile that he literally inverts Aristotle’s text, unlike in the Lectures where he is explicitly commenting on it (*VGPh* 207–9; *De an.* II 12). That he enthusiastically espouses Aristotle’s conception of sensation and an alternative reading of the simile of the ring and the wax is quite obvious in the Heidelberg *Encyclopædia* and in the Lectures. In 1817 he writes that judgment is sub-
sequent to sensation, and that Aristotle has recognized “perceiver and perceived, into which consciousness divides sensation, only as the sensing according to possibility; but of sensation he said that one and the same is the entelechy of perceiver and perceived” (ENZ.A §370 A). In the Lectures, Hegel says that sensation for Aristotle is the level of finding oneself determined (VGPh 206, 211). Aristotle is perfectly clear that the sentient’s receptivity is at the same time activity. Therefore he distinguishes between privative passivity and a passivity which concerns “the nature and abiding activity [Wirksamkeit] (power and habit, hexis)” (ibid., 205). In this latter sense, the subject is the preservation (“Erhalten, sôteria” – Hegel is commenting on II 5, 417b 2–15) of the potency by what is in actuality, and the “possession” (Besitz) of sensation in the soul (ibid.). This is what Hegel calls the “active reception in oneself – the activity in the receptivity, this spontaneity which sublates the passivity in sensation” (ibid., 207). The passive content is made ours (Die Energie ist, diesen passiven Inhalt zum Seinigen zu machen; ibid.). It is totally inconsistent with this theory, continues Hegel, to interpret Aristotle as saying that consciousness is passively determined by an outside impression. Tennemann’s interpretation, mocked by Hegel, does not recognize that in sensation we receive the form of the object without its matter, that is, we receive the universal.

This is crucial for Hegel, both in the Anthropology (where the soul is in immediate unity with its sensations and feelings, which do not yet correspond to objects outside of it) and in the Psychology (where sensation is pervaded by the certainty of reason after its opposition to the objectivity of the Phenomenology). Here, Hegel uses a pun to convey the fact that spirit discovers its freedom when it turns being (das Seiende) into its possession (das Seinige, ENZ.C §443). “Being” and “possession” are the two new expressions for external and internal at this psychological level. Subjectivity can only be conceived as the “subsisting of the manifold, . . . a preserving of sensations which are posited as being of an ideal nature. This is because in the soul the mere and abstract negation of that which has being is preserved and sublated.” The “now” acquires an ideal nature; it is a “past and has-been” (BS 545). For this reason the only true conception of subjectivity is that of a featureless mine (bestimmungsloser Schacht, ENZ.C §403), where all differences are preserved as ideal and virtual. This means for Hegel that, by relating itself to beings, spirit idealizes beings or abstracts them from their material particularity, from their external space and time, transposing them into its inner and universal space and time (ENZ.C §452).
Because spirit is in itself the one of the many, the ideal subsistence of all differences, it can learn from sensation that which for animals remains an isolated singularity. Because spirit is the unconscious preservation and internalization (Erinnerung) of all things, singular beings can be taken as occurrences or manifestations of concepts and have duration and meaning for us. Finally, because reality is for spirit only as negated and idealized in memory can spirit have an ideal life in which it can run through, recollect, and transform tradition, retrieving its past, sedimented stages, thus appropriating what Hegel calls its inorganic nature. This is the fundamental presupposition for a language, a history and an objective existence, and eventually for spirit’s self-knowledge.

The last two things I would like to note in what we have just seen are, first, that Hegel passes over Aristotle’s problematic distinction between sensible and noetic forms. For Hegel, in both cases the soul is concerned with the universal, the concept or form of the thing. For him all contents appear in an immediate form: “everything is in sensation” (ENZ.C §400 A), the way God is in our hearts or the way we have a sense of right and wrong. Thus it must seem natural to him that the same content assumes different forms in us according to Aristotle as well. The problem is that the sensible qualities of the composite substance sensed differ from the essence or substantial form of the sensed thing (De an. II 5, 417b 22–3; III 4, 429b 14–18; III 8, 432a 2–3). For Aristotle, sensation is necessary for thought, but sensible things are not just universal essences clothed in sensible appearance. To pass from sensation to thought, something different from a Hegelian “translation of forms” is needed.

When Aristotle writes that we retain the sensible form without the matter, he does in fact mean that the thing’s matter is irrelevant to sensation. The wax does not become a bronze ring, it merely acquires its circular shape. This will become crucial at a later stage, when we elicit in thought the universal out of the particular we have before our mental gaze: the image of the shape remains in us as a proxy or copy (eikôn) of the thing (“to the thinking soul images serve as perceptions,” III 7, 431a 14–16, my transl.). Thus, since noêta are potentially present in ma-

terial composites (III 4, 430a 6–7), we isolate in thought the noetic character of the thing in and through its image left over from sensation (De an. III 8, 432a 3–10).

What Hegel entirely disregards is the difference between the sensible qualities of a composite and the essence of it; differently stated, he entirely disregards Aristotle’s ontological schema of substance and properties, because for him all things are their concepts, regardless of their categorial status and independence (precisely Aristotle’s fundamental concern with the definition of ousia), where this schema itself is one logical determination along with others. As we see in §7, Hegel understands Aristotelian sensation in light of, and keeping as his point of departure, Aristotelian thinking, instead of regarding thought as subsequent to and originating in sensation. The result, however, is that Aristotle’s distinction between proper and incidental sensibles, that is, between qualities proper to each sense and sensation’s ascription of qualities to subjects, is erased, along with the autonomy of sensation. As is obvious, the ramifications of the transformation of the metaphysics of genera of being into dialectical logic are omnipervasive.

Second, Hegel ignores Aristotle’s forceful caveat on the difference between sensation and learning. In De an. II 5, Aristotle has written that learning grammar is the formation of our disposition, which we could then exercise at will. In the case of sensation, instead, there is no way that I can activate my senses at will, for I always need an external sensible thing to actualize my potentiality to sense (De an. II 5, 417b 17–28). For Aristotle, the senses are a congenital disposition (Met. Θ 5, 1047b 31 ff.) in the sense of a first actuality, not of a potentiality, since the time of our birth; they are like the possession of grammar, not like the simple potentiality of reason that the possession of grammar must presuppose (De an. II 5, 417b 16–21). In other words, there is a difference between the case of learning and that of sensing both in the establishment of the first actuality, and in the nature and sufficiency of the second actuality.

For Hegel this does not seem to matter. Why? I believe it is because for him more than for Aristotle everything is a disposition shaped by the soul and spirit. The emphasis rests much more strongly on the soul’s activity on itself and the establishment and education of first actualities than on what we are endowed with by nature. I find it significant in this connection that the Anthropology continues at this point with an examination of habit. Let us turn to this discussion to see how Hegel revitalizes the Aristotelian hexis while at the same time departing from it
by unobtrusively adopting a Rousseauian question as his starting point: the relationship between nature and civilization in the notion of “second nature.”

§4.4. Habit. The section on habit (ENZ.C §410) is not only among the longest in the Anthropology, it is also, in my opinion, the most important and convincing articulation of Hegel’s thesis on the soul’s shaping of corporeality.

Both hexis and habit stem from the respective Greek and Latin roots of the verb “to have.” When I have something, I am not that something: I am not immersed in it; I have a relation to and thus a distance from it, hence also the possibility of changing it and influencing it. If we think of the categories of Hegel’s objective logic, we can say that in being there is a transition from one determination to the next, independent of any will; in essence what I have is what I “shine” in. But I am not identical with, I am irreducible to, my appearance, and I have a relative control over how I am affected.

This is the situation at this point in the Anthropology: in habit the soul, which until now has been one with its body, “breaks with corporeality” (ENZ.C §409). This is not yet the intentional activity of a consciousness that has separated itself from objectivity, for we are still talking about corporeal and natural habits as products of the soul’s inadvertent and pre-intentional activity; but it is the immediate presupposition for consciousness.46

Let me summarize the content of §410.47 Thanks to habit the soul possesses its determinations and “moves within them without sensation or consciousness” (ENZ.C §410). Being thus free from them, it can address itself to further occupations. Repetition and practice engender habit. The soul’s self-feeling becomes “mechanical” in habit just as intelligence becomes mechanical in memory. While natural qualities, changes, and feelings are natural and immediate, habit is “a determinateness of feeling, as well as of intelligence, will, etc.” which has constituted itself as a natural and automatic being (ibid., my transl. and ital-

46 Even Kant, incidentally, seems to treat self-feeling as a preliminary form of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is “discovered” by the child when he stops speaking in the third person and adopts the I in the expression of his wants (Anthropologie, §1). But for Kant this pertains to pragmatic anthropology and must be kept apart from his transcendental theory of thinking and self-consciousness.

ics). This is why it is called “second nature,” argues Hegel: it is still the natural being of the soul, but it is also posited as an immediacy by the soul, which shapes and transforms corporeality. Habit is the liberation of man from dependence on nature through the education of sensations. The result of this training of our permeable nature is a strength: we reduce or idealize our passivity by becoming inured to cold, weariness, etc., indifferent to the satisfaction of appetites (“monkish renunciation and unnaturalness is irrational . . . , and is not a liberation,” ibid.), and skilled at turning a particular corporeal possibility into an ability to determinate purposes.

Habit “includes all kinds and stages of spiritual activity” (ibid.), from man’s standing upright (an immediate and unconscious posture which is the result of training) to sight (an immediate and simple act unifying in itself a whole range of differences) and to thinking, unhindered and flowing smoothly, at ease and freely in the previously established familiarity with its objects. In sum, in habit immediate determinations belong naturally to me: I move in them without impediments, effortlessly and unconsciously. For the soul, the body is raised to a sign of spirituality and is the “free shape, in which it feels itself and makes itself felt” (§411 A). Only thus can we interpret gestures, grimaces, tones as the expression of spirituality, of something higher than the body: the humanity that shines through it. But more than anywhere else humanity is in the face and in the hand, which Hegel calls “the absolute instrument” (ibid.). In the Addition, Hegel discards the deceiving appearance of similarity between men and apes: the gap between man and animals is absolute, not a matter of degree.

Several important consequences can be drawn from this. It seems to me that habit is rooted in both the contingency of nature and the plasticity of our senses; but it is the very reduction of the gap between contingency and will, between dependence and freedom. The body’s plasticity is the mediation through which the soul wins itself and engenders its habitual cosmos.

If the soul is immersed in the contingency of nature, it starts severing its ties when it predisposes patterns of habitual responses, when it fixates and determines an unaccomplished and contingent nature in the form of sensuous dispositions become unconscious through repetition. By using the body as a set of skilled and trained organs available for automatic and immediate (yet not unmediated) use, we can be in charge of situations; conversely, our body becomes the appearance of our spirituality. By possessing a permanent disposition that results in an
immediate reaction to stimuli without any need to give it any thought, we preliminarily discriminate that toward which we orient ourselves in the present: not just what we direct our body toward, but also what we let ourselves be affected by and what we expose ourselves to receive. We reduce the externality of nature in and through our bodily nature.

Habit can do this because of its mediating universality. We begin being less dependent on a plurality of external circumstances when we treat singular experiences as uniform; when we can identify tokens with types. Thus what habit leads to is the superimposition of the old onto the new, of the “has been” onto the now. Singular events, being similar to others in kind, are acknowledged as familiar and proper to us, and nonalien, something we recognize as our own stable universals; they begin losing their unexpected, uncontrollable, and uncanny power once we apprehend them within, and adapt them to, a web (our web) of regularities and connections.

Through habit, sensation acquires a temporal thickness and a theoretical import. Our immediate life, the life of sensibility, is systematized, ordered, interconnected. Habit is the active shaping of our receptivity in view of the future. Because the present is the precipitate of the past, it is, in Bergson’s famous expression, pregnant with the future. Only because we have habituated ourselves through experience to dealing with situations in determinate ways are we able to face similar situations readily, without being overwhelmed by them, with the speediness of thought and movement that comes from training. Habit produces natural immediacy through spiritual mediation – it produces spontaneity in receptivity.

This immediate habituation will form the basis for more complex spiritual activities that all equally require the unreflected familiarity and immediate insensitive and spontaneous flow of representations typical of consciousness and spirit: from memory and thinking to our political second nature and ethical life.

Unlike in the case of sensation, which Hegel explicitly praised in the Lectures and the Encyclopædia, I find that here Aristotle is more of a second nature to Hegel, as it were – an immediate and yet unthemetic, never mentioned foil.

Hegel does not claim that nature is a convention, that everything is culture and civilization. We are all endowed with “natural qualities” (ENZ.C §410 A); but what we do with them is how individuals differentiate themselves from one another – this is how natural qualities acquire
a value. What for Rousseau in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* was the work of reflection, for Hegel is the result of unreflected habit. Obviously habits retain a certain passivity: before we can begin to determine ourselves, we have to learn that we can do so, that is, we must be trained by parents and teachers to master our body, gestures, and language.

In Aristotle this is the famous paradox of education found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Only serious people who care about their characters and are already well-behaved enough can profit from the reading of the ethics (I 3); hopeless cases are not simply possible, but so actual and frequent that they represent the larger part of the city’s population. In other words, good habits and manners depend on us only in part; at first, all that matters is the models we are exposed to, and whether we find pleasure and pain with the proper things (*Eth.nic. II 3, 1104b 9–13*). For this reason, as we see in Chapter 9, Hegel answers the question: how can I make someone good? by saying: make him a citizen of a state with good laws (*PhR §153 A*), just like Aristotle (*Eth.nic. II 1, 1103b 2–6*). The social environment determines our first attitudes toward life.

For Aristotle, feelings and passions are not bad in themselves; but habits, and virtues in particular, are neither by nature nor against nature (*Eth.nic. II 1, 1103a 23–6*). They are purposive dispositions addressing natural qualities to rational ends (*Eth.nic. II 5–6*); they require time and effort. This education is the development of ethical virtues, which are rooted in but not reducible to habit, for they are dispositions to choice; therefore they will have to be examined as instituzionalized ethical life in the following chapter. But what virtues as purposive habits presuppose is exactly our possibility of shaping dispositions, first actualities, out of natural qualities in view of ends. And that presupposes that things may be otherwise – it presupposes contingency, neither chance nor necessity (*Eth.nic. I 3*).

Habits are hard to eradicate, argues Aristotle, because they become man’s nature (IX 11, 1152a 30–3). Habits are a determinate and stable species of disposition or arrangement (*diathesis*), which is itself a species of quality (*poion; cf. Categ. 8b 25–9a 13; Met. Δ 19, 20, 1022b 1 ff.*). Hence they qualify an individual as the determinate arrangement of pre-given natural qualities addressed to ends. In the *Categories*, Aristotle’s examples of habits are virtues and sciences: he argues that they are hard to remove once established, like first actualities in the *De anima*.
passage quoted above. An eye is well-disposed if the material arrangement of its parts (diathesis) is correct or normal; but only the capacity to discriminate differences in the visible objects makes for a good hexis. Again, a first actuality is developed out of a congenital potentiality; and when we exercise it, we make it pass to second actuality. In other words, the material organ is required for the function, but it is only the function, the energeia or activity, that determines form and end of organs.

Clearly, habits are developed on the basis of an ascription of value or goodness to a certain disposition, where the value or goodness can be something as natural as the success of the function or the choice of means to ends in a moral situation. Aristotle, as is well known, at first speaks of aretê in the case of functions and excellences regardless of the kind of function to be defined: the virtue or goodness of an axe is to chop well; analogously, the virtue of a citizen is to live well in his polis.

Even the sense of touch is taken at first as a broad and fundamental good shared by all animals. However, the specific shape touch takes on in the case of man is again its plasticity, which is superior to that of animals’ organs. Man has the hand, which is not simply a tool but the “tool of tools” (De part. an. IV 10, 687a 10): it has the worth of all animal endowments, since it is unlimitedly resourceful (like Sophocles’s pantoporos man) and can take on several functions. Aristotle distances himself from Protagoras’s view of man as the least endowed creature (“naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed,” Plato’s Protagoras 321c); nature is not a Hobbesian state of war ante litteram but has disposed everything in view of the best. Whereas animals are restricted and confined to the unique or narrow functions they are allotted through their endowments, they cannot change their means of defense or attack, or their fur or shoes, and adapt to novelties. Instead, man’s hand is at once “claws, talon, horn, sword, or spear” (De part. an. IV 10, 687a 23 ff.). The hand’s structure is amazingly plastic and prensive; the opposable thumb allows for the grasp of virtually anything whatever – and to grasp is to adapt to and receive the form of the thing.

That this is far from trivial is shown by Aristotle’s explicit comparison of the hand and the soul. The soul is somehow all things (Hê psuchê ta onta pòs esti panta, De an. III 8, 431b 21): it can become them all by knowing them in actuality. “It is not the stone that is in the soul, but its form; so that the soul is like a hand. As the hand is the instrument of all instruments, so is the intellect the form of forms” (De an. III 8, 431b 29–432a 2). What is common to hand and soul-intellect is their plas-
ticity: human beings’ very lack of specialization is not a plight but their strength, for it opens up a broad range of possibilities – to use and to know anything in principle. Unlike the intellect, the hand has a form of its own; but it still can adapt to several different tangible objects. It can use and fabricate tools which have a separate existence from us. One of the defining characteristics of touch is that it requires externality. The hand is the most practical mediation between the soul and such externality, just as the skin is the medium between inner and outer.

Man is the technological species; but only because it is the intelligent one. Aristotle criticizes Anaxagoras who said that man is the most intelligent animal because he has hands. Man has hands because he is intelligent, counters Aristotle: the organ depends on the function, not vice versa (De part. an. IV 10). In Aristotle we find the same dismissal of the similarity of men with apes as in Hegel. Apes are ambivalently in between quadrupeds and bipeds for Aristotle; thus he denied that they possessed fully the requisite for the use of hands, an erect posture leaving freedom for the use of his forelimbs.

From Aristotle to Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents, the upright posture has been synonymous with civilization. Freud focuses on the demotion of the sense of smell and the dawn of the sense of modesty and of self, as separate from others, due to the genitals’ sudden visibility. Hegel emphasizes the fact that standing erect is man’s will; man stands up as long as he wants to. Their differences notwithstanding, both start from an intuition of man’s development within and break from nature.

Aristotle, it seems to me, argues instead that the opposite is the case: man “stands erect naturally” (De part. an. IV 10, 687a 5 ff.). Nature provided him with arms and hands in place of forelegs (ibid.). The end is for man to be able to fulfill his divine nature, that is, thinking; but in order for that to be possible, the body must not weigh on the soul (De part. an. IV 10, 686a 25–b 2). Thinking, when entangled in corporeality, is awkward and deficient (686b 27–8). Man’s erect carriage is appropriate to his natural place: man’s “upper part is upper in relation to the whole universe, while in other animals it is midway” (De juvent., 468a 5–8, transl. Hett).

As is the case throughout the Anthropology, the main difference between Hegel and Aristotle is that Hegel emphasizes man’s pre-intentional and later explicit will, even in the lowest forms of his natural life. For Aristotle, instead, man’s divinity is part of the cosmos, not symptomatic of a break with it. The inferior is in service of the superior; it is not thoroughly shaped by it.
§5. The Phenomenology within the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

The Phenomenology is the stage at which the I emerges. The I divides itself from corporeality by making it thoroughly its own. It is the certainty of its autonomy and independence from anything external. Consciousness is in fact by its essence opposition to an external world. All its determinations become the object of and for an independent subject; but through the object consciousness relates and reflects itself into itself, for all relation between I and object is consciousness’ own doing.

The pure I is thus a result, and by no means the final one. This means that thinking is not exclusively the conscious unification of an object opposed to us; it rather stems from preconscious and relatively selfless processes involving the body, progressing to the further stage in which the I again loses its independence and opposition to a world, being identical with the object of thought.

By making Phenomenology an intermediate stage between the Anthropology and the Psychology, Hegel carries out a long process of redefinition of the role of the work he published in 1807 as the Phenomenology of Spirit. To be true, that work has undergone serious qualifications since its publication. Although Hegel never dismissed the Phenomenology, in 1808–9, on the occasion of his class on “Doctrine of Consciousness and Logic for the Intermediate Class” at the Nürnberg Gymnasium (see NS 70–110), the content of the 1807 Phenomenology, which was meant to introduce us to the system of philosophy, is dealt with under the heading of Phenomenology but reduced to the first part of the 1807 text, up to the chapter on Reason (Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Introduction of Reason). This is the first part of a doctrine of spirit, the second part of which is announced as the Seelenlehre (doctrine of the soul), or Philosophy of Spirit proper, which investigates the activities of spirit as opposed to consciousness in relation to outer objects, which was the theme of the preceding Phenomenology (NS 73). However, Hegel does not deal with the “doctrine of the soul” (presumably corresponding to what he later calls Psychology), but stops at Reason and moves from there on to the Logic. It is only in the 1810–11 “Philosophical Encyclopædia” that Hegel discusses the activities of spirit and articulates the division between theoretical and practical spirit, intelligence, and will. The first occurrence of an explicit tripartition of spirit into Anthropology, Phenomenology, and Psychology appears in 1816, in the Subjective Logic (WL 2: 494–96, SL 780–2). In
the following year Hegel redefines the role of the Phenomenology within the tripartition internal to spirit and integrates the chapters up to Reason as the second part of subjective spirit.48

Again Hegel does not dismiss the earlier work nor even downplay its importance. The 1807 Phenomenology is not only Hegel’s most brilliant and imaginative work. Its function remains relevant in Hegel’s evaluation even once he redefines its role in light of the Encyclopædia’s new systematic conception. Hegel was preparing the second edition of the 1807 Phenomenology when he fell ill in 1831, and still in 1827 and 1830 he continued to consider the earlier work as a presupposition and the deduction of the concept of science necessary for philosophy (ENZ.B–C §25), as he did in the Introduction to the Science of Logic (WL 42–3, SL 48–9).

What changes is the understanding of the introduction to philosophy or pure thinking. In the Encyclopædia, the foundation and justification of the idea of science is still necessary, but it is replaced by the decision to think purely. Accordingly, in the Encyclopædia there is no introduction to the logic but a preliminary conception which retains some of the characteristics of the 1807 Phenomenology – that is, the task of understanding thought not as a here subjective activity. After stating what objective thinking means, Hegel proceeds to discuss three positions of thought with regard to objectivity.

Parallel to this, the Phenomenology becomes one stage in the development of spirit, and not spirit’s appearance as a whole; it also becomes part of science itself, not an introduction to it. The restricted scope corresponds to a higher status, but most of its defining traits have changed. Consciousness is no longer a beginning, but a result of the Anthropology. The beginning itself changes dramatically: while the 1807 Phenomenology began with the pure being of natural consciousness, in contrast to Fichte’s beginning with the I, in the Encyclopædia Phenomenology the beginning is the I’s certainty of itself. Hegel reduces the theory of consciousness to its essentials, to the point that he gets rid of all those tools, now deemed unnecessary, which had made the 1807 work so rich: he now admits that his discussion of indexicals, language, and the universality of das Meinen or opinion in the chapter on sense-certainty was, in light of the change in systematization and the newly acquired difference

48 Besides the classical studies by Fulda and Pöggeler on the introductory role of the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, see Rameil, “Aufbau der Geisteslehre” (1988) on the changes in the Nürnberg period.
between sensuous consciousness and intuition, that is, between beginning of Phenomenology and of Psychology, an undue anticipation (ENZ.C §418 A). Consciousness is turned into a mode of thinking purified of the richness of determinations it had in 1807.

This shift can be compendiated in the consideration that in 1807 Hegel wrote a criticism of consciousness, whereas now he wants a pure theory of consciousness, a bare structure necessary for the systematic clarification before we treat spirit proper in its objective existence as a realization of thinking and free will. The perspective, in other words, is no longer the experience of consciousness and how it discovers itself while trying to adequate its certainty to the truth of the object, but the laying out of what spirit presupposes and requires in order to relate freely to itself – which is the overcoming of the opposition between a consciousness and a world, between subject and object.

But this must be understood along with another crucial and parallel modification: the restriction of consciousness to one epoch. While most historically inspired figures of consciousness present in 1807 disappear (for example, the struggle for recognition is not followed by Skepticism and Unhappy Consciousness but by Universal Self-Consciousness) and the entire process of appearing spirit is not seen in a historical and temporal development, now the Phenomenology abstractly refers to the bare backbone of one epoch, that of modernity, which culminates in Kant and Fichte, and is identified as the stage at which a singular I is opposed first to an external world, then to another self-consciousness (§415, A). And its purpose is the production or realization of reason, or spirit proper, which knows that its determinations are its thoughts, no less so than the objective essences of things (§439).

As we know, the phenomenological stage was not known to the Greeks. Hegel is perfectly right when he argues that Aristotle’s psuchê or nous were not at all equivalent to our “mind.” Aristotle does not even have a word for “I,”49 if we understand by this an inner mental space of homogeneous contents opposed to the outer world. That is a later, Augustinian discovery.

If above the I we have the identity of knower and known in actuality, what we must now consider is how the Psychology transforms the Aristotelian superior modes of knowing until, eventually, it radically departs from them.

49 As far as I know, the first time that the I appears as a substantive subject preceded by the article, at least nominally, in a peripatetic context is in Themistius, who writes that the I (to ego) is the composite of active and potential intellects (in De an., 100, 18–19).
§6. Thinking in Images and Thinking in Names

§6.1. General Remarks. Spirit resulting from soul and consciousness is the “knowledge of the substantial totality”; it knows itself as identical to being (ENZ.C §440). The Psychology lays out the subjective foundation of the identity between subject and object, and is at first an identity known (theoretical spirit), then actualized (practical spirit). While a logical foundation had been presented in the Logic, this foundation is subjective, in that here it acquires validity, confirmation, and truth for spirit itself. Spirit is here the production of its rationality in the realization of itself as intelligence and will. Hegel treats both intelligence and will under the Psychology and regards both theoretical and practical spirit as moments of its free self-determination. While he thereby seems to collapse the Aristotelian distinction between theory and practice found in the Nicomachean Ethics, he is actually following the same progression of the De anima from sensible to intellectual cognition and from intellect to desire and action.

As I wrote in §1 with regard to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit as a whole, the Psychology should not be read as a chronological or temporal development, nor as a transcendental regress from conditioned to condition, but as the movement from the found to the produced, from external necessity to freedom. This is also spirit’s sublation of what is called its formality, which consists in the difference between a given content and reason’s forms.

Theoretical and practical spirit are the two forms in which spirit appropriates externality and objectifies itself. But the two moments are not independent or opposed as passive to active, for spirit’s entire movement, both in the theoretical and the practical domain, is one from heteronomy to autonomy, from finding itself determined to determining itself. And while we usually take spirit to be receptive in cognition and active in the will, it is no less true, writes Hegel, that spirit is active in its cognition, in that it raises the empirical object out of the form of externality and singularity into the form of reason (representation and language); and that it is passive in its will, in that its content is immediately given to it in the form of feelings and drives. In both moments spirit is productive as well as partly affected by finitude: and its products are “in the theoretical range, the word, and in the practical (not yet deed and action but) enjoyment” (ENZ.C §444, transl. Miller).
Deed and action are superior to word and enjoyment. Subjective spirit will have to objectify itself in reality. But this spiritual production of a world of freedom can only take place once spirit’s content no longer conflicts with its form.

The opening section of Theoretical Spirit describes this formality of spirit and its movement of sublation as follows:

Intelligence finds itself determined; this is its illusory appearance from which in its immediacy it proceeds. However, as knowledge it consists of positing that which is found as its own. Its activity is concerned with the empty form of finding reason, and its purpose is that its concept be for it, i.e., that reason be for itself, along with which the content becomes rational for it. This activity is cognition. . . . The course of this elevation is itself rational, and consists in a necessary passage, determined by the Concept, of a determination of intelligent activity (a so-called spiritual faculty) into another (ENZ.C §445, my transl.).

Why is this elevation itself rational? Hegel says that the stages of liberation are rational stages. The moments of theoretical spirit are intuition, representation, and thought. In what sense are they said to be rational? And if they are, does that mean that their content changes when the form changes?

If the content, at first contingent and external, is then progressively transformed into intelligence’s property, thus acquires a higher existence or ideal citizenship in the domain of spirit; and if it is made rational, or is seen as spirit’s production – then in this inwardization of the object intelligence at the same time recollects itself and relates itself to its products (Er-innerung is the German word which expresses both). It finally knows what is true for it as its own production. While the content is determined by the form it acquires, it is progressively reduced to the form it has for intelligence; the more conceptual and comprehensive the form, the less is the content affected by difference, until the gap between form and content we started out with increasingly vanishes. The more the content is assimilated to its form, the less it is what it was as immediate and external. In the end there will be no more difference between object and subject, between what is found and what is produced, between thought-determination and externality.50

50 In 1805/6 Hegel expresses this in unusually unencumbered language: the object “has attained the form, the determination of being mine.” When the object is intuited again, it no longer has the meaning of “being, but rather the significance of being mine: it is
Let us focus on the details of this progression in order to understand its import, as well as to see why the principle which Hegel admittedly finds in Aristotle, that every form becomes matter to the superior form of consideration, is used in a way and for purposes that are diametrically opposed to its Aristotelian sense. I will dwell especially on imagination and representation.

§6.2. Inwardization. Theoretical spirit is divided into the three forms of intuition, representation, and thinking. In intuition, the object is a singularity; which is transformed into a universality in representation, and finally into a concrete universality in thinking.

Intuition is further divided into feeling or sensation, attention, and intuition proper. Feeling, a determinate affection, the form in which we immediately relate to the content, is the object of attention. Attention for Hegel is the diremption or self-determination of intelligence, the arbitrary isolation of the feeling by which the object becomes thematic and actually present to me. This is similar to Kant’s definition of attention as the I’s affection of inner sense, but with an important qualification, namely, that attention is good evidence of the indissociability of intelligence and will for Hegel. Attention is intelligence’s deliberate self-determination: paying attention, holding fast to something, is voluntary.

This form gives a new sense to the two moments which are the subject matter of the Psychology: the found and the produced, what is there and what is mine (in Hegel’s pun: das Seiende and das Seinige, or das Ihrige, when referring to Intelligenz). The object in attention is the object as both mine and being. Thus intelligence posits the object in its separatedness as its own. This is the condition for me to apprehend the object, the content of sensation or feeling, as a discrete unity; it is also the beginning of all education and knowledge. Intuition is the end of this moment; what I intuit is what I have isolated. Thus intuition is not blind, and its object is not a Kantian spatiotemporal singularity, but already known, that is I recollect it, or also I immediately have in it the consciousness of myself.” Thus I add to the object this being-for-myself, so that “what is facing me is the synthesis of both, content and I.” But thus “not only has a synthesis taken place, but the being of the object has been sublated . . . the object is not what it is” (JSE III: 188).

In the Heidelberg Encyclopædia, intuition does not constitute the first moment of intelligence but is included under representation (§369–§372). Feeling, in turn, is discussed as the stage which no longer differentiates between subject and object and is explicitly equated with Aristotle’s sensation as “the entelechy of sensing and sensed” (§370 A).
rather a Schellingian singularity, an immediate totality or a unified full-
ness of determinations.

Representation is idealized or inwardized intuition. Representation is the property of intelligence, which capitalizes on representation in a
system of cognitions that become objective through signs and language. What representation does is to negate the externality of being, turning the immediate into a possibility for intelligence and preserving it as its
own, as an ideality or an image standing for the object.

However, every ideality, every image is in itself transient. Intelligence is “its time and place, its when and where” (ENZ.C §453). All that hap-
pens acquires duration for us only when it is taken up by representative intelligence in its time and space, in its subjective orders and hierarchies; for intelligence measures time according to the interest the con-
tent holds for it. If we were not free from givenness, we could not form or recall an image whenever and wherever we are, that is, without relying on a present intuition. If we were not an abiding subjectivity, we
could not relate images to one another. In fact, intelligence is now de-
scribed as the in-itself of the images, the night or pit in which is stored an infinity of images and representations, yet without being in con-
sciousness (“of which we are scarcely ever conscious,” as one is tempted to say with Kant). That the image is “preserved unconsciously” (be-
wusstlos aufbewahrt, ibid.) means that intelligence is a subconscious “mine” or existing universal in which the different has not yet been re-
alized in its separation, but in which its determinations lie in a state of available virtuality and can in principle always be made discrete and ac-
tual. As in the Anthropology, where Hegel speaks of a “featureless mine” (ENZ.C §403), as we saw in §4, here Hegel insists that intelligence
must be conceived as this disposition – as a hexis or first actuality which
can be further actualized, becoming a second actuality when we recall an image and explicitly bring it to our attention.

That Hegel sees imagination and reason linked in the universality of
the I is not a novelty of the Encyclopædia. Already in 1802, in the pages of Faith and Knowledge devoted to Kant’s productive imagination, Hegel
writes that Kant, by raising the question of synthetic a priori judg-
ments, seized upon the true identity of being and knowing–although he
immediately misconstrued it in a formal and psychological fashion (GuW327). By exploiting the ambiguity of Kant’s notion of pure intu-
ition, Hegel interprets intuition as a synthetic unity, “as the heteroge-
neous which at the same time is also a priori, that is, absolutely identi-
cal” (ibid.). In other words, reason is precisely the possibility of this
positing, and as such is the identity of opposites. Thus Kant would be forced to admit that productive imagination, as both the sensible dimension of reason’s activity and as a spontaneity and absolute synthetic unity, is the principle of a sensibility which had been heretofore characterized as pure receptivity. Productive imagination would thus be what allows the originary synthetic unity of apperception to know itself as the truth in itself, as the bilateral unity which then becomes subject and object, splitting itself up in particular consciousness and world.

The fundamental shift involves the concept of self-affection, which belongs to the Kantian notion of figurative synthesis. While Kant seeks the ground of the relation between concepts and the pure manifold of intuition, that is, the connection between thought and reality, Hegel emphasizes what he would call the truth of this connection: since no intuited unity is possible without a synthesis, and since nothing given in experience escapes categorial determination, then Kant’s self-affection is ultimately the self-determination of pure thought in reality. The conclusion is that, in the terms of the *Phenomenology*, the truth of consciousness is self-conscious reason. And, in the terms of the *Encyclopædia*, the relation between givenness and subjective constitution is no longer one between two opposites. On the contrary, this relation shows itself as the transition from an apparent heteronomy to a self-determination of spirit discovering itself as notion or absolute reason, where self-knowledge appears as the foundation of the possibility of the knowledge of objectivity.

At first sight it would seem that Hegel is no longer dealing with the idealistic role played by imagination in the *Encyclopædia* once he no longer has to comment on a predominantly Kantian theme. And at first sight it would also seem that Hegel ignores both the Fichtean and Schellingean developments of productive imagination, as well as the discussion of the relation between concepts, intuitions, and schemata in the concept of self-determination and self-affection present in the works of Fichte, Beck, and Maimon of the 1790s. While the latter remark is more plausible, I would argue that for Hegel imagination retains a mediating if not central role in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.

To be sure, in the immediately following Philosophy of Spirit (1803–4; *JSE* I: 286), imagination has a surprisingly subordinate role.

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After *Faith and Knowledge* the Hegelian notions of intuition and identity, and with this some of the essential features of imagination itself, do in fact change. But if we chart the progression of forms of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit from 1805 and 1808 on, we will notice that imagination is always identified with the middle stages of the theoretical forms of intelligence, as in the Berlin *Encyclopædia*. More specifically, the philosophy of intelligence still hinges on imagination’s *spontaneity* when it comes to constructing the progression of subjective forms.

In this progression, imagination is the only moment containing in itself both fundamental sides of spirit’s realization of itself. These are spirit’s idealization of otherness (*Ideenletzung*) and its self-manifestation (*Sichselbstoffenbarung*). Indeed, despite what Hegel writes in the “Introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit” in the *Encyclopædia*, that is, that spirit is fundamentally self-manifestation (§§383–§384), the idealization of externality seems to me to be the preliminary condition of spirit’s manifestation of itself.

In this alternate movement of internalization and externalization, Hegel retrieves from the *De anima* traits pertaining more to idealization than to the complementary movement of giving intelligence a being (*Entäußerung*). In particular, the description of the many-sided function of imagination, from the sedimentation of images in memory, which is a formed potentiality, to the possibility of their arbitrary recall, can be conceptually traced back to Aristotle. Thus the principle that intuition and concept are no longer forms given at the outset as separate, but rather form the two poles of givenness and constitution, of apparent passivity and activity, within the immanent motion of thought, shows that Hegel, who finds a similar movement in Aristotle, deems him more speculative than Kant, as well as at the same time that he intends his philosophy of subjectivity to go beyond Aristotle no less than Kant (and Fichte).

This can be seen better if we remind ourselves that the relationship between lower and superior functions is neither that between intuition and concept as in Kant nor that between sensation and intellect as in Aristotle. It is rather the transition from external to internal, from the space and time in which objects are at first to the space and time proper to spirit, the absolute norm of the object.\(^5^3\) By transforming the externality of the found into its possession, thanks to which it is free to es-
tablish arbitrary connections at will, without relying on externality (in other words, by transforming an intuition into an image), intelligence subsumes or appropriates in itself given contents and generates a universal representation (see also NS 46, §144). But what precisely is supposed to mark the difference between empirical intuition and universal representation?

§6.3. Universality. To explain this point, and given Hegel’s lack of any explanation, I believe a cross-examination with Aristotle and Kant will turn out to be useful in yielding a clearer picture. In the idea that an image, taken from its externality and retained as a permanent representation, can later serve as a general rule – or “attractive force” – for the empirical associative relation of images (ENZ.C §455 A), Hegel seems to side with Kant, decidedly against, if not the model of Aristotelian epagôgê, at least any Humean reading of it (that is, as ideas resulting from habit, strengthened by repetition). In the simile at the end of the Posterior Analytics, according to which the universal or the one alongside the many stabilizes in us “like a rout in a battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored” (II 19, 100a6), as well as in the adage found in the Nicomachean Ethics a propos of dispositions, according to which one swallow does not make spring, repetition or cumulativity is useful in highlighting the universal in the particular, and in discerning a determinate universal out of a generality. Epagôgê is not a proof but a dialectical tool for Aristotle; it neither constitutes the universal nor gives rise to the mind’s ideas, for the universal is already present in the thing potentially, and epagôgê simply makes it visible to us. However, as we read in the De Memoria, “repetition engenders nature” (452b 1); our senses’ disposition to discriminate is refined through repeated actualization, and so is our ability to find universals.

Hegel abandons any cumulative model when he writes that “the image does not become universal representation because intuition is repeated more often,” but merely because it is subsumed in the I.

If the single intuition is subsumed in the I like a particular under a universal, then here the I is tantamount to the unitary virtuality of thought, which Hegel calls the night of self-consciousness. The prob-

in which he describes, in thoroughly Kantian language, “activity within receptivity, the spontaneity sublating the passivity in sensation” (my italics).

54 Philosophische Enzyklopädie für die Oberklasse (1808 ff.), in NS 46, §144.
lem is that Hegel then thinks, quite arbitrarily, that he can find in Aristotle the same notion of the subject as self-consciousness, as a universal in which determinations inhere as particulars. For the very reason that Aristotle does not conceive of the subject as a concrete and active universal, he cannot then fill what in Hegel’s words is the split between the repetition and the strengthening of memory and science and the nous’s intellection of the discrete indivisibles, but instead needs the notoriously enigmatic nous thurathen (intellect supervening from without, De gen. anim. II 3, 736b 27–9), that is, a transcendent and independent principle, to turn essences into images in thought.

In what sense does Hegel share Kant’s starting point while moving beyond Aristotle? Certainly not because, as Rosenkranz suggested, the image in Hegel is equivalent to the schema in Kant: time is thought of in very different terms, and in fact in Hegel’s subsumption of an intuition under an image it is secondary and irrelevant. Nor does Hegelian imagination overlap completely with Kant’s schematism as the function of the productive imagination. Let me try to explain this point. A subsumption of a particular under the intelligence’s universality is only possible as a recognition of an affinity between intuition and image, between a contingent and found externality and our possession. In turn, this is possible because the image, our permanent representation, serves as a rule or principle of association; in other words, because the image has a normativity with respect to my subsequent perceptions of the same object. If all I had were a flux of representations, as Kant argued against Hume in the first edition of the Critique, I would not even be able to associate one impression or image with another. What I need is a principle allowing me to apprehend things as determinate: a concept representing the specific identity of the object.

Now for Aristotle, imagination – the most equivocal, underdetermined and heimatlos (homeless) of his concepts, to paraphrase what Heidegger says of Kant’s imagination – is not a faculty or an independent power, but the trace left over from (derived from and subsequent to) sensation. It is defined broadly as “that through which an image originates for us” (De an. III 3, 428a 1–2), thus as a movement and not as an activity, much less an activity referring to an I-think. Imagination is fundamentally reproductive; a fantasma, if taken as an image referring to the thing at all, is a copy, not a standard or model but a deriva-

55 This point is made explicitly by Hegel in the same section quoted above, NS 46, §144. For Rosenkranz’s text, see Erläuterungen (1870: 88).
tive proxy. As such, it draws its meaning from the thing for which it stands, the norm with respect to which it is at best commensurate, and mostly inadequate. While for Aristotle the relation between a form and its appearance to us in sensation aims at explaining the stabilization of a given form in our memory, for Kant, instead, the issue is approached within the question of the objective reality of our concepts.

Kant’s concern in the schematism is the inverse of Aristotle’s. The problem that Aristotle bequeathed to the post-Aristotelian tradition, the origin and the nature of the universal, is the opposite of the Kantian, which is the account of the possibility of our concepts referring a priori to intuitions. Kant is on this particular point definitely modern and Cartesian, for the purity of a subject now opposed to an unlimited range of possible external objects posits itself as the standard and norm of the representability and truth of objects. In parallel, forms are no longer the given essences of things but are constituted reflexively and methodically as the concepts by which we bestow an order on objectivity. Thus the concepts become the condition of the possibility of images, which are theoretically warranted as governed a priori by the schemata of the understanding. Imagination is understood as an activity of synthesis with reference to the originary synthetic unity of apperception and subject to the a priori determination of sensibility.56

If we now take up the Encyclopædia again and the notion that an image is the permanent representation that serves as the universal subsuming particular intuitions under itself, we realize that Hegel takes imagination to be the capacity for variation, on the basis of an abiding representation, of modes, aspects, and contours of intuited contents. Thus the first image, the representation, works as the norm for the variation on the further images and intuitions, which thus become idealities instead of given singularities. In the terms of the 1817 Encyclopædia, the image held fast as a representation is the negative power which “rubs off or levigates the uneven of similar images one against the other” (§376). If representation provides a pattern for the recognition of instances of similar content, it is their norm, it normalizes them, it equates them to its typified rule. The identity between representation and intuition is not given but produced through ever renewed acts of identification and subsumption.

56 About imagination in Kant and in the Aristotelian tradition, see my “Productive Imagination” (1995). I have discussed in greater detail imagination in Hegel, its understanding and its numerous underlying problems, in “Riproduzione di forme” (1997).
When the subsumption takes place, when we recollect, intelligence recognizes images and intuitions “as already its own” (ENZ.C §454). Images, from being the simple property or Eigentum of intelligence, become its possession (Besitz, ibid.). Images which are my properties lie pre-reflexively in my inner space; but when I at a given moment identify an image with the type I have in me as a possession (Besitz), I adequate this “found” to what is “mine,” the instance to the form, and I actualize what lies as a possibility in me into the touchstone of further intuitions (a touchstone which experience can rectify over time). Erinnerung is this relation: its meaning is that now intelligence can present to itself the inner at will. Images can be alienated from the pit of intelligence and held fast as discrete representations.

Intuition thereby becomes secondary with respect to recollection. Intelligence no longer needs to rely on intuitions; it is the power to “dispense with external intuition for its existence in it” (ibid.). Intelligence draws its contents out of its pit. The conscious use of intelligence is the actualization of its own pre-reflective virtuality.

Thus the transition from passivity to the freedom of connections has taken place. Contents are no longer given in intuitions but are connected arbitrarily and freely by intelligence. From the indispensable reliance on the external senses, we have now reached their subordination to ideality. With the transition to the freedom of connections, the senses, just like space and time, are at the service of spirit’s activity. They are functional to our relation with the external existence that spirit now freely gives itself; for example, sight and hearing, to the extent that they are in relation with intelligence’s more sophisticated and permanent mode of objective existence, and language.

In a parallel fashion, their relevance and the order of their ranking change. Insofar as it is mediated by the productive imagination and transformed into a sign, intuition is only insofar as it is sublated: that is, it loses spatial and pictorial connotations to become temporal existence as spoken language. It is now, in Hegel’s words, vanishing sound, “a disappearing from existence while it is,” thus “a second existence, higher than the immediate one” (ENZ.C §459, my transl.). From the primacy of sight we reach primacy of the temporal sense. Thus in Hegel productive imagination – unlike in Leibniz, for whom it was still a characteristic production of hieroglyphics for the eyes (and reasoning, however blind, must take its bearings by a vision of signs) – supplants any priority of sight in order to subordinate to itself the sense of ideality, hearing, and vocality, making itself intelligence manifest in time.
If for Aristotle the universal resides potentially in the mind but is no less potentially in the thing, and if for Hegel the stable representation of something is the universal subsuming under itself all further intuitions of the same, then for neither Aristotle nor Hegel is the universal the result of a universalization or generalization from a multiplicity of cases through abstraction and comparison, as it is for modern nominalism. On the one hand there are no bare particulars independent of and opposed to universals; on the other, universals are not aggregates or syntheses of a material manifold unified in time by us, but are given or produced as the universals-in-particulars. The alleged opposition between sensibility and understanding, between particularity in experience and universality in the mind, is the historical fiction of (some medieval and) modern philosophy. We perceive _and_ think complex categorial relations for both Aristotle and Hegel.\(^57\)

What is less clear is how for Aristotle we elicit a universal from a form we sense; and what remains underdetermined, to say the least, by Hegel is the question of universality I asked above: how and why in the _Erinnerung_ does an intuition first become universal as image, and what is the difference, if any, between intuition and image. A related problem is that something analogous to Aristotle’s principal point is lacking, that is, a theory of the trace or imprint of a seal on wax. Namely, there is no discussion whatever of the genesis of images prior to and independent of the emphasis on the I’s freedom, that is, on intelligence as “the power over the mass of images and representations which belong to it” (_ENZ.C_ §456). Nor do we find a discussion of grammar and rules for the use of signs in Hegel’s section on language (§459), or of intelligence’s presuppositions in representation, from the nonsymbolic grasp of the relation between sign and signified to the judgment necessary for the

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57 See Hegel’s notion of a rational intuition (_ENZ.C_§449–§450), as well as his point that even in “this leaf is green” we have a relation of categories such as being and individuality (_ENZ.C_§3 A). On Aristotle and incidental perception as perception of relations, and _epagogê_ as the manifestation of the universal in the singular, see above in this chapter, pp. 271–3.

One obvious difference between this and the categorial intuition or ideation of Husserlian phenomenology is that through the intentionality of ideation we are led to open up the question of the living temporality of consciousness and to redefine the a priori in temporal terms (e.g., Husserl’s _Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness_ I §33 ff.; _Experience and Judgment_, §8, and Heidegger’s _Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs_, Seminar of 1925). This is an avenue which is blocked by Hegel: the temporality of consciousness is an ideality, a suspension of the temporal flow and a uniform intemporal past which, in a way comparable to Essence in the Logic, is an intemporal has-been (BS545).
application of linguistic rules. And this shows that Hegel thinks imagination and representation, the fulcrum and middle point of theoretical spirit, as well as any other moment of it, from within the exclusive opposition between finding and producing, between immediate intelligence and intelligence for itself. All Hegel cares to show is the transition from the first to the second, that is, the idealism of knowing.

All this allows us to understand some important points. First of all, unlike in Kant, in Hegel imagination is first reproductive, and only thereafter is it productive. But although under this aspect Hegel seems, at least formally, to draw upon Aristotle, it must be pointed out that reproduction, rather than providing the intellect with a fantasma or proxy for the sensible thing, exhibits the arbitrium and the independence of intelligence over the present external intuitions. Thus reproduction is tantamount to the “issuing forth of images from the I’s own internality, that is now the power over them” (ENZ.C §455, Petry transl. modified). This opposes the Aristotelian phantasía no less than the Kantian imagination, so that such an arbitrium or freedom is only nominally reminiscent of the empirical association, which in Kant is definitive of the reproductive moment. Moreover, by productive imagination Hegel means a creation of signs (Zeichen machende Phantasie), not a schematic effect of the understanding over the intuition of space and time.

Second, in this new form, that is, semiotic phantasy, intelligence is no more a universal whose activity is confined to the spontaneous and idealizing determination of the modes of its receptivity, but a universal that objectifies itself in a particular intuition.

§6.4. Externalization. With this poietic and productive moment of imagination we step over the critical threshold of the Hegelian exposition. If so far what we have been witnessing is a progression in the idealization, now on the contrary imagination makes itself being (“brings the internal content into image and intuition,” ENZ.C §457 A, my transl.). It transposes its own content in intuitive signs, giving itself a figurative being (ein bildliches Dasein); that is, it posits its own universal representations as identical to the particulars represented by symbols, by signs and by language. If earlier imagination had accounted for the transition from the external particular to the universal, now imagination accounts also for the retransformation of the inner universal into particular existence. However, such a particular becomes the external which intelligence gives itself to intuit itself objectively, thereby acquiring an historical existence: something rational and posited instead of some-
thing found. Thus intuition is not valid in itself, for its content but for what it points to.

In this way imagination first internalizes the given and then reifies the rational. In doing so, I might add, imagination in a sense retains, or better unites in itself (if obviously in a quite different framework and with quite different results), both its alternative functions, that of stabilizing forms in our memory, as in Aristotle’s phantasia, and that of exhibiting concepts in intuitions, as in Kant’s pure productive imagination. But whereas Kant – here in conflict with the Leibnizian school, and in order to safeguard the autonomy of the schematic moment of the imagination, on which the Analytic of Principles hinges – strove to carefully distinguish among empirical usage, schematic, characteristic, or symbolic hypotyposes, and the transcendental essence of the productive imagination, for Hegel there is no heterogeneity among these moments. In fact, for Hegel imagination is an activity, and stands vis-à-vis thought as one of its inferior stages, that is, one of its provisional or unilateral modes. There is no clear-cut distinction between different and isolated faculties when the model is that of modes inhering in a concrete universal. As Hegel wrote in 1805–6, “in intuiting, spirit is image” (JSE III: 186); the image is one mode or form in which spirit is.

But if imagination is crucial in the progression, the decisive stage is what comes next: that is, where it subsides and, like all good Aristotelian production, disappears before its products. Just because imagination is no less idealization than externalization, it can then sublate any reference to images and become memory, an unperceived link among signs only – namely, the last stage of representation, which is also the first of thought ($§458$ A–§459).

The existence of the subjective (feelings, intuitions, and representations) is now the superior objective existence in the realm of representation, in signs, and especially the more abstract and ideal signs that constitute language.\footnote{For a preliminary introduction to the range of topics implicit in, and the secondary literature devoted to, the theme of language in Hegel, see my “Linguaggio in Hegel” (1987).} In language, signs, that is, names, are senseless externalities that only have meaning as names standing for something else. They are senseless in that anything pictorial or sensible is sublated. Re-presentation, the relation of “standing-for,” is now the more abstract relation between a name, a sign posited by intelligence, and a meaning.

Intelligence’s content exists as a name; a name is “the externality of
intelligence to itself” (*ENZ.C* §462, transl. Miller). But all that a name is in itself is merely a singular production of intelligence. Again, like in imagination, what we need is a connection endowed with permanence; and while with inwardization Hegel resorted to the metaphor of the pit, here he takes memory as an abiding system, a bond of signs. The conjunction of the inward representation with the outward intuition is external and arbitrary, in that there is no resemblance or intrinsic relation between sign and signified; but memory is the preservation or inwardization of this external connection. Memory elevates this single synthesis of sign and signified to a universal permanent connection in which name and meaning are objectively connected. The external intuition, which is the sign, being one with meaning, is automatically transformed into a representation once intelligence has learned the use of the word. But then the name “lion” no longer needs to evoke an intuition or image to be understood, grasped, and used meaningfully. Memory has sublated in the sign all sensible presence and all difference – and reference is the paramount case of difference at this level.

Just like in habit, in its manifestation as memory intelligence is now the insensitive possession of the content through which it moves freely in its signs; it is free in that it does not need to tarry and dwell over differences, which here are the determinateness of reference. As mechanical memory, we are liberating ourselves from nothing less than meanings. Thought does not have an external reference or meaning. A meaning is a “different,” while thought has only itself as object. For Hegel this means that, for thought, objectivity and subjectivity are no longer different. In understanding a name we need not associate with it an image or a meaning because the name is now seen by intelligence as the sign of its signified. “We *think* in names” (*ENZ.C* §462 A) – not in images. Obviously “understanding” and “using” differ from learning. What Hegel leaves unsaid is that we learn words at first through reference, but that once we have mastered the relation between sign and signified, we no longer need intuitions and images. The latter would actually impair and slow down the regular, free, and unimpeded flow of thought. They live on in virtuality and can be recalled at will, only because they have been *sublated* in names. Thus thought is at home with itself, and no longer has to worry about correctness. Its concepts are not to be measured against things but can be thought in themselves, in their truth.

59 This example is the same as in Fichte’s *Von der Sprachfähigkeit* (1795), in *W* 8: 325.
Memory is etymologically related to thought (Gedächtnis-Gedanke), writes Hegel (ENZ. C§464 A). The fact that we can recite a poem by heart has tremendous importance for him: it shows that intelligence is perfectly independent and self-reliant in this very alienation of itself, in its very externality to itself. While for Leibniz blind reasoning had been instrumental to intuitive vision, Hegel reverses this relation: once all differences are deposited in our intelligence, once we are the masters of all differences and of their possible combinations, we no longer need to see determinations. Again, what Hegel fails to mention is that mechanical memory is only possible because it preserves in itself the intuition that intelligence has sublated. But the direction is clear: memory is the mechanism of thought as habit was the mechanism of bodily self-feeling. Here too the result is that reliance on givenness is no longer necessary.

In conclusion, intelligence has shown to be the identity of thing and thought, it has produced its freedom from what had made it finite. This only means that it can relate to itself in truth, as the agent responsible for the entire process; it does not mean that we have done away with the world. In fact the world is now identical with thought, and thought is no longer subjective.

§6.5. Differences between Hegel and Aristotle. Let me now go back to Aristotle to formulate my final conclusions about the differences between Hegel and Aristotle on imagination, representation, and memory.

Even on language and memory Hegel could find in Aristotle theses similar to his own. For example, Hegel distinguishes the voice as it is for the animal organism from what it is in human language (ENZ. C§351; §401 Z; §411 Z), as does Aristotle (De an. II 8, 420b 29–421a 6). And like Aristotle (Polit. I), Hegel insists on language as the most rational medium of communication, as well as the product of a people. In particular, Aristotle criticized in the De interpretatione Cratylus’s thesis that names are by nature correct. There is no natural connection between thing and word; unlike images, which must look like the things to which they refer, words are conventional signs (4, 17a 1) which refer directly to the affections of the soul (pathêmata tês psuchês) and only indirectly to things, and which in addition are a finite set representing an inexhaustible multiplicity of things. If we read Aristotle’s συμβολον as Hegel’s sign (that is, not as what Hegel calls symbol at ENZ. C§458), we can find in the Encyclopædia a similar progression: the sign replaces the multiplicity of beings as an ideal medium in which intelligence can freely re-
late to itself and its inferior modes, without any reliance on externality; in the arbitrary sign, intelligence has sublated the direct reference to sensible externality. But that is only possible because the affections of the soul, or intelligence’s determinations, are already a reduction of singulars to affections, or tokens to types – the reduction of an infinite multiplicity to a finite number of subjective determinations. Hegel is right, then, when he says that language is universal only because it relies on intelligence’s subsumption of externality under its universality; representations are universal qua subjective, and thus language is also universal as a result, not the other way around (as it would seem from a simplistic reading of the chapter on sense-certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit).

It is quite obvious, though, that Hegel pursues this theme in a very different direction, and that from here on Aristotle has little to do with the development of Theoretical Spirit up to thinking, especially when it comes to the external existence of intelligence that is memory. True, in the Lectures Hegel translates the title of Aristotle’s treatise De memoria et reminiscencia by Von Erinnerung und Gedächtnis; further, Aristotle does talk of recollection as a sort of inference (sullogismos tis, De mem. 453a 9–11); and Hegel does repeat Aristotle’s claim that the young have a better memory than the elderly (ENZ C §464 A; see De mem. 450b 1–5). Finally, there is even a hint in the De anima of the inverse processes run through by sensation and recollection: while sensation is a movement stimulated by the thing which ends in the soul, recollection instead starts from the soul and ends with the traces left by sensation in the organs (I 4, 408b 17).

But Hegel treats memory as the liberation from images, the opposite of what Aristotle argues for. Thus he relates etymologically memory to thought, while Aristotle finds the root of memory in the “persistence” (mnêmê- monê, An. Post. II 19, 100a 3) of sense-images. Differently stated, Hegel promotes memory to a higher status, compared to which “the recent attempts – already, as they deserved, forgotten – to rehabilitate the mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination” (ENZ C §462 A, transl. Miller). Anamnesis or recollection for Aristotle is a voluntary association of images, and memory remains a sensible pathos, an affection of common sense; it is not the existence of thought, which has resolved and idealized objective givenness into logical determinations.60

60 Chiereghin interprets otherwise: he takes Gedächtnis as the level of science, which is in turn a retrieval of Aristotelian anamnesis (in Dialettica dell’assoluto, 1980: 446–9).
Hegel is right in seeing Aristotelian memory as a lower and subjective power having to do with images and not with names. That is because of the close connection between *fantasia* and memory emphasized by Aristotle. Let us take a step back and turn our attention to Aristotle’s conception of imagination for a moment. The function of imagination is to give us an image that presents us with the thing without its physical presence. An image is some sort of presence, in some cases the vicarious presence of the thing. But when considering an image, am I then intuiting something absent? And in what sense can an image be said to correspond to that of which it is an image? How does it come to be considered a likeness of the thing? When I remember, I have an image of the thing which I treat as a likeness or copy (*eikôn*) of that thing: Why?

Sensation impresses a transcription (*tupos*) in memory. When one remembers, is one contemplating the present affection, or that from which it is derived (450b 12–13)? If it is the present affection, then remembering and sensing would be the same, and we could not remember anything in its absence. If I failed to consider my present image of Coriscus an image of Coriscus, I would be presenting myself with a new image: if it were not a likeness, all images would be different objects of ever renewed contemplation. When I conjure up an image of Coriscus, my imagination works together with my memory, which is the disposition (*hexis è pathos*, *De mem.* 449b 25) constituted by our repeated distinction between image (*fantasma*) and the image-as-a-copy (*eikôn*), and by the repeated consideration of an image as a copy of the thing to which it refers.

When I remember, I must be “seeing and hearing what is not present” (450b 19–20). Differently stated, memory is a real “presencing of absence.” But unlike imagination, which only makes me visualize images, memory presences absence *qua absence*. Unlike in imagining, in remembering the images are considered as deriving from an actual perception: we are aware of having experienced the thing before, hence also of the time elapsed, and the image we envision now is regarded as a likeness precisely because of our consciousness of its temporal index.

As copies, images can function *in reference to* things. Whether we regard it as copy or as image, the image is one; what changes is not its re-

Curiously, it is interesting to note how Hegel both demythologizes Platonic anamnesis (and thereby distances himself from the charges leveled against him by Bloch) and takes it as the Platonic expression of the a priority of knowledge in his comments on *Meno* and *Phaedrus* (*VGPh* 43–50).
lation to the original, as it would be for Plato (Soph. 232a1–235c7), but our different thematization, our intentionality or “mode of contem-
plating” the image (to pathos tês theôrias, 450b 31). Yet when an image is a copy, it is not because it stands in for its referent the way a sign or a symbol would, but by virtue of resembling it; and memory is always of images, even when we remember intelligibles (450a 12–13).

That we think in images is a very well known Aristotelian thesis (De mem. 450a 1; De an. I 1, 403a 8; III 7, 431a 16–7; 431 b2; 8, 432a 10). It follows from the necessity that thinking have a present object of thought. Thinking needs an intuition filling its thematic consideration just as sensation needs a sensible thing to be activated; “to the thinking soul images [fantasmata] serve as perception” [aisthêmata] (De an. III 7, 431a 14–15; compare 8, 432a 4–11).61 I need to place the thing “before my eyes” (pro ommatôn, De mem. 450a 4) and consider the absent thing in its image “as if I saw it” (hôsper horôn, De an. III 7, 431b 7). However, the exact nature of the dependence of thinking on images is a mat-
ter of dispute. While I believe that Simplicius, among others, was one-
sided in saying that Aristotle really meant that imagination is only required by the discursive soul, since the thinking soul is in identity with its object and not related through otherness or images (in De an. 267, 30–2), I also think that to make thinking dependent on imagination would be an undue restriction of Aristotle’s position, at odds with III 5 and the denial of the corporeal basis of thinking. Let me explain.

Obviously intelligibles are immanent in sensibles, and therefore they are apprehended on the basis of the images left over from our sensa-
tion of them. But, contrary to a widespread belief, Aristotle’s point that we cannot think without images does not reduce thought to images. An image is prior for us, for our apprehension and memory, not by nature. Aristotle makes himself quite clear when he distinguishes between ob-
jects of memory properly so called from objects of memory kata sumbe-
bêkos (450a 27).62 He also argues, in a passage which has rarely attracted the attention of commentators in this context (An. Post. I 10, 77a 1–3), that when a geometrician draws a triangle the figure only has an illustrative function. He contemplates or sees, as it were, the essence of the triangle in light of the image (see the connection between sight, faos, and fantasma at De an. III 3, 429a 3); but the relation between the two

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61 For a commentary on aisthêma see Sorabji, On Memory 82–3.
62 In the Addition to ENZ.C §455, Hegel may be referring to Aristotle when he says: “Also pure thoughts can be reproduced; however, imagination does not deal with them but with their images.”
is not direct or necessary. The image is irremediably particular and de-
terminate because through it my imagination reproduces what appears
to me in sensation. The image can help me understand or remember
aspects of the thing; but for Aristotle I do not simply translate into con-
cepts what is present in an image. The image presents me with the thing
I think; but it is precisely the particularity I must neglect, for there can
be nothing universal about an image as image.

We cannot think without an image. For the same thing occurs in think-
ing as in the drawing of a figure. There, although we do not make use of
the triangle’s determinateness of quantity, yet we draw it with a determi-
nate quantity. Similarly in thinking, although we do not think of the
quantity, yet we place a quantity before our eyes, but do not think of it as
of a quantity (De mem. 449b 24–450a 6).

Differently stated, thinking works against the particularity of images.
It often resists misleading appearances and thus “contradicts the imag-
ination” (De insomn 460b 16–20; see De an. III 3, 428b 2–4; hupolêpsis
keeps fantasia in check in De an. III 3). Imagining and remembering
are the subjective acts of the presentification of things the objective con-
tent of which is irreducible to them. Thus Hegel is right when he says
that, Aristotle’s empiricist metaphors notwithstanding, thinking is for
him far from reducible to corporeal impressions.63 Besides, in the no-
tion of eikôn Aristotle shows that he is talking about what we could call
re-presentation. To have an image as a likeness is to possess the thing
in its representation.

Yet Aristotelian nous looks to the original when it thematizes an im-
age as a copy. The image of the triangle puts me in contact with its
essence. The representation is only worth its connection to the origi-
nal, and it retains not just a reference to it but a similarity with it. For
Hegel, on the contrary, the thing enjoys a higher ideality, a second-de-
gree existence, in representation. Das Seinige, the recollected content,
is more valuable than das Seiende, the being it derives from. Hegel seems
simply to invert the point of Aristotle’s example of the picture painted
which can be seen either as picture or as copy (De mem. 450b 21 ff.),

63 The problem that most keenly bothered the Eleatic Stranger, that is, how exactly we
have access to the original if not in its image (compare Rosen, Sophist, 1983: 147–203),
is subjectivized by Aristotle in the question of how the form becomes a universal for us
(An.Post. II 19), and finally dispensed with by Hegel in the idea of the subsumption of
intuitions in intelligence.
where copy means precisely that it draws its meaning from what it refers to, when he says in the *Aesthetics* that, though seeing a living and a painted lion makes no difference to my representation, the copy or painted lion stems from spirit. It is a production of human ingenuity, and has thus a much higher value than the existing lion (*JA* 14: 272). Intelligence’s arbitrariness is a mark of truth because it is the arbitrariness of a free subjectivity. Hegel is here anti-Aristotelian only because he is anti-Platonic and opposes the criticism of poetry as twice removed from truth (*Resp.* X).

In contrast to this, Hegel seems to be anti-Aristotelian and Platonist when he speaks of recollection. An activation of memory is only possible for Aristotle as recollection, as the voluntary beginning of a search for the missing link. For Hegel, the recollecting activity is the principle of bringing forth out of one’s own interiority (a principle he could have found in Plato’s *Meno*; see the “*ex hautou*” at 85d) a plurality of images over which intelligence has command and which it can organize and connect at will.

Finally, intelligence is poietic and productive for Hegel. Like a king Midas who turns everything he touches into gold, intelligence infects everything with its spirituality. Its signs and symbols are therefore superior to what they stand for, just as language is superior to the infinite multiplicity of things, and the universality of intelligence to the particularity of outer existence. For what intelligence produces is not intellection, as the Aristotelian active *nous*, but rather a second-degree world, the world of representation which is then translated into logical determinations and thus considered in its truth.

§6.6. Conclusion. At this point let me draw this section to a conclusion. Only because intelligence for Hegel is the in-itself of the other, the power of connection, the *one of the many* and, specifically in these sections, the “attractive force of images” (§454–§455), it can be what Hegel calls the free negativity of the self. This is the potency of having an object from which one can abstract, and, in distinguishing itself from it, recognize oneself as the identity and the condition of the possibility of the thematization of different objects in the continuity of experience. With recollection, an internalized image, one can understand intuition by recognizing it as what already belongs to intelligence, insofar as it is a permanent representation. *Whereas in intuiting spirit came to know the intuited, now spirit cognizes itself in the intuited.* The meaning of all this
is the discovery of spirit’s self-consciousness as the truth of imagination and of representation.

In this reconstruction, to employ the dictum from Hegel’s *Lectures* on Aristotle’s *Physics*, the empirical *is* the speculative precisely because the active moment of imagination (in the non-Kantian sense of conferring ideal citizenship to the sensible) is already immanent in the subsumption of the intuited in the I. Every intelligent activity bestows intelligence’s universality on its products. To express in classical terms a point which Hegel adopts from Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s *Parmenides*, we can say that the spirit as concrete universal, the one of the many, *is* the one beside the many. Or, to express the same point in Kantian terms, every particular concept is in a restricted way what the I-think is unconditionally.

For Hegel there is a first in itself – the Concept, the Absolute, the divine self-consciousness – and a first for us: before pure thinking, we have emotions, images, and desires for things; only later do we rise to their concepts. But if these inferior forms of the thematization of objectivity were to remain outside knowledge, if their content were not sublated and given truth in thinking, we would have a non-dialectical split between the empirical and the speculative. Anthropology and Psychology would extrinsically oppose the Concept, whereas instead the true is at first for us as sensed and represented. If the systematic task is that of showing each form in its truth, in the Concept, that means precisely to show it as the provisional and finite moment of spirit’s self-manifestation.

In this task Hegel presupposes the Kantian transcendental deduction as given. To be sure, as we see in §4 and again in this section, Kant is wrong in attributing to subjectivity from the outset an empty I-think, and he is wrong not to show it as the self-constituting process of spirit, as the autodetermination already present in organic life as a presupposition of consciousness. Taking the difference between sensibility and understanding as a hiatus and a difference in nature, rather than in degree, reflects this misconceived relation between passivity and activity. But it is true that for Hegel the forms of knowledge and will must be comprehended and ascribed to the synthetic originary unity of apperception, now understood as absolute self-consciousness or infinite reason. Only thus can one understand how Hegel interprets the relationship between Aristotle’s divine *nous* and human intellect as the concretization of the universal, as the active presence of the infinite in the
finite. Were it not thus, the empirical would be only the empirical, it would never be the speculative.

It is in this fashion that Hegel curiously inverts the Kantian concept of Darstellung des Begriffs or the exhibition of the concept in concreto: space and time are no longer forms of intuition, but the Dasein, the existence of the Concept. Therefore it is not I who exhibit the concept in intuition, as in the mathematical construction of the Kantian Doctrine of Method; it is rather the concept which assumes a finite form in the existence outside of itself in nature, or in the finite empirical subjects of knowing and acting.

In sum, for Hegel, imagination and memory are not, as in Aristotle, an affection of the common sense, a remnant of sensation. Qua representation or formal thinking, and, above all, qua linguistic schematism (to use an early phrase of Fichte), they are rather a moment of pure thought. And, instead of being self-affection as in Kant, the effect of the understanding over the spatiotemporal intuition, they are rather the essential moment of the self-determination and of the finitization of thought in us.

§7. Hegel’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Nous

The Philosophy of Theoretical Spirit concludes with intelligence, which “knows that what is thought is, and that what is is only in that it is thought” (ENZ.C §465). By knowing reality, spirit has come to know itself.

Does Aristotle not appear to argue the same? For him the soul is somehow all things (hê psuchê ta onta pôs esti panta, De an. III 8, 431b 21). And if the intellect is potentially all things but none in actuality before thinking them, “once the intellect has become each of its objects . . . then it can think itself” (III 4, 429b 6, 9–10, my transl.). If it does not want to be an obstacle to the reception of the intelligible form, the nous cannot have a form of its own. It must be a potentiality to become the things it thinks, just as sense is potentially all sensibles. But unlike sense, the intellect cannot have an organ or be in contact with anything material.

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64 Von der Sprachfähigkeit (1795); in W8: 322.
65 In this brief reconstruction all I aim at is a summary, hopefully in neutral and general enough terms, of the most controversial point of Aristotle’s philosophy. I focus on what is relevant for the Hegelian exegesis without taking a stand on the endless disputes about the nature of the intellect. Whether the active intellect is identical with the prime mover, as it was for Alexander; whether, on the contrary, it is a separate substance but
If the intellect is potentially all intelligibles, it needs a cause to make it actual. In all of nature there is an efficient cause and a potentiality, likewise there must be an intellect that can become all things (tôi panta gînesthai) and an intellect that produces them all (tôi panta poiein), just as light makes potential colors actual. This second intellect, being by its essence actual, is separate, incomposite, and impassible (chôristos kai amighês kai apathês, III 5, 430a 17–18); it cannot but always think and is thus immortal and eternal (III 5, 430a 23–4).

When it thinks it is identical with the object of thought. “In the case of things without matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge (epistêmê hê theôrêtikê) is the same as its object” (III 4, 430a 3–5, transl. Hett; the same in III 5, 430a 20 and Met. Λ 9, 1075a 1–3). In theoretical science, or speculative knowledge, we do not think things through the mediation of images, nor do we think them as referring to the material composite; rather, for the thinking individual, who must first acquire the forms it then thinks, the mediation of corporeality is necessary, thus the intellect is corporeal and passive (pathêtikos, 430a 24).66

Hegel, who identifies the passivity with the potentiality of the intellect, takes it as only a “possibility before actuality” (VGPh 214);67 the principle of the identity in actuality of nous and noêta, the truth of “the

inferior to God, as it was for Averroes; whether the intellect, in other words, is a transcendent principle thinking in us or immanent to our soul, as Aristotle writes at III 5, 430a 13–14, and as first Themistius and later Aquinas insist contra what De Corte calls Alexander’s misunderstanding (Doctrine de l’intelligence, 1933: 54); why, furthermore, the intellect makes us think if it is unmixed with our body; and what, finally, it means that the intellect always thinks, and what its relation is to the divine nous of Met. Λ 7–9 – all these questions always remain open.

66 Themistius (in De an. 159–61) identifies this corruptible intellect with the subject of a passage in the first book, where Aristotle says that memory, dianoia, and affections perish together with the common organism (tou koinou, I 4, 408b 25–9). He is followed here by Aquinas, and in this century by De Corte (Doctrine de l’intelligence, 1933: 82 ff.) and Seidl (Begriff des Intellekts, 1971: 109, 129), among others. Brentano seems to repeat Aquinas, but is actually more influenced by Trendelenburg; he unites potential (III 4, 429b 30–1) and passive (III 5, 430a 24) intellect in the concept of sensory representations (Sinnesvorstellungen; Die Psychologie, 1867: 165–8).

67 This is the beginning of Hegel’s misinterpretation, according to Düsing (Geschichte, 1983: 131; Subjektivität, 1976: 309), who believes that Hegel misunderstands potentiality and actuality altogether. As I point out in Chapter 3, I do not think Hegel is wrong when he translates dunamis as the in-itself of actuality. Therefore I think that the misinterpretation only begins when Hegel turns activity into an absolute prius which finitizes itself, that is, when he interprets the divine intellect as the principle active in all lower beings.
Hegel reads the intellect as the self-referential and self-conscious foundational activity which makes possible and mediates any reference to givenness. In the Nürnberg translation of *De an.* III 4–5, he begins with 429b 22, presumably because he found this principle expounded in a dense and concentrated form in this passage. But if we look at how he translates the beginning of III 4 (429a 10–b 22) in the later Lectures, we realize that he inserts a negation into Aristotle’s comparison; as a result, he interprets the sentence “as the sensitive is to the sensible, so is the intellect to the thinkable” (that is, as receptive of them, 429a 16–17 Hett transl. modified), as if Aristotle claims that “the intelligible is object but not as the sensible” (VGPh 212). The reason for this slip does not lie simply in an anticipation of the qualification added by Aristotle a few lines below, that the potentiality of the intellect is not impassible in the same sense as sensibility, due to the lack of a corporeal organ (429a 29–31). Rather, it lies in the principle with which Hegel immediately concludes: “the intelligible is deprived of the form of objectivity,” and thinking has as its object itself and its products. In sensation, instead, the sensible appears at first as “an other, a being, as opposed to activity” (ibid.), hence it cannot refer to itself but is still affected by some sort of opposition.

It is not incorrect to say that in pure science, in that which has no matter (“in spirit,” as Hegel puts it, VGPh 215), the intellect is the thing itself, while in that which is material thinking is only potential and in itself (ibid.). In Aristotle this had meant that the identity of thinking and intelligible is only possible when the forms are thought without reference to matter, so that the intellect then moves about in its own element, as it were. Nor is it wrong to say that the *nous* somehow informs even lower stages of human learning that temporally come before thinking proper: after all, the intellect defines the human soul, and without it we would not draw conclusions from experience; *epagôgê* itself would be impossible without a cooperation between intellect and the senses. But Hegel’s conclusion from all this is thoroughly un-Aristotelian: the relation between active and potential intellect is posited by thinking, which “makes itself into passive intellect, into the objective,  

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68 Hegel seems to echo Themistius’s words, according to which the potential intellect is the “prelude” to the productive intellect “like dawn is to light, like seed to fruit” (*in De an.* 105, 26–32).
the object for itself: *intellectus passivus* (VGPh 213). It seems clear to Hegel that, if the active intellect is nothing but activity, and if its essence is efficient causality (*Wirksamkeit*), as III 5 argues, then it must be taken as the eternal activity of finitizing itself in the sensible as a whole.

In the sensible as a whole – and not in the Aristotelian potential intellect, which is a personal and individual intellect, for the latter notion has been meanwhile stretched and generalized into a very bizarre construction overlapping with the former. Passive *nous* is now the finite in its in-itself rationality, or reality insofar as it is thinkable: objective intelligibility. “That the world, the universe in itself, is rational, this is the *nous pathêtikos*” reads the note of an auditor in Hegel’s 1820 class. In the words of the Lectures, “passive *nous* is nature, and also what senses and represents in the soul is the *nous* in itself” (VGPh 216). In the manuscripts edited by Jaeschke and Garniron, the content of *nous* is the *nous* itself qua “*alles Gedachte . . . , panta noêta*” (“all that is thought,” J/G 88).

The rationality of nature, the fact that “nature contains the Idea in itself” (VGPh 215), becomes explicit in thinking, which is the identity of concept and objectivity or thinking and thought. This can be rephrased as follows: the intellect splits itself into an active and a thinkable intellect (“*der Nous ist der noêtos, das Gedachtwerdende*,” J/G 88).

But the totality of intelligibles, the Idea in itself, is mediated in and through spirit’s idealization. Like everything finite, the soul in general and sensation in particular is “merely the *dunamis* for thinking. The *nous* is everything in itself” (J/G 91). Insofar as it is *noêton*, the object of active thinking, the soul is, even in its lowest forms – which for Hegel even includes animal magnetism and sleep-walking, and for Aristotle breathing, reproduction, and eating – *nous* pathêtikos. The potentiality of soul to be all things is identified by Hegel with the passive intellect (VGPh 217) just because all thought-determinations are *virtually present* in the soul. Since the logos of the thing “is the logos of the soul itself” (VGPh 212), once they are freed from matter the forms exist in their purity; but as such they are thought and apprehended as the soul’s very idealities, just as it happens in Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Forms have become spirit’s progressive stages and products, and these

differ only by degree of clarity and complexity, ranging from the inadvertent and found feelings of the Anthropology to the Psychology’s posited representations.

The arbitrariness of this interpretation corresponds well to Hegel’s free use of the De anima in the Encyclopædia. As we saw in §4, on the soul as spirit’s substantial life and sleep, that which is insensitively and implicitly present in the soul is directly equated with “the passive nous of Aristotle, which is all things according to possibility” (ENZ.C §389). It is particularly instructive to read the section corresponding to this in the 1817 Encyclopædia (§311). Here “the simple unconscious thought” is “the nous of the ancients.” Whenever Hegel speaks of the “nous of the ancients” he is thinking of the Anaxagorean principle of the world which had laid the ground for taking reality as thought. What he means is the intelligibility of the world, and he calls this the great idea of objective thinking analyzed in Chapter Two above, i.e., that “there is understanding, or reason, in the world” (ENZ.C §24 A), or that “the essence of the world is to be defined as thought” (WL 1: 44, SL 50).

The Philosophy of Subjective Spirit shows the inferior forms of spirit as intelligibility in itself; they are the noêton, the object of thought, for thinking as reason. And only this is complete entelechy and end to itself. The activity of the intellect is thus its self-position. And since Hegel interprets the noësis noëseôs as the supreme dignity of the thinking activity, which is Spinozistically immanent in its attributes (as we see in Chapter 3), he understands absolute thinking as active in finitude. Thus he interprets the self-conscious intellect as “the absolute prius” of nature (ENZ.C §381). He therefore concludes that for Aristotle the same relation holds between finite spirit (the De anima) and absolute spirit (Met. Λ 7–9) (with the obvious crucial reservation that Aristotle’s limitation is to consider the absolute as exemplary for the finite, not as Sichselbstentfaltung or self-actualization in the finite, that is, in history and objectivity: VGPh 148–9, 413–14).

In the Lectures the treatment of the active intellect of De an. III 5 is invariably followed by reference to, and discussion of, the divine intellect from Met. A. The divine intellect thinks what is best, thus its own activity; it is absolute, and end to itself. It communicates itself to finite thinking, which is activity within passivity, and actually “produces what appears as the object to be taken up” or assimilated (Aufgenommenwerdendes, VGPh 218).

What is this misinterpretation rooted in? In Hegel’s very conviction about the speculative essence of Aristotle’s philosophy – in the seem-
ingly harmless, yet substantially misguided transformation of Aristotle’s principle that “the nous is potentially all its objects” into the quite different “the totality of intelligibles is the passive nous.” While “all” refers to the identity in actuality of the intellect with each of its objects in turn, and is thus a distributive generic term, the totality is already a wholistic shift from discrete identities to one underlying and fundamental in-itself identity. Unfortunately for Hegel, Aristotle’s principle cannot be conceived in terms of what Hegel calls a speculative sentence, where subject and predicate can be dialectically exchanged.

Passive nous can comprehend both nature as the Idea outside itself and finite spirit because the two are the finite existence that the absolute Idea gives itself to actualize itself and to regain itself as free subjectivity in a syllogism. If for man the world is at first a presupposition – and this is all that “finitude” means – then in itself or in truth it is rather the absolute that finitizes itself in externality. This is what Hegel makes of the logical and ontological priority of the active intellect over the potential intellect in the De anima.

That this relation between passive and productive intellect is irreconcilable with Aristotle is not apparent to Hegel. For him intelligence liberates itself from externality to know itself as the realization of the absolute in the finite, as the Idea incarnate in it. To do so it must purify thought-determinations from their representational and substantial substrates, and thus thematize them in themselves. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the form is not produced by thought, but is the specific difference that is postulated as also existing somehow (pôs) in the soul. From an Aristotelian viewpoint, the very interpretation of passive nous as the totality in itself seems to reinstate a sort of world-soul, the logical objectively pulsating in nature, against which Aristotle could not have been more explicit in De an. I 3. The self-moving cosmic soul of the Timaeus (34a), eternally thinking (Leg. X, 893c), praised by Hegel (VGPh 89 ff.), is criticized by Aristotle because it does not explain the unity of soul and body or how the soul can think itself ad infinitum. Infinite thinking is absurd to begin with: the practical logoi are like straight lines which find their end and rest in the good, while the theoretical logoi find theirs in the conclusions of demonstrations (De an. I 3, 407a 22–31). If one were to take Hegel’s thesis of the self-presupposition and circularity of knowledge literally, one would have to conclude that, for Aristotle, Hegel would be behaving like Xenocrates (An. Post. I 3).

Obviously, as we have seen, it is in the more general idea that spirit is self-referential actiosity, or the actualization of its potency, that Hegel
wants to retrieve Aristotle. But what he misses is that this “finitude of thought” is not a regrettable extrinsic limitation of Aristotle’s philosophy, a negligible one-sidedness stemming from the disregard of the mutual compenetration of God and world and from lack of systematicity, as we will see in a moment apropos the finite and discrete identity between nous and each of its objects in turn. If for him the peak is the identity of thinking and thought, and if the true substance is God, then the relation between human and divine intellects is that which pertains between an absolute truth and its finite instance. Finite reason apprehends categories starting from a world opposed to it, in time; but the “in and for itself” intellect (this is how Hegel translates nous chòristheis at VGPh 216) is the absolute unity of thought and object. Even though it appears that it can think itself by taking up the intelligible, it is still the activity of taking it up, hence the thematization and production of it (in the broad Encyclopædia sense seen in §6).

Hegel does not overlook or neglect passages that conflict with his interpretation. For example, even though he does not seem to find problematic the equiparation of chòristos and chòristheis, both rendered as “in and for itself” (VGPh 216), he does not ignore the immortality of the active intellect, which always thinks (430a 22). Thus in response to the perplexity raised by Aristotle, as to why it is that the human intellect does not always think, one is justified in presuming that he would answer that the absolute is always in actuality, that it is in fact itself activity, and that the finite intellect, in that it has presuppositions and must first learn before it knows, is a finite aspect of the same. Man dies as a material composite, but by thinking he elevates himself to the infinity of the absolute reason which is reflected in him.70

If I may be allowed to speculate on Hegel’s behalf and elaborate on

70 That Hegel thinks that inwardization and memory is the essence of finite thought is apparent from his very translation of the De anima in Nürnberg (as Chiereghin has noticed; Dialettica dell’assoluto 1980: 447.) In one of the most disputed passages of III 5 (430a 23–4), Aristotle writes of the active intellect: “we do not remember, because it is impassible” (ou mnêmoneuomen de, hoti touto men apathes). The passage is sometimes read without the comma, which alters its meaning as follows: “we do not remember that it is impassible.” Whether Aristotle is referring to the immortality and the prior life of the intellect, as argued by Nuyens (L’évolution, 1948: 306–9), or is saying that after death we have no memory because memory is part of the perishable intellect (for example, De Corte, Doctrine de l’intelligence, 1933: 84–5), is not clear. Hegel himself wavers: in Nürnberg he translates the passage thus: “Wir haben aber kein Bewusstsein” (“we are not conscious” of its immortality; Kern, “Eine Übersetzung,” 1961: 51 line 47). In the later Lectures he interprets the hoti as a causal adverb, not a conjunction, and translates thus: “we do not remember because it is not passive” (“Wir erinnern uns aber nicht”; VGPh 216).
his interpretation for a moment, I would say the following. For Hegel, if the intellect is everything potentially, thus nothing before it thinks, then when it does think, its object is thought itself. The fundamental suggestion he is putting forth is that the separate intellect, concerning the existential status of which so many problems arose, is nothing but the activity of thinking – which taken in itself does not need images, is free, activates itself at will, is immortal and never ending. By contrast, the acquisition of concepts and the beginning of thought from things makes the very same activity finite and initially passive. But the passivity does not entail any passivity for thinking in itself.

There is something ingenious in this interpretation. We must not think of the separate and immortal \textit{nous} as a substance about which we proceed to ask where it resides, thus making it again something finite and spatiotemporal. Just as the soul must be defined as a function, just as the capacity to chop defines the axe (\textit{De an.} II 1, 412b 28–413a 1), and sensing is an activity defined by actualization, so thinking, which unlike sense has no organs, must be an activity that can start itself. It is then otiose to look for the productive \textit{nous} somewhere, for example, to locate it in God. The productive \textit{nous} is nowhere other than in thinking, because it is nothing other than thinking; and thinking, irreducible to the thinker or to the psychological conditions for thought, can be said to be separate from them. Where before it was a noun standing for a thing, “\textit{nous}” is now turned into a verb denoting an activity that may occur anywhere and at any time, and which consequently is independent of time. Just as science is irreducible to scientists’ thoughts, thinking in itself is irreducible to thinking for particular subjects of thought. Subjects of thought can actually be understood as the modes or concrete existence of thinking in itself. Thinking pluralizes itself into several thoughts; thoughts or concepts are the determinate or partial self-differentiation of the Concept as a concrete universal. Put differently, no thinking is possible except as a mode and negation of this thinking in itself. This is what Aristotle would have meant by III 5, 430a 25 (“nothing thinks without it”).

But the trouble is that this cannot explain why Aristotle asks how this intellect always thinks (430a 23) – to say that thinking thinks would be a \textit{petitio principii}, or at best a meaningless and noninformative statement for this interpretation. And thinking’s eternity would remain a mystery, just like the meaning of the “we do not remember” (430a 24).

Besides, this is an attempt at explaining what Aristotle left unexplained. Aristotle never clarified the relation between human and di-
vine intellects. He says that they are both essentially activity (Met. Λ 7, 1072b 26–7; De an. III 5, 430a 18). The intellect is the divine in man (Eth.nic. X 8, 1177b 30–1), and the life of the intellect is our form of immortality (athanatizein, 1177b 34). Since the human intellect is what is most similar in kind (suggenestatoi, X 9, 1178a 26–7; Met. Λ 7, 1072b 15–25) to the divine, the highest human happiness is thinking, which is a homoioma of, similar to, divine life.71

What do the two intellects think? Our nous is insofar as it thinks the noêta, the intelligible essences or forms – that is, insofar as it is not itself but the thing in its essence. However, it is a likening to God made possible by the separate intellect.

Alexander is not wrong when he writes that this likening or assimilation to God is due to the very production of intelligibles on the part of the poietic intellect; but his identification of this production with the intellect coming from without (De an. 91, 1–4), with the divine intellect, is questionable (and of course has historically been questioned).

Though it makes sense in view of the fact that Aristotle does write that the separate intellect always thinks (De an. III 5, 430a 6, 22), it raises at least three problems. First, how can it belong in the human soul (anagkei en tei psuchei huparchein tautas tas diaphoras, De an III 5, 430a 13–14)? Second, in the case of the divine intellect, the nous is perennial noesis, that is, it is essentially activity; for humans the nous is instead a potentiality that is actualized in the noesis. Differently stated, the nous is not identical with its activity (for humans, thinking may be divine, but the intellect is not unqualifiedly so). Third, whatever is the meaning of the necessity for humans to think in images, that must mark another difference from divine thought, which obviously is not mediated by sensible images.

The first objection is raised by Themistius (in De an. 103) and Philoponus (in De an. 48; compare also Ross in De an. 45). But if it holds, the burden of proof is on them to explain the transcendence of the divine intellect and the relation that the divine intellect has to the human; besides, they must explain the fact that productive nous always thinks (and here the “immanentistic” interpretations differ, mostly as variations on the principle of the unique intelligence universally operative in all humans to be found in Themistius, in De an. 103, 26–30).

What does the nous toi panta poiein make? In what sense is it produc-

71 Eth.nic. X 8, 1178b 27. This is a transformation of the Platonic theme of homoiosis theoi, Theaet. 176c.
tive? And of what? Aristotle compares it to light, and says it is a kind of state (hexis). Light does not make its objects; it makes them visible (by being the actuality, energeia, and state, hexis, of the transparent, De an. II 7, 418b 9–10, 18–20). Now while for Aristotle light is what makes things visible, for Alexander it is what is most visible itself (hence the intellect is what is the most intelligible, to malista noêton, De an. 89). This remark helps me to rephrase the question: “What do the two intellects think?” in these terms: “Could human and divine thinking share this directedness to the same object, the activity of thinking itself?”

As in all similes, this metaphor of light leaves unexplained more than it accounts for. If light is both hexis and energeia, is it a first or second actuality – that is, does the productive intellect produce the disposition or the exercise of thinking, the visibility of forms or the seeing of them? A related question is: how can light illuminate itself? As Hegel wrote in the Logic with regard to Being and Nothing, unqualified or absolute light is indistinguishable from complete darkness. And obviously a source of light, just by making things visible, will always disappear from sight, itself becoming a blind spot. Yet Aristotle says of the intellect that in theoretical science, that is, in things without matter where thinking and thought are the same (Met. Λ 9, 1074b 35–1075a 4), it thinks itself. The same words return in De an. III 4, 430a 2–5. In this chapter Aristotle has written that the intellect cannot have a form but is itself the place of forms (429a 27–9); it knows when it thinks the essence or form and becomes each of its objects (b 6–7). Once it has apprehended forms, once it has become a hexis or a formed disposition with regard to them like the learned man with regard to the objects of his knowledge, it has become a first actuality. Aristotle thinks he has thus established two conclusions: this first actuality is a potentiality for its exercise; it can activate itself at will and at any time. In addition, it makes the intellect capable of thinking itself.

While the first conclusion explains the spontaneity and independence of thinking, the second is not very clear about exactly what the intellect thinks when it thinks itself. A science is always a science of a certain subject; that in science there is no difference between the things

73 429b 7–10. Bywater’s emendation (autos di’hautou for autos de hauton – accepted also by Ross; in Hamlyn’s translation: “it can think by itself,” instead of “it can think itself”) seems to make things easier, but it simply eliminates the problem and is therefore at odds with all the comparable passages in De anima and Metaphysics where the same thought occurs.
and the concepts of them sedimented in our soul does not alter the fact that thought’s self-consciousness is indirect and mediated by knowledge of its objects.

This is explicitly stated by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (A 9, 1074b 35–6): “It appears that knowledge and sensation and opinion and thought are always of other objects and only incidentally of themselves” (Apostle transl.; “incidentally” translates *en parergôi*). Unlike in sensation, which is aware of itself but which is actualized by sensible things, thinking possesses the forms habitually and can think of them at will; in Owens’s words, this “makes possible the intellect’s knowledge of itself.”

But what this leaves unexplained is the content of the *nous*’s thinking of itself. What does it know by thinking itself? For one thing, this self-consciousness is completely immersed in its consciousness of objects. Differently stated, there is no further reflection on the self-identical I abiding over time in contradistinction to whatever diverse contents it may have. Hence, no primacy of *nous*’s self-consciousness is inferred. Unlike a Cartesian mind, *nous*’s self-consciousness is dependent on its cognition of things. Second, Aristotle asks how the intellect can be an object of thought (*De an.* III 4, 429b 26). He writes that the intellect thinks itself the way it thinks intelligibles, as the first actuality of intelligibles.

It seems to me that if for Aristotle to know is to think a form, then either (1) the *nous* thinks itself qua thinking a form, thus has in view the form, that is, its actual identity with each of its intelligibles in turn, as well as itself, but so surreptitiously that one is led to wonder what content this thinking has other than the relation of the intelligible to the thinker; or (2) the *nous* thinks itself, in non-Aristotelian language, as the in-itself or potentiality of its identity and difference with its object, as the place of forms or dispositional intellect (to use Philoponus’s phrase, *in De an.* 21, 2–3). In the second case, however, it does not think itself as a form, hence it knows itself as little as it did in the first case. In other words, when thought thinks itself, two different consequences may follow, both presenting difficulties for the consistency of Aristotle’s theory. The first is that the unicity and indivisibility of the intellection of each essence is already thought together with the multiplicity of di-

anoetic cognitions following from it in science. Thereby, however, the distinction in the *Posterior Analytics* between principles and demonstration is blurred; in this case, we must take Aristotle to mean by “*nous*” not the discontinuous intellection of indivisibles and principles that the *nous* is in *De anima*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Posterior Analytics*, but what he calls *sophia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (VI 7, 1141a 19: “wisdom is intellect and science together”), that is, something closer to Hegel’s infinite reason. The alternative consequence is this: since the intellect does not think of a form when thinking itself, then its object is not its object the way intelligibles are, contrary to Aristotle’s statement at 430a 2–3.

In this reflexivity of thinking, Aristotle seems to assume a distinction between thinking and knowing, which does not hold in the case of the knowledge of things. Even so, this is a description of the reflexivity of thinking, not an explanation of self-consciousness, let alone of self-knowledge.75

Now Hegel seems content to read the divine *nous* as essentially the activity of thinking itself in order to find in Aristotle the same relation of identity and difference between human and absolute thinking as in his system. But since we cannot consider Aristotle’s God to be absolute reason, which contains in itself the totality of thought-determinations, and since we cannot conclude that for Aristotle the divine *nous* of *Met.* Λ 7–9 is the absolute presupposition and “truth” of the human intellect of *De an.* III 4–5, then we must admit that Hegel has hastily inferred from the speculative nature of Aristotle’s philosophy the ideality of the finite in his philosophy. Hegel does not comment on his translation of Aristotle’s sentence at 430a 24, “the *nous* is itself intelligible” (*VGPh* 215). But the context indicates that to him the meaning is clear: the intellect is immaterial, hence in it subject and object are the same, hence by thinking itself it thinks the *nous* pathētikos or the logical Idea existing in itself in finitude.

This is also behind his interpretation of the simile of the tablet. This has been misunderstood, says Hegel, as though Aristotle had meant to set up an analogy between a tablet and the intellect. According to Hegel – and he is deeply right on this, even when he pokes fun at Tenne-

75 I do not understand how Oehler, who writes that the intellect becomes self-conscious by thinking its objects, can conclude that self-reference is the condition of the knowledge of objects, and that this self-reference amounts to self-knowledge (“Self-Knowledge,” 1974: 498 ff.). I would at most speak of self-consciousness, not of self-knowledge. The commentaries by Rodier, Barbotin, Tricot, Ross, Hamlyn, and Movia are not helpful in explaining the *nous*’s self-relation.
mann’s Lockean interpretation that “thinking comes from without,”
from corporeal impressions (VGPh 216; see J/G 88–9) – what Aristotle
means is that thinking is not a material paschein but an actualization of
an inner potentiality to be written upon (De an. III 4, 429b 30–1). The
nous is potential and receptive with regard to intelligibles, like the tablet
with regard to writing; the potential nous is not thereby a tablet, but
rather its “unwrittenness.” For Hegel, active thinking is the writer. The
soul has no actual contents but those actively thought. Only actuality ac-
counts for potentiality, not vice versa.76

But if this is right, interpreting the finitude of thought as self-sublat-
ing in absolute thinking is not. Let me try to spell out this point. In
Hegel, we must distinguish three levels: the level at which I know the
object as an opposite, the further, rational level at which the object
shows itself to intelligence as its concept; and finally the speculative
level at which knowing is no longer knowing of a form or determina-
tion, but is instead reason’s knowing itself as the infinite and absolute
truth of the object and of subjective thinking. It seems to me that Hegel
should have seen that Aristotle’s theory of thinking can only ground the
possibility of, but stops before, the third level – that at which thinking
and knowing are the same, as the knowledge of the logical activity
within and animating all the concrete relations in our world.

To phrase this another way, all Hegel finds in the intellect’s self-think-
ing is the fact that the nous becomes intelligible to itself; the thing is its
concept. What Hegel does not see is that in this activity the nous finds
rest in the discontinuous intellection of indivisibles, that is, it appreh-
ends given and discrete essences. Its function, in other words, is finite
and pointlike, in that it is defined by each of its objects. (It is very
strange indeed that, to the best of my knowledge, Hegel never draws
any implication from his comparatively uninformative comments on
the infallible intellection of indivisibles of De an. III 6 at VGPh 220, nor
discusses the nous’s relation to dianoia, discursive thinking.) The intel-
lect is not the principle of a dialectic of concepts, a speculative and com-
prehensive logic of the relations among essences; it is first and foremost
an act of vision or understanding of essences, the end of a process
through which experience has led us. Even when the Aristotelian in-
tellect thinks itself and finds the other in itself (the forms in its first actu-
ality), it falls short of Hegelian free and self-conscious reason, produc-

76 This has been generally accepted as the correct interpretation. See, for example, Ham-
ing or bringing forth *itself in the other* (in Hegel’s passive *nous* as the totality of intelligibles or thought-determinations).

What guides Hegel’s interpretation is the principle that in intellection there is no more distinction between subject and object. While we apprehend sensible forms from without, intelligible forms come from within. This “internality” is exactly the point made in the Neoplatonic commentaries on the *De anima*. Simplicius, for example, argues that if the intellect knows its own forms, then the intellect does know itself directly, not incidentally, as Aristotle had seemed to argue, in that it knows itself as possessing them (*in De an. 230, 26–7*).

In Neoplatonism this is possible because forms have been transformed by Plotinus into Platonic Ideas immanent in an intellect which is, as in Aristotle, identical with its object, the *kosmos noêtos* (intelligible cosmos). Echoing Plato’s *Timaeus* (31b 1), Plotinus writes that the intelligible universe is the totality of living beings (*Enn. VI 7, 12, 2–4*). While the intellect always thinks, the soul, which has descended into the body, only thinks on occasion, something it does not realize because it is clouded by sensibility (*Enn. IV 3, 30, 14–15*). Our task is that of taking leave of our sensible garments and of becoming separate intellect (*V 3, 4, 10*), where we would be pure from our earthly nature and exist “not as human” (*ouch hôs anthrôpon*, *ibid.*). The task is that of rejoining our true essence and of participating in the *nous*’s self-consciousness, that is, in order to be self-knowledge not only incidentally but essentially. What must be postulated here is that the intellect of *Met. Λ* and that of the *De an. III 4–5* only differ by degree: the superior hypostases communicate themselves to the lower. Thus the *nous* in us “is and is not ours” (*V 3, 3, 27*).

In *Enn. V 3, 4, 1–14*, Plotinus compares the *nous* to a writer, the *dianoia* or discursive knowledge to its tablet. It is intelligence that generates its discursive image (*eikôn nou, V 3, 4, 21*). Thus what we need to explain is not so much how human beings think but rather how the divine intellect descends into us.

We are in part passive. We have within ourselves a hierarchy of hypostases and each is the matter or the image of higher forms. Thus even the lowest and most sensible forms of souls and of cognition are saved as a shadow or image of the superior rationality. This is what makes it possible to place imagination itself, the power of presentation of the supersensible in the sensible and vice versa, as an intermediate form between nature and thinking (*Enn. IV 4, 13*). Discursive thinking turns thought into images (*Enn. IV 3, 30*); thus imagination splits
itself into two phantastika, the sensitive imagination of Aristotelian origin shared by most animals, and the higher, more active imagination, which, in service of the intellect, becomes the mirror or sensualization of thought.

Proclus develops this point in a mathematical context and explicitly identifies phantasía and nous pathêtikos (in his commentary on Euclid’s Elements, 50–8). By the time of Philoponus, this identification is current and taken for granted: the passive intellect is sharply distinguished from the potential, which Aristotle states is impassible like the productive and identified with the corruptible intellect. Phantasía (the intellect’s vehicle in mathematics, in De an. 61) is nous because it has the object of cognition in itself, and is pathêtikos because it receives impressions (in De an. 13, 61–3). This is not yet Aquinas’ intellectual abstraction of universals from images: it is the corporeal existence of intelligence in the human soul. Hence, in Simplicius’s terms, the soul is a pluralization of the original unity of nous.77

In sum, Hegel seems to share many features of the Neoplatonic De anima interpretation, from the continuity between absolute and finite thinking, to the ampliation of the passive intellect into a wider notion comprehensive of sensibility and the soul at large, to the internality of thinking. Let me conclude this section by saying what is definitely not Neoplatonic in Hegel’s interpretation.

Hegel takes passivity and all appearance and particularity much more seriously than Neoplatonism. First, while the Neoplatonic commentators dissociated the De anima from the Parva Naturalia, judging the former to be directed to noetics and the identification with the highest hypostasis, they spurned the latter and grouped it with the other zoological and biological treatises that played virtually no role for them. Aristotle’s alleged hylemorphism is an equivocation in the first place, finally resolving itself in the instrumental use of the body by the

soul and in the separateness and priority of the intellect (Simplicius, in De an. 51, 29–52, 10). Hegel, instead, like Aristotle, had a genuine and much greater interest in the psychophysiological aspects of the soul. Even if his interest is directed to the demonstration of the rationality of organic and anthropological nature, his concern with nature per se is unmistakable.

This can also be seen in the interpretation of sensation. Plotinus had denied that sensation was an imprint or seal-impression on the soul (Enn. IV 6, 1–3); sensation is rather an activity and a force, weakening with age (IV 6, 3, 55). Likewise Simplicius, rather than stressing that for Aristotle the soul is active in sensing only because it had passively received the sensible form, emphasizes that in actualizing our potentiality in sensation we are not thereby affected in any way, we are “awakened to activity” (in De an. 264, 12 ff.). The soul is not passive, and sensation is caused by the soul from within (in De an. 119, 3–10). The difference between the passivity of sensation and of the intellect emphasized by Aristotle is virtually effaced, for sensation is understood as active in its own right. Against empiricism, it is not thinking that is reduced to sensation, but sensation, which is read as if it were a dim thought (as it is called by Plotinus at Enn. VI 7, 7, 30). Compared to this, Hegel, by understanding the passivity of spirit as its finitude, makes it a necessary and essential moment of spirit, not a regrettable loss and dispersion from which we must try to purify ourselves.

In itself the nous is not passive at all for Neoplatonism. It becomes obfuscated and passive by its mixture with the body. For Hegel, the passivity of nous is the intelligibility of the world in itself; not a defect representing a lapse from an original union, but the objective Idea in itself, and thereby the very structure of the fruitful lowlands of experience, to use Kant’s expression. This reference to experience is important precisely because Neoplatonism ignores the particularity and subjectivity of thinking. It is as particular subjects waking from spirit’s sleep and pursuing our particular purposes that we contribute to absolute spirit, not by annulling ourselves and our finitude in the intuition of the One.

In sum, Hegel’s motivation for understanding the soul as the in-itself totality, rather than a Neoplatonic interpretation, is more broadly his own argument to the effect that the soul is the unconscious pit, the mat-

78 Likewise, in Leibniz perception is an expression of the soul, which possesses in itself the forms of things from the outset (Nouveaux Essais, 2: 8, §21).
ter for thinking, which by turning its gaze to its inferior forms thematizes itself. To what extent is this internality of subjectivity modern and Cartesian?

When we read today in the same paragraph of the *De anima* that the soul is the cause of reproduction and nutrition, and that it uses the body for its own sake (II 4, 415b 7–28), we are baffled by such talk. We would rather read that the body, not the soul, is the cause of corporeal functions, and we tend to interpret Aristotle dualistically, as Simplicius did. We spontaneously sympathize with Descartes (without realizing he grounded systematically what today remains our basic conception) when he argues that he found the principle of nutrition which tradition had cited as one of the soul’s functions to be *toto genere* different from thinking (replies to Gassendi’s objections to the *Meditations*, in *A-T* 7: 356). Thus the distinction between what is in us and what is outside of us was established philosophically in definitive form. Our body is on a par with external nature. Instead of an Aristotelian soul that exists only in the body it animates, we arrive at a “mind” opposed to and distinguished from a body; and the mind’s distinctive nature is internality and direct accessibility. This obviously undermines the notion of soul as the active principle animating the body. Aristotle’s hylemorphism, the notion of the soul as unmoved mover and entelechy of the body, becomes incomprehensible; and when Aristotle uses opposites like “principle” and “matter” to speak of soul and body we take it as evidence of the dualism that the Neoplatonists read back into the *De anima*.

In light of this, we can say that Hegel is not just the synthesis of the Aristotelian soul and the Cartesian cogito. Rather, he wants to move beyond the Cartesian inner space of thinking – where thinking is in general terms the activities of consciousness, thus not Aristotelian *noēsis* but rather Aristotelian perception *and* thinking in one – in order to conceive of the soul (the moving, formal and final cause of the body) as itself the material cause for reason or absolute self-consciousness. The Aristotelian soul, by being made equal to passive *nous*, is active *nous*’s objectivization of itself to itself in all its forms. As a whole, thus, it retains its causality as the underlying subjectivity that pervades externality and relates itself to itself through it.

The final reason why Hegel is not a Neoplatonic interpreter of Aris-

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79 As I mention in Chapter 3, Hegel praises Simplicius as one of the best Aristotle commentators (*J/G* 191), but there is no evidence that he ever studied the commentators closely or was directly influenced by any one of them.
totle is that the relation between finite spirit and absolute spirit is not the simple one of participation or commonality, but the active constitution of the one through the other—in history and objectivity. Another way to say this is that spirit must will its freedom in reality, a theme definitely absent from nous’ self-thinking in the Enneads and in Neoplatonism at large. To this will to freedom we must now turn.

D. THE PSYCHOLOGY (II). PRACTICAL SPIRIT

§8. Practical Reason, Desire, and Will

Theoretical Spirit has negated the difference between itself and given-ness, between a priori form and empirically given content. Thinking spirit freely produces or gives itself a theoretical content. As a known identity of being and thought, spirit knows that what it thinks now has objectivity and that objectivity is as thought. Yet objectivity is qua known, but not yet qua produced by spirit; it is found, not made. Spirit must pervade objectivity with its work. In Hegel’s analysis, practical spirit is not yet that stage where intelligence acquires actuality, but is the moment of intelligence’s will in the modality of its self-realization. What remains undetermined through the sections on practical spirit is what spirit produces in objectivity, let alone how the subjective knowledge and the objective production are unified in one moment of spirit.80

80 Unlike for Theoretical Spirit, where I comment extensively on sections that are more obscure and neglected by the secondary literature, on Practical Spirit the reader can find excellent studies and commentaries in Peperzak’s works (“Tugendlehre,” 1982, “Foundations of Ethics,” 1983, Selbsterkenntnis, 1987, Praktische Philosophie, 1991), which discuss Hegel’s relation to Kant and Aristotle in both practical and objective spirit. This allows me to limit myself, in this section and in Chapter 9, to a discussion of select points which have been treated more systematically by others (for example, especially for Chapter 9, see Riedel, Siep, Ritter, as well as the other authors quoted in this footnote.) In the next pages I do not discuss Hegel’s oscillations on the systematic collocation of morality (Moralität) within practical and objective spirit from Jena on; even here, fortunately, we have very fine and exhaustive analyses by Menegoni (Moralità 1982, and Struttura dell’agire, 1993; compare also Cesa, “Doveri universali,” 1977, and “Moralità e Sittlichkeit,” 1981). Enskat, who begins his examination by saying that “Hegel’s practical philosophy is to a considerable degree the result of his confrontation with the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle” (Theorie des praktischen Bewusstseins, 1986: 5), strangely never puts this claim to use or discusses Hegel’s relation to Aristotle in his entire book.

Finally, this concluding section on practical spirit finds its place here and not at the beginning of the chapter on politics because, as I argue in Chapter 2, I think it best to follow the lead of the Encyclopaedia and the Lectures. As already pointed out, for Aristotle the demarcating line is not between subjective and objective spirit, but between philosophy of nature and politics, and the De anima falls within the former.
For this very reason, the fact that practical spirit is still one-sided and subjective and has not yet produced a determinate content in which to mirror itself, seems to imply that practical spirit seems to have less to do with Aristotle’s ethics, which is a part of politics than with Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason*, that is, with a reason that is by itself practical and which is the autonomous and determining cause of action. However, even here Hegel discusses and contrasts the one model to the other, and in the very criticisms of one-sidedness in one he refers to themes and points made in the other; but, interestingly, this time the relation runs more explicitly both ways. Even though Aristotle’s main fundamental inspiration is right, he does not escape the limitations of the Greek understanding of ethical life, compared to which Kant’s morality, based on an infinite will for itself (PhR §105) and an unconditionally legislative reason, reflects the higher modern principle with its universal autonomy.

§8.1. Hegel on the Will. Hegel’s emphasis on spirit’s will is preparatory for the objectification of spiritual life in reality. The philosophy of practical spirit investigates the subjective modes in which spirit resolves itself to action. The very important consequence will be that, unlike in modern forms of contractarian political philosophy, the rule of law and associated life does not proceed from natural needs and individual rights, but is deduced from the contents of a rational will. For humans, nature means self-actualization, and that means to realize its higher ends. To follow one’s nature is at the same time to subject oneself to reason and to act as spirit. This is how the commandment characterizing spirit is at once the expression of *a being as an ought*. Freedom is a task in that it is man’s nature to fulfill it.81

But will and freedom are not exclusively practical, nor is there anything distinctive about will that marks it off from intelligence. Intelligence had been free in its knowing in the Psychology (ENZ.C §440); and if will is intelligent by definition, then Hegel is decidedly opposed to the primacy of the will and the voluntaristic trend begun by Augustine and followed in the history of philosophy by Duns Scotus and Descartes, among others.82 Will is rather deduced from intelligence in

82 “A distinction which is no less false . . . is that which would make intelligence limited and will unlimited. The truth is quite the reverse” (ENZ.C §444 Z, transl. Miller). Compare PhR §6 A.
ENZ.C §468 as self-determining, just as in the Logic the Idea of cognition is the genus of which the idea of the good, following from the Idea of the true, is a species. What is implicit here appears to be, not the Socratic identification of virtue and knowledge with its appeal to the intrinsic desirability and compelling nature of the Good, but the consideration, made by Hegel time and again, that spirit is by its essence free, yet it must know it is free in order to be actually free. Slaves are slaves not because their humanity is not acknowledged, but because they do not think and know themselves as human, hence they cannot affirm themselves as such with the force this certainty carries (PhR §21 A).

Hegel had begun the Psychology by noting that intelligence and will are not separate (ENZ.C §445 A). In the preceding section he had argued that intelligence and will are not to be opposed as passive to active. In both theoretical and practical spirit there is a beginning in passivity that is progressively transformed into activity until we get to the highest products of which spirit is capable at the stage of Psychology, respectively “word” and “enjoyment.” Nor are “theoretical” and “practical” to be read as ordered in a temporal progression, but rather as two complementary moments that never exist apart from one another, but which can at best be exposed separately. Just as an intelligence without will is impossible, as for example we see in the case of attention, so too is the will without intelligence and freedom. Freedom is not just an attribute of the will but its very nature, just as gravity is the nature of a body (PhR §7).

By thinking of an object, I transform it into a thought and make it mine; the practical attitude, on the contrary, begins with thought (in Hegel’s broad sense) and interiority and then externalizes an internal content. I first find desires, needs, and inclinations in myself. That I determine myself to action means that I follow one as opposed to another; thus I differentiate myself, I posit one of my internal differences or determinations in the external world. All the determinations and differences I actualize are mine, as are the ends I set for myself to carry out. Will is thus more than the possibility of abstracting from all contents: it is my objectification of contents based on the representation to myself of ends. Stated in different and by now all-too familiar terms, it is spirit’s self-determination in reality. Animals share with man the practical attitude, in that they have needs and desires that they experience as a lack and contradiction they try to overcome; what they do not have is freedom, the capacity to will universal ends determined by reason and hold fast to them even against their own inclinations.
In this way the will is, on the one hand, sharply distinguished from desire in that it proposes to itself ends that are within its power to fulfill (Aristotle wrote that we all may wish to be immortal, but nobody deliberates or proposes to be: *Eth. Eud. II* 10, 1225b 33 ff.; *Eth. nic. III* 4, 1111b 22–3). On the other, will is, as Aristotle said of virtue (*Eth. nic. II* 1), neither by nature nor against nature; but only because human nature for Hegel is essentially an overcoming and thorough shaping of external nature. Freedom wills itself and uses individual appetites and inclinations by addressing them to universal ends to be produced objectively. Hegel shares this point of departure with Kant. Will freely gives itself a content and fulfills itself by stepping into actuality and spontaneously initiating a series of effects in the world.

In the *Groundwork*, Kant had argued against all attempts (Wolff’s *Philosophia practica universalis* in particular) at deriving duty from human nature (*Ak* 4: 390; 425). While everything in nature works according to laws, rational beings have the capacity to act according to the representation or conception of laws, that is, according to principles (*Ak* 4: 412). Hegel separates these two points. Because he deeply agrees with the latter does he think it necessary to downplay the former and broaden the understanding of human nature into the notion of a being that is as an ought.

The question of the naturalness of freedom and the will is obviously crucial to determine the import of Hegel’s assertion of spirit’s teleology in practice. In order to discuss this problem I focus on (b) Hegel’s lectures on the *Nicomachean Ethics*; (c) practical teleology in Aristotle; and finally (d) Practical Spirit in Hegel.

§8.2. *Hegel on Aristotle’s Ethics.* Man’s being and ought consist in the rationalization of nature and the replacement of nature by a second nature, of contingency by will, a world of institutions and deeds that reflect spirit and give it satisfaction. Obviously, basing a philosophy of action on human nature is only possible insofar as we are clear on the definition of the human agent’s nature. What must be included in this definition is all the natural anthropological presuppositions we considered in §4, as well as the spiritual formation of all human activities in and through man’s corporeality, consciousness, and intelligence. That we act in a world which is already in part ours forms a necessary presupposition for practical spirit. Man is more than his biological nature, which is bound to remain relatively external and accidental to him. Accordingly, action does not simply proceed from man’s nature.
In terms made famous by Hannah Arendt, it is not what man is but who he is that becomes the leading question for action.

In other words, man’s universal nature necessarily particularizes itself in an individual, for within mankind agents are individuals who do not stand differentiated from others, but relate to and differentiate themselves through their actions and lives. Through action individuals are more than just representative specimens of natural kinds, for they irreversibly change the environment and history definitive of their species. Differently stated, action is only possible if we understand ourselves as subjects capable of choice, projected toward ends known and willed, and involved in a world that can be irreversibly modified by us. Our relation with the world is at once our relation to ourselves as active and passive: we are the cause of the kind of existence we partly shape for ourselves and we are the cause of the dispositions, inclinations, and habits that are formed by our choices. If our human nature consists in this self-understanding and in the adequation of our reality to our destination and rational ends, then “nature” takes on a peculiar meaning here. Our life is more than a reproduction of the same, a perpetuation of the species; it is the production of the new, an origination of history.

As will, writes Hegel, reason “resolves itself to finitude” (PhR §13 A). Will is the unity of these two moments: I negate myself by externalizing part of myself, by positing my determinate contents as discrete in actuality, and yet, still wanting them to be recognized universally as mine, I affirm myself in them (PhR §7). While as knowledge “spirit is within the foundation of the universality of the Concept,” that is, it remains within itself, as will spirit “knows itself as deciding in itself and fulfilling itself from out of itself. From the idea of spirit, this fulfilled being-for-self or singularity constitutes the aspect of existence or reality. As will, spirit enters into actuality” (ENZ.C§469). Only individuals act; but acting means for them to bring forth spiritual contents and to initiate a series of effects in the world which, though starting with individuals, will acquire a life of their own and get out of their control. Once I act, I initiate a change which is irreversible, and I consign to externality what is most deeply mine (desires, ends, intentions). What I lose in this process is the appearance that I am complete in myself and would infect my purity only by compromising myself with externality; and what I gain is precisely the vanification of this appearance in all its immaturity. Hegel repeats Goethe’s maxim that only by limiting oneself can one accomplish anything great (“Wer Grosses will, muss sich zusammenraffen;” In der
Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister” PhR §13 Z, Knox 230); this self-restriction is the precise meaning of the resolution to finitude.

In this connection, Hegel obviously obliterates the Aristotelian distinction between action and production, for as we see in Chapter 2, spirit estranges itself in reality through its work. There must be no distinction between the two ends of the respective teleologies: a finished product and man’s habitual modification of his own dispositions, for work and practice are equal expressions of spirit’s self-determination.

In addition, the ultimate end, which for Aristotle was happiness and a good life, is now subordinated by Hegel to something higher, the affirmation of spirit’s freedom. All the moments of the objective realization of spirit are forms of the actualization of the free will (PhR §33). Happiness is the stage at which the will has a content that is still natural and given. This does not mean that individual inclinations should be curbed and happiness annulled; on the contrary, striving for happiness provides us with the individual basis and starting point for the beginning of actions that then become directed by reason to higher ends (PhR §11, §20, §21).

This shows that Hegel conflates under the heading of spirit’s self-realization, not just Aristotelian practice and production, but also both Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperatives.83 Reason is by itself practical; it necessarily actualizes itself (a necessity which Hegel never deduces). Spirit does not actualize contents prescribed to it by its nature. Whatever form of teleology Hegel adopts here, it is clearly very different from the realization of one’s nature that we find in nonhuman realms. While it is prescribed to a plant by its essence to grow, decay, and reproduce itself, man and reason have no similarly prescribed ends, for reason is fundamentally self-legislative. To actualize ends is to subject oneself to reason’s autonomous rule; but to do so is only possible on the basis of man’s self-understanding within a world of relations to be shaped by him.

Does Hegel thereby argue against an Aristotelian theory of the human good understood as the fulfilment of essential ends? The answer to this question is far from easy. While we cannot take Hegel’s claims to the contrary as evidence of their agreement, we must nonetheless recall that for Aristotle the fulfillment of human nature is more complex and less univocal than is the case with any other good performance of a function on the part of other types of being. Let us see first

83 As remarked by Peperzak in Praktische Philosophie (1991: 38).
what Hegel says about Aristotle before turning to Aristotelian teleology in the practical.

In the Remark to §471, Hegel writes that it is quite misleading to start with a separation of practical feeling from thought. In feeling, will, and thinking “there is only one reason.” According to Hegel, Aristotle also proceeds from the theoretical intellect to its practical self-determination in the *De anima* (*VGPh* 220). What Aristotle has written about “will, freedom,” responsibility, and intention is “the best we have up to our times,” it is only a matter of translating it into our way of thinking (*VGPh* 221).

It seems that what Hegel appreciates about the *Ethics* is that there is no sharp separation between *being* and *ought*, between higher and lower functions of the soul, and that man is striving to actualize his potentialities and rationalize nature through reason’s education of the passions. This is how he interprets the fact that it is one soul that feels, knows, desires, and acts (De an. I 5, 411a 30) as well as the inseparability of the parts of the soul (De an. III 9, 432b 2–3). What he misreads with respect to this unity of theoretical and practical intellects, however, is the subsequent unity of intellectual and ethical ways of life; he disregards the importance of the distinction between ethical and diachronic virtues and the dissociation between *logistikon* and *episêmonikon* intelligence (calculative and scientific), between wisdom (*sophia*) and practical intelligence (*phronêsis*) in book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and thereby the gap, if not potential conflict, between politics and philosophy. Further, one could object that the practical *nous* does not determine itself to action; if *phronêsis* issues commands (*Eth. nic* VI 11, 1143a 8–10), it is not with respect to reason but to the particular given situations it faces. Before Kant’s pure reason, which is *by itself* practical, it is hard to find a self-determination by reason.

Hegel continues his brief and cursory exposition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by saying that “rational insight” is essential for happiness, and that the good is the ultimate end to be pursued for its own sake. (Probably in order to distance Aristotle from a Wolffian notion of perfection, he says that “perfect” is a bad translation of *teleion* at *VGPh* 222.) Equally necessary for virtue are reason and the passions or inclinations; Hegel opposes what he calls the common interpretation which would find in Aristotle reason as the sole constituent of virtue (*VGPh* 223). He says that the moment of realization belongs to the individual; therefore the good, far from being the only principle of virtue, would remain ineffective without the drive that stems from the alogical part of the soul (ibid.). Virtue is thus the unity of both, and “this is the right determi-
nation” (ibid.). No inclination is good in itself; on the other hand, duty pursued for the sake of duty and through the repression of passions, says Hegel, is no less one-sided and typical of the age (ibid.) than a presumed innocence and natural goodness of the passions.

In the alogical part of the soul Hegel reads a “nous only 
dunamei” (VGPh 222). This is wrong, and not just because of all the reasons we outlined above in §7; there is the further problem that the appetitive soul, which in humans may or may not follow the voice of reason the way one listens to a father (Eth.nic. I 13, 1103a 1–3), is common to animals, which for Aristotle have no intellect. What they do have is the capacity to represent in imagination aims that are not present. Orexis (“reaching out for,” drive or tendency) in the De anima is studied as the beginning of subjective animal movement, a beginning sparked by the representation of an end in its absence, and not as the individual drive complementary to the universality of reason in exclusively human action. But what is clear is that Hegel praises Aristotle for taking passions as the thrust of an individual to realize himself. And what is no less clear is that he has some reason for finding in Aristotle the unity of universal and individual, namely, in the understanding of the practical intellect as involving both thinking and drive (“thinking by itself does not move anything,” Eth.nic. VI 2, 1139a 35–6; De an. III 9, 432b 26–9; and action is exercised on particulars, “peri ta kathhekasta,” VI 8, 1141b 16).

On this score it is Kant who is responsible for separating sensible inclinations from rational will; any particularity corrupts reason’s universality. Aristotle had instead identified in the unity of the character, as the result of reason’s guidance and habituation of the passions, the correct relation between the lower and higher parts of the soul as well as between interiority and external effects. Hegel thus turns to Aristotle in order to overcome the mutual exclusivity between I and nature that had been affirmed by Kant and Fichte, and “to reintegrate a degraded nature into the construction of ethical life.”84 Virtue and right imply each other as do customs and the State.

All this remains true despite the well known reservations advanced by Hegel. Freedom is known and affirmed as the absolute in-itself of man only with the advent of Christianity. “The individual as such has an infinite value” and is “destined for supreme freedom” (ENZ.C §482 A). This principle was unknown to Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Stoics, for whom man is free thanks to his birth or to culture (ibid.).

Christian religion, slavery was abolished precisely because every human being has a dignity and spirituality, which are absolute, untouchable, and recognized as universal.\(^{85}\)

This infinite principle, which guides Hegel’s entire Philosophy of Spirit, has been sanctioned in philosophy by Kant through the principle of the autonomy of practical reason and a rational will willing itself. Hegel ascribes this credit to Kant in the lectures on the *Critique of Practical Reason* ([VGPh] 3: 365–7). And while Hegel would not agree with Kant’s criticism of Aristotelian virtue as a misguided mean between two equal vices (*Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 6*: 404), he would insist that the will which wills itself and its freedom represents a higher position than that of the end of happiness pursued by man for Aristotle. He would agree with Kant that virtue is nothing determinate in itself, but is rather “something concrete which is susceptible of a more and a less.” But that is exactly the essence of particular virtues, which cannot have “a more precise determination” ([VGPh 224; PhR §150 A]). According to “our way of consideration, duty is absolute in itself . . . , not a mean between subsisting extremes determining it” ([VGPh 224–5, my italics]). The illusion that he includes himself in the contemporary “way of consideration” is immediately dissipated, for he retorts against Kant that the supposed universal of duty is empty, that no empirical content will determine it without “colliding” (ibid.) with its purity.

§8.3. *Ends in Aristotle.* That Aristotle’s connection between virtue and happiness refers to human self-realization can hardly be disputed. Happiness must span through an entire lifetime as the complete, unimpeded, and abiding exercise of a firm possession, that is, of a good and stable character (accompanied by good fortune). It means well-doing no less than well-being. Happiness is an end including in itself the various virtues and activities helpful in promoting it. It can be considered the attribute of a *bios*, a way of life; thus it sharply differs from our conception of happiness as a personal and incorrigible feeling over which we are the sole authority, but also over which we hardly have any power.

If happiness is activity according to virtue, implying a harmonious fulfillment of our potentialities, then the ultimate good pursued may

\(^{85}\) Ibid.; see also §552 A, §163 Z 1, *VPhG* 31, which all stem from *JSE III*: 263–4. This principle, the infinity and inner freedom of man’s particular subjectivity, came about with the dissolution of the external freedom of the polis, writes Hegel in 1805/6, and compensates for the loss of the harmonious Platonic political whole.
be either practical-political or theoretical, depending on whether reason is addressed to the passions or to itself. But in both cases the activity tends to realize the subject as a well-rounded and complete person, and in both cases humans’ highest and divine characteristic, *nous*, is active and directive. Aristotle does not see the problem we find today in the contrast between theory and practice, between an inclusive political virtue comprehending all practical virtues (*Eth.nic.* I 2) and a separate, alternative end, supposedly divorced from virtue, which is the highest life available to man, the life devoted to thinking (*Eth.nic.* X 7). For Aristotle both practice and theory are activities, and both guide a comprehensive hierarchy of virtues; a base, not to say evil, philosopher would sound like an inner contradiction to him. And there is no question that for Aristotle theory is superior to action and should be pursued if possible. The real contrast for him is between politics and the transpolitical life of thinking (X 7, 1177b 12–15). Of this contrast Aristotle says that the good polis directs its efforts at achieving all goods for its citizens, and will then encourage the pursuit of the highest good, the activity of *theòria* (Pol. VII 3, 1325b 14–23).

In both cases, the realization of human nature is made possible by a reason that has an understanding of man’s nature and ends. One of the consequences one may draw from this, and which is found time and again in the secondary literature, is that ends are prescribed to us by our nature the way an essence prescribes the activity to a natural being; reason is instrumental in this execution of ends given to us. It would not be too difficult to find in Aristotle the basis for this argument; after all, Aristotle says that the good is that which everything aims, and that we take the end for granted and only deliberate about the means to achieve it (*Eth.nic.* III 5, 1112b 11–12). That reason helps us carry out ends assigned to us by nature has been read as lending support to the argument that reason’s supposed lack of freedom with regard to ends is in turn the ground for the absence of an explicit concept of will in Aristotle. I think we should bring clarity to this conundrum by keeping the questions of purposive reason and will apart.

Let me first explain why I think that taking practical reason as instrumental denotes a remarkable absence of historical and exegetical

86 In the Aristotle scholarship, this issue goes back at least to Walter. The debate is periodically renewed (for example, by Allan, then by Gauthier and Aubenque, and more recently by the contemporary Neoaristotelians; compare Dahl, *Practical Reason*, 1984: 4 ff.) For a more general view relating Aristotle to the history of philosophy, see Arendt, *Life of the Mind* (1978: vol. 2, 55–63).
sense; why, in other words, ends and means are inextricable for Aristotle and cannot be isolated from one another the way they can for us (post-Machiavellians? Humeans? Weberians?), before then turning to the will.

While in living beings final and formal causes are so closely connected that a being’s activity brings to light its essence, the realm of action is the realm of contingency, of that which can be otherwise, and thus of what is determined by human intervention; instead of a reproduction of the same, here change is the norm. If so, action cannot be the performance of a function that is equally directive for everybody in the same sense. Not just because there are multiple ways to actualize human essence, just as there are multiple virtues (in particular, virtues directed to a political realm and virtues of the intellect per se with their two corresponding bioi, ways of life). More importantly, action is oriented to the contingent and involves choice: as I wrote earlier about Hegel, and I think the argument holds for Aristotle as well, we are not simple individual instances understood by reference to the genus in which we participate, whose life is a carrying out of a pre-given destiny assigned us by our essence; we are individuals relating to, and modifying, ourselves and reality simultaneously through our practical rationality and our projected ends.

If living well is the result of a life in accord with our rational nature, the very important difference between us and natural beings that perform their functions well is that we are not determined by our essence or nature to do what we do, but only to do it (or fail to do it) rationally. While a plant is individuated, constituted, and dominated by its nature or essence, our nature, rationality, directs our choices, especially our choices of a good way of life. I choose to become a person of this or that sort as opposed to another; say, I choose to become a politician as opposed to a philosopher, based on my understanding of the final end for me. Accordingly, I structure and center my life around different ranking orders of virtues; virtues remain a plurality within a comprehensive unity, but they are combined with different ends in mind. The hierarchy is chosen by an understanding and perception of a good life, which only reason gives me.

In a human being’s life, then, the formal cause is used for different final causes; the essence does not dictate the function or ergon. The difference between man as the object of natural science (De anima) and as the object of politics and ethics is that in the latter we do not try to study a given nature whose principles we want to identify. Here we have as our
object subjects that shape their lives, thus the active principles of their personal existence (bios), not of their mere natural life (zôê). Again, we must take man’s self-understanding into account.

When Aristotle says that we take ends for granted and deliberate about means to realize them, he is describing the practical syllogism in which we posit a good as a principle and proceed to find the best means to attain it. The physician does not have to deliberate whether health is the good, for he takes his bearings from it as from a fact, thereby positing the principle of his profession; what he looks for is the means to promote it, and in his analysis he follows the chain of steps until he reaches the last which is also the first of the practical measures he will adopt. Obviously he could have chosen a different bios, had he had a different view of the final end for his life.

Though practical intelligence does not invent new ends, nor does it merely find the right rules to actualize pre-given ends. Phronêsis is not an ethical virtue but a virtue of the intellect searching for the right rule or measure (ton orthon logon). This requires good judgment of particular situations, and is thus very different both from following a rule and from finding appropriate means to ends regardless of their quality.

It differs from following a rule because awareness and choice are essential to virtue, defined as the purposive disposition addressing passions to ends devised by reason (Eth.nic. II 6, 1106b 37–1107a 2). You cannot be ethical unless you are exercising your intelligence as a discriminatory and compelling power. If a virtuous deed requires awareness, choice, and to stem from an abiding disposition, then rules are not passively obeyed but are first of all judged and then deliberately chosen. Choice (proaieresis), in turn, is made right by virtue alone (VI 13, 1144a 20).87

Phronêsis also differs from simply finding the appropriate means because, for one thing, the end does not come into view unless you exercise practical intelligence; conversely, phronêsis depends on and requires the ethical virtues. I am moved to act by what appears good or desirable to me; but what appears good to me depends on my formed dispositions and my character, and that depends on what I have learned in my life as a whole, as well as on what my practical intelligence has learned to perceive, discriminate, and aim at (Eth.nic. III 5, 1114a 31

As a consequence, when it comes to choice, only the good are wise and vice versa (Eth. nic. VI 13, 1144a 34–1144b 1).88

As Kant wrote, and as Aristotle knew all too well, judgment as a faculty of rules has no rule guiding its application: it gives itself a rule. If I may adopt a Kantian vocabulary in a non-Kantian context, I would say that in phronēsis, judgment is only reflective, not determinant. In ethics, rules do not prescribe their application to all instances, for instances are not simple occurrences of universals to begin with; rather, rules are interpreted and given meaning by instances that are the starting point for experience and the object on which deliberation exerizes itself. Again, this reveals the difference in method between practical and theoretical sciences: if our object is what could also be otherwise, the generalities of practical experience must differ from the universals of science, and we must resist taking particulars as universals.

Yet phronēsis differs from discernment which is based on experience, not only because it relates generalities (which experience does not reach) to particulars, but more importantly, because while aiming at good deliberation on what is both good for the individual and within his reach (VI 8, 1141b 8–22), it issues commands, thus is not content with mere discrimination (VI 11, 1143a 8–10). It also differs from cleverness (deinotēs) and the ability to carry out intentions, because cleverness is defined by, and must be subordinate to, the quality of the end. Without an insight into the good end, cleverness is simply knavery (VI 13, 1144a 26–7).

What is most remarkable about this, from the modern point of view, is a twofold characteristic of phronēsis. It qualifies cleverness; in other words, the means are good or bad depending on the end (reciprocally, on the other hand, happiness at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics is qualified and determined by the different understandings of the bios that is supposed to make us happy: pleasure, honor, or virtue – here the end clearly differs according to, it is actually defined by, the path that leads to it). And, secondly, phronēsis does not exist without cleverness. It is not enough to have good intentions; it is our responsibility to acquire the ability to carry them out. And that involves, more than anything else, judgment of particular situations, including the kairos or appropriate time for action.

Good deliberation (euboulia) in absolute terms is not about means but about what makes us right about the end of life “concerning which prac-

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88 This is what marks the difference between Aristotle’s and the modern (see, for example, Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s) definition of the good, as we will see shortly in §8.4.
tical wisdom gives a true conviction” (VI 10, 1142b 33–4, transl. Ostwald). And the ultimate end is not simply happiness, but the exercise of excellent activities, the happiness of eupraxia (VI 5, 1140b 7). This concept, referring to a good conduct which is also crowned by success, is further evidence that for Aristotle human conduct cannot be understood independently of good human conduct. But, as such, eupraxia cannot provide us with a universal rule or a univocal standard; only its individual embodiment in what we regard as a phronimos will be a standard, and obviously that is directive only in necessarily particular circumstances.

Given this close relation between reason and action, it is no wonder that for Aristotle choice (proairesis) is the rational wish for a good that can be attained through our agency. He notoriously defines such choice as “desiring intellect or reasoning desire” (VI 2, 1139b 4–5). In light of this, to conclude that all we choose is the means for achieving pre-given ends sounds utterly simplistic.

That the question of purposive reason must be kept dissociated from that of the will is also apparent if we consider that we reason about ends, and that our actions are accountable as responsible and intentional volitions stemming from a principle internal to the agent, without need for a will as an independent power. In fact, in view of our examination of the relation between Hegel and Aristotle, it is fair to say that Aristotle does not have such a notion of will.

That practical intelligence is an outright inferior mode of nous is shown by the fact that Aristotle’s God has no will; practice and virtue have to do with contingency, and it would be absurd for us to impute justice or mercy or generosity to the gods. The will for Aristotle is not the free practical side of reason, for it is not independent of character and operates directly on passions. But if we had to be more precise, we would have to say that the will does not figure in Aristotle at all: there is no equivalent for the modern notion of will in Aristotle. As Snell has pointed out, the Greek language does not even have a word for “will.”

Thelein means: “to be ready, to be prepared for something.” Boulesthai is: “to view something as (more) desirable.” The former denotes a subjective preparedness, a kind of voluntary attitude devoid of specific commitment; the latter refers to a wish or plan (boulê) aimed at a particular object, i.e. a disposition closely related to the understanding and appreciation of a gain. But neither word expresses a realization of the will.89

89 Entdeckung (1948: 182–3). Cf. also Vernant and Vidal Naquet, Mythe et Tragédie (1972, ch. 3).
On Aristotle’s view, there is no good will but only a will or choice of the good. Wish (boulēsis) in Aristotle is the rational tendency or drive toward a good or end, and it uses choice (proairesis) as the efficient cause for the production of that good or end. Wish is itself a species of orexis, which means a goal-directed movement.

But does not Aristotle criticize Socrates over the notion of incontinence precisely because of his intellectualism (Eth.nic. VII 1–11)? Yes, but akrasia does not mean weakness of the will, as the standard English translation has it. Incontinence refers to our being overwhelmed by a desire, or our lack of knowledge or to a conflict internal to the agent – to a flaw either in our knowledge or in the education of our passions. (Literally, the egkratēs, the continent, is the one who has strength and power over himself, and thus achieves inner harmony and balance.) There is consequently no room in Aristotle for an evil will, since wish (boulēsis) is by definition the rational appetition of what is or seems good: the virtuous are opposed to “the common run,” the noble to the base, and all bad sides of a character are failures to be good and live up to the standard of a spoudaios (Eth.nic. III 6, 1113a 25), not the assent of a corrupt will to evil.

I believe we must agree with Gilson, Arendt, and MacIntyre among others, that only with Augustine and a Christian interiority do we have a notion of will as an independent power, which is a notion alien to Aristotle. Once the will is discovered, morality will have to be judged on the basis of the will alone, for even the character is an external factor dependent on the circumstances of our education. The will is instead our very interiority; it is prior to all our faculties and directs our actions and our minds equally.

In sum, we can say, in Kant’s terms, that Aristotle knows of Willkür, but not Wille (not will but choice). As Arendt reminds us, the medieval Latin translation of proairesis is liberum arbitrium – choice between two given possibilities. But the absence of an explicit notion of will does not depend on the fact that we are simply realizing our potentialities and have no sense of the future, as Arendt would have it (Life of the Mind, 1978, 2: 15), for reason is not a simple essential potentiality to be ac-

93 See Arendt on Paul’s transformation of the “thou shalt” into the “I will” of voluntary submission to a command (Life of the Mind, 1978, 2: 68).
tualized but has several uses and meanings depending precisely on the bios we project for ourselves (and on the ends we project for our future, as reads De an. III 10, 433b 7–8). Rather, the choice is exercised by practical reason for the sake of the ends reason sets for itself and recognizes as choiceworthy. As such, choice reflects our character and inclinations; we may want to oppose inclinations or desires until we have disciplined them and solved an inner conflict, but the virtuous person is the one who has mastered conflicts, lives harmoniously with him- or herself, and finds pleasure in being virtuous. A will opposing inclinations in principle, holding fast to itself to affirm its freedom over externality and the renunciation to finitude, is unthinkable for Aristotle.

Was Hegel then simply mistaken when he praised Aristotle on will and freedom (VGPh 221)? I think that praise refers to the speculative understanding of ethical experience, which he found in Aristotle, and in particular to the first half of book III in the Nicomachean Ethics and its analyses of the voluntary and the involuntary (cf. Hegel’s footnote at PhR §140 A). While I find it hard to disagree with Hegel on this score, I also think that Hegel extends to the Lectures on Aristotle the points he makes in the Encyclopædia with regard to passions, inclinations, and happiness as will’s inferior yet necessary moments. Let us then return to the inner articulation of practical spirit, where will is reason’s self-determination in practice, beginning from its most immediate and empirical forms, feelings, and impulses.

§8.4. Practical Spirit. Practical spirit is divided into (1) practical feeling, (2) impulses and choice (Willkür), (3) happiness, and finally (4) free spirit willing itself and realizing its freedom in objective institutions. As I have argued, reason is by itself practical; but not because of the purity of a will independent of impulses and feelings, as it is for Kant. Feelings and impulses are rather the starting point of action and of reason’s practical self-determination for Hegel.

Practical feeling is an immediate content that is found, and thus the immediate singularity of the subject. As usual, it is not opposed to reason and will but is will’s first empirical self-determination. We find needs and desires in us; a feeling of frustration comes about when we experience their inadequacy to reality. Evil is precisely the clash between such needs and a reality we experience as alien and overpowering (ENZ.C §472 A). Since feeling is basically of the pleasant and the unpleasant, and since pleasure results from an agreement between my inner needs or desires and reality, feeling entails the ought of adequat-
ing itself to reality. Thus it points beyond itself to less contingent formations such as personal inclinations.

We shape and habituate ourselves in view of this ought in the form of more stable feelings, more abiding dispositions relative to ends: impulses and inclinations. The found and accidental is partially posited through this moment, and becomes a habitual attitude. Impulses and passions are neither good nor bad in themselves; they are the indispensible vital moment of action for an individual.

On the one hand, impulses and passions are contrasted with the idle version of a natural happiness by means of which the needs of the subject are supposed to be satisfied without its acting in order to produce conformity between the immediate existence and its inner determinations. On the other hand, they are contrasted in a wholly general way with the morality of duty for duty’s sake. Impulse and passion constitute nothing other than the liveliness of the subject however, in accordance with which it is itself involved in its purpose and in the carrying out of the same. (ENZ.C §475 A).94

Hegel repeats Goethe’s sentence (“nothing great has been or can be accomplished without passion,” ENZ.C §474 A, transl. Miller – a principle that can also be taken as Aristotelian) in the context of the same evaluation of the subject and its actions that we find in the assessment of Aristotelian virtue in the Lectures. If it is neither Rousseau nor Kant, is it Aristotle then? Yes, provided we add: only formally. The determinate content, which all particular virtues have in the Nicomachean Ethics, comes to these empty and subjective forms only insofar as they are filled by the self-objectification of the will in right, morality, and ethical life. Put differently, Hegel tries to keep subjective practical spirit and political ethical life more separate in his analysis than does Aristotle, even though in their concrete existence the one side (practical spirit as a form) is never apart from the other (objective spirit as its own content).

An end has to become an end for me; no principle or law is active unless I have an interest in its actuality. Impulses and passions are then the individual condition for the accomplishment of anything universal. History itself is the stage of the Idea’s self-realization through the use of particular individual interests. This is the theoretical foundation of

94 Petry has “natural welfare,” and not natural happiness, for Naturglück in the first sentence.
Hegel’s philosophy of history but also of his conceptualization of the difference between ancient Greek and modern individuality. While in Greece a conflict between individual and common goods was fatal to the polis, in modern states the pursuit of individual goods in conflict with the universal good is legitimate and beneficial to the whole (PhR §124 A, §260). We are individual subjects whose freedom is untouchable and whose self-interest demands satisfaction; and yet freedom is not disruptive of the whole, because the modern state has a more comprehensive principle allowing for reconciliation of singular and universal goods, comprehending both the elements it has dissociated, civil society and institutions. While individuals realize themselves through the satisfaction of their passions, this immediate and quasi-natural activity brings about a human society and the consolidation of right and institutions which eventually contain the passions and interests that gave rise to them (PhR §260; VPhG 33–8).

Passions are not opposed to morality, but realize the universal. Aristotle, who obviously did not have a philosophy of history in which to see this principle objectified on a universal scale, and had in fact a very different understanding of history, would nonetheless have agreed with this. Choice is the result of the cooperation between reason and appetites or tendencies.

What he would have agreed with less is the next stage: Hegel’s understanding of reflection and decision as instrumental, based on the reduction of happiness to the pursuit of individual interest.

Action for Hegel is the point of encounter of inner and outer, and spirit’s resolution to finitude. As in the Theoretical Spirit, where the emphasis is on the progression of forms, in the Practical Spirit as well the forms have as their object the previous forms. Impulses, which stabilize feelings, are the object of choice, choice is the basis for happiness, and this is the object of will. Choice is free from impulses in that it can choose among them; this is a reflection on impulses that constitutes Willkür, liberum arbitrium (ENZ.C §§476–§477). Elsewhere Hegel says this is the most customary understanding of will, the contingent choice among given contents (PhR §15), the contents of “natural or immediate will” (PhR §11) – an accidental subjectivity’s will. Here rationality exerizes itself on an accidental and particular content, not on itself. Reflection leads to a decision directed at the satisfaction of a drive. All satisfaction of particular impulses is, however, not only particular, but also infinite; it has no natural rest. Multiple and particular drives acquire meaning when they are ordered and subordinated to a final comprehensive end, happiness.
Happiness is precisely the representation of a universal satisfaction of impulses (ENZ.C §479; PhR §20). As a fulfillment of man’s destination, it depends partially on our will and partially on external circumstances (W 4: 231). All this sounds Aristotelian: the various ends find their rest in the ultimate end, which we pursue for its own sake, happiness; happiness is also a notion that needs qualification and is specified by the bios that is supposed to promote it, which in turn is not sufficient to guarantee it. But its innermost core is not Aristotelian. Hegelian decision is not a proairesis directed to the good for us but rather the calculation directed to the satisfaction of needs. And when Hegel says that happiness is the abstract representation of the ought of impulses (ENZ.C §480), his concern is not the good life of eudaimonia or happiness, but the instrumental use of happiness against itself by reason. Happiness is individual happiness, the selfish satisfaction of interests that have nothing to do with the common good, and which nonetheless are conducive to it.

Through happiness, the cunning of reason reaches very far. The indeterminate character of happiness is not a flaw; happiness turns the disparate and different impulses into a unified whole, thus constituting the end of a natural individual existence. By pursuing happiness, we produce in reality the education (Bildung, PhR §21) that we impose on our impulses in order to satisfy them unitarily. Thereby happiness is instrumental in bringing about civilization and spirit’s presence in actuality. Like Smith’s invisible hand, the self-interest of private individuals is the thrust behind economic and civil society; their pursuit of their goals fosters the rationalization of nature for Hegel (PhR §187 A).

Thus happiness is not an empirical principle whose empty generality shows the elusiveness and futility of all eudaimonism, as in Kant. In the Preface to the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that taking happiness as the principle of morals is the euthanasia of all morality. Hegel opposes this no less than he does the antinomy of practical reason and the opposition between virtue and happiness in the summum bonum (highest good) found in the Critique of Practical Reason. Happiness is one of the highest motives and drives for action. It should not be opposed to morality, because by bringing about spirit’s well-being, it unintentionally permeates the accidental and contingent nature with spirit’s rationality and freedom, realizing spirit’s will in actuality.

Thus Hegel’s ethics, rather than being opposed to selfishness, eudemonism, and formalism, is a synthesis of them all,95 for all such forms

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are limited anticipations of the genuine form ethics must appropriate: taking self-determination seriously and willing it per se.

If we start out from a given feeling and an opposition between form and content, here the form now becomes the content. Spirit wills itself and its particular subjective freedom (PhR §124 A). That the will wills itself means that, in Hegel’s words, it forsakes the finite as a whole, that is, no single given end can satisfy the will. Only such a will, which wants to affirm itself as the principle giving objective life to an ethical world, can be the true self-determination typical of free spirit (ENZ.C §481). Only free will is this unity of inner and outer, of universal and particular. It is now ready to posit determinate contents and objectify itself in enduring institutions.

Once again Hegel tries to combine Aristotelian teleology with Kantian reason. It is man’s superior destination to live according to reason. To shed some light on the subtlety of this question, let us return to the question of the good, and remind ourselves of the modern inversion of Aristotle’s principle. For Hobbes and Spinoza (for example, Leviathan I 6; Ethics IV: def.1), the good is what we deem useful to us. No longer the norm for a good bios, the good here comes to mean the attribute that refers to the satisfaction of needs, which in turn are both the starting point of the examination and the very ground of natural right. Aristotle does contemplate this possibility of understanding the good, but flatly rejects it when he says: we don’t consider something good because we desire it, but we desire something because we hold it to be good (Met. Λ 7, 1072a 29; here Aristotle incorporates Diotima’s criticism of Aristophanes in a theological context).

Hegel does share with Aristotle the functional definition of the good (and of the true; see Chapter 10) as the adequacy of a reality to its concept, or as a being’s good performance of its function or ergon. But if we recall Kant’s very different inversion of Aristotle’s principle, that there is no good that determines me to act morally, for only moral law gives rise to the good, then we can see that Hegel demands a higher solution than the choice of the good in Aristotle’s sense, and that he has sublated both modern and Aristotelian notions of the good. No good can be found which is not spirit’s production of its rationality; the good is the good of spirit and its will (for example, PhR §129; §132 A). Freedom of will demands to be recognized as proper to all individuals and to be effective universally. Thus the good is both spirit’s need and spirit’s nature – but only because it is spirit’s production of itself in reality.
However, what for Kant had been the simple form of the universality of reason in the realm of moral legislation must be freed from its abstraction and, ultimately, hypocrisy. Kant conceived of reason as the elevation of given empirical contents to a lawful form; reason’s application of itself to contents is external. For Hegel, we must instead proceed by arguing from practical reason to its specific commands. And that means we must see reason at work in the institutions it has created. Practical spirit becomes objective spirit.

To Hegel, Plato and Aristotle (more the *Republic* than the *Politics*) work as a corrective to Kant’s abstraction: ethical life and reason are present and operative in the world of institutions, and rights and duties are assigned to the individual from his participation in an ethical community. Reason would be alienated from institutions if they were mere nature, a reification not yet revoked and appropriated from their simple externality; they are instead a second nature, posited by reason itself (PhR §4; ENZ.C §485).

§8.5. Reason and Desire. Before we see this in the next chapter, I would like to conclude by focusing on the relation between reason and desire.

Compared to Platonic *erôs*, with its manic and uncontrollable charge of desire from its bodily understanding (*epithumia*) to the noetic drive to rise toward a vision of the ideas (*Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Republic*), Aristotle naturalizes desire into *orexis* as a principle of animal movement amenable to the power of beings. He thereby neutralizes *erôs*’s subversive core. As a consequence, there is nothing mythical about our soul or *nous*, which is “merely” the divine in us; I mean that while *erôs* is a potential tyrant, which may nevertheless move us toward the ideas if we succeed in directing it, the divine *nous* in us is a gift, which we may or may not use, and which is in our power to cultivate. The very life of theory is spontaneous and follows naturally from the pleasure we find in our senses (*Met.* A 1). In other words, we are drawn naturally to wisdom; philosophy finds its genesis in the sensible, in experience. The senses are not muted by reason, since they are not exclusively practical and for the sake of survival to begin with. If so, no daimonic ascent of the soul above the sensible is required, for the soul is always already naturally drawn to wisdom.

Aristotle thus implicitly de-dramatizes Platonic *erôs*; explicitly, he criticizes it for not clearly residing in the appetitive function of the soul. Plato has muddled desire, tearing asunder the unity of drive and the soul into three separate parts, each of which has its own brand of desire.
(De an. III 9, 432b 3–7). While the import of this criticism is far from ambiguous, since Aristotle himself distinguishes between wish, spiritedness, and desire as the three senses of drive or orexis (e.g., De an II 3, 414b 1–2; Eth. eud. II 7, 1223a 26–7), one thing is clear: the intellect does not move, only the object of a drive or the end of an action (orektòn, prakton) does; nor is it moved, for only the composite living being is moved (III 10, 433b 13–27). If the philosopher’s erôs for truth is replaced by a general and natural desire for wisdom, then the intellect is not inspired or moved by daimonic forces; wisdom becomes an enterprise that we embark upon by ourselves, and is the result of reason’s efforts. The intellect is only directive and does not exercise efficient causality on tendencies (at most it contains them, as in the continent man). And even if wish is rational desire, that does not mean that the intellect is moved by desire; it means rather that it identifies the good as its object. Even so, then, erôs is severed from the intellect, and the natural desire to know from the opening lines of the Metaphysics is a drive that moves, not the intellect but the composite man in the continuity of his functions, from the senses upward to wisdom.

For Hegel, by contrast, reason’s desire and drive to find itself in reality and to permeate all reality is the thrust behind the movement of the concept.96 “It is therefore not only the highest force, or rather the sole and absolute force of reason, but also its supreme and sole urge (Trieb) to find and cognize itself by means of itself in everything” (WL 2; 552, SL 826). This desire is primary and underived, and it is responsible for accounting for all particular existence of desire. For example, as we see in Chapter 2, I pursue philosophy as science due to my care for the thing itself and my trust in reason. Or an individual self-consciousness reflects reason in its identity and difference with the object; and self-consciousness exists first and foremost as desire. But desire, rather than lack and need, which are satisfied through a consumption of the object, is desire for a higher, independent object in which it can mirror itself. As the well known pages on master and slave from the Phenomenology argue, self-consciousness realizes that the only object in which it can satisfy itself is another like it, which can afford to lose itself in order to find itself in the other. Thus desire is not a lack for which I can make up. Desire is not for an object to assimilate but for a subsisting other which is neither consumed nor disappears from the scene – for another self-consciousness to recognize me as a self-consciousness. But the struggle that

ensues between self-consciousnesses when recognition is missing is toward the goal of my individuality being recognized in principle, as an independent self-consciousness. Desire is more and more rational, because it is reason’s particularization of itself and means to affirm itself. Desire and reason are one, like intelligence and will. And what reason desires, from the logical element in nature and finite spirit to ethical life, is recognition, publicity, presence, reciprocity.

Even in Aristotle, the bond keeping cities together is reciprocity in its several forms, the most salient of which is friendship; and all forms of friendship are a defective variation on the best kind of friendship, that based on virtue. But it is a very different kind of reciprocity from Hegel’s: not the mutual recognition between two self-consciousnesses fighting each other for self-affirmation, but the relation, based on mutual concern and a shared system of values, in which one is the natural mirror of the other. Instead of being a demand of reason and a triumph of free will eventually emancipating a subdued self-consciousness, genuine reciprocity in Aristotelian friendship is rare (Eth. nic. VIII 4, 1156b 25) and only exists between persons who are similar in kind. They enjoy each other’s company because they are “another self” to each other (IX 4, 1166a 31–2).

Equality, intrinsically defining itself in opposition to inequality in virtue, is presupposed as a natural basis for friendship – not produced as a result in actuality out of spirit’s original core, freedom.
The Political Realization of Ethics

But my nature is rational and political; my city and my country, as Antoninus, is Rome; as a man, the world.

(The Communings with Himself of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus)

§1. Ancient and Modern States
Whatever Hegel thought in his mature years of his youthful enthusiasm for the Greek polis, it is clear that in the Philosophy of Right and in the Objective Spirit in the Encyclopædia ancient models have a more than limited role to play. In a modern political organization of associated life the requirements and conditions are so different from classical Greece that it hardly makes sense to compare and contrast Aristotle’s Politics with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Unlike other parts of their philosophies, a relation here becomes especially problematic because the respective theoretical foundations of the philosophy of politics are so relative to their historical circumstances and, as Hegel himself says of the Politics, so “positive” (VGPh 225), that it appears hardly meaningful, rather than a daunting task, to examine Hegel’s debt to, appropriation and discussion of, and distance from, Aristotle. To discourage us even more, it is in the context of political discussions in particular that Hegel reiterates on numerous occasions that the individual is the child of his age, and that philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought (PhR Preface; W7: 26, Knox 11).

Yet it is no less apparent that, in the idea of freedom acquiring the form of necessity as binding and universal right, which is at once duty and custom, Hegel revitalizes the Aristotelian understanding of laws as
a second nature and the priority of the state over individuals. Right is merely the symmetrical expression for duty: my duty is your right and vice versa; but something becomes a law only if I subject myself to it, if I recognize it as law and see in it an expression of spirit’s freedom. This is why Objective Spirit presupposes the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit for Hegel: institutions are now viewed as the positive expression of spirit’s freedom and thereby become the object of an individual’s will. They have established themselves as a habit directing our behavior, even as a way to feel (Sinnesart, Gesinnung, translated by Miller as “ethical sentiment”). The will thus becomes a substantial will; individual and universal are no less different than also identical (PhR §124 A).

Accordingly, it is as though Hegel merged Rousseau’s general will and Spinoza’s relation of substance to modes, resulting in an equally anti-Rousseauian and anti-Spinozistic thesis, that of the Aristotelian priority of the state over individuals. Thus Hegel’s references to Plato and Aristotle in his theory of Objective Spirit will be recurrent. But his use of Greek political thinking cannot be more than an instrumental device used to counter contemporary natural right and modern individualistic contractarianism. This thesis is worked out in its most significant details in this chapter.

Let me first summarize Hegel’s explicit stance on the polis in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel warns us against a facile transposition of Greek elements into our philosophy and the foundations of our politics. Not only is philosophy a public affair in the service of the state in Hegel’s time, while for the Greeks it was pursued in private like an art (PhR Preface; W 7: 21, Knox 7). More importantly, in the Greek classical state, whose most rigorous and yet untimely expression Hegel arbitrarily takes to be Plato’s Republic, which he reads not as Plato’s but the Greek spirit’s reaction before the menace of fragmentation, unity is attained at the expense of difference. There is no room for the person and for property (PhR§46 A), and especially not for subjective freedom (ENZ.C §552 A), individual choice, morality, and happiness. The lack of the infinite right of particularity to find satisfaction in itself and in its interiority explains the lack of a civil society in Greece (PhR §124 A). The weakness of ancient states is that they cannot withstand the disruption caused by the principle of self-consciousness’s infinite reflection in itself (PhR§185 A). Only a state that can afford to maintain particularity and the antithesis of reason to develop separately, integrating it in itself, is strong enough to compenetrate individual and common goods (ibid.).
The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself (PhR §260).

As we know from Chapter 1, self-consciousness, the infinite principle of interiority, is missing in Greece. But, to be more precise, it first dawns in the figure of Socrates as a tendency to look for the right and the good within oneself once the ethos can no longer satisfy a good will (PhR §138 A). While the Greeks did not yet have the strength to look inside the human soul, Socrates’ daimon represents precisely the beginning of a self-affirmation of individual will (PhR §279 A). On the whole, all laws were directed to the welfare of the state (Wann §167); therefore for the Greek world the substantial unity of finite and infinite remains hidden in “a mysterious background” (PhR §356); the principles of personal individuality and the will are not yet posited in the individual self-consciousness (PhR §356).

The complementary side of this is that the system of needs that constitutes civil society for Hegel is estranged from the human and political world, relegated to an alternative realm to freedom – work is a condition of slavery (PhR §356). In this connection Hegel says that while the work of an Athenian slave was more spiritual than modern servile workers, who are probably forced to endure rougher and more mechanical working conditions, the whole range of his activities was alienated and belonged to the master (PhR §67 Z). Work is not just a banausos or lowly service, which finds meaning in a product external to it; according to Hegel; it is one of the highest forms of spirit’s practical education of itself (§197).

All the above reflects, among other things, Hegel’s understanding of Plato as the advocate of a very tight unity in the state, and of Socrates as the initiator of the subversive principle that Plato strove to undermine with all his might in the Republic. This dialogue is a reaction to the emerging threat of the privatization of political life represented not just by Socrates but by sophistry as well.

The interpretation of these phenomena as typical of the crisis of the Attic city in this sense is definitely original, going against the fable convenue current in Hegel’s age (compare PhR Preface; W 7: 24, Knox 10). The commonplace about the Republic as an ideal city incommensurable with reality is so widespread and taken for granted that Kant himself
finds it convenient to refer to Plato’s perfect city for a clarification of ideas in their distinction from chimeras (in the Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason KrV A 313/B 370 ff.) – even though his knowledge of Plato was at best superficial, derived from the handbooks of the age, his criticism of Brucker notwithstanding.

It would take us too far afield to dwell on the reasons why I believe Hegel got the Republic badly wrong. All that is relevant to note in this context is that for him there is a continuity from the Republic to Aristotle’s Politics. What they share is the concern for a political unity prior to differences, and a strong realism opposed to all idealism. Plato’s Republic, rather than being the expression of a utopian constitution, is based on the “demoralization (Verdorbenheit) of democracy and the defectiveness even of this principle” (ENZ.C §552 A). It is thus no less a powerful response to the problems of the age than Aristotle’s Politics. And for the Greek age the state is prior to individuals. Hegel, who identifies natural right with modern contractarianism, whether of a Hobbesian or Rousseauian sort, and denies an ancient natural law, thinks that only the participation in a higher ethical life is what makes my customs and habits derive their meaning from the customs and habits of the spirit of my people.

Hegel does not make much of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Republic. The Aristotelian state (in Jena, Hegel translates polis as Volk, “people” JSE III: 256, and later as Staat, “state”) is for him “an entelechy” diametrically “opposed to the modern principle which takes its bearings from the individual” (VGPh 225) because it is in view of “the good, the right” (ibid.). If this trait, common to Plato, is all that Hegel emphasizes, he also mentions in passing that for Aristotle the end of the state is “universal happiness” (ibid.; J/G 94). He could – and should – have followed through this comment and understood this as the happiness of individuals within the state, hence as the at least tentative reconciliation of particular and universal.

Aristotle criticizes Plato for suppressing property and family precisely because a state is the unity of specifically different individuals (Pol. II 2, 1261a 22–4). Plurality must find its harmony in the unity, not be destroyed by it, for property and what is dear to us are the two principles that move us to feel affection for others, and they are both suppressed in the Platonic republic (II 4, 1262b 22–4). It is better to have family and property than to do away with the principal motives for action in a city; virtuous people share their property generously with others anyway. For no one would pursue property and wealth for his own
sake unless one were reversing the natural order of things: property is for use, and is only pleasant for the help it enables us to give to our friends and the liberality it makes possible (II 5, 1263b 2–14).

Hegel seems to ascribe little importance to this. He identifies the distance between Plato and Aristotle in the latter’s keen propensity toward aristocracy. Curiously, this is once again both a sign that the times of Athenian democracy were by then long gone, and evidence that, when Aristotle writes about the wrong the best would suffer if they were ruled by those who were less good, he has Alexander in mind.1

Aristotle’s aristocratic leanings or his justification of slavery are not the only or even the main reasons why for Hegel it makes no sense to transport an ancient model to modern times. Maybe the most incisive expression of this point is to be found in the Wannenmann manuscript, where Hegel says that a constitution is the expression of the spirit of a people and would thus be inadequate for a different people. While elsewhere he shows that he has in mind such vain attempts as the exportation to Spain of the Napoleonic code or Murat’s rule over the republic of Naples, here he continues: “Therefore there is nothing so irrational as to refer back to Greek and Roman constitutions for ours” (Wann §136). The wording of this point is rather striking. It may be taken to counter, among other things, Rousseau’s praise of Roman republicanism;2 but it can also be turned against Hegel’s own youthful appreciation of the polis as the invisible bond uniting a community, the bond missing in the age of scission and disruption of his formative years in Germany.

At the conclusion of the Constitution of Germany (1799–1803), Hegel echoes Machiavelli by invoking a Theseus capable, as in Plutarch’s Life, of uniting a dispersed multiplicity, in this case those territories humiliated by the suppression of 112 states, including many free cities, which had been promulgated by the Ratisbon diet in 1803. But after the demise of the Holy Roman Empire, the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna, and the establishment of a German confederation, the political configuration of Germany radically changes. In the Encyclopædia and the Philosophy of Right a political nostalgic romanticism is, like the appeal to an individual, more out of the question than ever. The idea that

1 In the Lectures Hegel has no doubt that Aristotle is thinking of Alexander (“ohne Zweifel,” 228); in J/G, he deems it only likely (“vielleicht,” 95).

2 But see Social Contract (bk. 2: 8) on the necessity for a constitution to be adequate to a people.
the modern state has incorporated the principle of subjectivity and is incomparably stronger and higher than Greek and Roman states makes all other considerations totally secondary for Hegel.

What is significant about the weakness of the Greek polis is that the Greeks had no idea of conscience and interiority (ENZ.C §482 A, §552 A); and yet Hegel chooses Socrates and Epictetus as examples of a dawning moral conscience in collision with a world become obsolete. While it is important not to simplify Hegel’s thesis, the problem of the coincidence between individual and universal, as we see in the next section, was more familiar than Hegel is willing to grant to the Greeks and to Aristotle in particular, who asked whether the virtue of a citizen and that of a good man were the same, answering in the negative in case of a disorderly polis (Pol. III 4, 1276b 30–7; 18, 1288a 37–9; IV 7, 1293b 1–7).

As I said, the reason why we cannot go back to Aristotle cannot simply turn on the question of slavery, because slavery is itself the symptom of a more fundamental misconception for Hegel. Obviously, Hegel denies that there are slaves by nature, and makes all slave/master relation a historical stage of spirit’s life. And that goes hand in hand with the notion of work, as we saw above (PhR §197; §356). Because labor is negativity and Bildung, the shaping of objectivity and the humanizing of nature, it is spirit’s self-objectification, and the slave eventually gets recognized by the master as self-consciousness. All work is spirit’s self-affirmation; it has a dignity which was not acknowledged by Aristotle or by the Greeks altogether, for whom production was at best incomplete, and in stark opposition with action, which alone could be an end to itself. Only with Luther and Calvin does all natural distinction in activities disappear, leaving room for the notion that all human labor is equally in the service of God, hence equally worthy of respect. Work thus acquires ethical relevance for Hegel and reflects the modern understanding of the superiority of freedom over nature.

The legitimate demand of particularity to see its needs satisfied regardless of the whole is what marks the difference between ancient and modern states for Hegel. Less idealistic schools of thought would insist on other points, downplaying the thesis that the gap between ancient and modern politics hinges on the different regard in which they hold self-consciousness, labor, and civil society. For example, one could speak

3 See Cesa, “Doveri universali” (1977: 47 n.).
of the differences determined by the new means of production, which affect the political institutions accordingly. Or, in a more strictly juridical-political vein, one could say that while a polis is a self-sufficient city-state characterized by a magistrature and assembly of citizens, a modern state first arises when a different notion of sovereignty takes over as a juridical rationalization, concentration, and legitimization of power in the hands of an exclusive subject. In the new figure of the sovereign that arises between the 16th and 17th centuries, the question of the identity and personality of the ruler(s) becomes secondary; what is essential is that the sovereign is no longer the ruler over his lands as a primus inter pares, as he was in the middle ages, but the maker, guarantor, and executor of law, a single inalienable authority without superiors or peers and in charge of all decisions. The modern state and the centralization of power in the figure of a sovereign whose task is that of exercising, the monopoly of legitimate force, in Weber’s phrase, arise at a single stroke. But the purpose of all this is the neutralization of internal, especially religious, conflicts. The sovereign must thus depoliticize society and leave it in the hands of a progressively more complex and rational administration. And politics must become more and more a science distinct from, but with power over, morals, religion, commerce, and all that society will pursue as a private enterprise.

The obvious consequence is that from Machiavelli to Bodin, from Hobbes and Spinoza to Locke, the purpose of the state is not that of promoting virtue, or even merely bringing together scattered individuals in view of a common good to pursue, but more modestly that of guaranteeing internal peace and the rule of law. It arises out of pressing need and the avoidance of mutual harm, not for the sake of a noble end and to promote a good life, as Aristotle would have it. If the state must solve conflicts of force and protect its citizens, then its essence is very far from that of the Aristotelian city-state. For Aristotle the city-state was based on the bond of friendship (Eth. eud. VII 10, 1242b 22 ff.). In modern states this is excluded for several reasons, the most important of which in this context is that the tacit or avowed common ground of isolated citizens is mutual advantage. In the modern state, progress in acquisition and technological command over nature knows no natural boundary. The polis, by contrast, has to control its

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5 Koselleck’s book (Kritik und Krise, 1959) remains an eminently stringent and penetrating analysis of the inevitable blurring of the demarcating lines between private and public by which society’s claims come back to haunt politics in the age between Hobbes and the French revolution.
own growth in order not to pervert its dimensions and its nature. The private pursuit of material welfare and accumulation of wealth is not a virtue but a vice; private and public goods have to be harmonious, but in the form of subordination of the former to the latter.

If a polis is sovereign, all this can mean is that it is self-sufficient and sovereign on itself, not that the sovereign exercises a rule over its subjects. The community gives itself a political structure; in our terms, a polis is neither a state nor civil society, for this distinction does not exist in ancient Greece; it was Hegel himself who canonized this distinction to describe the modern state. As Kamp reminds us, it is only at the price of gross simplification that one can read Hegel’s progressive schema of family-civil society-state back into Aristotle. Aristotle’s koinônia politikê is neither civil society nor state, for no distinction between the two is possible within it. Oikos has nothing to do with our or Hegel’s economy and the place of corporations, police, and administration of justice; nor does it simply correspond to the family, because it includes the relation of master to slave, and therefore requires a compenetration of despotic, regal, and aristocratic rule.

What forms a polis for Aristotle? A polis includes territory and place, but identifies first and foremost its citizens. Rather than being equally subject to the sovereign’s law, citizens actively taking part in the rule of the polis actually constitute the city-state. Aristotle refers to his theory of causes for a description of the constituents of the polis. Quantity and quality of population and territory are the material cause of a state (Pol. IV 12, 1296b 17–19; VII 4, 1325b 38–1326a 8), which the legislator qua formal cause (1326a 4) uses for the purpose of his founding act. But what identifies a community as what it is is its politeia. Usually this word is translated as constitution – or so Hegel translates it.

It may be of some interest to notice that by contrast Hegel understands the state in its positivity as a natural and finite determinate existence within the flow of history, whose final judge is world spirit; he therefore takes the national state as the material cause, individual passions as the means or efficient cause, and the idea of freedom above all particularity as the form and end of the realization (VPhG 29 ff.). But a more specific point in this connection is the following. Hegel has not

6 Theorie der Polis (1990: 99–102); compare also Riedel, Tradition (1969: 184–5); Metaphysik und Metapolitik (1975, ch. 7). It follows that Ilting’s interpretation of the “identity in meaning” between the “activities and forms of community,” which find their completion in the political community in the Politics and in the System der Sittlichkeit is more than exaggerated (“Auseinandersetzung,” 1963: 771).
just given us the foundations of a modern philosophy of right and of a philosophy of history. He has also taught us to appreciate the basic differences between ancient and modern politics with his unparalleled acumen (many of the above considerations would have been unthinkable before him), and to emphasize the indispensability of something like classical Greece’s ethical life for a modern state. It is therefore all the more strange that, while he repeats that the city-state is an association for the sake of the good, he does not use this criterion to understand the typology of Aristotle’s constitutions the way Aristotle does. For him they differ merely by the number of those admitted to exercise rule (PhR §273; Wann §135); for this reason, he prefers Montesquieu who clarified the principles on which monarchy, aristocracy, democracy and their respective degenerations are based. For Aristotle, the quantitative aspect of constitutions is secondary compared with their ends, which identify their correct or degenerate nature, as well as when they are compared with the criteria by which the rulers govern – and these are not quantitative (Pol. III 7–8; IV 4).

The question of quantity is relevant for one last aspect of the difference between ancient and modern states. For Aristotle, Babylon was too large to be considered a city-state. The best city-state is autarchic and self-sufficient; since the purpose of the city is to promote virtue and justice, citizens must know each other’s characters “in order to distribute offices according to merit.” The polis must therefore be “taken in at a single view” (eusunuptos, VII 4, 1326b 19–25).

If we bring to bear the categories of Hegel’s logic of measure, and the relative dependence of quantity and quality, by which a change in quantity brings about a change in quality, then we can conclude this section by saying that one further reason why a polis is very far from a modern national state is precisely that a modern state has revolutionized the geographic and economic extension of its boundaries (see WL 1: 393, SL 332). Its constitution must follow suit and change accordingly.

This issue of how we define communal life and a constitution is of crucial importance, for it involves the most fundamental of questions, the degree to which politics is “natural.” Let us see in the next section how Aristotle and Hegel characterize it.

§2. Constitutions, the Naturalness of Politics, and Ethical Life

A perfect city-state for Aristotle is self-sufficient and makes possible a good life (Pol. I 2, 1252b 30). It does not have a fixed governing class, for all ruling and administrative offices are temporary and exercised by
citizens in turn: political rights, political duties, and participation in rule are the same thing (Pol. III 1, 1275a 22–3). The regulation of access to offices in different regimes is what defines citizenship and the form of polis in question. Since this is a matter of distributive justice, such access will reflect the notion of justice the polis will value as its basis and respect as its living practice. Politeia can mean different things, such as the distribution of powers within a city and the delimitation of citizenship, or the character of public administration, of the regime, and of the law. But, most fundamentally, it determines who has a right to public offices, as well as the nature of the rule and the correct or degenerate understanding of its function, and the order and bond among the citizens or the specific bios of a city. Unlike modern constitutions, it does not need political representation to function or contemplate covenants or contracts of sorts. It does not establish the form of government and the abstract foundations of sovereignty. It says who must rule; the politeia coincides with the persons who rule (compare Pol. III 1; 6; 7–8; IV 1). It is more descriptive than normative.

While the foundation of the elementary forms of community is life, the peculiar purpose of a city is to live well (eu zên). For Aristotle, the first moment is that of a family; the family is a natural organization because it is based on the natural desire that brings together male and female. But this coupling is not temporary and accidental, like in most animals; it acquires a duration and permanence. Thus it involves a relation that goes beyond reproduction, giving rise to the first forms of inner divisions of tasks and functions. The important consequence is that in the family are already present the seeds of the city, that is, in the form of the necessity for a rule based on some sort of friendship and justice. A village is a natural expansion of the family, and so is the city. The city alone is self-sufficient, however. It differs from family and village in that the latter are pre-political relations among unequal members; the city is instead a political association, in that it is the rule of equal and free citizens. While man naturally desires to live with others, the city is not political by nature, since it comes about when laws are instituted by a legislator. This is why Aristotle says that the first legislator was the cause of the greatest goods for man: man is not by nature just but is made just by the city’s laws (I 2, 1253a 29–39). Man is not by nature political because he is a gregarious being like bees and ants; man

is rather political because he has a natural predisposition to justice. And justice is the good and the end of a city (Pol. III 12, 1282b 14–22). Thus, against the dissociation of physis and nomos (nature and convention) advocated by the sophists, Aristotle takes political institutions to be neither simply conventional nor wholly natural.

The city grows out of its constituents (Pol. I 1, 1252a 18); these, however, are not individuals but already organized forms of community, however primitive (in particular the family). If this is true in the order of generation, in itself or by nature the city is the activity of its citizens, and it determines their function just as actuality makes potentiality understandable. It is only in this sense that more elementary communities naturally “tend” to the city. Aristotle objects to Lycophron that if all that right does is to protect citizens, the law would be reduced to a contract and would thus be unable to make citizens good and right (Pol. III 9, 1280a 31–b 12). In the city the whole is not the same as the sum of its parts, because parts cannot be understood apart from their function within the whole. The state is in this sense prior to individuals (Pol. I 2).

As we saw, Hegel praises this thought. From the Wissenschaftliche Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts and the System der Sittlichkeit until the end of his life, Hegel countered this to the reduction of politics to a question of private law (Right as the first of the three moments of Objective Spirit). The state is higher than individuals precisely because it is irreducible to any individual will, and it is only arrogant to negotiate as private persons the good of the whole. Does he then agree with Aristotle on this understanding of the quasi-naturalness of politics?

Hegel frames the question in different terms. From the Anthropology onward man has been understood as his self-shaping into a psychophysical unity addressing itself to ends devised by reason. For Hegel, the formation of a political community cannot be natural or biological but only the object of spirit’s will.

The first thing to notice is that he takes Aristotle’s quasi-naturalness of politics to mean that individuals are part of a living whole: the state is like an organic body. Thus he does not read Aristotle in the naturalistic sense, which had been current since Hobbes. Hobbes had identified – tendentiously and wrongfully, as we saw – Aristotle as the advocate of a naturalistic view of politics in which there is no difference between men and bees (Leviathan, bk. 2: ch. XVII). Man is by nature political because he is gregarious.8

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But the momentous step taken by Hegel, which results in the biggest of differences between him and Aristotle, is that for him, unlike for Aristotle but in agreement with Hobbes, art is opposed to and superior to nature. For Aristotle, the end of a good life in accordance with reason dictates the developed form of virtue in a political community. While there is no preestablished rule for action and the legislator cannot look to nature for guidance, there is nevertheless a natural hierarchy of ends which political action keeps in view. The city aims at the good life of its citizens and stems from man’s natural propensity for justice.9

For Hegel, the state does not stem from nature in any, direct or indirect, sense, for it is deduced from the will. As we saw, he defines the will and reason as spirit’s nature; Sein and Sollen, is and ought, are one for spirit, whose essence is the command to bring about its freedom in actuality. But if this seems to blur the terms of the nature/culture distinction, the consequence which we must nevertheless emphasize is that right is essentially positive, a suppression of given nature by a spiritualized nature. That Hegel dissociates civil society from the state, the system of needs from politics, is part of this understanding; that he will then try to reunite them on the different level of ethical life is a consequence of that very dissociation.

Yet it would be misleading to say that Hegel would side with Hobbes, Hegel’s “most insistent interlocutor” in the Philosophy of Spirit, on a “rupture with ancient political philosophy.”10 For Hegel, human desires and needs are not Hobbesian natural drives but inferior moments of reason, as we see in Chapter 8. The contrast is not between natural and artificial bodies, as for Hobbes, but between an external contingent nature and a second nature permeated by spirit’s freedom and self-determination.

If only a rational and universally legislating will can ground right, no Hobbesian or Spinozistic material conatus will be sufficient to explain it; fear of death and self-preservation cannot account for the will. In this sense Hegel finds all notion of a natural right contradictory. The establishment of law and of a state is neither derived from nor a limitation of inborn and original rights. All right is grounded on free personality

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9 Compare Strauss, Natural Right (1953: 120–64).
10 The two quotes are, respectively, from pp. 26 and 9 of Taminiaux’s essay in Dialectic and Difference (1985). When Taminiaux argues that Hegel invokes the priority of the state over the individual because he reduces politeia to patriotism (ibid.: 17), he obviously caricatures Hegel.
and on the will’s self-determination. Nature does not know of such determinations; nature is rather the realm of violence and arbitrariness. As for Hobbes and Rousseau, right and wrong only happen in society; might is not right, and we must depart from nature (exeundum e statu naturae); but unlike Hobbes and Rousseau, there is no transition to civilization because the state of nature is – in contemporary language – an ideological construction to begin with (ENZ.C§502 A).

Right in Hegel may denote either the realm of objective spirit as a whole or its first moment. In the latter case, as abstract right, it is the stage at which free individuality is understood as juridical personality. In morality, the second stage of Objective Spirit, free individuality is a subject, as internal and reflected will. Neither stage was known to the Greeks, writes Hegel. As a consequence it is no wonder that, for example, Hegel argues the opposite of Aristotle on property. Aristotle takes property to be merely instrumental, thus by nature lower than what it is instrumental for (Pol. I 9). By contrast, for Hegel the personality knowing itself as free and entitled to an external sphere of freedom puts its will into its possessions (PhR §58). Property is not a natural right for there is nothing natural to property. My property becomes of infinite value because I have put my personal will (Rousseau would say my reflected amour-propre) into it and demand that others recognize it as such. Just as in politics, where there are no given laws governing us but only those laws we recognize and to which we subject ourselves, so too to invest my will into my property is to make it an external existence of my interiority, an end that claims to be recognized and respected as such.

For this reason, according to Hegel, Roman law is wrong in distinguishing between rights of persons and of things (PhR §40 A). What is missing from both Roman law and Aristotle is a clear conception of the division between nature as a moment to be subjugated by the will and the notion of juridical personality as a bearer of rights, a personality superior even to the worst effects of this progress, the reification of personal qualities into objects of exchange and of contract.

“Subject” is another category absent from Aristotle, for it is typical of “European” and Christian freedom (ENZ.C§503 A). A subject has a personal knowledge of good and evil. He recognizes and justifies in his heart and conscience external laws as inwardized principles informing his conduct (ibid.). This subjectivity of the will is something Hegel opposes to the substantiality of the will, which he calls ethical life. Here freedom acquires full consciousness of itself in its existence; its actuality is manners and customs, ethos – “freedom become nature” (ENZ.C§513 A).
Just like habit before the I and mechanical memory before thinking, so here ethical life is the freedom within a rational scope that has become insensitive and assented to possession. I move about in such ethos without having to make up my mind every time, because my mind is already made up in a web of relations that I inhabit and recognize as what constitutes my innermost nature: the customs, social and historical determinations which I know provide me with duties and rights and a systematically arranged practice.

The ethical substance is produced by the activity of persons; but the contributions we make are individual modifications of a substance that preexists individuals and gives them reality and meaning. Right, morality, and all individual relations find their origin in one encompassing whole, spirit and the will’s self-objectification in the historical tradition of a people. Ethical life animates, guides, and holds together independent persons from within their interiority. What keeps people together is not an unknown bond, for the most essential motive of Sittlichkeit or ethical life is confidence and a mutual reliance we recognize and value.11

In this respect a community imposes on us limitations we accept because we understand them as rational. A constitution (Verfassung) is precisely the existing order of liberties and the justice of a people. It gives objective and permanent existence to the certainty that we all participate in the rational communal ethical life (ENZ.C §539 A). We are by reason equal, so to speak; equality is a product of modern consciousness (ibid.).

Ethical life is the living good, as Hegel says, echoing Plato (PhR §142); it is the existence of freedom as the organized totality and as the external nature of a self-consciousness confident in the meaningfulness of what surrounds it (ENZ.C §539). While for modern natural right customs are entirely subordinated to the sovereignty of law and have no juridical status, in his notion of ethical life Hegel retrieves the meaning of institutions as the product of participation in communal life he finds in Plato and Aristotle. This principle of a people’s spirit, which is brought to the fore by Montesquieu in his notion of moeurs (customs), is for Hegel tantamount to the grounding of a rational will in a concrete content. Thus this notion is diametrically opposed to the

11 “Die Gesinnung der Individuen ist das Wissen der Substanz,” a sentence poorly paraphrased by Miller in his translation (ENZ.C §515). In the words of 1805/6, “spirit starts being as knowing” (JSE 3: 264).
reactionary historic school of Savigny and Puchta, who emphasize the
primacy of the spirit of a people over the state, and the origin of right
and law in the codification of the spontaneous habits of a people (PhR
§ 211 A).12

In ethical life my duty and right draw their meaning from my par-
ticipation in a whole (PhR § 155). Virtues are dispositions of the char-
acter toward the community; we fulfill our duties as members of a fam-
ily, as workers, citizens, etc. (ENZ.C § 516). Here the state is the manifest
will, a telos like Aristotle’s polis, and is explicitly compared by Hegel to
an unmoved mover (PhR § 258; cf. Pol. I 2). The will is finally realized,
for citizens understand the state as their own product; institutions are
no longer alienated from people who, rather than being subjects suf-
ferring laws they sense to be oppressive and limitative of their freedom,
are citizens who enact them and strengthen them with their personal
adherence in their everyday activities.

The state, however, is both the universal will of citoyens and, given
what it presupposes, the guarantor of the rights of bourgeois (VGPh
228; JSE III: 261). Hegel’s state is not an alternative to particularity. It
recognizes a role for public opinion, juridical personality, and morality,
and for the dispersion of particular pursuits of conflicting goods. It
transforms the substantial Greek ethos into a subjective power recog-
nizing individual rights, demands, and claims, which operates through
the abstract mediation of political representation of corporations and
interests. Hegel’s state infuses the Greek substantial ethos with right
and morality.

True, personal morality is but one moment of ethical life; morality is
in itself abstract and has no determinate content, for only ethical life
provides it with one. But the reflection of the subject in itself makes it
shoulder the full responsibility of its actions and assures it of its superi-
ority over the object. It is an indispensable moment on spirit’s way to its
full self-conscious realization. Morality cannot be annulled by ethical
life. It can even exceed politics. If hypostasized as the presumption of
rising above the course of the world and judging it, it is evil itself for
Hegel; but in cases in which ethical life is broken apart, especially in
transitional historical ages in which the state no longer expresses the
spirit of a people or is bent to the interest of a minority, morality for
Hegel must act outside laws to change the customs which have grown
obsolete and produce a reconciliation between individual and sub-

stantial whole. Morality as the alleged inviolable sanctuary of human
dignity is and must be affirmed as such no matter what. Turning it into
an arrogant self-righteous tribunal is not necessarily intrinsic to its
essence – only its most typical degeneration.

It is thus a severe limitation to have *Sitte* without *Gewissen*, ethos with-
out conscience, habit without a reflected and willful intention. And if
modern ethical life is strengthened by morality, its meaning departs
from that of Greek ethical life due to the right to particular freedom
and to a personal knowledge of good and evil. “[E]thical and religious
principles shall not merely lay their claim on him [man] as external laws
and precepts of authority to be obeyed, but have their assent, recogni-
tion, or even justification in his heart, sentiment, conscience, intelli-
gence” (*ENZ.C* §503). The modern state has a much stronger founda-
tion – in the interiority of its members. The free Lutheran subjective
conscience is the link between morality and politics.

For this reason Hegel says in the *Lectures* that while the state is for
Aristotle “the substantial” (*VGPh* 226), the modern state is freer be-
cause it enforces abstract right, which was unknown to Aristotle (ibid.,
227). It isolates individuals, lets them act as individuals, and yet, like an
invisible spirit, holds them together “like in a factory” (ibid.).

As a consequence, what Hegel means by ethical life cannot be just
the revitalization of Platonic–Aristotelian political philosophy. An ethos
from which all particularity is virtually banned, as Hegel thinks happens
in the *Politics*, cannot be the bond he advocates. Hegel shows once again
the power of *Aufhebung* at work. He wants to synthesize ancient and
modern political philosophy in a unity which, though indebted to and
preserving the best of both, is irreducible to either and represents an
advance over them – an advance over both unity at the expense of par-
ticularity and individualism at the expense of the public sphere.

While he begins his theory of objective spirit with abstract individual
right, he sees both right and morality as valid in ethical life. He thereby
avoids the origin of all law and obligation in subjective claims and the
reduction of politics to mutual relations among individuals, to a con-
tract of subjective wills. But instead of appealing to a natural binding
order prior to individuals, as did Aristotle, he subjectivizes the substan-
tial bond among them into a certainty, an invisible trust in spirit active
in the political community. Spirit animates institutions like *das Logische*
animates all reality; understanding this pervades our everyday life with
reason – whereby reason, rather than the traditional light, provides a
solid basis, a firm ground for action.
§3. Ethics, Politics, and Right

This more encompassing principle seems to operate behind Hegel’s interpretation of the Aristotelian polis. Hegel assimilates the relation of individual to community in the *Politics* to the analogous theses he found in the *Republic*: the subordination and reduction of all ethics to politics. Even though, with his distinction between infinite and substantial freedom and the superiority of the former, Hegel implies that the person, as a free person, becomes the subject of right and of the state as such, and rightly sees that for the Greeks men derive their rights from their participation in citizenship, nevertheless he still uses the same exaggeration as many readers have used when interpreting him – the so-called state idolatry and the effacement of individuals in the whole.

Aristotle did take it for granted that people are expected to abide by laws. The happiness of an individual coincides with that of the city-state (*Pol. VII* 2, 1324a 5). This is quite natural, since ethics is part of politics, the architectonic practical science (I 2, 1094a 26–b 11), and to secure the good of the city is nobler than to secure it for an individual (*Eth.nic. I* 3, 1094b 9–10).

The individual wants the good of the city and has inwardized the city’s commands in his habitual conduct and everyday life. The main concern of politics is not administration of power but “to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions” (*Eth.nic. I* 10, 1099b 30–2, transl. Ostwald). The right education is precisely the habituation of children to feel pleasure and pain at the proper things (II 1104b 11–13). Thus children will form and educate their appetites and bodies in view of the proper education of their souls to the good (*Pol. VII* 15, 1334b 20 ff.).

In sum, the individual has made customs and laws inner principles of habitual conduct. The ethos of a city, from initial coercion, becomes the end pursued spontaneously by citizens. The legislator turns laws into principles to which everybody wants to assent; “he makes the good in itself good for each” (*Met. Z* 3, 1029b 7).

We are not born in a void. As the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* suggests, life is not blind, it has an end to itself. Human existence is intentional and directed to ends if everything aims at the good. In other

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13 What remains unsaid in Hegel becomes the core of his disciple Michelet’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics: “Virtue has actuality (*energeia*) only in the state,” this is “a sublation of the moral standpoint” (*Ethik des Aristoteles*, 1827: 88–9).
words, we are born into a tradition of meaningful activities and habits. As Hegel would say, all we have to do is appropriate this inorganic nature of ours by realizing that the web of culture and institutions we are born into is not an alien power but the very core of our humanity.

Having said that, however, I must add that Aristotle also contemplates the possibility, opening up all sorts of problems for his theory, that the virtue of the good man and that of the citizen do not overlap (\textit{Pol. III} 4, 1276b 30–7; 18, 1288a 37–9; IV 7, 1293b 1–7). The virtue of a citizen includes the knowledge of what command and obeyance is required of free men. But since regimes are many, the virtues of citizens will vary accordingly, while for the good man only complete virtue will be the standard. Hence, it is possible to be a good citizen without being a good man; only in the best constitution do the two coincide (whether the good man can be a bad citizen or not is a question that Aristotle seems to find less intriguing than I would). Besides, it is possible to enjoy political recognition and honor without possessing the virtue that honor is meant to honor (as suggested at \textit{Eth.nic. I} 3, 1095b 24–30). Finally, and more importantly, the \textit{bios} of thought is higher than a political \textit{bios}, because the \textit{nous} is divine and transcends the all-too-human polis. If I may for once hypostasize \textit{bioi} into typified human figures, I would say that a philosopher is in principle twice removed from the good citizen.

The friendship involved among citizens and good men also differs. Political friendship, concord in the city, would make justice superfluous, and yet it cannot be taken for granted, as is shown by the fact that the state is for the sake of justice. Besides, the equality among friends, while rare since citizens are at best a small minority of the population (adult free males born of free citizens, with further restrictions on census, and so forth, depending on the regime), is based on the common features of citizens, those qualities making them citizens; the friendship of virtue is instead rarer and based on equality of character.

Hegel identifies the justice of the polis and the virtue of justice in an individual in both the \textit{Politics} and the \textit{Republic}. He takes up Socrates’s invitation to look for the characters of justice of the individual soul in the city, where they are written large (\textit{Resp. II}: 368d). He overlooks the difficulties of the identity of soul and city and identifies the good for one with the good for the other. He concludes that the individual wants the good of the whole as his end. Hegel will appropriate this lesson, with all the qualifications seen above, into his thought. The individual’s virtues, rights, and duties are concrete only as the offices set to him by
the whole; just as in the *Republic* justice is *ta heautou prattein* (doing one’s job), so in Hegel individual and political justice coincide (*ENZ.C* §516).

Thus it is hard not to agree with Peperzak when he writes that actual freedom is a second nature spiritualized through known and willed actions and habits, and that the “unity of true virtue with the customs of a well-constituted state is the Aristotelian expression for the Platonizing identity of individual and social justice.”

This is not yet the end of the story, however. The self-production of subjective free spirit in institutions and history is its determinate existence in actuality and a finite mirror of spirit’s infinite freedom. But since all actualization of freedom is nothing but a finite or negative form of it, objective spirit has a limited content in which reason cannot ultimately find contentment. Spirit’s full enjoyment of itself will be attained only in the sphere of Absolute Spirit, which is free from the historical determinateness and positiveness of Objective Spirit’s formations.

States and peoples are themselves finite, natural, and particular forms of spirit, and their superior destiny is world spirit, which, very significantly, reinstates a sort of Hobbesian state of nature at the level of the tribunal of universal history. There is no supranational right among states; spirit points out of objectivity to absolute spirit, a nonpolitical self-enjoyment in art, religion, and philosophy.

Spirit is fully *zu Hause*, at home with itself, as absolute only. But often Hegel speaks as though this should hold of Objective Spirit as well. While Hegel at times seems intentionally confusing on this, and while at times this is the result of a successful deduction, it also tacitly presupposes an unproven thesis, which can be articulated in three moments: (1) the eventual unity of reason in objectivity, (2) the relativity of morality to the state, and (3) the insufficiency of objectivity for spirit.

(1) Reason must prevail as a unity in particular states; in other words, no rational permanent dissent is going to survive the efforts of a community to reconcile it with itself; it can only last as long as one does not see the reason animating all others who must persuade him of it. Truth wins, theory persuades practice, and all conflict is a moment before final reconciliation.

(2) Further, reason and morality have little or no role to play in relations among states, which is the bad infinity of a Schillerian *Weltgericht* (world tribunal) in which war and peace alternate without end; the

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stronger prevail and constitute the new Zeitgeist or spirit of the time (PhR §340 ff.; ENZ.C §§547–§552). If the first point shows an unde-duceable optimism and the well-known danger of conformism, or, in Aristotle’s terms, if it presupposes that passions listen to reason like children to a father, then this second point betrays a positivism surprising for Hegel. But, more importantly, it is at odds with the first. Hegel em-\textcolor{red}{p}loys the word “right” in two opposite senses: while in the first, right prevails as the objective rationality of a people; in the second, right is the might of the prevailing people at a given time.

From a principle declined in the plural, right becomes singular, but at the cost of being identified simply with the right of the stronger ad-vocated since the time of Callicles and Thrasymacus. The connection of this employment of “right” with rights, morality, and the objectivity of reason, is quite dubious. Hegel’s theoretical edifice of objective right, so complex on the inside, seems to crumble on the outside before the acknowledgment of reason’s objective limits in world history. At the level of international relations, all politics is reduced to a Schmittian drawing of boundaries between amicus and hostis where auctoritas, non veritas facit legem (authority, not truth, makes law).

If this criticism is not off the mark, then we should not conclude, with Adorno’s aphorism in Minima Moralia, that the V 2’s are the truth of Hegel’s philosophy of history, but rather ask if, with this unbridgeable gap between objective and absolute spirit, Hegel has not betrayed the concepts of reason and right he had started from and so strongly af-firmed. We should ask if, in other words, he has not abdicated to a mutilated and positivistic understanding of right and morality that are only concrete within a state. If Hegel had, for example, allowed right and morality to have a say at the level of international relations,\footnote{International tribunals in the second half of the 20th century stem precisely from the intuition of the sore lack of a right that is not national (by which I certainly do not im-ply they are rational and/or impartial in any present form).} maybe the gap between Objective and Absolute Spirit would not transfer the burden of reconciliation to a sphere that, instead of recapitulating in itself the calvary of history, might well appear as alternative to it and a retreat from objectivity, against Hegel’s intentions. That the structure of the Philosophy of Right precludes this avenue is clear; Hegel should have taken more seriously the concept of natural right. But that it is also in-compatible with what Hegel has taught us about reason’s urge to ob-jectify itself in the world, is something I think we should doubt.
If in the tribunal of history Cronos devours his sons incessantly, the realm of Zeus will only be instituted outside of history, and the purpose of the second moment is to ground the third: no final reconciliation is possible in objective spirit; only a partial one within each state. National states, including ethical life and the inevitable “naturalness” of the spirit of a people, transcend themselves in a higher form of spirit, in its return to itself out of objectivity (ENZ.C §552). History is then viewed as the mirror of spirit’s freedom, but it cannot be the ultimate stage in its self-knowledge. And, as we know from Chapter 1, time and objectivity, rather than being included in spirit’s self-enjoyment, eventually get discarded as external clothes. Instead of a dialectic, we would have a Wittgensteinian ladder to throw away after use.

Even with all these limitations, as well as the eventual primacy of theory over practice, the true and the good are one for Hegel, for the Idea is one, and the true and the good are its modes. By contrast, in Aristotle we must emphasize the distinction between the good and the true and his effort to make ethics autonomous from metaphysics. While in the Theaetetus (176b–c) to become similar to God is to be just in the highest sense, for Aristotle this homoîsis theîi is the impassive contemplation of the eternal order of the cosmos (Eth.nic. X 8, 1178b 7–23), as opposed to that which can be otherwise and which is consequently subject to human arbitrariness and conventions.

In this sense Hegel is much closer to what he thought of Plato than to Aristotle. For one thing, all principles are unified, and the true and the good are moments of the Idea. (Hegel disregards the most crucial point, that for Socrates in the Republic the good was beyond being, epekeina tês ousias.) For another, truth’s axiological character is extended to refer to the totality of being, and is thus more similar to what we find in Spinoza than in Aristotle, as we see more in detail in Chapter 10.

To conclude, Sittlichkeit or ethical life presupposes the Aristotelian concept of an ethical realization of human action and life in institutions that become the habits and customs of individuals. However, Aristotle knew spirit’s freedom within nature but not its infinity (BS §527), and he did not conceive of the relation between finite and infinite spirit as a Menschwerdung Gottes, God’s becoming human (ENZ.C §377 Z).

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16 This point is inspired by the analogous criticism that has been leveled by Peperzak in his commentary on the end of Objective Spirit in his Selbsterkenntnis des Absoluten (1986, ch. 3).
templative life, with which Aristotle closes the *Ethics*, is for Hegel only appropriate to Absolute Spirit thinking itself (*ENZ.C* §574), for which all objectivity and history has been realized and understood as the deployment of its own rationality.

Only once the *noēsis noēseōs* is incorporated in spirit’s infinity can the concept and the reality of spirit coincide. But more precisely, only in philosophy, the retrospective gaze upon spirit’s systematic deductions and historical calvary in its realization of its freedom, has spirit finally carried out the task set out for it at the beginning: “Know Thyself” now means that the *noēsis noēseōs* is enriched with all the content of objective history. Spirit has realized its divine destination in full.
IV

CONCLUSIONS
§1. The Finitude of Thinking

The concept of *energeia* forms for Hegel the unitary principle of Aristotle’s philosophy. It is the foundation for understanding the concept of immanent form as an essence which is at the same time the cause of its being. As such, it cannot be understood apart from change but is the subject of its own function, the *archê kai telos* of its being. Thus Hegel thinks it as the unity of inner and outer, as a substance that is the subject of its modes.

I have argued in Part II that in Hegel’s interpretation substance as actuality is not a given and fixed identity but a self-producing unity; an entelechy is the unity of a multiplicity, not a unity over multiplicity. Essence and appearance are properly related in *energeia* understood as a self-relating negativity, a self-motion, and thereby the totality of its inner determinations.

If properly speaking *energeia* is thus subjectivity, a self-referential actuosity or the actualization of the potency internal to its essence, then it is not a windowless monad but is in constant relation to its otherness. It is an innerly articulated whole which includes the negative moment of determination within itself at the same time as it relates to its otherness. Taken in general, this structure pervades and defines the whole of nature and of human subjectivity.

Starting from the rich, pervasive, and multiform unity of reason and the homogeneity of approach to the objects of thought, by which all differences among things are internal to thought’s categories, Hegel loses
sight of the priority of the object over thinking fundamental for Aristotle. Thoughts, sciences, disciplines, and attitudes, and with them the different sides of reason, differ in status and rank by their relativity to their objects. For Hegel, on the other hand, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics are united in the notion of reason’s self-determination, of freedom’s self-objectification. The Idea and Spirit are different sides of the same principle, as are the good and the true. Unlike for Aristotle, all principles are unifiable in an absolute monism, for monism itself is not simple identity but includes negativity and difference.

Rather than denouncing Hegel for his supposed blunders, I have tried to give reasons, historical and theoretical, for Hegel’s moves and to understand them in light of concerns and motives that Hegel often put into his reading of Aristotle without always realizing they often had no place there. What still remains to be developed at this point is how and why Hegel turns *energeia* into a metaphysical principle explaining the *whole* of actuality – not only individual substance as a totality of inner determinations negatively relating to itself through otherness – as a teleological process of self-realization. As we see, the reason lies in yet another interesting trait operative in his overreading, if not misinterpretation, of Aristotle: Hegel’s concept of truth.

We see in Chapter 1 that Hegel shares with Aristotle a conception of truth as imposing itself upon us regardless of our particularity; we see in Chapter 8 (pp. 344–5) that for Hegel the good is isomorphic to the true, in that both true and good are defined as *energeia*, that is as the movement by which each thing tries to adequate or realize its concept or standard, its telos. How this structure and movement of adequation relates to a final, and the most famous, of the requirements for truth advocated by Hegel, that of *totality*, is the object of this chapter. It will give further support to the thesis of the entire book, which is that the finitude of thinking affirmed by Aristotle is not an accident of his manner of philosophizing but constitutes the main obstacle to his assimilation in Hegel’s system, as well as the main stumbling block for Hegel’s interpretation.

As we see in Chapters 2 and 7, there is an inner teleology constituting each being for both Aristotle and Hegel; but on top of that there is in Aristotle an external teleology that extends through the universe as a cosmological principle; and in Hegel there is a systematic teleology that guides the degrees of the progression of the Idea in logical thought-determinations, natural beings, and spiritual formations. This second teleology in Hegel orders categories and stages of the *Reallphilosophie* from what is most external to the most self-sufficient (Hegel
would say concrete) being. But this is only what can sustain itself and
know itself as such, the subject of thinking, for whom all that precedes
must be recapitulated and understood as a circle returning to itself. In
such a circularity, which removes the appearance of the immediacy of
all beginning (ENZ.C §17), all forms and essences are interrelated and
there are no separate genera or finite principles – not even a nous, if
this is conceived as finite and not productive of its inner differences the
way absolute thinking is productive of all finite thoughts (compare
Chapter 2, pp. 70, 73–4).

That the nous is finite for Aristotle is quite apparent in his under-
standing of science. The scientificity of arguments is guaranteed pre-
cisely by finitude: premises are firm starting points, essences are dis-
crete, and the principles of demonstration must be proper to the genus
under investigation in order to avoid confusion of domains and infinite
regress.

While this seems to preclude a universal science of being, which is
not a genus, the only reduction it actually speaks against, as we saw in
Chapters 2 (p. 87) and 3 (pp. 112–15), is that of all senses of being to
one science and of all principles to one principle. A science of being
and principles is possible as the anapodictic examination of the first
principles underlying all being and what we say about it. But a science
of being is not a logical or ontological necessary chain of steps pro-
gressively grounding each other, from being to substance to the cate-
gories to actuality to God. The Metaphysics is not the descriptive account
of the steps in mind’s itinerary on the way to God. The relation of pri-
ority between substance and what refers to it cannot be taken as a rela-
tion of foundation or inclusion from the first to what follows from it.

The very finalization of sensibleousiai in God gives us a scientific
knowledge of the relation of God to nature as little as the identification
of God with the object of love. But that the heavens and nature depend
(êrêtēai, Met. Α 7, 1072b 14) on God as the object of love tells us at least
(1) that the eternity of cosmic movement must be understood as the
continuity of an ascent for which God must be posited as the first prin-
ciple of movement, thus avoiding an infinite regress; (2) that this con-
tinuity is a cosmological imitation guided by the aspiration of each
species to superior perfection; and (3) that God is like an ideal for the
human nous, a perfection we only reach occasionally.

The obvious consequence1 is that the relation of God to the world is

1 Drawn most forcefully by Aubenque (Être, 1962: 330, 390).
not a communication from a principle to a consequence. God and nature, physically related in order to save movement from infinite regress and absurdity, are conceptually unrelated, for the essence of the one and that of the other fall asunder; the one means nothing with respect to the inner constitution of the other. If we must take seriously Aristotle’s statements that for God it would be a debasement to think something other than itself (Met. A 9, 1074b 25), then God cannot know the sublunar world, despite all the pious attempts to prove the contrary, from Themistius to Aquinas, as we see at the end of Chapter 3. God does know itself as the principle of all (Met. A 2, 983a 8); but he ignores what hinges upon that principle insofar as it cannot be deduced from it, let alone be created by it. The situation entertained as a hypothesis by Parmenides (Parm. 134e), whom Socrates warns of its very grave implications, and by the Eleatic Stranger (Soph. 249a), that the divinity might not know us, does not seem to trouble Aristotle a great deal. To draw from the words of the Metaphysics (A 10, 1075a 13–15) a meaning that is hardly Aristotle’s, we have the paradoxical situation of an army ruled by a general who does not know his troops.

Even though Hegel acknowledges that Aristotle’s philosophy is not a system, and that the speculative as the identity of subject and object is expounded by Aristotle as one particular theme alongside others instead of valuing it as the only or the highest truth, he interprets Aristotle’s sentence that divinity cannot be jealous (Met. A 2, 983a 2–3) as God’s communication of its essence to the world (VGPh 150). Not that Aristotle expressed himself very differently. But Hegel, as is natural for a lecture course but much less so for the thesis of the identity of the logical and the historical progression of the Idea, bases his interpretation on a selection of passages, which he does not compare with other details that, if taken seriously in their totality, could give him a different global picture of the thought of a philosopher. He does not commensurate programmatic assertions of a certain ambition set out by an author with the effective argument proving the desired and asserted thesis.

Accordingly, he says nothing of the aporias surrounding the Aristotelian God. And while I argue in Chapter 3 that Hegel tries to support Aristotle’s theology to prevent it from becoming a negative theology, Hegel also thinks he is thereby filling in gaps that were not necessarily inherent in Aristotle’s thought, and which instead seem to me to follow from the stated principles of the Metaphysics. Led astray by Erasmus’s text which favored the Neoplatonic-Spinozistic tendency of his interpretation, Hegel conceives of the relation between God and
the world as the immanence of the absolute in nature and finite spirit, despite the acknowledged limitation that Aristotle did not follow through with this principle and develop a system with it.

Hegel finds Aristotle’s genuine greatness in this immanence of the finite in the infinite, of the barest determinations in thought thinking itself, of being and nature in the absolute self-consciousness; in sum, in what is speculative “in the metaphysics and psychology.” It would not go beyond the spirit of Hegel’s intention to conclude that, in energeia as subjectivity and in the nous as the middle among ontology, psychology, and theology, that is, among being, spirit, and the absolute, Hegel finds the unity of nature and man with absolute spirit.

From an Aristotelian perspective this is too much and too little. Too much, because the Metaphysics sets precise limits to the universality of being as the most abstract genus working as the principle of its own dialectic. Too little, because nowhere in the Lectures or elsewhere is there any mention of what Aristotle considered “the hardest problem” (Met. B 4, 1001a 4), that of being and oneness in relation to the substance of things. There is no trace, in other words, of the Greek problem from Parmenides on: that of saving plurality and change in relation to the unity of being from contradictoriness and from the mere semblance of doxa. The conclusion is that the Aristotelian relation between dialectic and science is inverted by Hegel: instead of starting from the givenness of the realm of investigation and the attempt to understand its nature, for Hegel philosophy must show the different realms of being as well as the particular sciences dealing with them as negative and finite moments of a totality, as limited modes of one absolute truth, that of thought.

For Aristotle there is no room for the reductio ad unum of principles in and as moments of thought thinking itself; principles are discrete and diverse. If so, thought is not only innerly divided between a noetic identity with the intelligible and a discursive thought endowed with its own grammar. It is also at least to some degree separate from its object, in that thought is not the cause of forms and the universal of which all essences and intelligibles are concrete finite moments. The Aristotelian

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2 As reads the unpublished Nachschrift Hotho of 1823/4 (I wish to thank Professor Jaeschke for letting me read it). I quote this passage to show that the integration of the commentary on Metaphysics Λ and on De anima III (VGPh 218–19) is not to be ascribed to Michelet’s compilation but was thought by Hegel to be the unity and speculative peak of Aristotle’s philosophy. Compare also J/G 88–91.
intellect is not the principle of a dialectic of concepts and the logic of the relations among essences. As I write in Chapter 8, even when Aristotle speaks of identity between thought and intelligible, what he means is a discrete identity, so that at best the nous finds the other in itself, the forms in its first actuality; it cannot produce itself in the other the way Hegelian reason does as the logical structure animating all of reality.

Differently stated, even the identities of thinking and intelligibles are only declined in the plural, as the thoughts of forms without matter. And as we see in Chapter 5, the infallible touching/saying of an essence, which constitutes the principle for a demonstration, is like a clear vision of what we have been looking for, an intuitive grasp of an essence at first experienced generically. This intellection of indivisibles is understood by Aristotle to be an integral part of the problem of essential and accidental predication and of the respective theoretical modalities of nous.

In light of the question of the infinity and totalizing self-relation of reason as opposed to what I call the finitude of thinking in Aristotle, I find it very significant that the locus of Hegel’s discussion of essential and accidental predication is his logic of judgment.

The various types of judgment are expounded according to the way the relation between subject and predicate is grounded, from the more abstract to the more concrete, from the greater difference between subject and predicate up to their identity. Thus the judgment is not taken as a subjective operation performed by a consciousness, but as the inner self-articulation of the concept. For the copula does not set up a relation but expresses an already existing one, and in particular the relation between a singular and its universal. The judgment is thus the relation between two nonidentical terms which it at the same time posits as identical.

In the ‘qualitative judgment’ subject and predicate fall asunder; all the predicate does is express an isolated point of contact between subject and predicate, an empirical relation of belonging. In “This rose is red” we have a relation of inherence comparable to Aristotle’s “being in a substrate (en tōi hupokeimenōi)” from the Categories.

In the ‘judgment of reflection’ the predicate does not express an accidental or empirical property of a singular substrate but an essential link between the predicate and the subject now taken in its essential

3 ENZ.C§166, A. Recall from Chapter 6 (pp. 183–4), that when a statement only expresses something individual it is only a proposition and not a judgment.
4 As noted by Doz (La logique, 1987: 207).
side. In “This plant is curative,” the subsumption of the substrate in the predicate is the overcoming of the substrate’s singularity. We now have an essential ascription to a “this” which is not limited to its singularity, for the singularity is taken as representative of its species.

In the “judgment of necessity” we first start asking the question of the inner truth of judgment. We do not have an empirical external juxtaposition of subject and predicate, as in the qualitative judgment, or a relation between two concepts assumed as independent, as in the judgment of reflection: now, for example, in “The rose is a plant,” the relation is that of a necessary subsumption of a singular under its universal and, conversely, of self-particularization of the concept.

But it is only in the ‘judgment of the concept’ that we assert whether the object is adequate to its concept, based on the subject’s being. The relation is not that between our judgment and the state of affairs, but that between reality and concept – and this is the ordinary sense of judgment, says Hegel. We ascribe judgment to those who can tell whether something is a good example of its kind, whether a reality is adequate to its concept, not to someone who can correctly say that a rose is red (ENZ.C§178 A). In this judgment the concept is posited as the unity of subject and predicate.

We will have to return in §2 to the consequences of this understanding of judgment: since Hegel has a functional notion of the true and the good, he takes judgment in its genuine sense as a judgment of value – not necessarily a moral evaluation, but a judgment directed to the evaluation of a particular in light of its standard, a reality in light of its concept. For now, we must note something else: if judgment is the scope within which inherence and subsumption, accidental and essential predication have their place, then we must also recall that “[t]he standpoint of the judgment is finitude” (ENZ.C§168). The union of determinacy and universal, of a “this” and its concept, of a phenomenon and its essence, is the still external union of a copula connecting two moments which at first are assumed as independent and originally distinguished (the originary partition, Urteilung, that all judgment is for Hegel no less so than for Hölderlin). This way, the determinate is not understood as thinking’s mediation within itself, but is presupposed as the fixed subject, the independent substrate of representation. In other words, if in the Aristotelian identity of thinking and thought we have the expression of the conceptual reality of the determinate, philosophical knowledge as a knowledge of the whole must raise the determinate content of a discrete intuition to a moment of the Concept.
In order to expound the self-mediating activity of the universal, philosophy cannot use the syntax of judgment. It must have recourse to what cannot be found in Aristotle: it must incorporate and express the dialectical movement of subject and predicate in a speculative sentence, the infinity and activity of thinking in the whole of reality, and above all the negation of the separation of isolated and discrete forms – the ideality of the finite.

For Aristotle, each *energeia*, each logos and definition, is *logos tinos, logos tês ousias* (definition of something, of a substance). It is understood by that of which it is predicated. If Hegel rightly interprets the correlativity of potentiality and actuality, and the in-itself as that which is not yet actual, he nevertheless does not see that potency for Aristotle is always the potency to act or undergo a change in a particular subject. Differently stated, what for Aristotle is a state of individual substance becomes for Hegel a principle relative to a Spinozistic substance: the totality of being as a *causa sui*.

The three Kantian categories of relation (substance, cause and reciprocal action) are the three forms of relation with which the Logic of Essence ends; they are the ways in which actuality is the whole manifesting itself. Finally, reality has shown to be a totality, an infinite relation to itself in which all terms are independent and at the same time all moments of the identical whole. This is the necessary substance as a self-producing actuality, which Hegel also calls actusioty. But this very consideration brings to light the impossibility of reading Aristotelian substance as actuality in the notion of *Wirklichkeit* (actuality), unless one adopts the framework of the Spinozistic single substance actuating itself in its modes and positing them as necessarily dependent on itself. This totality or absolute necessity is in turn fully rational only inasmuch as freedom is the core of this necessity – as the thinking of it.

The *thinking* of necessity . . . is rather the dissolution of this hardness; because it is its going together with *itself* in the other – the liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, and not the having of itself in that other

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5 Compare *ENZ.C* §151 Z. For Düsing (*Subjektivität*, 1976: 285, 228 ff.), Belaval (*Études Leibniziennes*, 1976: 357) and Doz (*La logique*, 1987: 163–6) Hegel has in mind the Spinozistic concept of mode, rather than the Aristotelian accident, when he writes that the accidental is in the substance like in an Other. This escapes Sanchez Sorondo’s attention; he overlooks Spinoza’s importance in this connection altogether and sees only Aristotelian motives operative in these pages (*Aristoteles y Hegel*, 1987: 246–68; compare my discussion in “*Metafisica e dialettica*,” 1990).
actuality . . . as something-other, but the having of its very own being and positing in it. As existing for itself, this liberation is called “I,” as developed in its totality, it is free spirit, as feeling, it is love, as enjoyment, beatitude. (ENZ. C §159 A).

This is how the necessity of Spinoza’s substance turns itself into the freedom of the Concept, a whole articulating itself in a process going on within it. For this reason the Concept becomes the absolute basis and ground (Grundlage) of Subjective Logic, the conceptual totality, the universal underlying all particularization, thereby enriching and validating itself.

While it seems to me that sometimes Hegel understands energeia as actuality and sometimes as the Concept, and that this ambiguity runs through his reading and lies behind the twists of this notion for different purposes according to context, this ambiguity is secondary, for from an Arstotelian point of view the ideality of the finite and the Spinozistic inherence of modes in the substance is impossible. Like potency and actuality, the logos also draws its meaning from the substance it must define. If it is to say the indivisible essence of the thing (and the entire criticism of Plato is centered around the participation of a thing in several ideas, thus a participation that breaks apart the unity of the substance and the individual subject of becoming), then the form must be the immutable, simple, monadic essence of a substance: in Hegel’s terms, the universality of the determinate.

By contrast, the dialectical Concept, which purports to be the fluid unity of formal elements, does away precisely with the unmediated plurality of forms and the reference of concepts to substrates. What seems to be missing in Aristotle from a Hegelian perspective is the negative and skeptical side of reason that Hegel finds in Plato (especially the Parmenides): the destruction of the independence of forms. What is missing is a dialectical logos of logos, a reflection on the web of mutual dependencies among concepts taken per se, apart from the substrates they constitute. If Hegel complains that in Kant thinking in itself had not been the object of consideration, and that forms were all considered in their abstract relation to the I (WL 1: 60, SL 63), then he should have stated no less forcefully that for Aristotle thinking is not dealt with for itself, in its truth, because all forms are relative to substances.

6 Hartmann writes in a similar vein that it is always the thing which is defined in its concept, the concept itself is not defined (“Das Problem des Begriffs,” 1939: 108 ff.).
Hegel did not is indicative of his understanding of the connection between truth and nous, as we see in §2.

Hegel seems aware of the finite and particular nature of logos. In the general introductory part of the Lectures, speaking of Aristotle’s “manner,” he says that Aristotle tries to “determine every object” by giving its “horos” (VGPh 148). But thereby the object remains in its particularity, “therefore the study of Aristotle is inexhaustible” (ibid.). We should restate the “particular content of every thing,” for Aristotle does not “reduce (zurückführt) particulars to their universal principles” (ibid.). Aristotle gets speculative when he unites the empirical determinations of an object in the unity of the concept, but this has an empirical side and no methodical necessity (ibid.). The whole universe is treated as a series of independent objects because, as we know, Aristotle missed the “Konstruieren, Beweisen, Deduzieren” (“construction, demonstration, deduction”) which only articulate the unity of the concept in a system. At the end of the lectures on the Organon, Hegel says that the Aristotelian logic would become a “science of reason” if only the particular forms of thought stopped claiming validity in and for themselves (VGPh 242). In that case, the speculative would be the soul of the only true syllogism, the rational syllogism in which God concludes Himself with Himself after passing through objectivity (VGPh 241).

By treating definition as an aspect of secondary importance, and by considering finitude a characteristic of Aristotle’s manner, which comes most to the fore in his logic but does not affect or diminish the speculative peak of his philosophy, that of the divine nous in its relation to the world, it seems to me that Hegel does not see that Aristotle cannot be integrated in a holistic perspective because his “ontology” is different from Hegel’s. Being is a plurality of independent genera and of determinate essences; within such realms the identity of thinking and things is discrete and limited to our touching/saying of multiple forms. But it never forms the principle of a conceptual dialectic, for being is plural and separate from thought, and not the active substrate underlying its development.

Hegel, who begins the Logic with Aristotle’s most fundamental question, ti to on; (“what is being?”), would agree with him that being is not a definite concept. At the beginning of the Logic it is an immediate indeterminate abstraction. But, as the most abstract and universal genus, for Hegel being is the barest category, the indeterminate mode of the Concept that remains as the basis for the progressive concretization in the totality of forms of the Logic eventually culminating in thought
thinking itself. Thus this being is a not yet actualized virtuality, a substrate waiting to be specified in the progressive forms in which thought determines itself, the barest form of an in-itself totality.

For this reason advance in philosophy is a “retreat into the ground, to what is primary and true,” and the beginning is “the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations” (WL 1: 70–1, SL 71). If the progress is a determination of the ground, the beginning is preserved as the ever-differentiated basis in all its determinations, and what matters is that the beginning and the end coincide.

For Hegel, not just beginning and result, but all logical determinations “may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute” (ENZ.C §85), which differ in adequacy, concreteness, and self-sufficiency. However, in the definition the thought is contained only in the predicate (ibid., and §169 A), and it is in the nature of definition to be expressed in one sentence. The criticism of the thetic beginning of Spinoza’s Ethics and of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre in the Differenzschrift is based precisely on the fact that a sentence needs to be argued for. As such it is only something posited for reflection; and as such it is antinomic, that is, it is an affirmation opposed to its negation, and its determinate negation must be said in another sentence. A definition must then be showed as a one-sided determination, the connection of two different beings that cannot include negativity and the resolution of positive and negative in a superior unity. Spinoza, who wants to begin science with a definition of the absolute, turns the definition into a presupposition, an immediate datum. But the absolute cannot be known as a first, as an immediacy; “the absolute is essentially its result” (WL 2: 196, SL 537).

The knowledge of the absolute as a result is only possible as a cognition of the whole and in a speculative dialectical language: that is, in a syntax which embodies the criticism of the form of judgment, incapable of expressing the speculative (WL 1: 93, SL 90). What definition, judgment, and the universality of the determinate cannot do is express the ideality of the finite substrates of representation, for they presuppose their objects as given. They cannot express “the self-moving Concept which takes its determinations back into itself” (W 3: 57, PhS 37); they cannot “set forth” “[t]his return of the Concept into itself” (W 3: 61, PhS 39) and thus destroy the solid basis of the inert grammatical subject, as

Hegel thinks the speculative sentence in the Preface to the *Phenomenology* must do.

This is only possible once we understand the substance as subject, setting into motion the grammatical subject until it takes back into itself its determinations and represents them all. Only the Concept as the *causa sui* is the universal which posits and sublates all reality as a thoroughgoing unity of determinations and the activity that constitutes them. Empirical predicates cannot be attached to the absolute as to a subsisting inert substrate, if the absolute is to be a result and the becoming of its self-consciousness. In this movement, the absolute must be at once the substrate of the movement and the activity of its self-determination. It must be at once form and content. This is what finite thinking cannot do: set forth the Concept as dialectical movement, subject, the true in and for itself.

§ 2. Truth and Holism

In light of all this, it is now quite instructive to focus on what Hegel says about truth in Aristotle. Hegel mentions the theme of truth twice in the *Lectures* on Aristotle: apropos *De Interpretatione*, he says that it deals with “the doctrine of judgments and propositions. Propositions are those in which affirmation (*kataphasis*) and negation (*apophasis*), *pseudos*, and *aletheia* take place – not that in which the *nous* thinks itself, pure thought; not the universal but the singular” (*VGPh* 235; compare *ENZ.A* § 134 A).

The second case is in the context of the divine *nous* as everything in itself, the speculative peak of Aristotle’s philosophy that “considers everything in thought” and knows “what things are in and for themselves” (*VGPh* 164–5). Hegel says:

> The ordinary definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of a representation with the object.” But the representation itself is only a representation, I am not yet in agreement with my representation (with its content); I represent to myself a house, a beam, I am not yet it – I and representation of the house are different. Only in thought is present the true agreement of subjective and objective; I *am* it. Aristotle finds then himself at the highest standpoint; one cannot want to know anything deeper. (ibid.)

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8 I understand the italics as Michelet’s way to emphasize a point presumably stressed by Hegel in class.
With regard to the first sense, one should recall Hegel’s distinction between proposition and judgment; in qualitative judgment and in propositions “subject and predicate do not stand to one another here in the relationship of reality and concept” (ENZ.C §172 Z). We predicate of a subject a property that may or may not belong to it.

Hegel insists in the Encyclopædia Logic that “[i]n the ordinary way, what we call truth is the agreement of an object with our representation of it. We are then presupposing an object to which our representation is supposed to conform” (ENZ.C §24 Z 2). This formal subjective agreement holds “whatever kind this content may otherwise be” (ENZ.C §172 Z), that is, “even when the object only remotely corresponds to its concept and hence has hardly any truth at all” (ENZ.C §437 Z, Miller transl. modified).

Hence Hegel’s important distinction between correctness (Richtigkeit) or exactness and truth. If what we ordinarily consider true is the result of an adequation between the object and consciousness, we do not realize that we are operating under a tacit and very weighty assumption: the phenomenological separation between an independent subject and a no less independent object presupposed as mutually external and identifiable regardless of their relation. But the Phenomenology of Spirit has shown the one-sidedness of this assumption. In the words of the Introduction to the Phenomenology, if consciousness is the measure of the in-itself and of what is for it, such that the distinction between the truth of the object and the knowledge consciousness has of it is consciousness’ own doing, then the standard of the truth of a content cannot be the adequation of an object to consciousness, but of the object to its concept. If truth in a subjective formal sense is truth relative to a consciousness which ignores its presuppositions, “[i]n the philosophical sense, on the contrary, ‘truth,’ expressed abstractly and in general, means the agreement of a content with itself” (ENZ.C §24 Z 2), the conformity of an object to its concept.

This is implicit in ordinary language, says Hegel (ENZ.C §24 Z 2, §213 Z). When we speak of a true friend, a true state or a true work of art, what we mean is their adequacy to the concepts of friendship, state and artwork. They are what they ought to be. Here “not-true,” “false,” is equivalent to bad, and “bad” means inadequate to its concept, to its Sollen or ought. Bad is always bad insofar as “its reality conforms to some

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extent with its concept” (*ENZ.C* §213 Z); in other words, a reality is never totally other than its concept, for otherwise it would be the reality of a different concept. A friend either resembles a friend or is not a friend at all. And Hegel is right that it takes intelligent judgment in order to tell; that is, what it takes is both knowledge of the concept and a correct subsumption of the reality under it.

Reality is then its movement of adequation to its destination and ought. But if a bad man is he who does not behave in accord with his destination (*Bestimmung, ENZ.C* §213 Z), it follows that only subjectivity, what is by its essence mediation with itself, qua self-referentiality and infinity, can be true (*ENZ.C*§74), can constitute itself as the movement of adequating its reality to its concept. For this reason Hegel says that only with respect to life can we first properly speak of truth (*ENZ.C*§337 Z), and that even more properly speaking only the Idea, qua unity of concept and objectivity, is true (*WL* 2: 462, *SL* 755).

The question of the truth of the content, prior philosophically to the “phenomenological” question of the truth of our cognition of it, specifies itself relative to a hierarchy of levels ordered by a criterion of self-referentiality, in which what is self-sufficient and an end to itself is always truer than what is heteronomous. The I represents a house as a “different;” but in thought the I is one with the content, for the I is the activity of producing its concept and holding fast to it in the adequation of the real existing house to its ought.

This conception of the true is analogous to Hegel’s conception of the good we saw in Chapter 8 (pp. 344–5). Everything under the sun is a reality which is to a greater or lesser degree adequate to its ought. Being and ought, *Sein* and *Sollen*, the alleged illegitimate conflation of which is the object of Hume’s critique in the third book of the *Treatise*, are indissociable. Likewise in Aristotle, the *ergon* (function) of a being is its capacity to perform its function well and realize its telos. From this point of view, the definition of the axe is on a par with that of the soul and depends directly on the good activity which identifies it. If an axe does not chop well or if a hand is severed from the body, they can no longer be called respectively axe and hand: they are inadequate to their forms or essences. Each being is understood in light of its complete full-blown actuality. Only this is directive for the good being of each thing, as well as for our understanding of them. (Recall from *Met. Θ* that *energeia* is prior in terms of being, knowledge, and time.) In other words, essence and concept are as normative as they are descriptive.10

10 When MacIntyre takes this consideration of the good and true as a criticism of Hume’s
In our life we always judge things based on their standards. If the computer I am using breaks down it is inadequate to its function. If a friend betrays me or lets me down when I am in need, he or she is not a true friend; when an enemy does this (or a lover, if someone shares Aristotle’s view of the superiority of an abiding friendship over love and friendships of pleasure), it is hardly a surprise once we reason under the assumption that we know roughly what to expect of a certain concept, under which we include, however tentatively, persons. I am not thereby confusing and conflating “is” and “ought,” or theory and practice; I am viewing a fact based on a normative consideration, and judging it accordingly.

What matters for Hegel in this is to see whether the ought is internal to the logical or objective nature of the being under consideration, or it is external to it and declared to be an end that we cannot in principle reach but at best asymptotically approximate. The latter case is a bad infinity, in Hegel’s terms, and is exemplified by morality, the standpoint of a conscience whose duty only ought to be: as long as conscience regards its duty as what only ought to be, it cannot recognize any actualization of duties as real, let alone as good (PhR §129–§140).

This same functional-normative conception is what accounts for the opposite alternative, ethical life. If my duties and rights are defined by my roles as husband, citizen, teacher, etc., such that my practice and my activities are prescribed to me as commands in a given objectivity, then my destination is both realized in my everyday life while at the same time being the object of my rational will. As we see in Chapter 9, I recognize such activities as those adequate to the roles I choose for myself. My Sittlichkeit is my second, rational nature voluntarily adhered and assented to, not a standard alien to my interiority. In this sense the “is” and the “ought” imply each other.

However, based on Hegel’s teaching alone, one should stress that this implication is often far from clear, for sometimes the correct subsumption fails to give us a true judgment – especially when concepts necessarily change their meaning over time. What Hegel seems aproblematically to assume is that it is possible to fix a univocal, independent and stable standard or ought for concepts like friend, state, and artwork. For example, we see in Chapter 9 that what constitutes a state in Greece is miles away from the modern state – thus my judgment about a particular state will have to change accordingly. I cannot say what a friend is un-

supposed critique (in After Virtue, 1981: 52 ff.), he is no less a Hegelian than an Aristotelian.
less I have defined love, loyalty, morality, the good, ethical life, etc. If a composer were to reproduce a quasi-Mozartian melody in the 20th century, it would not be a quasi-Mozartian beauty, but most likely a nostalgic and degraded form of kitsch. Vice versa, if I have a classical concept of beauty, I can hardly subsume an artwork of some avant-garde artist under such a concept. Obviously, concepts have a temporal or contextual index of sorts, which any judgment must take into account.

Once again we are sent back to the ideality of the finite and to Hegel’s basic requirement for truth, the consideration of something even larger than contextuality, namely totality. Every definition is finite and one-sided not only because the finite is by its essence contradictory, but also because every definition cannot stand on its own feet but has its truth ultimately in the Idea. “True” is only absolute spirit’s movement of constituting itself as self-knowledge through its knowledge of reality as a whole. Only as a system known “[t]ruth is its own self-movement” \((W 3: 47, PhS 28)\). Only once it has overcome the phenomenological presupposition that thinking is the external connection of fixed substrates is philosophy the science both of the thing and of pure thinking at once \((WL 1: 43, SL 49)\). Any content is only true inasmuch as it is understood as one moment of the Idea in its self-manifestation in the finite, returning to itself as self-conscious reason.

Thus Hegel says that only God is true in and for Himself \((ENZ.C \S 24 Z 2; \S 83 Z)\). What is not absolute reason is marked by the inner essential difference between concept and existence or reality, so that the finite must die to show the inadequacy of concept and singularity. Man is both true and false, both identical with and different from, free infinite reason. He is true insofar as his rational essence is for him; he is false or finite insofar as he can never be fully adequate to universal reason, having an organic life which carries in itself the seed of death and thus contradicting himself \((ENZ.C \S 81)\).

One is tempted to find a Spinozistic influence in the notion that the false is what is limited or bad, and not the opposite of the true – recall that the Absolute or God does not have an opposite, just as ousia, the substrate of contraries, does not – and in the subordination of the normative character of truth to its holistic conception. In the “veritas norma sui et falsi” \((Ethica 2: 43 schol.)\), the inadequate idea is a privation of the perfect idea. And God alone is true. Truth manifests itself the way light manifests both itself and darkness \((ibid.)\). In a similar vein, Hegel’s absolute Idea manifests itself in reality as the truth of all its finite moments.
Once again the similarity, in the idea that truth is the standard of itself, is strong, but the differences are more significant. Hegel could have written Spinoza’s words: “truth is self-evident” (De intell. emend., Opera 2: 18) and “reveals itself” (Kort. verhand., Opera 1: 79). But first and foremost Spinoza had meant that the mind’s ideas are true qua clear and distinct, whereby the criterion of adequacy is evidence and certainty (Ethica 2: def. 4), not an objective ought, or what I called the normative-functional sense of true. Further, falsity is a privation of knowledge typical of inadequate and confused ideas (Ethica 2: prop. 35). If ideas are modes of God’s thought, then there is nothing in ideas by which they are said to be false (Ethica 2: prop. 33).

Considering that the false is a necessary moment of the true for Hegel, and that only as a result is the true possible as a comprehension of all one-sided and negative standpoints, then even here one should see his criticism of Spinoza at play: Spinoza annuls the finite in the negative unity of the substance. Spinoza does not consider in his definition of truth the subordination of negativity to the subjective infinity, of the being-for-other to the being-for-itself of spirit. Negativity is the abyss of the finite; it is not also the necessary moment for subjectivity’s self-production (ENZ.C § 151 Z). Spinoza does not rise to the understanding of the true as the movement of subjectivity which knows itself as, and not just is, the totality. It is not the progression whereby all transition is within the same, the development (Entwicklung) of itself, running through all finite, one-sided and partial (thus false) moments.

What is interesting to notice here is the counterintuitive fact that light manifests both itself and its opposite. We see in Chapter 8 (pp. 317–18) that the metaphors of the sun and light, from the Republic to the De anima, always imply a difference and a separation between the source of light and what light illuminates. As I argue there, with Alexander light, and with that the nous, becomes that which itself is most visible. According to the Stoic Chrysippus, light (phôs) at once reveals itself and the things illuminated just as the representation (phantasia) reveals itself and what produces it (SVF 2: 54). For Plotinus, the sun is a model for the Good (Enn. I, 7, 1, 25–6); it illuminates the intellect, which in turn provides light for the soul (VI, 7, 17, 36–7). In the Rules, Descartes writes that sunlight is not altered by the things on which it shines; likewise, science is unitary and does not depend on its objects (A-T 10: 360). Very close to Spinoza is the understanding of light and truth we find in the Logique de Port-Royal (Disc. 1: 13): truth is surrounded by clarity and needs nothing else to be discerned, just as light
discerns itself immediately from darkness. In Wolff, the light in our souls makes our thoughts clear (Vernünftige Gedanken, §203). The connection between the lumen naturale, the light of reason, and the enlightenment brought about by it here becomes evident and forceful.

In Kant reason is transparent to itself (KrV A XX); here light is the outcome of reason’s secure possession of itself. Reason duplicates itself as the only principle active in its own extension to experience, and sets up a relation within itself between its active and passive sides.

All that this cursory glance at some of the stages in the progressive transformation of the application of the metaphor of light to reason and understanding is meant to show is that, for Hegel, reason is this very same relation first outlined by Kant. By bringing clarity on itself reason makes humans come out of the state of tutelage they had put themselves in. Reason is the agent of mankind’s liberation and acquires a direct connection with its historical situation. Reason must be judged for Kant (recall the derivation of “critique” from krinein), but there is no judge superior to reason itself. Instead of a relation between an independent source of light and the things it illuminates, the relation is transferred into reason itself, and consequently becomes an internal articulation with two complementary sides.

For Hegel, reason includes both subject and object as the two poles of a relation. Subjectivity is this very relation, finite subject and object its poles; and while they are open and limited, their dialectic takes place within the self-enclosed whole of absolute subjectivity. Absolute subjectivity is this comprehended relation precisely because the finite subject is this relation in-itself. In the terms used by Hegel to define consciousness, “it is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship – the light, which manifests itself and something else too” (ENZ.C §413).

If this is the only way to conceive of the structure of the True and of absolute subjectivity, that is, as including both the True and its certainty, both object and measure or standard; and if we remind ourselves that, for Hegel, Aristotle took the truth of substances to be their conformity to their actuality; then we have reason to believe that what I call above the subordination of the normative character of truth to its holistic conception is not for Hegel a subordination at all. It is rather an Aufhebung which can reconcile both terms. And they are not reconciled by Hegel alone; in Hegel’s mind they had been reconciled by Aristotle himself.

Recall Aristotle’s distinction between a discursive understanding of truth and a noetic apprehension of truth. Aristotle has a sentence which,
though never quoted by Hegel, would have made his interpretation of truth and the good as adequacy quite justified: in the *Prior Analytics* we read that “everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself” (I 32, 47a 8). The true is not tested against the yardstick of an external object to which it must conform; it must first agree with itself.

But what is significant is that this does not mean adequacy as “ought;” even more importantly, Hegel’s two senses of truth outlined at the opening of this section are *not* Aristotle’s two senses. Whereas one is the discursive sense of judgment, the other (about the house, the beam etc.), far from being Aristotle’s intuition of indivisibles, is expounded by Hegel as a corollary of the divine thought thinking itself. In other words, Hegel is not commenting on *Met.* Θ 10 and *De an.* III 6 when he praises Aristotle on truth as the agreement of subjective and objective, but is already setting forth the holistic projection of the identity of thinking and thought, the deployment of thought that has itself as its object as in the *Science of Logic*.

This is confirmed by a passage in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Here Hegel writes that the *eidos* or species is a simple thought, which appears fixed and enduring; “*nous,* simplicity, is substance” (*W*3: 54, *PhS* 34). “But this self-identity is no less negativity; therefore its fixed existence passes over into its dissolution” (ibid.). Why? Because the movement of determinateness is not “imposed on it by an alien power; but having its otherness within itself, and being self-moving, is just what is involved in the *simplicity* of thinking itself . . . the pure Concept” (ibid.).

The interpretation of the *nous* as absolute reason implies its transformation into dialectic and the dissolution of the finite. But this is much more implicit in Hegel’s interpretation of the identity of the subject matter and themes in the *Metaphysics* and the *Science of Logic* than in Aristotle’s own theory, for which forms or essences are actual as causes of things and the *nous* is potentially all things because it thinks them without matter. If Aristotle were to say that the totality of being is accessible as in itself the activity of spirit and the logical, and that forms are posited by absolute reason, then the *Metaphysics* would be what is precluded by Aristotle’s criticism of the mathematization of the cosmos pursued by Plato along with the thesis of the nongeneric universality of being, one, and the good: the absolute and apodictic knowledge of the whole of reality as the finite which has its truth in thinking and God. As the scientific system of God’s life, of substance and subject, philosophy in Hegel becomes pure and simple *sophia.* Hegel discards all of Aristot-
tle’s hesitations at the end of *Met.* A 2 and writes that he has set himself to make science “lay aside the title ‘love of knowing’ and be *actual knowing*” (*W3* : 14, *PhS 3*).

As we see in Chapter 6, §3, and Chapter 8, §7, it is hard to realize how for Aristotle determinateness can have in itself its being-other and be self-movement. The positivity and lack of the dialecticity of *ousia* is precisely the limitation that one would have expected the Hegelian critique to show. That this does not happen goes hand in hand with Hegel’s lack of any emphasis on the Aristotelian “firmer of principles,” which denies that determinateness is negation. Despite Aristotle’s understanding of natural teleology and subjective entelechy, one thing he never conceives is the negation of negation (whether as spirit’s return to itself or otherwise).

There is something else that goes hand in hand with this. I argue in Chapter 9 that Hegel sees a continuity between the *Republic* and the *Politics*. It seems to me that another continuity he finds between Plato and Aristotle runs between the dialectic of Plato’s *Parmenides* and the theory of *nous* as potentially all things. From this it follows for him that the *energeia* of *nous* is just such a dialectic of finite forms. Again, the limitation of *nous* is not that it is not dialectical enough for Aristotle, but that it does not pervade all of spirit’s life the way *Geist*, spirit, does.

On dialectic and passivity-activity, I conclude by quoting a passage from Aristotle. Recall the role of digestion pointed out in Chapter 7. I state there that for Hegel digestion is a metaphor for the assimilation of externality at work both in theory and in practice. I also say that Aristotle does not share the idea of the negation of otherness, whether in theory or in practice. Another way to point this out is to say that to know is a way of acknowledging and honoring, rather than digesting, the independence of the object. Think of Aristotle’s emphasis on the asymmetry of relations, including those that have symmetry as their goal, such as friendship. Return of affection and reciprocity are hoped for, but are gratuitous and irrelevant for the determination of the motivation at stake; which explains why we feel gratitude when reciprocity ensues. Something similar informs relations in theory between knowing and the things to be known: the same transcendence and independence of the object that we have in the giving of affection.

Aristotle illustrates this more beautifully than I can:

for to be loved is an accident; one may be loved without knowing it, but not love. . . . And here is a proof. The friend would choose, if both were
not possible, rather to know than to be known, as we see women do when allowing others to adopt their children, e.g. Antiphon’s Andromache. For wishing to be known seems to be felt on one’s own account and in order to get, not to do, some good; but wishing to know is felt in order that one may do and love. Therefore we praise those who persist in their love towards the dead; for they know but are not known.11

11 Eth.eud. VII 4, 1239a 32–b1. Compare also Eth.nic. VIII 9, 1159a 27 ff. The reference to mothers preferring to know than to be known has to do with the theme of children given away for adoption or lost through war, abduction, etc., and growing up not knowing their parents, a theme made popular by classical comedy.
When one lives far away, one hears only of the major artists in the galaxy and is often satisfied with merely knowing their names; but when one draws closer, the twinkle of stars of the second and third magnitude becomes visible until, finally, one sees the whole constellation – the world is wider and richer than one had hitherto supposed.

(Goethe, *Italienische Reise*)

§1. Two Historical Questions

The extent to which Aristotle may have influenced the formation of Hegel’s philosophical thought is far from clear. It is hard to distinguish between what has contributed to the development of Hegel’s thought on specific counts and what Hegel is pleased to find in Aristotle after having independently reached similar conclusions. It is even more conjectural, if not otiose, to speculate on why Hegel sometimes openly admits sharing a common ground with Aristotle, while sometimes he does not mention him at all, despite the apparent Aristotelian origin of some of his theses or the similarity between their perspectives in contradistinction to the modern tradition which Hegel criticizes. Thus sometimes we cannot determine when Hegel writes with a similarity with Aristotle in mind, or with Aristotle as an alternative model against which he could define his position more sharply. Obviously, this does not happen with Aristotle only. It is Hegel’s customary practice to discuss theories and concepts of thinkers he does not mention, often because they were familiar to his audience and he deemed an explicit reference unnecessary.

For example, it is not clear why only the second and third editions of the *Encyclopædia* close with the quote from the *Metaphysics* and con-
tain the most explicit praises of the *De anima*. While, as I argue in Chapter 8, §2, I think that Hegel engages in a renewed and extensive study of the *De anima* after the 1817 *Encyclopædia*, as the Fragment shows, what is not clear is why a supposed debt to Aristotle is acknowledged more and more explicitly over the years, and especially in Berlin, with regard to theses that remained substantially unaltered from roughly 1805–6 on. In other words, it is not clear why Aristotle is often mentioned only in oral additions or in the lectures with regard to subject matter which brings almost nothing new to the late Jena, Nürnberg, or Heidelberg writings.

Many such issues would be less futile if we possessed the Jena notebook with Hegel’s first course on the history of philosophy, and if we were in a position to determine Hegel’s evolution in his interpretation of Aristotle and his assimilation of ancient philosophy in general. If nothing else, we would then avoid the risk of turning Hegel’s idea of the fundamental unity of the history of philosophy into a caricature of a continuous archeological retrospective projection of mature stages of a thinker’s philosophy back onto his earlier phases – thus finding everywhere lack of independence and originality, sheer variation on the given, direct lineages or indirect filiations from the old and traditional.

Above all this it is unclear when Hegel felt the motivation to study Aristotle in Greek. According to a document by Leutwein published by Schwegler, Hegel would have studied the Erasmus edition in Tübingen, while Schelling was more extensively reading the Gnostics.¹ We saw in the Introduction that in his teens Hegel translated among other things parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and that in Tübingen he had translated Platonic dialogues. He read *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* together with Schelling and Hölderlin, as is indicated in passages of the *Positivity of Christian Religion* and in the general inspiration of the *Ältestes Systemprogramm*.² In Frankfurt he bought an edition of Platonic dialogues which, a few months later, became the permanent center of his interests, along with Spinoza, until roughly 1803–4.

Ilting has shown how the *System der Sittlichkeit* (1802) is run through by constant references to Aristotle’s *Politics* (“Auseinandersetzung,” 1963). In the notion that the soul in the Jena *Logic and Metaphysics* is passive and active, a substance and not yet a subject, Chiereghin has identified the first use made by Hegel of the Aristotelian theme of sen-

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sation.\textsuperscript{3} In Jena there are several signs of a reading of Aristotle, a reading which becomes more and more assiduous shortly before the \textit{Phenomenology}. Among others, some such traces not yet identified by scholars include the use of the first book of the \textit{Politics} as a model for the still Schellingian theory of potencies in the \textit{Realphilosophie} of 1803–4, that is, the progression from the family as the first systematization and sublation of the natural particular desire into “an abiding inclination” (\textit{JSE} I: 281; see also the will as character in \textit{JSE} III: 208), to language as the rational medium of communication, and then to economy which first begins as family patrimony. I have already emphasized how in the chapter on perception in the \textit{Phenomenology} Hegel discusses the division and unity of the point from the \textit{Physics} and the accidental and common sensibles from the \textit{De anima}. But in all such cases we have details which, albeit significant, still pertain to a philosophy in formation, and do not refer to one principle that imposes itself in all its ramifications and in the plurality of its consequences, as does \textit{energeia} in Hegel’s mature evaluation.

The task of this chapter is historical in a twofold sense: in §2 we see what pictures of Aristotle were current in the years of Hegel’s formation, so that we are able to gauge the novelty of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle when contrasted with the Aristotle of his contemporaries, and also to see why Hegel constitutes an independent and original chapter in the history of Aristotle interpretation. In §3 I determine when Hegel decides to take up an attentive study of Aristotle per se and why this has an influence in one of the most important turning points in his mature thinking.

\textbf{§2. Pictures of Aristotle’s Philosophy in the Late 18th and Early 19th Centuries}

The notion of \textit{energeia} is to some degree a recurrent theme in the second half of the 18th century. One may surmise that Hegel’s emphasis on this notion derived from many of the suggestions typical of the authors studied by him. For example, we cannot exclude that in the Philosophy of Nature the notion of a \textit{Bildungstrieb} or \textit{nisus formativus} (formative impulse) found in Blumenbach and later in Goethe’s morphology, or the \textit{conatus} as impulse to motion which is so current in 17th and 18th

century philosophies of nature and anthropologies, which pushed toward a new definition of the relation between efficient and final causality, are more important in the determination of Hegel’s position than Aristotle’s *energeia*. On the other hand, the coupling of entelechy and perfection in the notion of a self-actualization of sorts is so widespread in the German *Schulphilosophie* that the possibility that Hegel has been influenced by this tradition seems worth pursuing.

It is well known that Hegel, who appreciates Wolff for shaping the German philosophical language,⁴ has never studied him and always labels him the pedantic systematizer of Leibniz’s philosophy. Nor does he ever realize that he includes both followers and opponents of Wolff such as Crusius and Mendelssohn in the same bag, the so-called “Wolffian philosophy.”⁵ But it is no less well known that Hegel forms his first cognitions in logic, metaphysics, psychology, and politics with the German scholastic handbooks which still enjoyed the widest circulation at the time of his school years, from Stuttgart to Tübingen.⁶

Unlike in Great Britain and France, in Germany classical metaphysics was not repudiated as a stumbling block for the free development of modern philosophy and natural sciences, but was reinstated within a renewed context: especially with the Lutheran Protestant Reformation and the neat Augustinian separation between mundane and heavenly reigns, that is, between religious and earthly spheres, the nec-

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⁴ But see the letter to Voss of 1805 (Briefe 55, Letters 107), where Hegel praises Luther for making the Bible speak German, and Voss for making Homer speak German, and claims his own efforts are directed to making philosophy speak German. About Wolff as the founder of German as a philosophical language, compare Heine, *Religion and Philosophy* (1835: 80); Bloch, *Subjekt-Objekt* (1949, Introduction, §4) stresses the importance of Christian Thomasius along with Wolff. Ch. Thomasius was the founder of the first German-language intellectual monthly, the *Monatsgespräche* (compare Haakonssen, “German Natural Law,” forthcoming).


⁶ See the exhaustive reconstruction given by Pozzo in his *Introductio in Philosophiam* (1989) for logic and metaphysics until 1800; for the Aristotelianism of the handbooks used by Hegel, see 50 ff. and 116 ff. About Hegel’s early interest in psychology, Pozzo rightly emphasizes how, even as Hegel re-elaborates in Bern the notes taken at Flatt’s courses in the “Materialien zu einer Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes” (in Dok. 195–217; compare Henrich, “Leutwein,” op. cit., 70–1), he is more interested in the genetic Enlightenment view of psychology (Garve, Tetens) than in that of the Wolffian or Kantian schools (ibid., 134 ff.).
ecessary philosophical grounding stone for what was beneath matters of faith was found in Aristotelianism. For example, the soul was approached religiously when it came to its immortality and destination, but through Aristotelian concepts when it came to its functions and activities; and this is a distinction that survives all the way down to Wolff’s rational and empirical psychology.

The Praeceptor Germaniae or Lehrer Deutschlands, Philipp Melanchthon, the instaurator of the new educational system in Protestant Germany, who put together all the textbooks adopted by the new schools and who initially shared the same hostility toward Aristotle’s doctrines as had Luther, from the 1520s progressively came to base his entire non-religious philosophy on Aristotle’s.

His influence began in Wittenberg (Leipzig and Jena), and spread over to Marburg, Heidelberg, Tübingen, etc. The favor Aristotle meets in Germany explains how Aristotelians such as Zabarella and the staunch champion of Catholic orthodoxy, Suarez, were more read in Germany than in Catholic countries, and also how after the Aldina edition of Aristotle published in Venice the new collections of Aristotle’s works edited in the 16th century by Erasmus, Sylburg, and Casaubon came out in Basel, Frankfurt, and Lyon. Though in Germany there is no “Aristotelianism” comparable to the Padua school, something which is of significant interest in its own right, still it is important that Aristotle was part of the canon of the new education, a canon in which the textbooks bore the indication “Ex Philippo Melanchthone et Aristotele” (Petersen 1924: 125).

Like all humanists, Melanchthon rejected the scholastic commentaries of Aristotle for their sterility and promoted a return to the sources, in line with the freedom of spirit and interpretation advocated by Luther. Melanchthon valued the Politics because, given the absence of a theory of the state in the Gospels, it rooted morality in the firm ethical foundations of family, religious community (notice what takes the

7 The book to read on Aristotelianism in Germany is still Petersen’s Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie (Leipzig 1921), a very rich, thorough and instructive analysis of this phenomenon. About Melanchthon’s schools, compare ibid., 107–8, 121 ff.; about Melanchthon and Aristotle, see ibid., 28–108. Compare also Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance (1983: ch. 1); Kessler, “Psychology” (1988: 516–18); more specifically on Melanchthon and the De anima (Melanchton wrote a Commentarius de anima in 1540) compare Rump, Melanchthons Psychologie (1900).

8 Compare Petersen, Geschichte (1921: 288 ff.); Wundt, Schulmetaphysik (1939: 41 ff.; 173–225); Courtine, Suarez (1990: 405 ff.).
place of the later “civil society”) and state against all individual pretentions to rise above them. In general, for Melanchthon Aristotle’s teachings should be bent to the purposes of moral philosophy and practical ends.

More interesting for us is the fact that, while in such prestigious universities of the time as, for example, Bologna, the De anima was studied along with Galen and Avicenna as a propaedeutic to medicine, and where the psychology was still the peak of natural philosophy, for Melanchton the psychology, expounded on the basis of the De anima, included a theory of freedom, the passions, and of topics that were traditionally discussed in rhetoric and ethics, not in psychology. Here psychology becomes anthropology. In this context, Melanchthon’s interpretation of the two intellects is curious and important: the active intellect invents, the possible intellect accepts. Accordingly, God’s knowledge is an intuition which generates the image of itself in the Son (“Aeternus pater sese intuens filium cogitando, qui est imago aeterni patris”).

Further, despite the preservation of the consecution of the three souls (vegetative, sensitive, and intellective), the animal soul is “material” and separated from the human, which comes directly from God.

Obviously Leibniz is another important figure in the role of Aristotle for the German tradition. As we see in Chapter 7, Leibniz understands force as more than simple potentiality or dunameis; force is rather the vis activa constituting a substance and an entelechy (“De primae philosophiae emendatione,” in PS 4: 469). Leibniz thinks he is finally bringing clarity to Aristotle’s notion of entelecheia as active force (Specimen dynamicum, in MS 6: 234–46); accordingly, nature is the principle of movement and rest (whereby Aristotelian change, kinēsis, is reduced to phora, locomotion; see PS 4: 393). Rest is then an infinitely small movement, and entelechy is interpreted, as in a tradition inaugurated by Cicero, as endelecheia or continuous motion (Nouveaux Essais, II, §21, PS 5: 156).

In view of Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle, what Leibniz does in his “psychology” is no less significant. Just as matter is force, so too is the soul a center of “energy” which is always active, even when it does not realize it, as in the small perceptions. In fact, souls do not differ radically from bodies. The continuity in reality is such that all substances and entelechies are active forces; when accompanied by perception or representation, they are souls (Nouveaux Essais, II, §21: 1, PS 5: 155).

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9 Quoted in Kessler, op. cit. 518; compare Petersen, op.cit., 80–5.
There is no gap between body and soul, between matter and consciousness; the transition is afforded by the unconscious as the inert and virtual basis for the monads’ reflection on themselves. The soul is active force, a network of dynamic relations which it represents to itself. The entelechy of the soul is thus understood as its perfection and self-sufficiency (Monadology, §18; Theodicy, PS 6: 150). Far from being an inert tabula rasa and a passivity, the intellect is always actio.

This is where Leibniz thinks he parts ways with Aristotle. He considers him an empiricist of sorts who is closer to Locke, while Leibniz finds himself closer to Plato (Preface to Nouveaux Essais, PS 5: 41–3).10 This characterization is so appealing and convenient in its simplicity that Kant himself adopts it in the “History of Pure Reason” (KrVA 854/B 882), where we read that Plato is the chief of the noologists and Aristotle of the empiricists, respectively followed by Leibniz and Locke.11 Yet, Leibniz, famously considered a conciliator by his contemporaries, also remarks that the two positions are less incompatible than they seem: Plato’s reminiscence implies no preexistence of our cognitions and must be understood in its purity; Aristotle, with his comparison of the soul to an unwritten slate, is simply more “popular,” whereas Plato is more profound (Discours de mét. §27). Leibniz insists that he has more to learn from Aristotle’s Physics than from Descartes or anybody else (letter to Jakob Thomasius of 1669, in PS 1: 15–27), and that notions such as substantial form cannot be dispensed with in philosophy (Discours de mét. §10–§11).

Even for Wolff the soul is a force and a spontaneity receiving nothing from without. The several faculties are various tendencies and expressions of a single fundamental vis repraesentativa (Psychol. ration. §184 ff.; Psychol. empir. §11 ff.). Since all changes in a substance are produced by the substance as its representations and inner states, the substance must thus have an inner power of representing to itself the affections of its body (Psychol. ration. §62 ff.). This is a basic power to which all other faculties can be reduced. This theory, which, as Henrich has shown, soon comes under attack by Rüdiger and Crusius who stress the pluralism of the faculties of the soul, and which represents the target of Kant’s later criticism of the monism of our cognitive sources,12 is re-

10 Trendelenburg alerted the reader to Leibniz’s misunderstanding in his commentary on the De anima (p.399): “Cave ne mentem tabulam rasam cogites, per se inanem et inertem, in quam res quasi dominae semet ipsas inscribant . . . velut ipse Leibnitus.”
11 All that Kant adds to this is the usual caveat to the effect that Leibniz was also “in considerable disagreement with his [Plato’s] mystical system” (ibid. See Chapter 1 above, n. 29).
12 Henrich, “Einheit der Subjektivität” (1955: 21 ff.).
lated to the metaphysical principle of perfection, which means the concordance of the many in the one (Ontol. §503).

Not only does the psychology presuppose metaphysics and this notion of perfection; practical philosophy presupposes it as well, in the notion of perfection as realization of our entelechy and of our natural abilities. Reason and human nature have been wrongfully separated, says Wolff. We must retrieve the notion that man’s actions are directed to his perfection and to the realization of his nature (“Actiones nostrae ad perfectionem nostram statusque nostri per se tendunt,” Phil. practica universalis 1, §103). However, this means that ethical life is now defined ontologically, not ethically, that is, it is divorced from all considerations of ends and of ethical institutions. Final causes for Wolff, like for most moderns, involve intelligent substances and the willing of an end (Ontol. §941); in other words, perfection and teleology are dissociated.

Wolff’s explicit position on Aristotle shows how he understands his own philosophy of perfection as quite independent of Aristotle’s energeia. Wolff admires Aristotle’s Organon unconditionally for its systematic deductions of truths. He understands by substantial form the vis activa and vis motrix. However, the Aristotelians have not properly understood this force (Ontol. §771); they fail to grasp the notion of potency or distinguish it from possibility (Ontol. §761). Even though his notion of action as the perfection of man’s possibilities is the highest good and happiness at once (“summum bonum et felicitas simul,” Phil. practica universalis 2, §217; the notion criticized by Kant as empty in the Groundwork, Ak 4: 443), this is not understood with any notion of ends or of eudaimonia in view. If practical philosophy grounds ethics, economics, and politics, it is qua morality and the universal realm of inner principles; morality and ethics are now two separate spheres. Wolff’s attitude toward the De anima is very critical. Christian Thomasius, who spurned the logical tradition of the syllogistics, found in the alleged tabula rasa the antecedent of a Lockean empiricism which he favored, but which Wolff strongly opposed in terms very similar to Leibniz.

Another part of Aristotle’s philosophy that was criticized by some of

14 Petersen, Geschichte (1921: 446).
15 Petersen, Geschichte (1921: 446). Both Wolff and his opponent Crusius define nature in Aristotelian fashion as the inner principle of movement (compare Tonelli, Elementi metodologici, 1959: 61).
16 Compare Wundt, Deutsche Schulphilosophie (1945: 31); Tonelli, “Categorie aristoteliche” (1958: 34).
Wolff’s followers, who here departed from their teacher, was the syllogistics; but this criticism sometimes went hand in hand with a retrieval of Aristotle’s dialectic and psychology. In Baumgarten, Aristotelian rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic are studied along with the psychology in the new discipline of aesthetics as the science of sensible cognitions, the sister of logic. In Meier and Feder, also Wolff’s pupils, the idea of perfection becomes the leading thread for an ampliation of psychology into aesthetic and morals.

True, as in Hegel, we find in Wolff a criticism of the tabula rasa; and the *Psychologia empirica* sets forth a progression of forms which reminds us of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, including the deduction of the *facultas appetendi* from the soul and the distinction within it of desire and will. But by and large Petersen’s judgment, that in the 18th century Aristotelianism lives a shadow life ("ein Leben im Schatten," ibid., 438), seems difficult to dispute. Aristotelian notions are current, but handed down as trite commonplaces nobody seems interested in questioning. The return to the primary sources is very rare and the interest in Aristotle’s philosophy in its own right the exception. The contrast between Plato and Aristotle is reaffirmed incessantly and superficially, to emphasize the respective contrast between the enthusiast and the worldly man, or between the rationalist and the realist. But nobody goes much beyond this.

At this point it is also easier to rely on commonplaces, for they start acquiring an intrinsic reliability and authority as the history of philosophy is first extensively made accessible as an independent discipline by Brucker. The *Historia critica philosophiae* (1740–2) is largely adopted and studied in universities, to the point where Kant bases his knowledge of Plato and Aristotle on it. Brucker, like Bacon and Bayle before him, finds the *Physics* and the *De anima* particularly obscure and worthless; the *Metaphysics*, with its abstract notions lacking all clarity and distinction, is probably the worst (*Hist. crit. phil.* 1: 776–839). *Entelecheia* is a good example of an empty and meaningless word useless in the explanation of natural things. Brucker cherishes the liberation of mankind from the servitude under which the Aristotelian philosophy had subju-
gated it. The word he uses to describe this servitude is “yoke” (significantly, the same word used by Leibniz fifty years before him, but referring to his own personal autobiographical development).²⁰

With Voigt, Buhle, and Tennemann we have a new reading of Aristotle, an Aristotle now approached directly, but this time clearly through Kantian lenses. Voigt, as I have already mentioned, published in 1794 the first translation of the De anima, which he interpreted as a propaedeutic to the Critique of Pure Reason. Buhle, the editor of Aristotle’s works, published the Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie the second and third volumes of which (respectively, 1797 and 1798) dealt with Plato and Aristotle. Buhle expresses the necessity of a critique prior to the solution of philosophical problems, the distinction between propaedeutic and system and between the logic of pure thought and knowledge.²¹ Accordingly, he understands the passive intellect as the Kantian understanding and the active intellect as reason or the faculty of principles, and subordinates the Organon to the De anima. For Buhle, Aristotle brings to completion the idea of a system that was already present in Plato.

If Aristotle, and the De anima in particular, were followed in their spirit, argues Buhle, and if in the dogmatic systems reason was restricted to experience à la Aristotle, the Kantian critique of reason would have been easier and philosophy would have been purged of its errors much sooner (Lehrb. 2: 418). With the same end in mind (critique versus dogmatism) but the opposite interpretation, Tennemann argues that Plato contains elements of critique; here Aristotle instead represents a dogmatism of a Lockian sort in which the physiology of the human understanding is accommodated to the principles of empiricism (Gesch. der Phil. 3: 53). Worse still, unlike Locke’s, Aristotle’s empiricism is presupposed, not argued for.²²

Aristotle’s ethics and politics enjoy a more stable fortune in 18th century German philosophy. While Kant does not have a single word for Plato or Aristotle in the Critique of Practical Reason but only talks about

tics who followed him. They took “the obscure entelechy of this man” as the secret of forces (“die dunkle Entelechie dieses Mannes,” Ak 1: 17).


²² Compare Santinello, Storia (Età hegeliana, 1995: 78).
the likes of Mandeville and Hutcheson, and eudaimonism is only treated with a brief mention of Stoics and Epicureans but not Aristotle, authors such as Garve engaged in a renewed confrontation with Aristotle’s ethical writings precisely on such topics as happiness and ethics. The problem inherent in the separation of morals from happiness is what pushes Garve to a retrieval of Aristotelian ethics. Garve, who translated the *Nicomachean Ethics* into German and accompanied it with explanatory notes on the first part in 1798, had a great admiration for the thorough method of the work. In the same year Schlosser publishes the first German translation of the *Politics*, which Garve also translates, independently, in the following year (1799). What is important about all this is that, in the decade of the French Revolution, the political debate on the reformations needed in Germany, which could not be carried out publicly and explicitly, is all centered around Aristotelian concepts applied to contemporary issues and concerns.23

From this point of view, in these years Aristotle becomes a catalyst of vehement reactions, along with Spinoza. Aristotle’s God and Spinoza’s God are both the essence or soul of the universe in the interpretation now current. Orthodox theologians take Aristotle as a dangerous Spinozist *ante litteram* (compare Petersen, *Geschichte*, 1921: 414–17). As a result, all radical Enlightenment figures who sympathize with Spinoza end up strengthening the Aristotelian front. But as is well known, not all authors see in Spinoza a challenge to Christianity (for Herder, for example, there is no incompatibility between them).

What is no less well known is that the polemics about the Spinoza renaissance is a decisive moment to gauge the maturity of the German Enlightenment in the last quarter of the century. The interpretations of Spinoza are as diverse and controversial as the issues in his philosophy around which different authors now fight. There is Lessing’s and Herder’s Spinoza,24 which spurs Jacobi’s worried reaction to the “spectre haunting Germany.” Spinoza is in this case for both defenders and opponents the spirit of reason and philosophy carried to the extreme, which for Jacobi eventually leads to the negation of faith and transcendence. Hamann, in turn, could not understand why Jacobi wasted his time on Spinoza, the killer of reason and science. Goethe and the Ro-

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23 Another interesting thing to notice in view of Hegel’s treatment of Aristotle is that Garve’s student Fülleborn expounds Aristotle’s philosophy in two parts: first, his philosophy, second, his “manner” (compare Petersen, *Geschichte*, 1921: 456).
mantics valued the higher view of nature as intrinsically divine and animated by life that was made possible by Spinoza.

What is common to all such readings of Spinoza is the absence of a gap between nature and divinity, between nature and ego, and finally between finite and infinite. This is also what the young Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling share in their reading of Spinoza. In this respect what Schelling writes in the Bruno (1802) is significant. “The supreme potency or true God is that outside of which nature is not, just as the true nature is that outside of which God is not” (Werke 3: 203/307); “the unity of finite and infinite appears reflected in the finite as being, but in the infinite as activity” (ibid. 201/305). Strikingly, this activity is called “Aktuosität,” actuosity (ibid., 202/306).25

Since we have seen the Aristotelian sense attached to this word by Hegel and the importance it has in singling out Aristotle and the notion of energeia in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit and in the relation finite/infinite, and since we know that Hegel and Schelling read Plato and Spinoza together in these years, it is tempting to conjecture that Hegel and Schelling may have shared a study of Aristotle too. This brings us to the question with which this chapter began: when does Hegel study Aristotle in depth?

§3. When Did Aristotle Begin Exercising an Influence on Hegel?

Actuosity is a strange word indeed. The perplexity of the editors of the Encyclopædia Logic is quite noteworthy.26 Actually, the word has little to do with German mysticism, for it is a word used by Suarez and by many Aristotelians commenting on the theory of God as actus purus in the 16th and 17th centuries. There is even an English transliteration, “actuosity,” in 1677.27 But we must remember that Hegel uses this word in the Science of Logic after he has commented on Spinoza’s substance (WL

25 I wish to thank Claudio Cesa for calling my attention to this reference.
26 Compare Geraets, Suchting, Harris: “Where Hegel found this term, which he ascribes to the scholastics, is not clear. But it comes either from a history of philosophy or from his reading of von Baader, Boehme, and German mysticism. In his Philosophy of Religion lectures Hegel used it once only . . . ; and Jaeschke has no note on it” (EL 314).
27 These are two quotes reported by the Oxford English Dictionary (1987: 133) to illustrate the first English occurrences of “actuose” and “actuosity:” “Actuose . . . 1677, Gale, Crt. of Gentiles III, 22: ‘Energein, as applied to God, notes his actuose, efficacious and predetermine concurse in and with allthings.’” About “Actuosity . . . 1677, Gale Crt. of Gentiles, II, iv, 102: ‘What is life but the Actuositie of the Soul informing the bodie? and what more promotes this Actuositie than exercize?’”
2: 220, *SL* 556: “This movement of accidentality is the *actuosity* of substance as a *tranquil coming forth of itself*”). And what is important to recall in this connection is that the word *actuositas* is used by Spinoza, a philosopher deeply versed in modern scholasticism, when making a salient point in his characterization of the substance. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza writes that God’s potency is but its actuose essence (“*Dei potentiam nihil esse, praeterquam Dei actuosam essentiam*,” 2, prop. 3, Schol.; compare also 1, prop. 34). It is essential here to emphasize that for Spinoza God was not a passive but an active substance; and that, for Schelling, Spinoza stresses the objective-natural principle according to which the more we know the necessity of nature the more we approach God. In this framework, the finite has no existence when severed from the infinite. The Spinozism of the *Bruno* is thus what allows Schelling to merge the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of identity, and to find in nature the eternal, in being, God.

Compared to all this, Hegel’s similar statement “God is being” in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has a radically different meaning: the absolute cannot be identity and indifference, absence of relations, but must comprehend the concreteness of the history of consciousness and the process of the mediation of the self with itself, precisely what Hegel takes *energeia* to be. In other words, while the literal antecedent to Hegel’s use of actuosity is Spinoza and not directly Aristotle, at the same time Hegel understands the concept of actuosity as the active self-realization he associates with Aristotelian *energeia*.

Between 1800 and 1805 we cannot find any trace of a study of Aristotle on Schelling’s part. If we note the common interest in Spinoza, but must exclude a common interest in Aristotle on the part of Hegel and Schelling, then we must also, and more importantly, note that it is precisely in these years that Hegel begins to distance himself from Spinoza and Schelling and to discover the concept of subjective activity. It seems necessary to conclude that the notion of *energeia*, already read here as the self-realization of spirit (especially in the second *Realphilosophie*), affords the transition from the Spinozistic Absolute to the actuality of human consciousness, from the Platonic ideal dialectic to the historic reality of human life and action. This notion of subjective activity allows Hegel to transform the logic into a metaphysics of spirit, and to find in the organism and in the spiritual world the logic of life and of man’s theoretical and practical activity.28

Hegel’s reading of Aristotle and the overcoming of the purely negative dialectic of Plato in the development and realization of the absolute is thus instrumental for his criticism of Schelling’s philosophy of identity. In this sense I agree with Haym, who argues that in the Phenomenology Hegel criticizes Schelling by proceeding in Aristotelian fashion (“dass er ... zu aristotelisieren begann,” in Hegel, 1857: 225–6, Haym’s italics).

On the other hand, by contrast with the reading of Aristotle current among his contemporaries in the years when Hegel sets out the major lines of his definitive interpretation of Aristotle, one must emphasize the novelty and the originality of Hegel’s interpretation. True, Hegel may have assimilated many Aristotelian notions indirectly through a long tradition, from the textbooks he studied and the debates in which he took part. But there are two points that must be emphasized here. One is that, as I argue in Chapter 1, some Aristotelian concepts are often handed down to posterity as the material for debate, and on the basis of which subsequent philosophers would then differentiate their positions. For example, virtually everybody until Kant defines imagination in Aristotelian terms, from Chrysippus to Wolff. To conclude that Proclus’s commentary on Euclid, Descartes’s Rules, Spinoza’s Ethics, and Hobbes’s Leviathan (to name only a few instances that retrieve several crucial elements from Aristotle, down to the example of the misleading appearance of the width of the sun) are all Aristotelian is to condemn oneself to the blindness and shallow homogeneization of those who cannot see but similarities, where instead nominally similar concepts have undergone substantial and radical shifts in meaning.

The second point is that even if he was unwittingly subject to the cultural climate of his age on some points, in his interpretation of Aristotle Hegel never relied on any given communis opinio; rather, he invariably tried to give his own exegeses of what he was dealing with. I think that the autonomy of Hegel’s evolution must be valued and stressed along with his commitment to distance himself from the common interpretations of the philosophy of Aristotle, and thus to approach Aristotle directly. More than the continuity of a tradition, we should emphasize the break with it. When we are called to judge his interpretation, we must acknowledge his effort at first liberating himself, and later his students, from preconceived and prejudiced readings of ancient thought. Obviously, this holds first and foremost for Hegel’s in-

29 I have studied this history of the notion of imagination up to Kant in my “Productive Imagination” (1995) and in my forthcoming book on Kant and the imagination.
interpretation of *energeia* and the related reversal of the primacy of possibility over actuality asserted by Leibniz and Wolff.

Whether he bought the Erasmus edition because no other edition was available to him, as reported by Leutwein, or because he mistrusted all forms of Aristotelianism, Latin, or German, the novelty of his image of Aristotle in comparison with his contemporaries’ is striking.\(^{30}\) From Brucker’s *Historia critica* and *Institutiones* to Tennemann’s history of philosophy, to Buhle, Tiedemann, Stanley, and Ast, all major works in the history of philosophy are familiar to Hegel, who mentions them, and for various reasons deplores them all, in the Introduction to the History of Philosophy (*VGPh* 1: 132–36). By contrast, not only does Hegel introduce a radical innovation in the concept and methods of the history of philosophy,\(^{31}\) he also sets forth interpretations of Plato, Aristotle, and Neoplatonism, which are thoroughly new and original for his epoch.

I think we must conclude that if, until roughly 1804/5, Hegel accepts relatively current and mediated notions from the Aristotle of the traditions he was acquainted with, the original core of his interpretation assumes a definite and univocal structure and inner articulation when Hegel studies Aristotle in depth for his first course in the history of philosophy. In 1805, there are many meaningful changes in Hegel’s systematic conceptions, which are today well known. One of these changes is that, after writing the manuscript known as *Logik, Metaphysik und Naturphilosophie* (*JSE* II, 1804/5), for the first and only time Hegel does not announce a course in logic and metaphysics for the winter semester of 1805/6. He teaches the history of philosophy (and mathematics) instead.

In the 1804/5 version, the Logic was the system of sceptical reflection which was to annihilate Platonically the finite and pave the way to Metaphysics, which begins with the identity of being and thinking and is the *systema rationis*.\(^{32}\) The Logic had the function of introducing to true philosophy, the knowledge of the absolute. This relationship be-

\(^{30}\) According to Wieland, only because Hegel reads Aristotle in Greek “can he distinguish precisely between Aristotle and Aristotelianism” (*Physik*, 1962: 36, Wieland’s italics). As I think I have shown throughout the book, the reason why I disagree with Wieland is that Aristotelianism is more than a simple misunderstanding and *Verfälschung* of Aristotle (ibid.); often Hegel shares, most of the time unwittingly, previous commentators’ points. What cannot be disputed is that Hegel does agree with Wieland on the necessity to approach Aristotle directly and to mistrust Aristotelianism.


\(^{32}\) Compare Chiereghin, *Dialettica dell’assoluto* (1980: 180 ff.).
tween logic and metaphysics breaks down as Hegel’s conception of the absolute changes. Life and knowledge before 1804/5 fall within the domain of Realphilosophie only, and the concept of end has no decisive role to play in the Logic or in the Metaphysics. After 1805 the Concept is defined as entelechy, as the teleological realization of itself, as the mediation of life and reason. With the importance that the concept of end takes on after 1805, “Leben und Erkennen,” “Life and Knowledge” are no longer alien to the absolute but constitute the structure of the Logic, which is now the speculative theory of the diamond-net of the human world. And if in the 1803/4 Philosophy of Spirit the potencies of consciousness, the organization of its forms as middles (JSEI: 276), were the expression of an ethical system in which consciousness does not yet have the role of the autonomous bearer of its own development, in the 1805/6 Philosophy of Spirit the teleological essence of subjectivity which constitutes itself as the knowledge of itself in its other is more evident and closer to the mature conception. But more important is the fact that the systematic conception within which Hegel is thinking spirit has undergone a change that will never be reversed in his later philosophy: the new structure of the system is that of a Self, the absolute self-consciousness whose foundation is for the first time the concept of life.

In the Preface to the Phenomenology, right after valuing, by appeal to examples taken from the De anima, the mediation and becoming Schelling supposedly avoided, Hegel writes that “Reason is purposive activity” (W 3: 26, PhS 12). Hegel here has in mind Aristotle and natural teleology, and he mentions them three to four lines below. A further polemical jab at Schelling, who “looks disdainfully at determinateness (horos),” again pits Aristotle against Schelling; Aristotle is obviously the reference, but this time he is not explicitly mentioned. At the end of the Preface we also find the meaningful indication that the self-movement of the Concept was already alive in Neoplatonism. Neoplatonists considered Plato’s Parmenides “the true disclosure and positive expression of the divine life” and esteemed Aristotle’s philosophy “for its speculative depth” (W 3: 66, PhS 44). The context makes it very clear that here Hegel is following the thread of the interpretation of the nous which will structure his consideration of the nexus Metaphysics Λ 7–9–De anima III 4–5 in the later Lectures.

33 Compare Pöggeler, Hegels Idee (1973: 164 ff.).
34 Compare Horstmann, “Probleme der Wandlung” (1972: 114 ff.); Düsing, Problem der Subjektivität (1976: 156 ff.).
If this is the first occurrence in Hegel of the consideration of Aristotle as the first great Neoplatonist, and if we recall that the study of Neoplatonism and of Aristotle are carried out by Hegel at the same time in his preparation for the Jena course in the history of philosophy, then we have a framework within which the relation zôê–noêsis noêsêôs (Met. Λ 7, 1072b 27), the life of God and thought thinking itself, become the essential traits of the new conception of the Absolute. What we have, in other words, is a framework in which the *energeia* of a Neoplatonic Aristotle (in view of Enneads V 5, 2, 11–12; 6, 6, 20–2), transformed into the self-realization of spirit, helps promote the understanding of the Logic of life as Idea and as the immediate existence of reason. This is thus at the root of the metaphysical conception of logic operative after 1805.

If I advance this as a conjecture on Hegel’s development in Jena which I find quite plausible in light of what I have argued so far, what is not a conjecture is the important consequences of this relation finite/infinite for the future development of Hegel’s philosophy, from God’s manifestation in the human historical world to a Subjective Logic which is run through by the concept of telos grounding the identity of subject and object. Obviously, it is not a matter of saying that, given Hegel’s mature judgment on the *De anima*, the 1805/06 *Realphilosophie* is also shaped around Aristotelian lines, for neither the Philosophy of Spirit of the 1805/6 system nor the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit of the *Encyclopædia* is a mere retrieval of Aristotle. Rather, what I believe to be not far-fetched but helpful in shedding light on this essential transition in Hegel’s thinking is his discovery of Aristotelian teleology and subjectivity. I am not saying that Aristotle is responsible for Hegel’s crisis in 1805/6, or that he gives Hegel the new concept of the Absolute, compelling him to rethink the concepts of teleology and life, which since the time of the Early Theological Writings were alien to thinking and until 1804/5 were alien to the *Logic*. What I am saying is that the way Hegel interprets the Aristotelian *energeia* shows that he has now found what he had been looking for, the new concept of purposive reason and the connection of life and reason. To avoid misunderstandings, let me stress once again that we cannot but agree with Hegel when he says that nothing speaks to us unless we are predisposed to hear it.

Even if it is often biased in its presuppositions and misguided in its conclusions, the importance of Hegel’s interpretation for our reading of Aristotle is great, and his work to this effect is fundamental. As he put

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35 This criticism was recently voiced by Tuschling, “Die Idee” (1991: 552).
it, nothing would be more interesting than to devote a whole course to Aristotle, because “no other philosopher has been so much neglected by the moderns, and to no other ancient philosopher do we owe as much reparation” (VGPh 242). We have precious little information about Hegel’s relations with people like Bekker, who was his colleague in Berlin, or with Bonitz; and we cannot tell what he thought about the philological work that was being carried out during his lifetime on a critical edition of Aristotle’s corpus. But it is doubtless that Hegel contributed, in the influence of his philosophy and the example of his study of Aristotle’s texts, to the subversion of many run-of-the-mill commonplaces surrounding Aristotle’s philosophy, bringing it back to life after centuries of oblivion, occasional piecemeal exploitation, or passive reception.
In a time when the sheer bibliography including only 20th-century works on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* constitutes a book in its own right (R. Radice, *La Metafisica di Aristotele nel XX secolo, Bibliografia ragionata e sistematica*, Milano 1996), the present bibliography cannot aim at any form of completeness or systematic comprehensiveness. I have included only those works on either Hegel or Aristotle to which a reference was relevant or instrumental for my own discussion.

However, I have made my best efforts to take into account and hereafter list all works on the relation between Hegel and Aristotle in the languages I know. For a survey and discussion of the existing literature on Hegel’s relation to Aristotle, see the works cited in the Introduction, n. 18.

Unless otherwise noted, all literature is cited by reference to the *original* sources and date of publication. Quotes and page numbers are from English *translations* whenever the translation is listed in this bibliography.


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